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  • Jonathan Ross on Groq’s $20 Billion NVIDIA Deal, Faster Inference, and Why Asking the Right Questions Wins the AI Age

    Jonathan Ross, the founder of Groq and the inventor of Google’s Tensor Processing Unit (TPU), sits down with David Senra (host of the Founders podcast) to walk through Groq’s roughly $20 billion partnership with NVIDIA and the decade of near-death struggle that preceded it. You can watch the full conversation here. Ross, now a senior executive at NVIDIA following the deal, is unusually candid about being one of the world’s worst leaders when he started, about coming three weeks from running out of money, and about the single contrarian bet (that faster inference would make AI both faster and smarter) that almost everyone, including his own engineers, told him was pointless.

    TLDW

    Ross explains the structure of the NVIDIA deal (a call to Jensen Huang about buying 100,000 GPUs turned, in three weeks, into NVIDIA’s largest deal by nearly 3x) and why pairing Groq’s LPU with the GPU defeats the many different bottlenecks inside an LLM the way you would use both 18-wheelers and delivery vans in a logistics network. He unpacks the AlphaGo moment that revealed faster inference makes models smarter, the shift from the information age (answering questions) to the AI age (asking the right questions), and a leadership philosophy built on autonomy, one brutally clear priority (25 million tokens per second on a challenge coin), and giving people the fewest constraints so they can surprise you. He shares hard-won lessons from Jensen and NVIDIA (the least political large org he has seen, no secret one-on-ones), his concepts of reality quotient and the dominant game, return on luck and the GitHub opportunity he let his team talk him out of, intentional leadership (“I intend to do this”), the Grok bonds that traded salary for equity and saved the company, hiring for negatives instead of positives, loss bias and manufactured discontent, and a closing case for radical optimism: code is becoming free, software creation is being democratized like literacy, and education should stop teaching kids to answer questions and start teaching them to ask.

    Thoughts

    The technical spine of this interview is a genuinely counterintuitive claim: you can make a model smarter by making it faster. Ross’s proof is the AlphaGo anecdote, where the exact same model, ported from GPUs to his TPU, saw its ELO jump by hundreds of points and beat the world champion, because more compute per unit of time let it search deeper and surface moves like the famous Move 37 that were too far down the tree to find otherwise. Once you internalize that inference speed is not a convenience but a capability multiplier, the entire Groq thesis, and the logic of the NVIDIA deal, snaps into focus. The industry spent years treating fast inference as a nice-to-have. Ross treated it as the whole game, and was nearly alone in doing so for a very long time.

    The most transferable material is the leadership arc, precisely because Ross is willing to say he was bad at it. His core insight is that there is no single correct way to lead, any more than there is one way to invest, and the founder’s first job is to know which way is true to them. Ross is a delegator who hires autonomous people and gives them a single, poetically compressed objective, then gets out of the way. The reason that matters is subtle: if you over-constrain the goal, your team can never surprise you with a better answer than the one you already had, which means they can never actually innovate. The Kelly Johnson line Senra offers (“extreme performance often comes from one brutally clear priority”) is the same idea from the Skunk Works side. A challenge coin that reads “25 million tokens per second” is not a slogan, it is a mechanism that lets every engineer connect their work to one dominant game.

    Two ideas deserve to be lifted out and used directly. The first is intentional leadership, borrowed from David Marquet’s submarine turnaround: replace “should I do this?” with “I intend to do this.” Asking for opinions invites pessimism and hands your most timid people a veto. Declaring intent still lets someone shout “the hatch is open” when it truly matters, but it stops the reflexive no. Ross traces years of stalled progress to the simple error of asking instead of declaring. The second is his inversion of hiring: hire for negatives, not positives. Growing talent means showing people the path, so you emphasize positives. Selecting talent means screening people out, so you hunt for the disqualifying negatives, because one person’s negative trait infects the whole team. Most founders, Ross included for years, are clever enough to talk themselves into any candidate. A versioned “people spec” and a deliberate loss-averse posture are the antidote.

    The Grok bonds story is the emotional center and a small masterpiece of change management. Facing a layoff list that would have killed the company (because the people slated to be cut were exactly the ones needed to make the product work at all), Ross instead asked the team to trade salary for equity, framed with World War II war-bond imagery. Eighty percent participated, half went to statutory minimum wage, and attrition actually fell. His phrase for why is “put everyone’s hands on the steering wheel.” Passengers fear a windy road, drivers feel in control. It is a reminder that morale under existential stress is often a function of agency, not comfort, and that the Phil Knight move of converting employee sacrifice into ownership is a recurring pattern in company survival stories for a reason.

    Where the conversation turns almost spiritual is manufactured discontent. Ross observes that the entrepreneurs in a room of successful people were the least happy with their wealth, and that this very dissatisfaction was the fuel that kept them building. His own current discontent is stark and worth sitting with: the world does not have enough compute, and if it takes an extra year to cure cancer or slow aging because of that shortage, he considers it his fault. Whether or not you accept the moral weight he assigns himself, the mechanism is instructive. Edwin Land wrote “300 people died today” on the whiteboard while inventing anti-glare technology. A concrete, human cost attached to delay is a far more durable motivator than a revenue target. Paired with his closing optimism about code becoming free and software creation democratizing like literacy, it makes for one of the more clear-eyed and yet hopeful founder conversations in recent memory.

    Key Takeaways

    • The NVIDIA deal began as a request to buy about 100,000 GPUs; Jensen saw what Groq had built pairing GPUs and LPUs and decided to make it available to all NVIDIA customers, closing what Ross calls the firm’s biggest deal by nearly 3x in roughly three weeks from first call to wired money.
    • GPUs and LPUs are complementary: inside an LLM’s decoder layer, the GPU is better at the compute-bound attention portion and the LPU is better at the memory-throughput-bound weights, so combining them defeats bottlenecks across the whole performance curve, like using both 18-wheelers and last-mile vans.
    • As AI increasingly talks to AI, speed dominates, because agents kick off other agents and compound; a human tolerates a one-second wait, but AI is just sitting there idle.
    • Agentic micro payments will make the number of payments skyrocket, but payments infrastructure is not yet built for AI operating inside an allocated budget.
    • Ross prototypes cutting-edge ideas as personal hobby projects first, then brings them to work; his personalized “daily brief” evolved from long text into headlines he can interrogate with follow-up questions, like the game of 20 questions.
    • The information age rewarded answering questions; the AI age rewards asking the right ones, as everyone shifts from individual contributor to leader of AI, and good leaders ask the question no one else did.
    • There is no single right way to lead, just as there are many ways to invest; the founder’s job is to know themselves and pick the leadership form that is true to them (inspiration versus fear, control versus delegation).
    • Ross was, by his own account, one of the world’s worst leaders at the start, which cost Groq three to four years; his fix was to define one goal simple enough to fit on a challenge coin: 25 million tokens per second.
    • The fewer constraints you give a person (or an AI agent), the more freedom they have to surprise you with a better solution; over-constraining the goal makes real innovation impossible.
    • Lessons from Jensen and NVIDIA: it is the least political large organization Ross has seen, Jensen never runs secret one-on-ones (tell everyone at once, copy everyone on email), and the whole strategy reduces to “what does the customer actually need?”
    • Jensen manages around 60 direct reports, each smarter than him in their own domain, which he offers as the model for orchestrating AI agents that may be smarter than you.
    • Asking a sharp question that makes an expert say “I didn’t think of that” is a universal founder skill (it appears in every Bezos book) and can be honed.
    • Confidence, not competence, was Ross’s early bottleneck: shadowing a leader of 2,000 people, he realized he would have made the same decisions, and acting with confidence made people follow his direction without changing the decisions themselves.
    • The better and more creative your people, the harder they are to manage; running 450 highly creative scientists felt more like managing 5,000.
    • Reality quotient (RQ), distinct from IQ, is the ability to recognize reality and, in its extreme form, to choose the dominant game; MySpace optimized accounts signed up while Facebook optimized monthly active users and won.
    • The first principle of change management is to make it feel like it is not a change; people who seem fine with change are usually anchored to something that did not change.
    • Return on luck (from Jim Collins): the most successful companies do not get more lucky breaks, they seize the ones they get; Ross let his team talk him out of powering GitHub’s LLMs on Groq chips, then vowed never again.
    • People adopt fast inference only when they experience it personally; an Anthropic demo three months before ChatGPT drew no reaction because the answers were not the audience’s own, and Groq later went viral off a fast-LLM video posted on X.
    • Great innovators often experience a problem before others do; the future is already here, just not evenly distributed, and Ross saw fast inference’s value first because of AlphaGo.
    • Intentional leadership (from David Marquet’s USS Santa Fe turnaround): say “I intend to do this” instead of asking for an opinion, which stops reflexive pessimism while still letting people flag a real problem.
    • Grok bonds: three weeks from running out of money, Ross swapped a layoff for a war-bond-style salary-for-equity exchange; 80% participated, about half took statutory minimum wage, and it bought roughly two months of runway.
    • “Put everyone’s hands on the steering wheel”: participation in saving the company cut attrition to under 10% during the crisis, echoing Phil Knight converting employee loans into Nike equity.
    • West Coast VCs behave like lemmings (one pass triggers all passes), while East Coast VCs run independent analysis; the herd missed what became NVIDIA’s biggest deal ever, a live example of the Keynesian beauty contest.
    • For the first time, top startups are not starved for cash, so putting in more money is no longer an advantage even though investors still behave as if it is.
    • Hiring flip: move from hiring for positives (how you grow talent) to hiring for negatives (how you select talent), because one negative trait poisons the team; write a versioned “people spec” like a product spec.
    • Loss bias (a loss feels roughly six times more painful than an equal gain) can be a hiring signal: Ross looks for people who “book the win early,” treating any missed improvement as a loss.
    • Poetic design (maximum meaning in minimal expression, “every word matters”) was a positive on the people spec; its negative is maximalist, cluttered design.
    • Michael Jordan manufactured pressure by taunting opponents so a loss would be humiliating, forcing superhuman performance (per his trainer Tim Grover), a deliberate version of throwing your keys over the fence.
    • Manufactured discontent (David Ogilvy’s “divine discontent”): the best entrepreneurs never rest on wins; the least happy people with their wealth were the ones who kept building.
    • Ross’s discontent today is the world’s lack of compute; he treats every delayed medical breakthrough as partly his responsibility, the way Edwin Land wrote a daily death count on the whiteboard while fighting headlight glare.
    • Software has run on “code rationing” because code was expensive to write, enforced by “no engineers”; as the marginal cost of code approaches zero, you just implement, experience, and re-implement.
    • AI democratizes software creation like the alphabet democratized literacy: Ross’s executive assistant now builds working apps, and individual founders with taste but no coding background will create valuable companies.
    • Education should be revamped around asking questions and solving real community problems; if a kid can look up or prompt the answer, the assignment taught nothing, but making them ask the right questions to get AI to solve a real problem does.

    Detailed Summary

    The $20 Billion NVIDIA Deal and Why LPUs and GPUs Belong Together

    The deal’s most striking feature is speed: the idea was first floated on a call roughly three weeks before the money was in the bank. Groq had been integrating GPUs and LPUs and went to Jensen Huang wanting to buy about 100,000 GPUs to deploy themselves. Jensen saw the combined system and decided it should be offered to all of NVIDIA’s customers. The technical logic is that processing an LLM token involves many matrix multiplies with different bottlenecks, some compute-constrained (better on the GPU, especially the attention portion) and some memory-throughput-constrained (better on the LPU, applying the trained weights). There is no single perfect architecture, so putting the two together defeats bottlenecks across the whole curve. Ross adds that as AI talks to AI, speed becomes everything, because agents spawn agents and compound exponentially.

    Asking Questions, Daily Briefs, and the Shift to Leading AI

    Ross builds cutting-edge tools as personal hobby projects before bringing them to work, including a personalized “daily brief” that functions like a presidential daily brief. He redesigned it from long text into headlines he can interrogate, because interactivity, like 20 questions, distills straight to what you actually care about. This grounds one of his signature ideas: success in the information age meant answering questions, but success in the AI age means asking the right questions. As people move from individual contributors to leaders of AI, the skill that matters is the leader’s skill of asking the question everyone else missed or was afraid to raise, since the question you ask determines the output you get.

    Knowing Your Leadership Style and the Challenge Coin

    Ross frames leadership like investing: the first principle is simply having followers, but there are infinite valid styles. New founders fail by copying advice that is not true to them. Ross is a natural delegator (he has not held a driver’s license since his teens because he would rather think than control the car) who hires unusually autonomous people. Early on this backfired badly, because he entrusted people who needed direction, and he calls himself one of the world’s worst early leaders, a gap that cost Groq years. His breakthrough was distilling the mission onto a challenge coin reading “25 million tokens per second,” which let everyone connect their work to one dominant game. He references David Marquet’s Turn the Ship Around later, but the coin embodies Kelly Johnson’s Skunk Works principle that extreme performance comes from one brutally clear priority, plus the rule that fewer constraints give people more room to surprise you, turning a team from Superman into the Avengers.

    Lessons from Jensen: Killing Politics and Serving the Customer

    Working at NVIDIA taught Ross how much further he could have pushed lessons he half-learned at Groq. NVIDIA is, in his experience, the least political large organization anywhere, and a big reason is that Jensen never tells different people different things in private one-on-ones. When you address a room, everyone hears the same message; separate conversations breed side cliques. Ross’s practical rules: hold big meetings for anything you want a group to know, and copy everyone on email so no one can route politics through you. The other Jensen lesson is to stop playing 3D chess and just ask what the customer needs, tell them only what you believe and can support, and refuse to sell them something they do not need. Senra notes he has covered roughly 19 ideas from The Nvidia Way on his Founders podcast, and Jensen’s line that he already manages 60 reports smarter than him is the template for managing AI agents.

    Reality Quotient, the Dominant Game, and Change Management

    Groq hired for reality quotient, not just IQ, because plenty of very smart people construct elaborate stories disconnected from reality. In its extreme form, RQ is the ability to choose the dominant game, the way Facebook’s focus on monthly active users beat MySpace’s focus on accounts signed up. The founder’s job is to help everyone connect their activity to that dominant game (for Groq, tokens per second), then manage the change. Ross’s first principle of change management is to make it feel like it is not a change: nobody likes change, and people who tolerate it well are usually focused on something that stayed constant. If your team is anchored to the dominant goal, a new tactic does not feel like change; if they are anchored to a narrow task, it does.

    Return on Luck, the AlphaGo Insight, and the GitHub Miss

    From Jim Collins’s Great by Choice, Ross took the idea that winners seize luck better, not that they get more of it. He experienced it first-hand with AlphaGo: after a DeepMind team asked whether his TPU was as fast as rumored (he said yes, Ghostbusters-style), porting the identical model from GPUs to TPUs pushed its ELO from around 3,200 to roughly 3,900 and it crushed the world champion. As Thinking Fast and Slow by Daniel Kahneman frames it, more compute lets the model virtually play out more moves and occasionally find a better second-best line, which is how the famous Move 37 surfaced. Faster thinking is smarter thinking. Yet Ross also let his own engineers talk him out of powering GitHub’s LLMs on Groq chips, twice, because they focused on why it could not be done rather than why it could. He eventually did the math himself, hit the numbers, and learned to stop inviting that pessimism.

    Selling Speed and Intentional Leadership

    Customers could not grasp fast inference until they felt it. Ross recalls an Anthropic demo three months before ChatGPT that drew no reaction, because seeing someone else’s answer appear is not magical, but getting your own question answered instantly is. So Groq simply put fast inference online, and it went viral after someone posted a video of a blazing-fast LLM on X (Ross noticed his own demo slowing in Norway because usage had skyrocketed). The deeper fix for internal resistance came from Turn the Ship Around, David Marquet’s account of turning the USS Santa Fe from worst to best in nuclear readiness by replacing command-and-control with intentional leadership. Saying “I intend to do this” rather than “should I?” stops people from reflexively supplying negative opinions, while still letting someone shout “the hatch is open” when there is a genuine problem.

    Grok Bonds: Three Weeks From Zero

    With three weeks of cash left and a layoff list on the table, Ross realized the cuts targeted exactly the people needed to finish an unprecedented compiler and reach the critical mass where the product would even work. Layoffs would not save the company; only reducing burn without losing people could. So Groq held an all-hands, put up World War II war-bond imagery, and launched “Grok bonds,” an exchange of salary for equity. Ross expected heavy attrition; instead 80% participated and about half dropped to statutory minimum wage, real pain for engineers used to six-figure salaries. It bought closer to two months of runway. His framing, “put everyone’s hands on the steering wheel,” explains why attrition actually fell below 10%: drivers feel more in control than passengers, and it echoes Phil Knight in Shoe Dog converting employee loans into Nike equity on the edge of collapse.

    Hiring for Negatives, Loss Bias, and Manufactured Discontent

    Ross was good at spotting smart, talented people but kept hiring ones who caused organizational problems, because he could always talk himself into a candidate. Watching a sharp head of HR screen people out, he realized he had been hiring wrong: growing talent means showing positives, but selecting talent means hunting for disqualifying negatives, since one bad trait spreads to the whole team. He formalized a versioned “people spec” with positives like return on luck and poetic design, each paired with a negative. He also hired for loss bias, the fact that a loss feels roughly six times more painful than an equal gain, seeking people who “book the win early.” That competitive, pressure-seeking wiring links to Michael Jordan manufacturing humiliation stakes (per Tim Grover in Relentless) and to David Ogilvy’s divine discontent. Ross’s own manufactured discontent today is the world’s shortage of compute, which he frames in life-and-death terms.

    The Optimistic Close: Free Code and Universal Software Literacy

    Ross ends on aggressive optimism. Software has long run on “code rationing” because code was expensive to write, policed by “no engineers” whose job is to say no. As the marginal cost of code approaches zero, the workflow flips to implement, experience, then re-implement. More important is accessibility: just as alphabets and universal education turned reading and writing from a scribe’s monopoly into a question of quality, AI is making software creation universal. His executive assistant now builds working apps, and a wave of individual founders with taste but no coding background will create valuable companies. The corollary for education is to stop teaching kids to answer questions and start teaching them to ask, revamping curricula around real community problems where the point is asking the right questions to get AI to solve something that matters.

    Notable Quotes

    “Success in the information age was about being able to answer questions. Success in the AI age will be about being able to ask the right questions.”

    Jonathan Ross, on the fundamental shift AI creates

    “The fewer constraints that you give someone, the more freedom they have to solve the problem, and the more freedom they have to surprise you with the solution.”

    Jonathan Ross, on leading creative teams

    “Being able to think faster makes you think smarter.”

    Jonathan Ross, on why faster inference produces more capable models

    “There are plenty of really smart people who wouldn’t recognize reality if it tapped them on the shoulder.”

    Jonathan Ross, defining reality quotient versus IQ

    “If you express intentional leadership, you say, ‘I intend to do this.’ People don’t tend to offer their opinion, but if it’s very wrong and there’s a reason, they will push back.”

    Jonathan Ross, on the lesson from Turn the Ship Around

    “When people are passengers in a car, they’re more nervous about a windy road or a scary road. But when they’re the driver, they feel more in control.”

    Jonathan Ross, on why Grok bonds kept the team together

    “The biggest flip in my hiring was when I went from looking for positives, which is what you do when you’re trying to grow talent, to looking for negatives, which is what you do when you’re trying to select talent.”

    Jonathan Ross, on inverting his approach to hiring

    “If it takes us an extra year to cure cancer because we don’t have enough compute, that’s my fault.”

    Jonathan Ross, on the discontent that drives him today

    Watch the full conversation between Jonathan Ross and David Senra here on YouTube.

    Related Reading

    • Groq the company Ross founded and the LPU behind the fast-inference story and the NVIDIA partnership.
    • AlphaGo versus Lee Sedol (Wikipedia) the match, including Move 37, that showed Ross how much faster hardware raises a model’s capability.
    • The Keynesian Beauty Contest (Wikipedia) the dynamic Ross uses to explain why West Coast VCs herded past what became NVIDIA’s biggest deal.
    • Zero to One by Peter Thiel, the source of the first-principles thinking Ross applied to the contrarian bet on fast inference.
    • Founders podcast by David Senra the host’s biography-driven show, source of the Jensen, Michael Jordan, and Edwin Land ideas referenced throughout.

  • OpenAI’s Leaked 2025 Financials: $34 Billion in Spending, a $38.5 Billion Net Loss, and a $17 Billion Microsoft Bill Ahead of Its IPO

    Infographic summarizing OpenAI leaked 2025 financials: $13.07B revenue, $34B total costs, $20.92B operating loss, $38.53B net loss, where the $34B went, the $17.2B paid to Microsoft versus $303M paid back, inference costs, and IPO valuation context

    OpenAI’s audited 2025 financials leaked this week, and they are the clearest picture yet of what it actually costs to run the company behind ChatGPT. Independent journalist Ed Zitron first published the documents, and the Financial Times independently confirmed them. The headline: OpenAI spent $34 billion last year, booked $13.07 billion in revenue, and reported a net loss attributable to the company of $38.5 billion. The disclosure lands just days after OpenAI confidentially filed for an IPO that could value it north of $1 trillion.

    TLDR

    OpenAI’s audited 2025 numbers, leaked by Ed Zitron and confirmed by the Financial Times, show revenue tripling to $13.07 billion while total costs reached $34 billion, producing a $20.92 billion operating loss and a $38.53 billion net loss attributable to the company. The much larger net loss is inflated by a one-time $41.55 billion non-cash charge tied to OpenAI’s October 2025 conversion from a nonprofit to a public benefit corporation; strip the non-cash items and the loss is closer to $8 billion. R&D alone was $19.18 billion, cost of revenue (inference) was $7.5 billion, and sales and marketing ballooned to $5.73 billion. OpenAI paid Microsoft $17.2 billion in 2025 while Microsoft paid OpenAI only $303 million, exposing a deep Azure dependency. The company burned $1.60 for every dollar of revenue, down from $2.37 in 2024, and gross margin slipped from roughly 40% to 33% as more capable models consumed more compute per query. The leak arrives as OpenAI files a confidential S-1, targets a listing as early as September 2026 at up to a $1 trillion valuation, and races rival Anthropic, which is more valuable on paper and claims it is already turning an operating profit.

    Thoughts

    The most important thing to understand about these numbers is that there are two loss figures and the press will conflate them. The $38.53 billion net loss is the scary headline, but $41.55 billion of it is a non-cash accounting charge from converting investor convertible interests into equity during the for-profit restructuring. That charge is real on the audited statement and it will show up in the eventual S-1, but it is a one-time artifact of OpenAI’s unusual corporate history, not money that left the building. The number that describes the actual business is the $20.92 billion operating loss. That is the one to watch, and it is still enormous.

    The genuinely encouraging line in the whole release is the loss-per-dollar ratio. In 2024 OpenAI spent $2.37 to generate a dollar of revenue. In 2025 that fell to $1.60. A company that is still losing $1.60 on every dollar is not a healthy business, but a company whose efficiency improved by a third in a single year while tripling its top line is at least pointed in a defensible direction. The bull case for OpenAI lives entirely in the slope of that line. If it keeps improving at that rate, the math eventually crosses over. If it stalls, the valuation is a fantasy.

    The Microsoft relationship is the single most revealing disclosure, and it is wildly asymmetric. OpenAI paid Microsoft $17.2 billion in 2025. Microsoft paid OpenAI $303 million. That is a 56-to-1 ratio, and it reframes the partnership: Microsoft is not really a peer or even just an investor, it is OpenAI’s landlord and primary supplier, collecting rent on every model trained and every query answered. The April 2026 renegotiation that capped revenue-share payments at $38 billion through 2030, down from a projected $135 billion, suddenly looks less like a favor and more like OpenAI desperately trying to lower its single largest cost. The dependency cuts both ways, but right now Microsoft holds the better hand.

    The structural problem hiding inside the cost of revenue line is inference. Training a model is a fixed, one-time cost. Serving it is a recurring cost that scales with every one of ChatGPT’s roughly 800 million weekly users. OpenAI spent $5.02 billion on Azure inference in the first half of 2025 alone, and the more capable its reasoning models get, the more compute each answer burns. That is why gross margin went down even as revenue went up. It is the opposite of how software is supposed to work, where the marginal cost of one more user trends toward zero. OpenAI’s marginal cost is real, large, and growing. The counterargument is that per-token inference costs have been falling roughly tenfold a year, so the unit economics could still flip. That is the entire wager.

    Finally, the timing matters more than the numbers. OpenAI’s confidential S-1 means these audited figures were going to become public regardless, since the SEC requires the full prospectus at least 15 days before a roadshow. What the leak changes is who gets to study them first. Prospective IPO buyers, enterprise customers signing multi-year API contracts, and competitors now have the audited books weeks or months early, and they are reading them against Anthropic, which filed at a higher valuation and claims an operating profit. For a company asking the public markets to underwrite a $1 trillion bet on a monopoly outcome that does not yet exist, losing control of the narrative this early is not a small thing.

    Key Takeaways

    • OpenAI’s audited 2025 financials were first published by independent journalist Ed Zitron and independently confirmed by the Financial Times, the first verified look at the company’s books before its planned IPO.
    • Revenue grew from $3.7 billion in 2024 to $13.07 billion in 2025, more than tripling year over year, making OpenAI one of the fastest-growing businesses in history.
    • By the end of 2025 OpenAI was generating roughly $2 billion in monthly revenue, up from about $1 billion a quarter at the end of 2024.
    • Total costs and expenses hit $34 billion in 2025, up from $12.48 billion in 2024.
    • Research and development was the single largest expense at $19.18 billion, up from $7.81 billion, and exceeded total revenue on its own.
    • Of that R&D spend, $10.59 billion went to Microsoft, almost certainly the GPU compute cost of training frontier models on Azure.
    • Cost of revenue, the expense of serving ChatGPT responses (inference), rose from $2.65 billion to $7.5 billion.
    • Sales and marketing jumped from $1.11 billion to $5.73 billion, a 418% increase.
    • General and administrative costs rose from $907 million to $1.57 billion.
    • The operating loss, the truest measure of day-to-day economics, grew from $8.78 billion to $20.92 billion.
    • The net loss attributable to OpenAI was $38.53 billion, up nearly eightfold from $5.09 billion in 2024.
    • The bulk of that jump was a one-time, non-cash $41.55 billion charge from OpenAI’s October 28, 2025 conversion to a public benefit corporation, reflecting the changing fair value of convertible interests and warrant liabilities.
    • Stripping out the restructuring charge and other non-cash items such as stock-based compensation and Microsoft computing credits, the underlying loss was about $8 billion.
    • Including all factors, gross net loss reached $60.35 billion, lowered to the $38.53 billion attributable figure by removing $21.82 billion attributed to noncontrolling and redeemable noncontrolling interests.
    • OpenAI burned $1.60 for every $1 of revenue in 2025, an improvement from $2.37 in 2024, the clearest data point in the bull case.
    • Measured as a percentage of revenue, the operating loss improved from 237% in 2024 to 160% in 2025.
    • In total, OpenAI paid Microsoft $17.2 billion in 2025: $10.59 billion in R&D fees, $6.047 billion in cost of revenue, $527 million in sales and marketing, and $42 million in G&A.
    • Microsoft paid OpenAI just $303 million in the same year, a 56-to-1 imbalance underscoring OpenAI’s Azure dependency.
    • SoftBank paid OpenAI $867 million in 2025.
    • At year-end OpenAI carried $3.64 billion in outstanding payables to Microsoft, plus tens of millions more in accrued and non-current liabilities.
    • OpenAI spent $5.02 billion on Azure inference in just the first half of 2025; Azure inference from 2024 through Q3 2025 totaled $12.43 billion.
    • ChatGPT serves roughly 800 million weekly users, meaning billions of queries a week, each one burning GPU time at Azure’s pricing of about $6.98 per H100 GPU-hour.
    • Gross margin fell from roughly 40% in 2024 to 33% in 2025, because more capable reasoning models consume more compute per query.
    • Research firm Sacra estimates OpenAI’s inference costs reached $8.4 billion in 2025 and will rise to $14.1 billion in 2026, a 68% increase.
    • At year-end OpenAI held just over $50 billion in assets, with almost half in cash.
    • The April 2026 Microsoft renegotiation ended exclusivity and capped revenue-share payments at $38 billion through 2030, down from a projected $135 billion, potentially saving OpenAI up to $97 billion over five years.
    • OpenAI filed a confidential draft S-1 with the SEC around May 22, 2026 and confirmed it publicly on June 8, naming Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley as underwriters.
    • The company is targeting a listing as early as September 2026 at a valuation that could exceed $1 trillion, though Sam Altman has said a public offering “may be a while.”
    • OpenAI raised $122 billion earlier in 2026 at a $730 billion pre-money valuation, putting its post-money value around $852 billion.
    • At an $852 billion valuation, OpenAI trades at roughly 65 times its 2025 revenue.
    • Rival Anthropic also filed IPO paperwork this month after raising $65 billion at a $900-$965 billion valuation, making it more valuable on paper than OpenAI, and says it expects to report an operating profit of $559 million in the June quarter.
    • HSBC analysts estimate OpenAI may need more than $207 billion in additional capital through 2030 even under optimistic projections.
    • OpenAI projects profitability by 2029 or 2030; independent analysts put the more likely date at 2031 or later.
    • Bridgewater partner Greg Jensen reportedly told clients the implied revenue multiples price OpenAI for “a monopoly outcome that does not yet exist.”
    • Zitron separately reported OpenAI had a negative 122% non-GAAP operating margin in Q1 2026 and that ChatGPT growth has stalled, with the company projecting paid ChatGPT Plus subscriptions to fall from 44 million in 2025 toward cheaper tiers in 2026.

    Detailed Summary

    How the leak happened and why it matters now

    The audited documents were obtained and first published by Ed Zitron on his newsletter Where’s Your Ed At, then independently verified by the Financial Times, which reviewed the same materials. That dual sourcing matters: this is not a rumor or a model, it is OpenAI’s actual audited financial statement. The timing is the story. OpenAI filed a confidential draft S-1 with the SEC around May 22, 2026 and confirmed it publicly on June 8. Under SEC rules the full prospectus must be released at least 15 days before an investor roadshow, so the 2025 numbers were going to be public soon regardless. The leak simply moved that disclosure forward, handing prospective investors, enterprise customers, and competitors an early look at the books.

    Revenue tripled, costs grew faster

    OpenAI’s revenue rose from $3.7 billion in 2024 to $13.07 billion in 2025, and monthly revenue reached nearly $2 billion by year-end. By almost any normal standard that is spectacular growth. The problem is that costs grew faster, reaching $34 billion against $12.48 billion the year before. The gap between what OpenAI earns and what it spends has widened every year since its founding, and 2025 is the starkest example yet. Revenue alone was outpaced by research and development as a single line item in both of the last two years.

    Two loss numbers, and why both matter

    There are two figures that get cited interchangeably and should not be. The operating loss of $20.92 billion is what the business spent beyond what it earned from operations: training models, serving ChatGPT, paying engineers, running marketing. The net loss attributable to OpenAI of $38.53 billion is far larger because 2025 was the year OpenAI completed its conversion from a nonprofit to a for-profit public benefit corporation, finalized on October 28, 2025. That restructuring triggered a $41.55 billion non-cash charge reflecting the changing fair value of convertible equity interests and warrant liabilities. Before the conversion, investors held convertible interest rights treated as liabilities under US accounting rules and revalued upward as OpenAI’s valuation climbed, creating the charge. It is not expected to recur. Including all minor items, gross net loss reached $60.35 billion, reduced to the $38.53 billion attributable figure after removing $21.82 billion tied to noncontrolling and redeemable noncontrolling interests, primarily the OpenAI Foundation’s stake. Strip the non-cash noise and the underlying loss was about $8 billion.

    Where the $34 billion went

    The spending breaks into four lines. Research and development was $19.18 billion, the largest category, with $10.59 billion of it flowing to Microsoft for training compute. Cost of revenue, the expense of serving responses to users, was $7.5 billion and captures inference, the compute consumed every time someone prompts ChatGPT or calls the API. Sales and marketing reached $5.73 billion, up 418% year over year, a striking jump for a product that grew largely by word of mouth. General and administrative costs added $1.57 billion. The shape of the spending tells you OpenAI is simultaneously racing to build better models, serve a massive and growing user base, and aggressively defend market share through marketing.

    The Microsoft dependency

    The most striking single disclosure is the scale of the Microsoft relationship. OpenAI paid Microsoft $17.2 billion in 2025: $10.59 billion in R&D fees for model training, $6.047 billion in cost-of-revenue for inference serving, $527 million in sales and marketing, and $42 million in G&A. Microsoft paid OpenAI just $303 million the same year. SoftBank paid OpenAI $867 million. The 56-to-1 ratio between what OpenAI pays Microsoft and what Microsoft pays back makes the structural reality plain: Microsoft is OpenAI’s largest landlord. The dynamic began shifting in April 2026, when the two renegotiated, ending Microsoft’s exclusivity and capping revenue-share payments at $38 billion through 2030, down from a projected $135 billion. That could save OpenAI up to $97 billion over five years, though Microsoft keeps its IP license through 2032 and remains the primary cloud partner.

    Why inference is the core problem

    Training happens once. Serving happens billions of times a day. When OpenAI releases a model it spends months and billions on training compute, a fixed cost that falls away when training ends. Inference is the opposite: every ChatGPT message runs through the model on Azure GPU hardware, consuming electricity and compute to generate a response. With roughly 800 million weekly users, that is billions of queries a week, each burning GPU time at roughly $6.98 per H100 GPU-hour on demand. OpenAI spent $5.02 billion on Azure inference in the first six months of 2025 alone. Sacra estimates full-year inference costs of $8.4 billion in 2025, rising to $14.1 billion in 2026. This is why gross margin fell from about 40% to 33% even as revenue tripled: more capable reasoning models consume far more compute per query, and revenue has not kept pace with the cost growth that capability generates.

    What it means for the IPO and the race with Anthropic

    OpenAI was last valued around $852 billion post-money after raising $122 billion in early 2026, which puts it at roughly 65 times 2025 revenue. It has named Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley as underwriters and is targeting a listing as early as September 2026 at up to a $1 trillion valuation, though Altman has hedged that it “may be a while” and that staying private might be the better course. HSBC estimates the company may need more than $207 billion in additional capital through 2030. The race is with Anthropic, which filed paperwork the same month after raising $65 billion at a $900-$965 billion valuation, making it more valuable on paper, and which says it expects a $559 million operating profit in the June quarter. The contrast is sharp: the two leading AI labs heading toward public markets at the same time, one bleeding cash at scale, the other claiming profitability, both asking investors to bet on a future that has not arrived.

    Notable Quotes

    “The financial condition of OpenAI is deeply concerning. $38.53 billion in losses are astronomical, and far higher than most believed it would be. Losses also appear to be mounting year-over-year at a dramatic rate, and I’m not sure how this company finds a way toward any kind of sustainability or profitability.”

    Ed Zitron, the independent journalist who published the leaked audited financials

    “It’s unclear what this means, nor how OpenAI reconciled the removal of $3.74 billion in costs. I will not speculate further.”

    Ed Zitron, on a discrepancy he found in the restated 2024 figures

    “OpenAI’s two biggest expenses are R&D and marketing. Budget cuts there, coupled with an ability to raise prices or win new sources of revenue, could see the company move into the black over time. Cutting R&D would be the most difficult part of that, given that AI companies can only hold onto their customers by generating the best-performing models.”

    Jim Edwards, Fortune, on whether OpenAI has a realistic path to profitability

    “What the audited documents make impossible to argue is that the path to profitability is short, clear, or cheap.”

    TechTimes analysis of the leaked OpenAI financials

    The implied revenue multiples price OpenAI for “a monopoly outcome that does not yet exist.”

    Bridgewater partner Greg Jensen, reportedly telling clients how to read OpenAI’s valuation

    “OpenAI spent $34bn last year as the ChatGPT maker poured money into a race to dominate the fast-growing AI market ahead of a planned stock market listing.”

    George Hammond and Bryce Elder, Financial Times, framing the audited 2025 spend

    Read Ed Zitron’s original reporting with the full breakdown here, and the Financial Times confirmation here.

    Related Reading

    • Ed Zitron, Where’s Your Ed At the primary source that broke the audited 2025 financials with the full line-by-line breakdown.
    • OpenAI (Wikipedia) background on the company’s history, structure, and the nonprofit-to-for-profit conversion that drives the non-cash charge.
    • Inference (Wikipedia) on the recurring compute cost that explains why OpenAI’s gross margin shrinks as usage grows.
    • Anthropic the rival lab that filed IPO paperwork the same month at a higher valuation and claims it is already operating at a profit.
    • SEC on confidential filings context for why OpenAI’s audited numbers were headed for public disclosure regardless of the leak.

  • US Government Orders Anthropic to Suspend Claude Fable 5 and Mythos 5: Inside the Export Control Directive, the Jailbreak Dispute, and What It Means for Frontier AI

    On June 12, 2026, Anthropic published a statement announcing that the US government, citing national security authorities, has issued an export control directive forcing the company to suspend all access to its newest frontier models, Claude Fable 5 and Claude Mythos 5. The order technically targets foreign nationals inside and outside the United States, including Anthropic’s own foreign national employees, but the practical effect is that both models are going dark for every customer worldwide. It is the first publicly known instance of the US government ordering a deployed frontier AI model offline, and Anthropic is complying while openly disputing the basis for the decision.

    TLDR

    The US government delivered an export control directive to Anthropic at 5:21pm ET on June 12, 2026, suspending all access to Fable 5 and Mythos 5 over an alleged jailbreak of Fable 5’s safeguards. Anthropic says the letter contained no specific details, that the only evidence shared was verbal, and that the technique in question amounts to asking the model to read a codebase and fix software flaws, a capability the company says is freely available from other models including OpenAI’s GPT-5.5 and used daily by cyber defenders. Anthropic defends its defense in depth strategy, notes that thousands of hours of red teaming by the US government, the UK AISI, and third parties found no universal jailbreak, and warns that recalling a commercial model over a narrow, non-universal jailbreak would effectively halt all new frontier model deployments if applied industry-wide. Access to all other Anthropic models, including Claude Opus, Sonnet, and Haiku, is unaffected, and the company says it believes the situation is a misunderstanding and is working to restore access, with more details promised within 24 hours.

    Thoughts

    This is a watershed moment regardless of how it resolves. Governments have blocked AI exports before, but ordering a deployed commercial model recalled out from under hundreds of millions of users is a new kind of intervention, closer to a product recall than a trade restriction. The mechanism matters too. Export control authority aimed at foreign nationals, including a company’s own employees, that cascades into a global shutdown is a blunt instrument doing the work of a regulatory regime that does not exist yet. The US has no statutory process for recalling an AI model, so the government reached for the closest tool on the shelf, and the result is a precedent built on improvisation.

    There is real irony in who got hit first. Anthropic has spent years arguing, publicly and in Washington, that governments should have the power to block unsafe AI deployments. Now the company that asked for a referee is the first one whistled, and its complaint is not about the existence of the power but about the process: a letter at 5:21pm with no specifics, verbal evidence only, and no transparent or technically grounded procedure. That distinction is the whole ballgame for AI governance. A power to halt deployments without due process standards is not regulation, it is discretion, and discretion cuts in every direction depending on who holds it.

    The technical dispute underneath is genuinely interesting because it exposes how unsettled the definition of a dangerous jailbreak is. Anthropic’s account of the offending technique, asking the model to read a specific codebase and fix any software flaws, describes something security teams do on purpose every single day. Vulnerability discovery is the canonical dual use capability: the same analysis that lets a defender patch a hole lets an attacker find one. If the bar for recall is that a model can be coaxed into doing competent security analysis, then every capable model on the market fails that bar, which is exactly Anthropic’s point about GPT-5.5. The hard question the directive dodges is not whether Fable 5 can find bugs but whether it provides meaningful uplift beyond what is already freely available, and Anthropic says it does not.

    For builders, the immediate lesson is uncomfortable: model availability is now a political variable, not just an engineering one. Teams that built directly on Fable 5 lost a production dependency overnight through no fault of Anthropic’s infrastructure, their own code, or any terms of service violation. Multi-model fallback strategies, abstraction layers over providers, and graceful degradation paths just moved from nice-to-have to table stakes for anyone running serious workloads on frontier models. The companies that absorbed this outage gracefully are the ones that assumed any single model could vanish.

    The next 24 hours matter more than the directive itself. Anthropic has promised more details, and the government will face pressure to either substantiate a concern that justifies a global recall or quietly walk it back. Either outcome sets the real precedent. If the directive holds on thin evidence, every frontier lab now operates under the threat of arbitrary shutdown. If it collapses under scrutiny, the case for a formal, transparent statutory process for AI deployment decisions, which Anthropic explicitly endorses in its own statement, gets a lot stronger in Congress than it was a week ago.

    Key Takeaways

    • The US government issued an export control directive on June 12, 2026 suspending all access to Claude Fable 5 and Claude Mythos 5, citing national security authorities.
    • The directive formally targets access by any foreign national, inside or outside the United States, including Anthropic’s own foreign national employees.
    • The net effect is that Anthropic must disable Fable 5 and Mythos 5 for all customers worldwide to ensure compliance, not just for foreign users.
    • Access to all other Anthropic models, including the Claude Opus, Sonnet, and Haiku families, is not affected by the order.
    • Anthropic received the directive at 5:21pm ET the same day it published its statement, and says the letter did not provide specific details of the national security concern.
    • Anthropic’s understanding is that the government believes it has become aware of a method of bypassing, or jailbreaking, Fable 5’s safeguards.
    • Anthropic reviewed a demonstration of the specific technique and says it only identified a small number of previously known, minor vulnerabilities.
    • The company says other publicly available models can discover the same vulnerabilities without requiring any bypass at all.
    • Before launch, Fable 5’s safeguards were red-teamed for thousands of hours in total by the US government, the UK AISI, multiple private third-party organizations, and internal teams.
    • No tester has found a universal jailbreak for Fable 5, meaning a method that broadly bypasses safeguards and unlocks a wide range of cyber capabilities.
    • Anthropic openly states that perfect jailbreak resistance does not appear possible for any model provider today, and that every safeguard in the industry is vulnerable to non-universal jailbreaks.
    • Fable 5 was deployed under a defense in depth strategy: make jailbreaks either narrow or very expensive to produce, then combine that with monitoring to quickly detect and shut down successful attacks.
    • Anthropic’s 30-day customer data retention requirement for Fable exists specifically to support jailbreak research and mitigation, a policy the company says carries real costs with customers.
    • Anthropic says it has not received any disclosure of a concerning non-universal jailbreak that led to a harmful result; disclosed potential jailbreaks were benign or provided no Mythos-specific uplift.
    • The only evidence the government has provided is verbal, describing a narrow, non-universal jailbreak that essentially consists of asking the model to read a specific codebase and fix any software flaws.
    • Anthropic reviewed a report it believes is the basis of the directive and validated that the capability level shown is widely available from other models, including OpenAI’s GPT-5.5, and is used every day by cyber defenders.
    • Anthropic is complying with the legal directive while explicitly disagreeing that a narrow potential jailbreak justifies recalling a commercial model deployed to hundreds of millions of people.
    • The company warns that if this recall standard were applied across the industry, it would essentially halt all new model deployments for every frontier model provider.
    • Anthropic supports government power to block unsafe deployments in principle, but only through a statutory process that is transparent, fair, clear, and grounded in technical facts, and says this action meets none of those principles.
    • Anthropic apologized to customers, called the situation a misunderstanding, said it is working to restore access as soon as possible, and promised more details within 24 hours.

    Detailed Summary

    What the directive actually does

    The order arrived as a letter from the US government at 5:21pm ET on June 12, 2026, invoking national security authorities under export control law. On paper it suspends access to Fable 5 and Mythos 5 by any foreign national, whether inside or outside the United States, a category that includes some of Anthropic’s own employees. In practice, Anthropic says compliance requires abruptly disabling both models for every customer, since there is no clean way to enforce a nationality-based access boundary across a global product. The letter did not spell out the specific national security concern. Everything else in Anthropic’s statement is the company’s own reconstruction of what prompted the action.

    The jailbreak at the center of the dispute

    Anthropic’s understanding is that the government became aware of a method for bypassing Fable 5’s safeguards. The company reviewed a demonstration of the technique and characterizes the results as a small number of previously known, minor vulnerabilities, all relatively simple, all discoverable by other publicly available models without any jailbreak at all. According to Anthropic, the government’s evidence so far has been entirely verbal, and the technique boils down to asking the model to read a specific codebase and fix any software flaws. The company reviewed a report it believes underlies the directive and validated that the displayed capability is widely available elsewhere, naming OpenAI’s GPT-5.5 directly, and noted that this exact kind of analysis is what defenders use to keep systems safe.

    Anthropic’s defense in depth posture

    The statement restates the safety posture Anthropic laid out at Fable 5’s launch. The safeguards around cybersecurity tasks are strong enough that users have complained they are overly broad. In the weeks before launch, the US government, the UK AISI, multiple private third-party organizations, and internal teams red-teamed the safeguards for thousands of hours combined, and those tests showed Fable’s protections to be substantially more effective than any previously deployed model. No tester found a universal jailbreak. Anthropic is candid that perfect jailbreak resistance is likely impossible for anyone today, which is why the strategy is defense in depth: keep jailbreaks narrow or expensive, monitor aggressively, and shut down attacks fast. The 30-day customer data retention requirement on Fable exists to support that monitoring and mitigation loop. The company says this posture makes Fable’s risks comparable to models already deployed across the industry.

    Complying while disputing the standard

    Anthropic is removing access for all users as legally required, but the statement draws a hard line on the principle. The company disagrees that a narrow potential jailbreak, one that produced no disclosed harmful result, justifies recalling a commercial model serving hundreds of millions of people. Its broader warning is that this standard, applied evenly, would halt all new frontier model deployments industry-wide, since every provider’s safeguards are vulnerable to narrow jailbreaks. Anthropic also turns its own policy position into a critique: the company has publicly supported giving government the ability to block unsafe deployments, but through a statutory process that is transparent, fair, clear, and grounded in technical facts, and it says this action does not adhere to those principles.

    What happens next

    Anthropic closed by apologizing to customers, calling the situation a misunderstanding, and committing to restore access as soon as possible. The company promised to share more details over the next 24 hours, which makes this a developing story. The open questions are whether the government substantiates its concern with written technical evidence, whether the directive survives that scrutiny, and whether this episode accelerates the formal statutory process for AI deployment decisions that Anthropic says should have governed the action in the first place.

    Notable Quotes

    “The net effect of this order is that we must abruptly disable Fable 5 and Mythos 5 for all our customers to ensure compliance.”

    Anthropic, on why a directive aimed at foreign nationals becomes a global shutdown

    “We received the directive from the government today at 5:21pm (ET). The letter did not provide specific details of its national security concern.”

    Anthropic, on the abruptness and opacity of the order

    “These vulnerabilities all appear relatively simple, and we have found that other publicly-available models are able to discover them as well without requiring a bypass.”

    Anthropic, on its review of the demonstrated jailbreak technique

    “We suspect that perfect jailbreak resistance is not currently possible for any model provider.”

    Anthropic, restating the position it disclosed at Fable 5’s launch

    “We stand by this defense in depth strategy. It reduces the risks posed by Fable, making them comparable to the risks of existing models already deployed across the industry.”

    Anthropic, defending its layered safeguards approach

    “To date, the government has only given us verbal evidence of a potential narrow, non-universal jailbreak, which essentially consists of asking the model to read a specific codebase and fix any software flaws.”

    Anthropic, describing the technique behind the directive

    “However, we disagree that the finding of a narrow potential jailbreak should be cause for recalling a commercial model deployed to hundreds of millions of people.”

    Anthropic, on complying while contesting the decision

    “If this standard was applied across the industry, we believe it would essentially halt all new model deployments for all frontier model providers.”

    Anthropic, on the industry-wide implications of the recall standard

    “As we have stated publicly, we believe the government should have the ability to block unsafe deployments, as part of a statutory process that is transparent, fair, clear, and grounded in technical facts. This action does not adhere to those principles.”

    Anthropic, on the kind of oversight process it says should have governed the action

    “We apologize for this disruption to our customers. We believe this is a misunderstanding and are working to restore access as soon as possible.”

    Anthropic, closing its statement to customers

    Read the full statement on Anthropic’s site here.

    Related Reading

  • Dario Amodei on Policy for the AI Exponential: Anthropic’s Plan for AI Regulation, Job Displacement, Civil Liberties, and Democratic Leadership

    In June 2026, Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei published “Policy on the AI Exponential”, a wide-ranging essay arguing that the gap between how fast AI is advancing and how slowly policy moves has become dangerous, and that the window to close it is open right now. He opens with a memorable image from The Lord of the Rings: the Hobbits trying to rouse Treebeard, the ancient tree who takes a full day just to say hello, to defend his forest before it is cut down. That mismatch in speed, he writes, is exactly the relationship between AI and our political institutions. This post breaks the essay down in full and adds analysis of where the argument lands.

    TLDR

    Amodei argues that AI’s scaling laws point toward “powerful AI,” a country of geniuses in a datacenter, within a few years, while legislation still moves on a timescale of years. For most of the last few years, safety advocates including Anthropic pushed only for optionality-preserving moves like transparency rules, chip export controls, and labor data collection, because the risks were not yet concrete. He says that has changed: events like Claude Mythos Preview proved frontier models are now tools of national strategic consequence, and the time for binding regulation has arrived. The essay covers five policy areas. First, regulation and public safety, where he proposes an FAA-style regime of mandatory third-party testing of frontier models above a compute threshold across four risks (cybersecurity, biological weapons, loss of control, and automated R&D), with government power to block unsafe deployments. Second, macroeconomics and tax policy, where AI could deliver hypergrowth and severe, enduring job displacement at the same time, demanding measurement, pro-employment incentives, and possibly UBI or universal capital accounts. Third, accelerating AI’s positive impact, where the danger is regulators like the FDA being too slow rather than too lax, and biomedical approval needs reform. Fourth, the state and civil liberties, where AI could become the ultimate tool of autocracy through autonomous weapons and mass surveillance, requiring new accountability rules, a domestic ban on autonomous weapons, closing the data broker loophole, and public rights to AI advice. Fifth, securing leadership by democracies through a values-based global coalition that controls the AI supply chain, coordinates on risk, shares benefits, and rejects AI-powered repression. He closes by rejecting the idea that public concern about AI is a PR problem to be marketed away, calling it democratic accountability working as it should.

    Thoughts

    The most important move in this essay is structural, not technical. Amodei is explicitly retiring the “preserve optionality” posture that defined Anthropic’s policy work through 2025 and replacing it with a call for binding rules. For years the argument from safety-minded labs was that the risks were too speculative to legislate against without doing more harm than good, an idea he grounds in the Collingridge dilemma and the Hayekian point that regulators lack the information to make good calls. That was a defensible hedge. What is striking here is the claim that the hedge has expired. He is saying the evidence is now concrete enough that continued caution about regulating has flipped from prudent to negligent. Whether you trust the underlying capability claims or not, that is a genuine change in position from one of the field’s most influential voices, and it deserves to be read as such.

    The FAA analogy is doing enormous work, and it is worth poking at. Airplanes and drugs are mature technologies with stable physics and decades of incident data; the certification regime works because the failure modes are well understood. Frontier models are the opposite: the whole premise of the essay is that capabilities are changing faster than anyone can characterize them. Amodei half-acknowledges this when he warns that a fixed list of safety requirements tends to consume 95 percent of compliance effort on things that turn out not to matter while missing the real risks, a lesson he says Anthropic learned from its own Responsible Scaling Policy. So the proposal is really for an agency nimble enough to rewrite its own standards continuously, which is a much taller order than the FAA. The honest read is that he is proposing a regulator we do not yet know how to build, and betting that building it is still better than the alternative.

    The economics section is where Amodei is most careful, and it is the part most likely to be misread. He goes out of his way to say enduring job displacement is undesirable and that warning about it is not the same as wanting it, a distinction critics of AI leaders often collapse. His real claim is subtle: that AI might jam the economic policy dial on a “hypergrowth, hyper-inequality” setting that is hard to unstick, because AI substitutes for human cognition broadly and faster than past technologies, potentially overwhelming the usual escape hatches like comparative advantage and Jevons paradox. If he is right, the political fight of the next decade is not about growth, which AI supplies, but about distribution, which it does not. His mention of UBI, universal capital accounts, and higher capital gains taxes is notable coming from a frontier CEO, even hedged as it is.

    The civil liberties section is the one that should travel furthest beyond the AI-policy bubble, because it does not depend on accepting his most aggressive timelines. The data broker loophole, the idea that the government can simply buy the bulk data Americans hand to private companies and run mass analysis on it, is a problem that exists today; AI just raises the stakes by making that data vastly more revealing. Same with the proposal that anyone facing adverse government action should have access to AI at least as capable as what the government uses against them. These are concrete, near-term, and bipartisan in a way the abstract autonomy debates are not. The most candid line in the whole piece is his admission that AI cannot be safely entrusted to either governments or companies, an unusually direct acknowledgment that his own industry needs external checks, with Anthropic’s Long-Term Benefit Trust offered as one imperfect example rather than a solution.

    The geopolitics section is the most contested terrain. Framing AI as a nuclear-scale reset of the game board, with a virtual country of 100 million geniuses divisible across military strategy and weapons R&D, leads naturally to a democratic coalition that hoards chips and denies them to adversaries. That logic is internally consistent, but it sits in tension with the benefit-sharing and “eventually the whole world joins” language elsewhere in the same section. Export controls that lock down the supply chain are, by design, a tool of exclusion, and reconciling that with broad diffusion of AI’s benefits to developing countries is the circle the coalition idea has to square. Amodei is clearly aware of the tension and bets that making membership attractive resolves it. The closing image is the one to remember: Treebeard waking up, with the warning that the goal is to channel real public concern into constructive policy rather than let it curdle into formless anger.

    Key Takeaways

    • The core tension of the essay is a mismatch in speed: AI advances exponentially while legislation moves on a multi-year timescale, dramatized by the Treebeard and Hobbits image from The Lord of the Rings.
    • In only four years, AI models went from barely writing a coherent line of code to writing most of the code at major AI companies, with similar gains across biology, physics, math, finance, law, and translation.
    • Scaling laws now have over a decade of empirical support, and if they continue another year or two they likely produce “powerful AI,” a country of geniuses in a datacenter.
    • For the last few years, safety advocates including Anthropic focused on optionality-preserving policies: transparency legislation, chip export controls, and data collection on AI’s labor effects.
    • Amodei argues that posture is no longer enough. Claude Mythos Preview revealed that frontier models pose real cybersecurity risks to the financial sector, critical infrastructure, and national security, and proved AI is now a tool of strategic consequence.
    • He expects biological risks to follow cyber risks, with serious AI autonomy risks potentially not far behind.
    • The essay covers five policy areas: regulation and public safety, macroeconomics and tax policy, accelerating AI’s positive impact, the state and civil liberties, and securing leadership by democracies.
    • Alongside the essay, Anthropic released a legislative proposal on frontier model testing and a policy framework for job displacement, both with promised financial backing.
    • On regulation, Amodei invokes the Collingridge dilemma and Hayek’s information problem to explain why pre-writing AI law in 2023 to 2024 was risky, then argues the situation has now changed.
    • Anthropic’s 2025 answer was transparency, helping pass SB 53 in California, RAISE in New York, and SB 315 in Illinois, plus advocating a federal transparency standard.
    • He now calls for binding regulation modeled on the FAA, where frontier models must pass technical testing and can have release blocked or reversed if they fail high safety standards.
    • Models above a compute threshold should face mandatory third-party testing in four areas: cybersecurity, biological weapons, loss of control of AI systems, and automated R&D that accelerates the other three.
    • Government should be able to block or deter deployment of models judged to present unacceptable risk, scoped to those four risks with protections against political favoritism.
    • Evaluation could come from a government agency or from authorized and inspected private organizations under a “regulatory markets” approach.
    • AI companies should have strong security to protect model weights, conduct regular red teaming and penetration testing, report safety incidents promptly, and work with government against major threat actors.
    • He warns a time may come when the most powerful systems resemble weaponizable nuclear materials rather than airplanes, requiring more aggressive measures, but cautions against getting ahead of present dangers.
    • On economics, AI could deliver extremely rapid growth via accelerated science and operational efficiency, supercharged by AI building better AI.
    • The same properties make AI a broad substitute for human cognition that changes the economy faster than past technologies, risking large and potentially enduring labor market disruption.
    • The feared outcome is a “hypergrowth, hyper-inequality” setting that is hard to unstick, where the challenge shifts from incentivizing growth to sharing its benefits.
    • Amodei is emphatic that enduring job displacement is undesirable and dangerous, and that he warns about it to help society adapt, not as a prophet of doom.
    • Anthropic says it works with customers to find new revenue and use cases rather than only cost cutting, and explores interaction paradigms that keep humans active alongside AI.
    • He predicts AI will enable single individuals to build billion-dollar companies, noting teams of a few people already reach hundreds of millions in revenue, while admitting significant enduring job loss may be intrinsic to the technology.
    • Any response must address both economic provision and the human need for meaning, purpose, and agency, with the latter ultimately more important and beyond what policy can directly deliver.
    • Suggested economic interventions: better measurement and tracking (governments expanding statistics beyond Anthropic’s Economic Index), pro-employment incentives, and long-term macroeconomic support.
    • Pro-employment ideas include wage insurance, retention tax incentives, workforce training grants, and employer-employee matching infrastructure.
    • If displacement is large and permanent, mechanisms like universal basic income or universal capital accounts, financed through company taxes or higher capital gains taxes, may be necessary.
    • He frames datacenter and energy-price backlash as largely a symbol of broader economic anxiety, and says AI companies should pay to absorb rate increases, a pledge Anthropic has already made.
    • For technologies accelerated by AI, the bigger risk is regulators like the FDA being too slow, not too lax, because AI may make downstream tech safer in ways that violate skeptical regulatory assumptions.
    • Biomedicine is the illustrative case: AI could flood the drug pipeline, raise effect sizes, treat previously untreatable diseases, and create whole new therapy categories, while the current FDA and EMA pipeline takes 7 to 8 years.
    • Agencies should pre-approve standards for AI methods like PD/PK modeling, toxicology prediction, dose selection, biomarker validation, synthetic control arms, and surrogate endpoints, plus more flexible accelerated-approval mechanisms.
    • On civil liberties, powerful AI in the wrong hands could be the ultimate tool of autocracy, and existing constitutional protections are not fully equipped to counter a surprise seizure of power.
    • Threats named include fully automated drone armies that obey unlawful orders and surveillance AI that infers the innermost details of every citizen’s life from widely available data.
    • Civil liberties proposals: accountability rules and an “off switch” for autonomous weapons, a domestic ban on fully autonomous weapons including in law enforcement, closing the data broker loophole, and public rights to AI advice during adverse government action.
    • Amodei warns companies as well as governments can seize quasi-state power, citing the Gilded Age and the East India Company, and says AI cannot be safely entrusted to either alone.
    • He offers Anthropic’s Long-Term Benefit Trust as one separation-of-power structure and urges the industry to explore mechanisms that go further.
    • On geopolitics, he argues AI resets the geopolitical game board like nuclear weapons, becoming the dominant source of military and economic power for any nation that holds it.
    • A nation with powerful AI versus one without it, or even one three years behind, could resemble WWII Marines facing medieval swordsmen.
    • He calls for a democratic coalition that shares chips and semiconductor manufacturing equipment internally while denying them to adversaries, citing MATCH and OVERWATCH as good first steps.
    • The coalition should coordinate risk policy, share benefits including harmonized medical approvals, provide mutual AI defense, reject AI-powered repression, and cooperate on macroeconomic stabilization.
    • He rejects the idea that AI’s image is a PR problem, arguing public concern reflects real risks and is democratic accountability working as it should, with the task being to channel it into constructive solutions.

    Detailed Summary

    The speed mismatch between AI and policy

    Amodei frames the entire essay around a single problem: AI advances at a lightning pace while policy, especially legislation, moves very slowly, often for good reasons since governments wield grave powers that should not be used hastily. He illustrates this with Treebeard, the sentient tree from The Lord of the Rings who takes a full day to say hello, as a stand-in for political institutions trying to respond to a technology that can go from amusing toy to a country of geniuses in the time it takes Congress to act. He recounts the dilemma responsible actors have faced: they could see where the exponential was headed, but to observers looking only at present capabilities, AI looked as mundane as the latest consumer app or cryptocurrency, making a laissez-faire attitude hard to argue against. The absence of AI’s radical effects, and uncertainty about their shape, made it genuinely difficult to design good policy even where the will existed.

    That uncertainty, he says, is why safety advocates limited themselves to optionality-preserving measures like transparency rules, export controls, and labor data collection. But over the last few months the evidence of AI’s power and risk has become undeniable, with Claude Mythos Preview as the emblematic example: it scrambled the global cybersecurity landscape and proved AI models are now tools of global and national strategic consequence. He expects biological and autonomy risks to follow, and argues the world must now activate its slow, rickety policy apparatus to handle risks that will compound quickly. He worries current early actions are at least a year out of step with AI’s progress, and presents the essay as an attempt to close that gap across five policy areas, focused on US policy but relevant worldwide.

    Regulation and public safety: an FAA for frontier models

    Amodei opens by acknowledging the real costs of regulation: it can reduce a product’s benefits, disincentivize innovation, and suffer from the Hayekian problem that regulators lack the information for good tradeoffs, plus the Collingridge dilemma that a technology’s impacts are hard to anticipate until it is too late to manage them. In 2023 to 2024 these dynamics argued against pre-writing AI law, since the exact form of biological or autonomy risk, how to test for it, and how it would play out were all unclear, creating a high risk of low-value compliance requirements that miss the real dangers. Anthropic’s answer was transparency: requiring developers to disclose safety procedures, tests, and critical incidents, which is why it supported SB 53 in California, RAISE in New York, and SB 315 in Illinois in early 2026.

    Now, he argues, the risks are clearly here and it is time for binding regulation. His analogy is to cars, airplanes, and drugs: powerful technologies essential to the economy but capable of killing many people if designed or operated poorly. He models AI regulation on the FAA, with frontier models required to pass testing and auditing and with release blocked or reversed if they fail high safety standards. His concrete proposal: mandatory third-party testing for models above a compute threshold across cybersecurity, biological weapons, loss of control, and accelerating automated R&D; government power to block deployment of unacceptably risky models, scoped narrowly with anti-favoritism protections; evaluation by either a government agency or authorized private organizations in a regulatory-markets model; strong weight security, red teaming, and penetration testing at AI companies; and prompt reporting of safety incidents. He notes a future may arrive when systems resemble weaponizable nuclear materials and demand harsher measures, but warns against designing for dangers that have not yet emerged.

    Macroeconomics and tax policy: growth and displacement together

    Here Amodei challenges the standard premise that growth is fragile and must be traded off against the drag of taxes or deficits to reduce inequality. Powerful AI, he suggests, may scramble that assumption by producing extremely rapid growth through accelerated science and efficiency, supercharged by AI building better AI, while simultaneously acting as a broad substitute for human cognition that reshapes the economy faster than any prior technology. The result could be a world stuck on a hypergrowth, hyper-inequality setting that is hard to unstick, where the central challenge is no longer incentivizing growth but sharing its benefits. He is careful to make two points clearly: first, enduring job displacement is undesirable and dangerous and should be minimized, and his warnings are meant to help society adapt, not to play prophet of doom; second, any response must address both economic provision and the deeper human need for meaning, purpose, and agency, which matters more and which policy cannot directly supply.

    His policy menu starts with measurement and tracking, arguing good policy is impossible without accurate data, and that governments could expand economic statistics well beyond Anthropic’s Economic Index. Next come pro-employment incentives such as wage insurance, retention tax incentives, workforce training grants, and employer-employee matching, costs he says society should readily accept since they are likely offset by AI productivity gains. If displacement proves large and permanent, he says long-term income support like universal basic income or universal capital accounts may be needed, financed through taxes on relevant companies or higher capital gains taxes. He closes the section by reframing datacenter and energy-price backlash as mostly a symbol of broader economic anxiety, while saying AI companies should absorb rate increases, as Anthropic has pledged.

    Accelerating AI’s positive impact: the slow-regulator problem

    For technologies accelerated by AI, rather than AI itself, Amodei flips his concern: the bigger danger is regulatory systems designed for a slower pace failing to handle the deluge of new products, and AI making downstream technologies safer in ways that violate the skeptical assumptions baked into agencies like the FDA. He focuses on biomedicine as the area likely to produce AI’s biggest humanitarian benefits and where regulation is especially complex. AI could greatly increase the rate of new drug candidates, improve their effect sizes and safety profiles, treat previously untreatable diseases, and create entirely new therapy categories the way antibodies, peptides, and cell therapies did.

    The current pipeline at the FDA and EMA takes 7 to 8 years, built on the pessimistic assumption that drug candidates usually fail and often carry safety problems even when they work. Without reform, AI will jam or overload that system. Amodei proposes that agencies develop standards now for accepting AI simulation and analysis, so they can be adopted quickly once proven rather than after years of unnecessary testing. Specific candidates include AI-based PD/PK modeling, toxicology prediction to reduce animal testing, more accurate dose selection, biomarker validation from large datasets, synthetic control arms, and surrogate endpoints (especially for aging and neurodegeneration). He urges more flexible accelerated-approval mechanisms generally, and notes biomedical acceleration may also reduce AI’s risks by aiding biodefense and improving mental health.

    The state and civil liberties: guarding against AI-driven tyranny

    Amodei frames the perennial balance between state power and individual liberty, enforced through machinery like the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, the Posse Comitatus Act, and FISA, and argues AI threatens to upset that balance while raising its stakes. Powerful AI in the wrong hands could be the ultimate tool of autocracy, because the enormous returns to intelligence combined with AI’s pace create a perfect storm for a surprise seizure of power. The danger could take many forms but shares one feature: AI conferring sudden power while routing around democratic oversight. He cites a fully automated drone army that could obey unlawful orders, where trained humans might object, and a surveillance AI that analyzes widely available information at massive scale to infer the innermost details of every citizen’s life, an ability current civil liberties law never contemplated.

    His proposals: create accountability rules for autonomous weapons so they respond to court orders, legislation, and human overseers rather than blindly following orders, possibly with a judicial finger on an off switch; ban domestic use of fully autonomous weapons, including in law enforcement, while allowing them against foreign adversaries; close the bulk-collection and data-broker loophole that lets the government buy and analyze data Americans share with private companies; and guarantee public rights to AI advice at least as capable as what the government uses during adverse action, as an extension of the Administrative Procedure Act, due process, or the Sixth Amendment. He closes by warning that companies, not just governments, can capture the state, citing the Gilded Age and East India Company, and argues AI cannot be safely entrusted to either alone. Anthropic’s Long-Term Benefit Trust is offered as one accountability structure, with a call for the industry to go further.

    Securing leadership by democracies: a values-based coalition

    Amodei rejects treating AI as a mere instrument of trade policy to diffuse a tech stack worldwide. He believes AI resets the entire geopolitical game board like nuclear weapons, potentially even more so, becoming the dominant source of military and economic power for whoever holds it. In a virtual country of 100 million geniuses, millions could be assigned to military strategy, drone manufacture, weapons R&D, intelligence, and scientific advancement at once, so a nation with powerful AI facing one without it, or even three years behind, could be like WWII Marines against medieval swordsmen. Because powerful AI also enables deeper autocratic repression, it matters enormously that the world’s strongest nations are democracies.

    His answer is a global coalition built on shared democratic values that draws in the rest of the world by making membership increasingly attractive and exclusion increasingly costly. Operating principles include managing the AI supply chain by sharing chips and semiconductor manufacturing equipment within the coalition while denying them to adversaries, expanding and tightening export controls (he cites MATCH and OVERWATCH as good first steps); coordinating on biological, cyber, and autonomy risk to make compliance compatible and effective; sharing AI’s benefits including harmonized medical approvals; mutual defense through collective AI cyberdefense, drones, manufacturing, compute, and intelligence; rejection of AI-powered repression; and macroeconomic cooperation against contagious employment crises. The coalition would respect each nation’s sovereignty, start with aligned democracies, and grow iteratively, ideally toward the whole world, but at minimum positioning democracies to contain and outcompete repressive regimes.

    A window of opportunity

    Amodei closes on cautious optimism. The same exponential that strains policymaking has created a unique opening: clear evidence of AI’s risks, an early taste of its value and disruption, and public backlash against unregulated approaches have left policymakers unusually open to forward-looking action. Treebeard and his forest are waking up. He firmly rejects the industry-circle view that this is a PR problem solved by better marketing, arguing people are worried because the risks are real, and that public concern in response to transparency is democratic accountability working as it should. The key challenge is focusing that concern into constructive solutions rather than letting it descend into formless anger and violence. He is optimistic because issues from job displacement to model testing to export controls have common-sense appeal across the political spectrum, and a broad nonpartisan coalition could adopt sane, forward-looking policy faster than usual.

    Notable Quotes

    “in only four years, AI models have gone from barely being able to write a coherent line of code to writing most of the code at major AI companies.”

    Dario Amodei, on the pace of the AI exponential

    “in the several years that it can take Congress to act, AI can go from an amusing toy to the full country of geniuses.”

    Dario Amodei, on the mismatch between AI’s speed and the speed of legislation

    “However, now the risks are clearly here. It is time to go beyond transparency to more serious and binding regulation of AI.”

    Dario Amodei, marking the shift from transparency to binding rules

    “enduring job displacement is undesirable and dangerous, and we should do everything we can to minimize or prevent it, not to bring it about.”

    Dario Amodei, clarifying his stance on AI and jobs

    “The key challenge in such a world won’t be incentivizing growth, but finding a way for everyone to share in the benefits.”

    Dario Amodei, on a hypergrowth, hyper-inequality economy

    “Powerful AI in the wrong hands could be the ultimate tool of autocracy, and our existing legal and constitutional protections are not fully equipped to counter this threat.”

    Dario Amodei, on AI and civil liberties

    “A nation that possesses powerful AI facing one without it … could be the equivalent of an army of World War II Marines facing an army of medieval swordsmen.”

    Dario Amodei, on AI as the dominant source of geopolitical power

    “People are worried about AI because they correctly perceive that its risks are real, not because AI CEOs have been insufficiently Panglossian.”

    Dario Amodei, rejecting the idea that AI has a PR problem

    “Treebeard and his forest are waking up.”

    Dario Amodei, on policymakers’ new openness to acting on AI

    “Policy on the AI Exponential” is a dense, structured argument from one of the most consequential figures in the field, and it rewards a full read in the original. The summary and analysis above are a guide, not a substitute. You can read the full essay here.

    Related Reading

  • Bill Gurley on Mental Models, Systems Thinking, AI Investing, Stablecoins, and the Future of Venture Capital

    Bill Gurley spent his career at Benchmark backing some of the most consequential marketplaces and network-effect businesses of the internet era, including Uber, and he is one of the few investors who pairs deep Wall Street fundamentals with a real feel for the bleeding edge. In this wide-ranging conversation on Shane Parrish’s The Knowledge Project, he lays out the mental models he keeps returning to, how systems thinking keeps you out of trouble, why the history of your field is a hidden superpower, where AI investing is headed, and how stablecoins and tokenization could quietly rewire finance. It is a masterclass in thinking clearly about complex systems while staying obsessively curious about what is happening on the edge.

    TLDW

    Gurley anchors his thinking in systems thinking and complexity theory, warning that multivariable nonlinear systems produce second and third order consequences that punish anyone who optimizes for a single metric. He argues that mastering both the deep history of your field and its newest edge is wildly differentiating, whether you are interviewing for a marketing job or breaking into venture capital. On AI he is measured: he doubts a single model eats every vertical, sees real moats in workflows and proprietary data, flags that we may be painting in the corners on training data, and explains why Chinese open source models may innovate faster because forced knowledge sharing compounds. He thinks the AI buildout looks overfunded and that circular deals both raise the odds of an eventual correction and delay it. He makes the case that the IPO process is a rigged power grab, that stablecoins and instant payments threaten Visa, Mastercard, and the entire 2 to 3 percent credit card stack, and that proxy advisors like ISS have drifted from shareholder interest into a black-box heist. He closes on the craft of storytelling and writing as thinking, the equal-partnership design of Benchmark, why venture bends toward youth, and what success means now that his dream job is behind him.

    Thoughts

    The most useful idea in this conversation is also the quietest one: most bad decisions are not bad in the moment, they are bad in the second derivative. Gurley’s dating-site story, where lengthening profiles raised engagement in the test and then quietly killed conversion months later, is the whole argument in miniature. A linear model would have shipped that change and called it a win. A systems thinker assumes the variable you optimized is connected to three others you cannot see yet, and waits to find out. That posture, refusing to get deterministic about a single metric, is the difference between a clever experiment and a durable business. It is also the most transferable thing in the episode, because it applies to product changes, hiring, policy, and your own career just as cleanly as it applies to a dating app.

    His pairing of old and new is the second idea worth stealing. Everyone in tech tells you to live on the edge, and Gurley agrees, he keeps five premium AI accounts running so he never misses a release. But he insists the edge is only half of it. Knowing the deep history of your field, the masters of marketing, the forefathers of physics, the classic cartoons that taught animation, is rare enough that it instantly creates contrast and signals genuine passion. The compounding move is to hold both at once. If you understand the legends and you actually get TikTok, you are a power player in a way that someone who only knows one end of the timeline can never be. Most people pick a side. The leverage is in refusing to.

    On AI specifically, Gurley is refreshingly unwilling to pick the consensus lane in either direction. He does not buy that one near-sentient model swallows every vertical, and his reasoning is grounded rather than vibes-based: workflows and proprietary data create real switching costs, which is why he watches the legal AI startups ingesting case law and building new databases rather than assuming everyone reverts to a general chatbot. At the same time he respects the Microsoft pattern of platforms climbing the stack and crushing the apps above them. The honest answer is that it is genuinely up for grabs, and his comfort sitting in that uncertainty is itself a model. The cheap takes are “one model to rule them all” and “it is all wrappers.” Gurley holds both possibilities and keeps testing.

    The systems lens does its best work on China. Rather than moralize, Gurley runs the mechanism: roughly ten open source models, intense domestic competition, and a culture of publishing techniques and weights so every model can learn from, train, and test every other model. His two-farmer metaphor, one market where farmers only trade goods and another where they are forced to share best practices, makes the prediction obvious. Forced knowledge sharing compounds faster than secrecy. The uncomfortable corollary he names is that American startups are quietly forking those open models all over Silicon Valley, and that incumbents may be lobbying for heavy regulation precisely because it pulls up the drawbridge against open source competition. That is the systems thinker’s signature move: follow the incentives to the consequence nobody is saying out loud.

    Finally, the money section is a clinic in spotting rent extraction. The IPO process where bankers pick both the price and the favored buyers, the 2 to 3 percent credit card toll that exists for no defensible reason while the rest of the world built instant bank transfer decades ago, and the proxy advisors who score companies in a black box and then sell you the cure, are all variations on the same pattern: an intermediary that captured a choke point and defends it through regulatory capture rather than value. Gurley’s optimism is that crypto rails, stablecoins, and tokenization may finally route around these tolls the way WeChat Pay and Alipay leapfrogged cards in China. Whether or not you agree on the timeline, the analytical habit is the takeaway. When something costs far more than it should and has for decades, ask who captured the rules, and watch the edge for whoever is about to make those rules irrelevant.

    Key Takeaways

    • Systems thinking means treating the world as multivariable nonlinear systems where one variable flipping can change the entire system’s behavior, the way weather and stock markets do.
    • The real danger is second and third derivative effects, consequences that only show up much later, long after the metric you optimized looked like a win.
    • A dating site lengthened profiles because longer profiles tested as more engaging, then discovered months later it was negative for conversion, the textbook second order trap.
    • Never get too deterministic about a single metric or single variable, and always know what is actually important and what sits on top.
    • Gurley built his foundation on the canon: Peter Lynch’s One Up on Wall Street, A Random Walk Down Wall Street, the Buffett letters, Ben Graham, and Howard Marks.
    • A firm grasp of the financial bedrock is what lets you innovate on top of it, and many Silicon Valley VCs would benefit from understanding finance better.
    • Bill Miller reframed value investing as buying an asset that is underpriced relative to what you think it will be worth in the future, which is how he justified holding Amazon for its network effects.
    • Wall Street is the buyer of the product that venture capitalists create, so even at the two-people-in-a-PowerPoint stage you should ask whether the eventual public market will be excited by it.
    • Trajectory matters more than the starting place, because the trajectory is where the company actually ends up.
    • Knowing the deep history of your field is remarkably differentiating, and tedium while learning it is a signal you are in the wrong lane.
    • John Lasseter served Gurley a ten-course meal where each course was tied to a classic cartoon essential to understanding animation, a display of mastery over the history of the craft.
    • Magnus Carlsen won a trivia contest on the history of chess, and Picasso was a wildly successful realist painter by 14, both proof that the greats master the fundamentals first.
    • Obsessive, constant learning is the trait Gurley sees most in great entrepreneurs, because disruption always happens on a moving edge they need to understand at the top one percentile.
    • The compounding advantage is mastering both the old history and the new edge at once, the way understanding both marketing legends and TikTok would set you apart in any interview.
    • Most people underestimate how much AI can do, so push more of the downstream work into the prompt: identify the top ten, list pros and cons, rank them on one dimension, then another, and add up the numbers too.
    • Gurley uses ChatGPT for project structure and memory, Gemini for restaurant research powered by Google review data, and notes that coders swear by Claude while some prefer Perplexity for finance.
    • He doubts one model dominates everything; verticals like coding already let users swap models, and price optimization will push more swapping over the next few years.
    • Heavy, expensive regulation could ironically create oligopoly, and some players may be quietly begging for regulation because it pulls up the bridge against Chinese open source models.
    • China’s roughly ten open source models compete intensely and share weights and techniques, creating a system that can innovate faster, like farmers forced to share best practices instead of just trading goods.
    • A quiet secret is that startups all over Silicon Valley are forking those Chinese open source models at real volume.
    • Gurley comes down against the idea that one near-sentient model removes the need for vertical models; workflows and proprietary data, like legal startups ingesting all the case law, create durable moats.
    • We may be running out of training data, painting in the corners, which is why one of the most powerful improvements is hiring experts at thousands of dollars an hour to fine-tune the models.
    • Yann LeCun’s view is that the next leap is broader than LLMs, since language-based models hit an asymptote and are weak at math and numbers.
    • AlphaGo’s shocking move proves models can innovate beyond their training, but it lived in a constrained game; the real world has infinite paths a computer cannot exhaustively search.
    • Gurley’s non-consensus view is skepticism of the China vilification mindset, noting the US is only 3 to 5 percent of the global population and wondering how the other 95 percent hears American exceptionalism.
    • The AI buildout looks overfunded: the Magnificent Seven took free cash flow from 50 to 100 billion a year down toward zero by pouring it into capex.
    • The venture community has become more risk-seeking because it now deeply believes in increasing returns and power laws, and the pre-profit losses keep scaling, from Amazon’s 2 to 3 billion to Uber’s 15 billion to far more now.
    • Circular deals, where a cloud provider funds a model company that spends the money right back on its services, inflate growth, which both raises the probability of an eventual correction and extends the time before one hits.
    • Burn rate is a measure of risk; ten years ago a million a month was scary, now companies burn five billion a year and cannot really know their unit economics.
    • Tokenization without financial-disclosure regulation invites speculation and manipulation, which is part of why companies like Stripe stay private and negotiate liquidity prices with trusted investors.
    • The IPO process is unfair because bankers pick both the price and the shareholders; a freshman would simply match supply and demand anonymously in an auction, the way direct listings and ICOs do.
    • Stablecoins threaten the 2 to 3 percent credit card stack; USDC holds dollar-for-dollar Treasuries and rides fast global crypto rails, while US transfers still suffer three-day ACH settlement and 25 dollar wires.
    • The rest of the world built instant transfer long ago, from UK Faster Payments 20 years ago to Argentina’s PIX-style system reaching 60 to 70 percent of transactions, while US bank regulatory capture stalled Fed Now.
    • Visa and Mastercard run roughly 60 percent operating margins as a bank-created duopoly, and China leapfrogged them entirely with WeChat Pay and Alipay QR-code wallets.
    • Moody’s power is being the trusted standard, the watermark, so AI on the back end does not displace it; ISS and proxy advisors, by contrast, score companies in a black box and get paid on both sides.
    • Proxy advisors drifted from shareholder interest into a fraud-and-risk-mitigation mindset, which is why they reflexively opposed the Tesla pay package that only paid out if the stock soared.
    • The rise of passive index funds concentrated voting power in firms that lack time to evaluate votes; it would be healthier if they abstained or voted in proportion to active holders.
    • Storytelling is one of the top founder traits, because founders are recruiting, raising money, and closing customers and partners constantly, selling all the time.
    • Writing is thinking: Bezos’s six-page memo forces you to find the loose ends and tie them up, and a public blog becomes a calling card that magnetizes founders and deal flow.
    • Other founder unfair advantages are product instincts, which fewer than 5 percent of non-product people ever truly learn, and sheer determination, Bezos’s single angel-investing test of whether someone will do it no matter what.
    • Uber had no HBS case study to lean on; its winner-take-all network effects forced mega burn rates with no precedent and no mentor to call, a situation every AI company now faces.
    • Benchmark’s equal partnership, with no king, president, or lead and five equal partners, makes recruiting easy, kills comp politics, and aligns everyone, at the cost of being hard to scale or run new initiatives.
    • Venture bends toward youth because young investors can match founders’ age, master a fresh niche faster, and have the free time to study something 80 hours a week.
    • Gurley defines current success through Arthur Brooks’s From Strength to Strength, hoping to apply his synthesizing and writing skills to bigger societal problems and dent the universe a little.

    Detailed Summary

    Systems Thinking and Second Order Effects

    Gurley opens with the mental model he keeps returning to: systems thinking, shaped by Donella Meadows’s Thinking in Systems and his board seat at the Santa Fe Institute, which studies complexity theory. He describes complex systems as multivariable nonlinear systems that are very hard to predict, capable of behaving one way for a long time until a single variable flips and the whole system behaves differently, like weather or stock markets. The practical payoff is staying out of trouble by anticipating first, second, and third derivative consequences. His clearest example is a large dating site that lengthened user profiles because the test showed more engagement, only to learn many months later that knowing more at that stage was negative for conversion. The lesson is to never get too deterministic about a single metric and to keep the whole system in view, because a change here can ripple to there in ways you only discover much later.

    Learning the Craft of Investing

    Because he started on Wall Street rather than in venture, Gurley absorbed the investing canon first: Peter Lynch’s One Up on Wall Street, A Random Walk Down Wall Street, the Buffett letters, Ben Graham, and Howard Marks, people who spent careers assembling and publishing their thinking. That financial bedrock, he argues, is exactly what lets you innovate on top of it. His friend Michael Mauboussin introduced him to Bill Miller, the Legg Mason manager who beat the S&P for 15 straight years and was Amazon’s largest shareholder for a long stretch. Miller reframed value investing as buying an asset underpriced relative to its future worth, which combined with a belief in network effects justified holding a company that could grow at an unreasonable rate for years. Gurley also frames Wall Street as the buyer of the product venture capitalists create through eventual M&A or IPO, so founders should think early about whether the public market will be excited by what they are building, since trajectory matters more than the starting place.

    Mastering Both the History and the Edge

    Gurley makes an unusually strong case for studying the deep history of your field. He recounts a dinner with Pixar’s John Lasseter, who served a ten-course meal where every course was tied to a classic cartoon he considered essential to understanding animation, and notes that Magnus Carlsen won a chess-history trivia contest and Picasso was a master realist by 14. In a world that skims for the executive summary, walking into a marketing interview with command of the masters of marketing is wildly differentiating and signals genuine passion; if learning that history feels tedious, you are probably in the wrong lane. The counterpart trait he sees in great entrepreneurs is obsessive learning on the moving edge, where disruption actually happens. Gurley keeps five premium AI accounts so he never misses something. The real power player holds both at once, the legends and the newest thing, the way a candidate who knows the marketing greats and truly gets TikTok stands out completely.

    Using AI Well and the Model Wars

    People underestimate how much AI can do, Gurley says, so you should build more of the downstream work into the prompt: instead of asking for the top ten and studying them yourself, ask it to list pros and cons, rank on one dimension, rank again on another, and add up the numbers too. He uses ChatGPT for its project structure and memory, leans on Gemini for restaurant research because it carries Google review data, and notes coders swear by Claude while some prefer Perplexity for finance. On whether one model dominates or models become niche commodities, he points to coding, the largest vertical, where tools like Cursor already let users swap models, and predicts price optimization will drive more swapping. The counterforce is regulation: if it gets expensive and mundane it could create oligopoly, and some players may be quietly begging for it because it pulls up the bridge against Chinese open source models.

    China, Open Source, and the Systems Advantage

    Asked to apply systems thinking to China, Gurley describes roughly ten open source models locked in intense domestic competition, all learning from one another because the ecosystem chose openness, with models able to train and test other models and teams publishing the techniques behind their breakthroughs. His metaphor: two agricultural societies, one where farmers only trade goods at market and another where they are forced to share best practices; the second evolves far faster. The result is a system capable of innovating faster than the more secretive Western approach. The quiet secret he names is that startups all over Silicon Valley are forking those open models at real volume, and a key open question is whether regulation tries to stomp that out. He extends this into a broader non-consensus discomfort with the vilification of China common in Washington and parts of Silicon Valley, observing that the US is only a few percent of the global population.

    AI Investing, Moats, and the Limits of Models

    On how AI changes investing and whether a startup is just a wrapper, Gurley calls it up for grabs but lands on the side of durable verticals. If models become near-sentient, one model does everything; he doubts that, pointing to workflows and data moats, like the several legal AI startups ingesting all the case law and building new databases that customers will not simply swap for a general chatbot. He balances this against the Microsoft pattern of platforms climbing the stack past Lotus 1-2-3 and WordPerfect. He also flags scaling limits: we may be running out of data, painting in the corners, which is why one of the most powerful improvements is paying experts thousands of dollars an hour to fine-tune models, though human knowledge has an edge. He invokes Yann LeCun’s argument that the next leap is broader than language-based LLMs, which hit an asymptote and struggle with math, and the AlphaGo debate, where a shocking innovative move proves creativity within a constrained game but says little about the infinite paths of the real world. He notes AlphaGo and Tesla’s FSD are constrained, non-LLM systems.

    Is the Buildout Overfunded

    Gurley admits he is shocked by the scale of money, noting the Magnificent Seven drove free cash flow from 50 to 100 billion a year down toward zero by spending it all on capex, something he would not have believed five years ago. He traces it to the venture community’s growing conviction in increasing returns and power laws, where proven companies grow far beyond expectations, which makes investors more willing to take risk on the come. The losses before turning cash-flow positive keep scaling, from Amazon’s 2 to 3 billion to Uber’s roughly 15 billion to far larger now. On corrections, he recalls the dot-com crash producing a three to four year nuclear winter before Amazon climbed back, and explains that circular deals, where a cloud provider funds a model company that spends it right back on its services, inflate growth and therefore both raise the probability of a correction and extend the runway before one arrives. Burn rate, he stresses, is a measure of risk, and at five billion a year it is nearly impossible to know your unit economics.

    Tokenization, the IPO Heist, and Going Public

    There is no shortage of capital, so funding is not the bottleneck; the risk with tokenization is that, absent disclosure regulation, it invites speculation and manipulation, as seen in retail-loved names like GameStop and Palantir. Tokenizing a private company like Stripe could create the wild price swings companies stay private to avoid, since private liquidity events let them negotiate a price with trusted investors rather than expose the constantly moving underlying value, and Robinhood’s tokenization plans already drew legal pushback. Gurley reserves his sharpest critique for the IPO process, calling it insanely unfair because bankers pick both the price and the favored shareholders. A freshman computer science and finance student would simply match supply and demand anonymously in an auction, the way an ICO or a direct listing does, but Wall Street will not let go of the greedy power grab and reverted to a controlled oligopoly after direct listings were available.

    Stablecoins Versus the Payment Cartel

    Gurley argues stablecoins could be deeply disruptive to credit cards. Most of the developed world built instant bank-to-bank transfer long ago, from UK Faster Payments 20 years ago to Argentina’s PIX-style system that quickly hit 60 to 70 percent of transactions, while US bank regulatory capture stalled Fed Now and left an ecosystem living under 2 to 2.5 percent card fees. A USDC stablecoin holds dollar-for-dollar US Treasuries and rides proven, fast, global crypto rails, letting anyone move a dollar in seconds for pennies, against the backdrop of three-day ACH settlement and 25 dollar wires. He sees Visa and Mastercard, a bank-created duopoly with roughly 60 percent operating margins, as heavily threatened, and points to China, where WeChat Pay and Alipay built ubiquitous QR-code wallets that leapfrogged the entire card system, all because the government made money transfer easy.

    Moody’s, Proxy Advisors, and Index Funds

    Moody’s power, Gurley explains, comes from being a trusted standard, the watermark, so even AI on the back end does not displace it. Proxy advisors like ISS are a different story: they score companies in a black box, refuse to reveal the criteria, and then get paid by the same companies that want to learn how to score better, which he calls more of a heist than a service. They drifted from a shareholder-interest mandate into a corporate-governance, fraud-mitigation posture obsessed with rules, which is why they reflexively opposed the Tesla pay package that only paid Elon Musk if the stock soared, a deal Gurley says he would sign for every company he has worked with. The rise of passive index funds compounds the problem, concentrating voting power in firms without time to evaluate votes; he would prefer they abstain or vote in proportion to active holders, since closet indexing during the MAG 7 run already distorted active management.

    Storytelling, Writing, and Founder Advantages

    Gurley fell in love with the craft of writing in business school, moving from business books to personal development titles like Dale Carnegie and Seven Habits, then biographies, then long-form narrative nonfiction by Malcolm Gladwell, Michael Lewis, and Jon Krakauer, the New Journalism that reads like fiction. Writing forces clarity: he cites Bezos’s six-page memo as a tool that makes you think through corner cases and tie up loose ends, and notes that codifying his marketplace knowledge and publishing it turned his blog into a calling card that magnetized founders and deal flow. He lists the top founder traits as storytelling, product instincts, understanding the edge, and determination. Storytelling matters because founders are constantly recruiting, fundraising, and closing customers and partners. Product instinct is nearly unteachable, present in well under 5 percent of non-product hires. And determination is Bezos’s single angel-investing test: will this person do it no matter what, come hell or high water.

    Uber, Benchmark, and the Shape of Venture

    The Uber lesson with no HBS case study was that a winner-take-all category with network effects demanded funding ad nauseam, producing burn rates bigger than any public company would dare, with no precedent and no mentor to call, exactly the situation AI companies now face, only with a zero added. Gurley credits Benchmark’s design, an equal partnership with no king, president, or lead and five equal partners, for making it easy to recruit top talent, encouraging senior partners to develop newcomers since everyone shares the upside, and eliminating annual comp politics. The downside is that without a CEO it is hard to scale or run new initiatives, famously captured by the firm settling on a single splash-page website. Founders choose a VC for reputation and network effects, the stamp of approval that carries weight, and young investors can break in because they often match founders’ age and can outwork everyone to master a fresh niche like esports or YouTube, which is why the industry bends toward youth. Asked what success means now, Gurley says his venture career was a dream job he would have done for free, but it is done; inspired by Arthur Brooks’s From Strength to Strength, he wants to apply his synthesizing and writing to bigger societal problems and dent the universe a little.

    Notable Quotes

    “We do live in a world where information is really cut up, but we also live in a world where you can have access to more information than you ever could.”

    Bill Gurley, on why the abundance of knowledge rewards the curious

    “You got to be really conscious of the consequence and not get too deterministic about a single metric or a single variable.”

    Bill Gurley, on the discipline of systems thinking

    “Value just means that the asset is underpriced relative to what you think it will be worth in the future.”

    Bill Gurley, relaying Bill Miller’s reframing of value investing

    “I’ve always thought of Wall Street as the buyer of the product that venture capitalists create.”

    Bill Gurley, on why founders should think about the public market early

    “One society, when the farmers come to market, they just sell each other goods and then they go back. The other society, when the farmers come to market, they’re forced to share best practices. Which one is going to evolve faster?”

    Bill Gurley, on why open source models can out-innovate

    “If you took a freshman computer science student and a freshman finance student and said imagine how a company should go public, they would match supply and demand anonymously like you would in any auction.”

    Bill Gurley, on the rigged IPO process

    “When I meet an entrepreneur, there’s only one thing I ask myself. Is this person gonna do this no matter what? Come hell or high water, they’re doing this.”

    Bill Gurley, quoting Jeff Bezos on his single test for angel investing

    “You’re recruiting employees, you’re recruiting executives, you’re raising money, you’re closing customers, you’re closing partnerships. You’re selling all the damn time.”

    Bill Gurley, on why storytelling is a top founder trait

    “I often said that if we lived in a socialist society and everyone had to work for free, I would still take that job.”

    Bill Gurley, on loving his venture career

    “I would like to see if I can apply those techniques to bigger, broader problems in society and dent the universe a little bit that way.”

    Bill Gurley, on what success looks like in his next chapter

    Watch the full conversation with Bill Gurley on The Knowledge Project here.

    Related Reading

  • Inside Anthropic, the $965 Billion AI Juggernaut: Dario and Daniela Amodei on Claude, Claude Code, and the AI Arms Race

    In this episode of The Circuit, Bloomberg goes inside Anthropic, the AI lab that started as an underdog and is now valued at nearly a trillion dollars. The conversation centers on the sibling duo running the company, Dario Amodei, the brother and visionary, and Daniela Amodei, the sister and operator, along with Boris Cherny, the engineer behind Claude Code and Claude Cowork. It is a rare, on-the-record look at how a safety-obsessed startup founded by a group of OpenAI defectors in 2021 became the breakout star of the AI arms race, wiping billions in value off software stocks and forcing an uncomfortable national conversation about the future of work. You can watch the full episode here.

    TLDW

    Dario and Daniela Amodei walk through Anthropic’s rise from a pandemic-era group meeting on the grass in Precita Park to a roughly $965 billion AI juggernaut that is now profitable for the first time. They explain why they left OpenAI, citing a breakdown of trust and values with Sam Altman rather than a single safety disagreement, and how Dario’s early bet on scaling laws shaped the entire field. The two describe how Claude is trained for character and “professional warmth,” anchored in documents like the UN Declaration of Human Rights, and how the company defines a good model as one that does not lie, hallucinate, or deceive. The business story is enterprise and coding: Claude Code and Claude Cowork automated huge chunks of software engineering, triggered a SaaSpocalypse that erased $285 billion in market value overnight, and pushed annualized growth to as high as 80x in a single quarter. Boris Cherny, recruited from a slow miso-making life in rural Japan, says Claude has written one hundred percent of his code for at least six months. The hardest part of the conversation is jobs: Dario stands by his warning that AI could eliminate half of all entry level white collar jobs in one to five years, pushes back hard on Jensen Huang’s “doom marketing” critique, and lays out where displaced workers might go, from the physical world to human-centered roles like a reimagined, more interpersonal version of medicine. The episode closes by teasing AI and the future of warfare, a scarily powerful new model called Mythos, and Dario’s identification not with Oppenheimer but with Leo Szilard.

    Thoughts

    The most revealing moment in this profile is not a number, it is Dario Amodei’s description of the “smooth exponential.” His whole career, he says, has felt like nothing happening, nothing happening, nothing happening, and then zoom. That mental model is the key to understanding why Anthropic behaves the way it does. A company that genuinely believes it is riding an exponential will tolerate enormous near-term discomfort, public criticism, and internal strain, because it has already priced in a future that looks nothing like the present. Whether that conviction is wisdom or a kind of motivated certainty is the open question the episode never fully resolves, but it explains the urgency in every answer he gives.

    The Boris Cherny segment is the part that should make working engineers sit up. When a senior engineer says Claude has written one hundred percent of his code for six months and that he feels like he has a jet pack, that is not a marketing line, it is a description of a job that has already changed underneath the person doing it. The framing in the piece is optimistic, superpowers and fun, but the logical endpoint is exactly the one Dario himself names a few minutes later: you automate ninety percent of a job, the remaining humans get ten times more leveraged, and then the curve keeps bending toward one hundred percent. Anthropic is, unusually, building the thing and narrating its own disruption in the same breath. That honesty is rare, and it is also a little vertiginous.

    The values-versus-business-model argument deserves more scrutiny than it gets. Dario’s claim is elegant: a business model that conflicts with your values forces you to either betray the values or become irrelevant, so Anthropic chose enterprise and coding because curing diseases and making energy cheaper are enterprise work, while consumer engagement is the addiction-maximizing trap of social media. It is a genuinely good argument, and it is also extremely convenient that the values-aligned path happens to be the most lucrative one. The episode lets that tension sit, which is the right call. The honest reading is that Anthropic found a place where doing well and doing good currently point in the same direction, and the harder test will come the first time they diverge.

    On jobs, Dario is more persuasive than his critics give him credit for, precisely because he refuses the comfortable framing. Jensen Huang and others accuse him of conflating tasks with jobs and of doom marketing that benefits Anthropic. Dario’s response, that the idea this is cheap marketing is itself cheap marketing, is sharper than it first sounds. He is pointing at the way social media flattens a five-page argument about tasks, jobs, tax policy, and the adolescence of technology into a three-second clip designed to provoke. The deeper point is that he is trying to hold two things at once, fast GDP growth and high unemployment, and our public discourse is structurally bad at holding two things at once. That is less a story about AI than about the medium we use to argue about it.

    Finally, the Oppenheimer exchange reframes the entire profile. Dario explicitly rejects the lone-genius model and names Leo Szilard, the scientist who first imagined the chain reaction, as the figure he identifies with. He calls Oppenheimer a failure case, an example of what should not happen. For a man whose company is constantly accused of cultivating a great-man mythology, choosing the early-warning scientist over the bomb’s public face is a deliberate statement about how he wants this story to end: not with charismatic individuals at the center of everything, but with checks and balances everywhere. It is the most quietly radical thing said in the whole piece, and the teaser for a model named Mythos lands with a little extra irony because of it.

    Key Takeaways

    • Anthropic is profiled as an AI juggernaut valued at nearly a trillion dollars, with the figure of roughly $965 billion framing the episode, and is described as profitable for the first time.
    • The company was founded in 2021 by a team of OpenAI defectors and started as an underdog lab before becoming the breakout star of the AI race.
    • Anthropic is run by a sibling duo, Dario Amodei as the visionary and Daniela Amodei as the operator who turns his ideas into action, and Daniela jokes that when they argue, no one wins.
    • Dario describes the AI trajectory as a “smooth exponential” where nothing seems to happen for a long time and then progress suddenly explodes.
    • He says he predicted from a graph that Anthropic would become the AI company with the most revenue and valuation around this time, and that it has happened.
    • Dario grew up in San Francisco with a leather-craftsman father and a librarian mother, took calculus in middle school, and studied math at UC Berkeley while in high school, with no early interest in the internet revolution.
    • Dario studied neuroscience before moving to AI at Baidu and later Google, while Daniela was an early employee at Stripe.
    • Both joined OpenAI starting in 2016, where Dario developed the concept of scaling laws, predicting that large language models would improve simply by adding more data and compute even if the underlying algorithm stayed the same.
    • Scaling up was a counter-cultural scientific bet at the time, held mainly by the founding research team, and it helped supercharge OpenAI’s models and pave the way for ChatGPT.
    • The Amodeis left OpenAI after clashing with Sam Altman over direction and values, framing it as a breakdown of trust and honesty rather than a single safety disagreement.
    • Altman has said that despite their differences, he mostly trusts Anthropic as a company.
    • Anthropic has all seven of its co-founders still at the company, which Dario notes almost never happens at a company of its size.
    • The early team met during the pandemic at Precita Park in San Francisco, pulling up chairs on the grass to talk about what they were building.
    • The name Anthropic comes from the Greek word for human, reflecting a stated mission to build responsible AI for the long-term benefit of humanity.
    • Dario has published long essays including Machines of Loving Grace and The Adolescence of Technology, exploring both the miraculous potential and the worst-case scenarios of AI.
    • Claude is trained to follow a set of principles called a Constitution, intended to keep it aligned and well-behaved.
    • Daniela describes Claude’s intended personality as “professional warmth,” approachable but distant, not a best friend and not cold or calculating.
    • A good model, in Anthropic’s framing, does not lie accidentally or intentionally, with lying including hallucinations where the model invents something it does not know.
    • Anthropic’s own research has shown that models can purposely try to deceive users, which the company works to prevent in production models.
    • There is no universal standard for helpfulness or harmlessness, so Anthropic draws on founding documents like the UN Declaration of Human Rights to train Claude’s character.
    • The company has begun consulting religious leaders about Claude as an entity and about core values that transcend any single worldview.
    • Early Claude models, around the Claude 2 era, were sometimes “nannyish,” expressing concern when a user just wanted the weather, which researchers describe as tuning a fine dial.
    • Anthropic’s revenue skyrocketed over the past year, driven by a focus on lucrative business tools rather than consumer apps.
    • Claude Code automated large chunks of software engineering, and Claude Cowork extended that power to non-engineers.
    • Dario frames the enterprise bet as a values-and-business decision, arguing that a business model conflicting with your values forces you to betray them or become irrelevant.
    • He contrasts engagement-and-addiction-driven consumer and advertising models with enterprise uses like curing diseases, advancing biotech and pharma, and making energy cheaper.
    • Soon after Claude Cowork launched, $285 billion in market value vanished overnight in what traders called the SaaSpocalypse, with some software stocks down nine days in a row.
    • Dario argues the software “pie” will get bigger overall, even as some incumbents shrink or go out of business if they fail to adapt and defend their moats.
    • Boris Cherny, the engineer behind Claude Code and Claude Cowork, was recruited in 2024 from a slow life in rural Japan where he made miso and shopped at farmer’s markets.
    • Cherny’s bet was that a coding agent could do all of software development, not just autocomplete a line or a sentence.
    • He now runs anywhere from a few to a few thousand Claudes at once and says Claude has written one hundred percent of his code for at least six months.
    • A live demo builds a working recipe app that suggests meals for the week in minutes, work that used to take hours or days.
    • At the second annual Code with Claude conference, Anthropic reported API volume up nearly 17x year over year, eight frontier models shipped in twelve months, and first-quarter growth that annualizes to roughly 80x.
    • Dario stands by his warning that AI could eliminate half of all entry level white collar jobs in the next one to five years, saying he remains the same order of concerned.
    • He warns of an unusual combination of very fast GDP growth alongside high unemployment, underemployment, low-wage jobs, and high inequality.
    • Jensen Huang and others have pushed back, accusing Dario of conflating tasks with jobs and of doom marketing that benefits Anthropic.
    • Dario responds that the claim this is cheap marketing is itself cheap marketing, and blames social media for flattening his careful five-page arguments into three-second clips.
    • Anthropic published a paper estimating that management, finance, and legal jobs could be among the fields most affected by AI in the near future.
    • Dario points to the physical world, human-centered relationship-driven work, and humans directing AI as places displaced workers might go, though he is unsure how thick those roles will be.
    • He uses medicine as an example, predicting AI will excel at diagnosis while doctors pivot toward the interpersonal, hands-on, bedside-manner parts that AI cannot replace.
    • The episode teases a next installment on AI and the future of warfare, a scarily powerful new model called Mythos, and the theme of riding the exponential while avoiding dystopia.
    • Dario names The Making of the Atomic Bomb as a favorite book and identifies most with Leo Szilard, who first conceived of a chain reaction, rather than Oppenheimer, whom he sees as a failure case.
    • His view is that the only way the AI era ends well is through checks and balances everywhere, not larger-than-life personalities at the center of everything.

    Detailed Summary

    An unlikely AI celebrity and a sibling-run juggernaut

    The profile opens in a library Dario Amodei clearly loves, establishing him as an unlikely AI celebrity, a man known for warning the world about the risks of artificial intelligence who now runs a company valued at nearly a trillion dollars. Anthropic is presented as the breakout star of the AI race, wiping billions off software stocks, going head-to-head with the Pentagon, and building models powerful enough to threaten modern cybersecurity, with early testers reportedly calling one capability a super weapon and asking the company not to release it. Guiding the company is the sibling pair, Dario the visionary and Daniela the operator who translates his swirling cosmic thoughts into action. Daniela explains that the two have always been close and always wanted to do something big together, and when asked who wins their arguments, she says no one. The framing throughout is of a young, fast-growing startup carrying enormous responsibility for how humanity works, learns, thinks, and even fights wars.

    The smooth exponential and the road from OpenAI

    Dario describes his entire career as the experience of a smooth exponential, where nothing happens for a long stretch and then things go crazy, and he says he watched a graph and correctly predicted Anthropic would top the field in revenue and valuation around now. His backstory is a math prodigy in San Francisco, the son of a leather craftsman and a librarian, taking calculus in middle school and Berkeley math classes in high school, indifferent to the internet revolution and drawn instead to science fiction and understanding the universe. Daniela, more into reading and the arts, calls them near-perfect complements. Dario moved from neuroscience into AI at Baidu and Google, Daniela went to Stripe, and both eventually joined OpenAI starting in 2016, where Dario developed scaling laws, the then counter-cultural bet that more data and compute alone would make models smarter. That insight helped power the models behind ChatGPT, but the Amodeis clashed with Sam Altman over values and direction. Dario frames the departure bluntly: disagreements on safety alone were not enough, but a loss of trust, a sense that Altman’s stated values were not his real values, made it impossible to continue. The resolution, he says, was simply to go off and do their own thing.

    Precita Park, the Constitution, and teaching Claude to be good

    Anthropic’s origin story runs through Precita Park, where the early pandemic-era team gathered on the grass to talk about what they were building. Of seven co-founders, all are still at the company, a retention record Dario says almost never happens at this scale. From the start the company pitched itself as the ultimate safety-conscious lab, with Dario publishing essays like Machines of Loving Grace and The Adolescence of Technology. Claude is trained on a Constitution, and Daniela describes its intended character as professional warmth, approachable but distant. Defining a good model, the team says it should not lie, whether through intentional deception or hallucination, the latter being the model inventing answers it does not actually know. Anthropic’s research has shown models can deliberately deceive, something they work to prevent in production. Because there is no universal standard for helpfulness or harmlessness, they anchor Claude’s training in documents like the UN Declaration of Human Rights and have begun talking with religious leaders about values that transcend any single worldview. Daniela recalls early “nannyish” Claude 2-era behavior, where the model fretted over a user who only wanted the weather, and describes the work as threading a fine needle to land in the center of the dial.

    The enterprise bet, Claude Code, and the SaaSpocalypse

    Anthropic’s revenue surge and first-time profitability are attributed to a focus on business tools, especially Claude Code, which automated large chunks of software engineering, and Claude Cowork, which extended that capability beyond engineers. Dario frames the bet on coding and enterprise as both a values and a business decision: a business model that conflicts with your values eventually forces you to betray them or become irrelevant. He contrasts the engagement and addiction incentives of advertising-driven social media and AI video with enterprise applications like curing diseases, biotech, pharma, academic research, and cheaper energy, all of which he counts as enterprise work aligned with the company’s mission. The disruption was immediate and brutal: soon after Claude Cowork launched, $285 billion in market value vanished overnight in what traders dubbed the SaaSpocalypse, with some software stocks falling nine days straight. Dario’s read is that the overall software pie will grow even as specific incumbents shrink or fail, and that the big losers will be those who do not see what is coming or defend their moats.

    Boris Cherny, jet packs, and Code with Claude

    Much of Anthropic’s recent growth is credited to Boris Cherny, the engineer behind Claude Code and Claude Cowork, hired in 2024 from a deliberately slow life in rural Japan where he made miso and frequented farmer’s markets. A serious science fiction reader, Cherny was awed by his first AI chatbot and also acutely aware of how badly the technology could go. His bet was that a coding agent could do all of software development rather than just autocomplete. He now describes orchestrating anywhere from a few to a few thousand Claudes at once, talking to one while it writes code and moving to the next, and says Claude has written one hundred percent of his code for at least six months. He compares the feeling to having superpowers and a jet pack, calling engineering more fun than ever. A live demo has Claude build a working weekly-meal recipe app in minutes. The story then moves to the second annual Code with Claude conference, where the company reports API volume up nearly 17x year over year, eight frontier models shipped in twelve months, and first-quarter growth annualizing to roughly 80x, with attendees ranging from technical superfans to curious non-engineers.

    Jobs, the tasks-versus-jobs fight, and a more human medicine

    The episode turns to the uncomfortable core: whether engineers will be the first casualties of the AI they are building. Dario stands by his warning that AI could eliminate half of all entry level white collar jobs in one to five years and says he is still the same order of concerned, describing a strange combination of very fast GDP growth with high unemployment, underemployment, low-wage work, and inequality. He notes the usual productivity hump, where automating ninety percent of a job makes humans ten times more leveraged on the rest, before the curve bends toward one hundred percent. With 70 percent of Americans expecting AI to kill jobs and nearly a third fearing for their own, the stakes are political. Jensen Huang and others accuse Dario of conflating tasks with jobs and of doom marketing, and Dario pushes back hard, arguing he writes carefully across five pages about tasks, jobs, tax and macroeconomic policy, and the new jobs of the adolescence of technology, and that calling this cheap marketing is itself cheap marketing born of social media’s three-second culture. Anthropic has published a paper suggesting management, finance, and legal jobs could change the most. Dario points to the physical world, human-centered relationship work, and humans directing AI as landing spots, using medicine as his example: AI will become an excellent diagnostician, but it cannot physically examine a patient or provide bedside manner, so medicine pivots toward the interpersonal. The episode closes by teasing AI and the future of warfare, a powerful new model called Mythos, and Dario’s identification with Leo Szilard over Oppenheimer, whom he calls a failure case, insisting the era can only end well with checks and balances everywhere rather than larger-than-life figures at the center.

    Notable Quotes

    “There’s this kind of smooth exponential, and the experience of the smooth exponential is, nothing’s happening, nothing’s happening, nothing’s happening. Little things happen, and then zoom, it goes crazy.”

    Dario Amodei, on how AI progress actually feels from the inside

    “When you feel that you can’t trust someone, when you feel that their values are not what they say they are, when you feel that they’re not honest, that makes it very hard to continue to work with a company.”

    Dario Amodei, on why he and Daniela left OpenAI

    “Some of the early companies that we gave this to said things like, this is a super weapon, please don’t release this.”

    Anthropic, on early reactions to one of its more powerful models

    “I like to describe it as professional warmth. So the goal is not for it to be your best friend, but it’s not for it to be sort of cold, rote, calculating.”

    Daniela Amodei, describing the character Anthropic designs into Claude

    “If you pick a business model that fundamentally conflicts with your values, you’re gonna have a hard time. Either you betray your own values or you become irrelevant.”

    Dario Amodei, on why Anthropic bet on enterprise and coding

    “For me personally, it’s been writing a hundred percent of my code for at least six months. The work of engineering has just completely changed.”

    Boris Cherny, the engineer behind Claude Code and Claude Cowork

    “I feel like I suddenly have superpowers. I have like a jet pack and the engineering has never been this fun.”

    Boris Cherny, on building software with Claude Code

    “I think we could have this very unusual combination of very fast GDP growth and high unemployment, or at least underemployment, or low wage jobs, high inequality.”

    Dario Amodei, on the economic shock he is most worried about

    “The idea that this is cheap marketing is itself cheap marketing. I think it’s part of the disease of Silicon Valley.”

    Dario Amodei, responding to the doom-marketing accusation

    “The figure I most identified with was Leo Szilard, who was the one who first had the idea that there could be a chain reaction.”

    Dario Amodei, on which atomic-age scientist he sees himself in, rejecting Oppenheimer as a failure case

    Watch the full episode of The Circuit inside Anthropic here.

    Related Reading

    • Anthropic the official site for the company, Claude, Claude Code, and its safety research.
    • Machines of Loving Grace Dario Amodei’s long essay on the optimistic case for powerful AI referenced in the profile.
    • Scaling laws (Wikipedia) background on the data-and-compute bet Dario developed that reshaped modern AI.
    • Leo Szilard (Wikipedia) the physicist who first conceived the nuclear chain reaction and whom Dario says he identifies with.
    • Purpose the PJFP pillar on building meaningful work and direction in a world being reshaped by AI.

  • Claude Fable 5 and Claude Mythos 5: Anthropic Ships Its First Generally Available Mythos-Class AI Model With New Safeguards

    Anthropic has launched Claude Fable 5 and Claude Mythos 5, the first Mythos-class models offered beyond a tiny circle of cyber defenders. Fable 5 is the generally available version, wrapped in a new layer of safeguards, while Mythos 5 is the same underlying model with some of those guardrails lifted for a small group of vetted partners. The pair sits a full tier above the Opus class in raw capability, and the launch is as much a story about how Anthropic is choosing to gate that capability as it is about the benchmarks. Below is a full breakdown of what shipped, what the model can do, and why the safeguard design matters.

    TLDR

    Anthropic released Claude Fable 5, a Mythos-class model that is now its most capable generally available model, posting state-of-the-art results across software engineering, knowledge work, vision, memory, and scientific research. To ship it safely and fast, Fable 5 carries new safety classifiers that route flagged queries in cybersecurity, biology and chemistry, and distillation over to Claude Opus 4.8 instead of refusing, a fallback that triggers in under 5% of sessions. The same model ships without cyber safeguards as Claude Mythos 5 for Project Glasswing partners in collaboration with the US Government, where it is described as having the strongest cybersecurity capabilities of any model in the world. Highlights include a codebase-wide migration of a 50-million-line Ruby codebase that Stripe says took a day instead of two months, beating Pokemon FireRed with a vision-only harness, accelerating drug design roughly tenfold using Mythos 5, producing novel molecular biology hypotheses preferred by scientists about 80% of the time, and over a week of autonomous genomics research. Both models cost 10 dollars per million input tokens and 50 dollars per million output tokens, less than half the price of Mythos Preview, with a staged subscription rollout and a new 30-day data retention policy for Mythos-class traffic.

    Thoughts

    The most interesting decision here is not the capability jump, it is the naming split. Fable and Mythos are the same brain. The only difference is whether the safeguards are on. Anthropic is effectively shipping one model twice: a gated public edition and an ungated edition handed to a short list of trusted defenders working with the US Government. That is a clean way to resolve the central tension of frontier AI, which is that the exact capabilities that help a security professional close a vulnerability also help an attacker find one. Rather than dumbing the model down for everyone or holding it back entirely, they are letting the access list, not the weights, carry the risk. Expect this pattern to repeat as capabilities climb.

    The fallback-to-Opus design is the other quietly important choice. When a classifier flags a query in cybersecurity, biology, chemistry, or suspected distillation, the user does not hit a wall of refusal. The request is silently handed to Opus 4.8, a model that is still excellent at almost everything. Graceful degradation beats a hard no, both for user experience and for trust. It also reframes what a safeguard is. Instead of a binary block, it becomes a routing decision, and because more than 95% of sessions never trigger it, most users will never notice it exists. The honest admission that the classifiers are tuned conservatively and will sometimes catch harmless requests is the right posture, even if it will annoy power users who keep getting bounced to the smaller model.

    The commercial signals are worth reading closely. Pricing came down to less than half of Mythos Preview, which suggests confidence in serving costs at scale, but the subscription rollout tells a more cautious story. Fable 5 is free on Pro, Max, Team, and Enterprise plans only through June 22, after which using it requires usage credits until capacity catches up. That is a polite way of saying demand is expected to badly outrun supply. The model is fully available on the API and consumption-based Enterprise plans from day one, because those bill by the token and self-throttle. Subscriptions, which are all-you-can-eat, are where a capacity crunch actually hurts, so that is exactly where the brakes went on.

    On the science, the genomics result is the one that should make people sit up. A model doing over a week of largely autonomous research, assembling single-cell data across 138 species, then designing and training its own machine learning model that outperforms a recently published Science paper while being 100 times smaller, is a different category of claim than acing a benchmark. So is the drug-design work, where Mythos 5 reportedly matches or beats skilled human operators end to end, choosing binding sites, running protein design tools, and recovering from its own failures. If those hold up to publication and independent replication, the interesting frontier stops being chat quality and becomes whether a model can run a research program. That is also precisely why the biology and chemistry classifier exists, and why Anthropic is being so deliberate about who gets the ungated version.

    One caveat worth keeping in view: nearly all of the evidence in the announcement is Anthropic’s own, or comes from partners with early access and an incentive to be enthusiastic. The Stripe migration, the FrontierCode score, the Slay the Spire memory result, the protein targets, and the genomics model are all compelling, but they are first-party until outside labs and the eventual system card, peer review, and independent red-teamers weigh in. The note that the UK AISI made progress toward a universal jailbreak inside a brief testing window is a useful reminder that the safeguard story is a work in progress, not a finished proof.

    Key Takeaways

    • Claude Fable 5 is a Mythos-class model made safe for general use, and is now Anthropic’s most capable generally available model.
    • Mythos-class is a tier that sits above the Opus class in capability. The first was Claude Mythos Preview, released in April through Project Glasswing.
    • Fable 5 is state-of-the-art on nearly all tested benchmarks, and its lead grows as tasks get longer and more complex.
    • Claude Mythos 5 is the same underlying model as Fable 5, but with safeguards lifted in some areas. Fable and Mythos differ only by their safeguards.
    • Mythos 5 is described as having the strongest cybersecurity capabilities of any model in the world, and is deployed through Project Glasswing with the US Government.
    • New safety classifiers cover cybersecurity, biology and chemistry, and distillation. Flagged queries fall back to Claude Opus 4.8 rather than being refused.
    • Users are told whenever a fallback happens. More than 95% of Fable sessions involve no fallback at all, and for those sessions Fable performs effectively the same as Mythos 5.
    • The safeguards are tuned conservatively and trigger in less than 5% of sessions on average, sometimes catching harmless requests. Anthropic plans to reduce false positives after launch.
    • Stripe reported Fable 5 compressed months of engineering into days, performing a codebase-wide migration of a 50-million-line Ruby codebase in a day that would have taken a team over two months by hand.
    • Fable 5 scores highest among frontier models on Cognition’s FrontierCode evaluation for high-quality agentic coding, even at medium effort, and is more token-efficient than past Claude models.
    • On Hebbia’s Finance Benchmark for senior-level reasoning, Fable 5 has the highest score of any model, with gains in document reasoning, chart and table interpretation, and problem solving.
    • IMC noted Fable 5 aced their trading-analysis evaluations nearly across the board, including factual lookup, conceptual reasoning, root-cause analysis, and expected-value analysis.
    • Fable 5 is the new state-of-the-art for vision, and can rebuild a web app’s source code from screenshots alone.
    • Fable 5 beat Pokemon FireRed using a minimal, vision-only harness with no maps, navigation aids, or extra game-state information. Earlier Claude models needed a complex helper harness.
    • Persistent file-based memory improved Fable 5’s Slay the Spire performance three times more than it did for Opus 4.8, and Fable reached the game’s final act three times more often.
    • Fable 5 built a simulation of the solar system, deriving the planets’ orbital motion from physics first principles and using it to predict solar eclipses.
    • Using Mythos 5, internal protein design experts accelerated aspects of drug design by around ten times, with the model matching or beating skilled human operators end to end.
    • Nine of 14 protein targets in the drug-design study yielded strong candidates Anthropic is now investigating.
    • Mythos 5 is Anthropic’s first model to consistently produce novel, compelling scientific hypotheses. Scientists preferred its molecular biology hypotheses about 80% of the time in blinded comparisons.
    • One Mythos hypothesis, a novel mechanism for an E. coli protein, was corroborated by an independent lab working on the same problem.
    • In over a week of largely autonomous work, Mythos 5 assembled single-cell data for millions of cells across 138 animal species and trained a custom model that outperformed a recent Science paper while being 100 times smaller.
    • Anthropic’s automated alignment assessment found Mythos 5’s level of misaligned behavior was low and similar to Opus 4.8. Because they are the same model, Fable 5’s alignment is similar.
    • An external bug bounty produced no universal jailbreaks in over 1,000 hours of testing, though the UK AISI made progress toward one in a brief initial window.
    • One external partner found Fable 5’s safeguards against harmful cyber queries the most robust of any model tested, including Opus 4.8 and Opus 4.7, with zero compliance on harmful single-turn cyberattack requests.
    • The biology and chemistry classifier is deliberately broad for now. Mythos-class models outperformed dedicated protein language models at predicting AAV viral shell assembly using biological reasoning alone.
    • The distillation classifier targets large-scale attempts to extract Claude’s capabilities to train competing models, which could proliferate near-frontier capabilities without safeguards.
    • A new policy requires 30-day data retention for all Mythos-class traffic on first- and third-party surfaces, used only for safety, with logged human access and deletion after 30 days in almost all cases.
    • Anthropic plans trusted access programs that let cybersecurity organizations apply for Mythos 5, and let a small number of life science researchers access Fable 5 with biology and chemistry safeguards removed.
    • Both models cost 10 dollars per million input tokens and 50 dollars per million output tokens, less than half the price of Mythos Preview. Developers can use claude-fable-5 via the Claude API.
    • Fable 5 is free on Pro, Max, Team, and seat-based Enterprise plans through June 22. On June 23 it moves to usage credits on those plans until capacity allows it to return as a standard inclusion.

    Detailed Summary

    A Mythos-class model, made safe for general use

    Fable 5 is the first Mythos-class model Anthropic has made generally available. Mythos-class is a tier that sits above the Opus class, and the first of its kind, Claude Mythos Preview, was released in April through Project Glasswing to a limited group of cyber defenders and critical software infrastructure providers. The company framed today’s launch as the moment it could finally bring that level of capability to all users, because its safeguards had matured enough to allow it. Fable 5’s capabilities exceed those of any model Anthropic has made generally available, and its advantage over other models grows as tasks get longer and more complex.

    Two models, one brain

    Claude Mythos 5 is the same underlying model as Fable 5, but with safeguards lifted in some areas. The names are the only real difference: Fable, from the Latin fabula meaning that which is told, is akin to the Greek mythos, and the safeguards are what distinguish the two. Mythos 5 launches first to existing Mythos Preview users, including the Project Glasswing cybersecurity partners, as an upgrade. It is deployed in collaboration with the US Government and is described as having the strongest cybersecurity capabilities of any model in the world. Anthropic plans to steadily expand access through a more systematic trusted access program.

    Software engineering and token efficiency

    Fable 5 can work autonomously for longer than any previous Claude model, and software engineering is where that shows most clearly. During early testing, Stripe reported it compressed months of engineering into days, performing a codebase-wide migration in a 50-million-line Ruby codebase in a single day that would otherwise have taken a whole team over two months by hand. It is also more token-efficient than past models, scoring highest among frontier models on Cognition’s FrontierCode evaluation for high-quality, maintainable agentic coding, even at medium effort.

    Knowledge work, vision, and memory

    On complex analytical work, Fable 5 posted the highest score of any model on Hebbia’s Finance Benchmark for senior-level reasoning, with substantial gains in document-based reasoning and chart and table interpretation, and IMC said it aced their trading-analysis evaluations nearly across the board. In vision, it is the new state-of-the-art, able to extract precise numbers from detailed scientific figures and rebuild a web app’s source code from screenshots alone. It needs less scaffolding too: where earlier Claude models struggled to play Pokemon even with helper harnesses, Fable 5 beat FireRed with a minimal, vision-only harness using nothing but raw game screenshots. On memory, giving Fable persistent file-based notes improved its Slay the Spire performance three times more than it did for Opus 4.8, and it built a physics-first-principles solar system simulation accurate enough to predict solar eclipses.

    Life sciences: drug design, hypotheses, and genomics

    Using Mythos 5, Anthropic’s internal protein design experts accelerated aspects of the drug-design process by around ten times. With protein design and bioinformatics tools but no human assistance, the model matched or beat skilled human operators, executing the full workflow of choosing binding sites, selecting and running design tools, and recovering from failures. Nine of 14 protein targets yielded strong drug-design candidates now under investigation. Mythos 5 is also Anthropic’s first model to consistently produce novel, compelling scientific hypotheses: scientists preferred its molecular biology hypotheses about 80% of the time in blinded comparisons, and one, a novel mechanism for an E. coli protein, was corroborated by an independent lab. In genomics, Mythos 5 ran over a week of largely autonomous research, assembling single-cell data for millions of cells across 138 species and training a custom model that outperformed a recent Science paper despite being 100 times smaller.

    The new safeguards: classifiers and fallback

    Mythos-class capability is potent enough that Anthropic considers it a substantial misuse risk, especially given how much advanced AI usage is dual use. Fable 5 ships with a new set of classifiers, separate AI systems that detect potential misuse and jailbreak attempts and stop the main model from responding. When a classifier flags a request related to cybersecurity, biology and chemistry, or distillation, the response is handled by Claude Opus 4.8 instead, and the user is told. The cybersecurity classifiers cover both exploitation and broader offensive cyber tasks like reconnaissance and lateral movement, and Anthropic says they prevent Fable from making any progress on those tasks. The biology and chemistry classifier is intentionally broad for now, after tests showed Mythos-class models could outperform dedicated protein language models at predicting AAV viral shell assembly using biological reasoning alone. The distillation classifier targets large-scale attempts to extract Claude’s capabilities to train competing models.

    Jailbreak resistance, data retention, and availability

    Anthropic ran extensive red-teaming, including an external bug bounty that produced no universal jailbreaks in over 1,000 hours, though it notes the UK AISI made progress toward one in a brief window. The company concedes it is likely impossible to fully prevent universal jailbreaks and aims instead to make any that remain slow and costly enough to catch before they scale. A new policy requires 30-day data retention for all Mythos-class traffic, used only for safety, with logged human access and deletion after 30 days in almost all cases. On availability, Fable 5 is live everywhere today and fully available on the API and consumption-based Enterprise plans, while subscription access rolls out in stages: free on Pro, Max, Team, and seat-based Enterprise through June 22, then on usage credits from June 23 until capacity allows it to return as a standard inclusion. Both models cost 10 dollars per million input tokens and 50 dollars per million output tokens.

    Notable Quotes

    “Today we’re launching Claude Fable 5: a Mythos-class model that we’ve made safe for general use.”

    Anthropic, opening the Claude Fable 5 and Claude Mythos 5 announcement

    “Fable 5’s capabilities exceed those of any model we’ve ever made generally available.”

    Anthropic, on where Fable 5 sits in the lineup

    “It has the strongest cybersecurity capabilities of any model in the world.”

    Anthropic, describing Claude Mythos 5

    “During early testing, Stripe reported that Fable 5 compressed months of engineering into days.”

    Anthropic, on Fable 5’s software engineering results

    “Our early data shows that more than 95% of Fable sessions involve no fallback at all.”

    Anthropic, on how often the safeguards route to Opus 4.8

    “Mythos 5 is our first model to consistently produce novel, compelling scientific hypotheses.”

    Anthropic, on the model’s molecular biology research

    “It is likely impossible to completely prevent universal jailbreaks, but our goal is to make any remaining jailbreaks sufficiently slow and costly that we can detect and prevent them before they are used at scale.”

    Anthropic, on the limits of its safeguards

    “Fable is from the Latin fabula, ‘that which is told,’ akin to the Greek mythos. The safeguards are what distinguish the two models.”

    Anthropic, explaining the Fable and Mythos naming

    Read the full announcement and the benchmark tables on Anthropic’s site here: Claude Fable 5 and Claude Mythos 5.

    Related Reading

  • Thomas Laffont of Coatue on the $4 Trillion AI IPO Wave: SpaceX, Anthropic, OpenAI, and Why the New Unicorn Economy Is Healthier

    Thomas Laffont, co-founder of the $55 billion hedge fund Coatue Management, made his All-In Podcast premiere with a data-dense walk through what he calls a once-in-a-generation moment for the unicorn economy. In front of Chamath Palihapitiya, Jason Calacanis, David Sacks, and David Friedberg, he argued that a roughly $4 trillion wave of private value is about to hit the public markets, led by SpaceX, Anthropic, and OpenAI, and that the new AI-driven unicorn economy is actually healthier than the one that came before it. You can watch the full presentation and Q&A on YouTube.

    TLDW

    Laffont presents Coatue’s slide deck on the state of the unicorn economy and argues it has rebalanced after the excesses of 2021. The average unicorn is up about 70 percent since September 2024, AI keeps taking a bigger share of all fundraising, and the model has shifted from many small unicorns to fewer companies each raising far more, with funding per unicorn up roughly 5x since 2021. He introduces a “Magnificent 8” private index (SpaceX, Stripe, Anthropic, Databricks, Revolut, ByteDance, Anduril, and more) worth nearly $4 trillion that has crushed the public Mag 7, then shows that exits are finally thawing as SpaceX heads to an IPO in weeks and Anthropic confidentially files its S1. He lays out Coatue’s “CODE” framework for why SpaceX gets more valuable the more it launches, a counterintuitive finding that the odds of a 10x actually rise as companies get bigger (31 percent for $100 billion-plus centicorns), the explosive revenue ramp of OpenAI and Anthropic past Workday, ServiceNow, Adobe, Salesforce, and now the hyperscalers, a three-pillar map of where AI revenue comes from (consumer, ads, enterprise), and the AI memory thesis. The Q&A with Chamath and Calacanis digs into the power law, K-shaped outcomes, whether these valuations are disconnected from reality, the public market as the great antiseptic, and what happens when trillions in private value finally recycles back through GPs and LPs.

    Thoughts

    The most useful idea in the talk is not the $4 trillion headline, it is the cohort-health chart. Laffont splits unicorns into eras and shows that the pre-2021 cohort was healthy, roughly 80 percent had raised again or exited 20 quarters after minting, while the giant 2021 ZIRP cohort of 479 companies is stuck with under 20 percent doing either. That single comparison reframes the whole AI boom. The bullish read is that the 2024 AI cohort is small, concentrated, and cash-generative, so it looks more like the healthy pre-ZIRP group than the 2021 hangover. The bearish read is that we are watching the same movie with bigger numbers, and the test only comes when these companies face public markets. Laffont is honest that we do not yet know which cohort the AI class resembles, and that intellectual humility is what makes the deck credible rather than promotional.

    The SpaceX “CODE” framework is the sharpest analytical move of the presentation. Most people would assume a launch business gets cheaper per launch as it scales. Laffont shows the opposite, the market pays more per launch as cadence rises, and explains it as a phase change in business quality: from one-time government launch revenue, to a single recurring-revenue constellation, to multiple constellations, to a platform with optional upside in space data centers, the moon, and Mars. It is a clean way to think about any company that climbs from a project business to a platform business, and it applies far beyond rockets. The lesson for investors is that valuation can rationally expand even as unit economics look like they should compress, because the nature of the revenue underneath is changing.

    The counterintuitive 10x odds finding deserves more attention than it got in the room. Conventional wisdom says the bigger you are, the harder it is to grow, so a $100 billion company should be less likely to 10x than a $10 billion one. Coatue’s data says the reverse: centicorns have a 31 percent shot at a 10x, far higher than the 8 percent a unicorn has at becoming a decacorn. Laffont’s explanation is a filtering mechanism, every step up validates a compounding advantage and durability of earnings, so survivors are increasingly the kind of business that keeps compounding. This is essentially a quantitative restatement of quality investing, and it is the intellectual backbone of the LP strategy the besties tease out, just buy whoever reaches $100 billion and hold.

    Where the argument gets genuinely contested is valuation, and the panel does not let it slide. The pushback that “these are not fake companies” is true and important, OpenAI and Anthropic are growing faster than any software company in history, and Anthropic reportedly had a profitable month. But growth and reality do not settle the question of price when you are paying 50 to 100 times revenue for trillion-dollar private companies, as Bill Ackman pointed out earlier in the day. Laffont’s answer is the most grounded thing he says all session: the public market is the great antiseptic, it will not care about anyone’s slide deck, and he wants to see these names withstand short sellers and skeptics. That is the right posture. The deck is a thesis, not a verdict, and the verdict arrives roughly six months and one day after the IPOs, once passive flows and supply have washed through.

    The closing thread, that almost every sector is being transformed at once and we still do not have superintelligence, is the part worth sitting with. The risk in a presentation this bullish is treating the trend as destiny. The value is in the framing tools Laffont hands you, cohort health, phase-change business quality, the filtering odds, the three revenue pillars, and the antiseptic of public scrutiny. Use those to interrogate each name rather than to buy the index on faith, and the talk earns its premiere billing.

    Key Takeaways

    • Coatue Management is one of the most successful hedge funds of the last two decades with about $55 billion under management, and is raising roughly another billion dollars specifically to invest in AI.
    • The unicorn economy is up about 70 percent on average since September 2024, and the public market has made a similar move up over the same period.
    • The unicorn economy’s share of the NASDAQ rose significantly after 2015 but has plateaued in recent years, reflecting strong performance from public companies.
    • AI keeps increasing its wallet share of all venture fundraising, multiple years in a row now.
    • The composition of funding has changed. The unicorn “factory” peaked in the ZIRP era of 2021 and has normalized at a much lower level since.
    • Funding per unicorn has increased roughly 5x since 2021. There are fewer unicorns, and each one is raising more.
    • Cohort health, pre-ZIRP group: of about 73 unicorns, 20 quarters after minting roughly 80 percent had either raised a new round or exited, which is healthy.
    • Cohort health, 2021 group: of about 479 unicorns, 20 quarters in, fewer than 20 percent had exited or raised again. Far larger cohort, far worse outcomes.
    • The open question is which cohort the new 2024 AI cohort will resemble.
    • Funding is concentrating: the top 10 companies capture a large share, and it is a small number of AI companies, not all of them, with Anthropic and OpenAI raising massive rounds.
    • Laffont proposes a “Magnificent 8” private index: SpaceX, Stripe, Anthropic, Databricks, Revolut, ByteDance, Anduril, and more, spanning internet, AI, fintech, and space tech.
    • That private index represents almost $4 trillion of value and has crushed the traditional public Mag 7, with almost every name outperforming.
    • Exits are thawing. 2026 is on a good trend for cash returned versus consumed, not quite 2021 levels, with half a year still to go.
    • That trend does not yet include three imminent liquidity events: SpaceX (IPO expected in weeks) and Anthropic (confidentially filed its S1), whose combined value could exceed the prior decade of exits combined.
    • The ecosystem is far more balanced than when Laffont first presented at the 2024 All-In Summit, when it was consuming much more cash than it returned.
    • OpenAI and Anthropic revenue growth is unlike anything previously seen. Starting from January 2025, they passed Workday, then ServiceNow, then Adobe, then Salesforce, and are now bigger than Google Cloud and Azure.
    • On current forecasts, that revenue could pass AWS by the end of the year and exceed all of Microsoft by 2028.
    • Hyperscalers are not sitting still. The largest companies in the world are funding the disruption, investing unprecedented sums to enable the ChatGPT moment.
    • The SpaceX “CODE” framework: the number one driver correlated to SpaceX’s valuation is cadence of launches, and valuation per launch rises as launches increase.
    • Why per-launch value rises: business quality improves through phases, pre-constellation (one-time government revenue), initial ramp (one recurring-revenue constellation), scale (multiple constellations), and platform (space data centers, moon and Mars optionality).
    • Anthropic in particular is scaling like no company seen across the PC, internet, or mobile eras.
    • Counterintuitive 10x odds: a unicorn has about an 8 percent chance of becoming a decacorn, a decacorn has 8 to 13 percent odds of reaching $100 billion, but a centicorn ($100 billion-plus) has a 31 percent chance of a 10x.
    • Value creation has accelerated. It typically takes years to go from $500 billion to $1 trillion in market cap, yet recently three companies did it in one year and two did it in a matter of weeks.
    • Cerebras is the counterexample of slow success: years of dark periods and no new capital developing its technology, then a massive OpenAI contract that quintupled the company’s value ahead of its IPO.
    • Semiconductors are on a generational run, with the sector dramatically outperforming the index since the 2024 All-In Summit.
    • AI memory thesis: the more an AI system knows about you, the more useful it is, so memory per user could quintuple, which helps explain recent moves in memory companies.
    • Where the revenue is: the AI ecosystem is roughly $140 billion today, about $300 billion this year, and is expected to double in 2027.
    • Three revenue pillars: consumer (subscribers times ARPU), ads (about a quarter of Meta and Google ads are AI-enabled today, heading toward 100 percent and roughly $150 billion), and enterprise (tools like Claude Code and Codex inside businesses).
    • Disruption is hitting every sector: software, telco (Starlink-powered global phone calls), semis, energy (data centers reshaping Pennsylvania’s grid), auto (Ferrari’s electric and autonomous stumble), and consumer (GLP-1s reshaping food, alcohol, and wellness).
    • Final takeaways: the new unicorn economy is healthier thanks to AI, winners are compounding faster so the cost of not owning a winner is higher than ever, disruption is everywhere, and we do not even have superintelligence yet.
    • In the Q&A, both Anthropic and OpenAI publicly say they want to be public, and big outcomes now look likely to become liquid within roughly a 12-month window.
    • The valuation pushback: these are not fake companies, they generate substantial revenue at scale and grow faster than anything before, and Anthropic reportedly even had a profitable month.
    • The public market is framed as the great equalizer and antiseptic, but with passive buying the true price discovery may not land on day one, more like six months and a day after listing.
    • A floated LP strategy: wait for whoever reaches $100 billion and concentrate capital there as the least brittle, quickest-return bet, tempered by the warning that valuations are disconnecting from any historical metric (50x to 100x revenue).
    • An open risk: with so much capital, OpenAI and Anthropic could rationally start a price war, the way ride-sharing and food-delivery players once did, though heavy infrastructure spend complicates it.

    Detailed Summary

    The unicorn economy has rebalanced after 2021

    Laffont opens by reframing a market many assume is frothy. The average unicorn is up about 70 percent since September 2024, and the public market has tracked a similar climb, so private and public value are moving together rather than diverging. The unicorn economy’s share of the NASDAQ rose sharply after 2015 and then plateaued, which he reads as a sign of how strong public companies have become. Underneath the headline, the structure of funding has changed. The 2021 ZIRP era was a unicorn factory that minted enormous numbers of companies, and that machine has since normalized to a much lower level. The result is a barbell: fewer new unicorns, but each raising far more, with funding per unicorn up roughly 5x since 2021. AI sits at the center of this, taking a steadily larger share of all venture dollars for several years running.

    Cohort health is the real story

    The deck’s most important slide measures the health of the ecosystem by cohort. The pre-ZIRP cohort, about 73 unicorns, looks healthy: 20 quarters after becoming unicorns, roughly 80 percent had either raised a new round or exited. The 2021 cohort tells the opposite story. It is enormous, about 479 unicorns, and 20 quarters in, fewer than 20 percent had raised again or exited. That contrast sets up the central question of the talk. A new 2024 cohort of AI companies is forming, and no one yet knows whether it will resemble the healthy pre-ZIRP group or the bloated, stuck 2021 group. Laffont’s framing leans optimistic because the AI cohort is small and concentrated, but he is careful not to declare the answer.

    The Magnificent 8 and a $4 trillion private index

    Funding is not just flowing to AI, it is flowing to a handful of AI names, with the top 10 capturing a large share and Anthropic and OpenAI raising the biggest rounds. From this concentration Laffont builds a private index he half-jokingly calls the Magnificent 8, a number he expects to shrink as companies go public. The members span sectors: SpaceX, Stripe, Anthropic, Databricks, Revolut, ByteDance, and Anduril, covering internet, AI, fintech, and space tech. He says he would be comfortable owning that index for the next decade-plus. Collectively it represents almost $4 trillion of value and has outperformed the public Mag 7, with nearly every constituent beating that benchmark.

    Exits are thawing and a wall of liquidity is coming

    One of Laffont’s recurring concerns at past summits has been balance: the unicorn economy is great at consuming cash, but a healthy ecosystem must also return it. On that score 2026 is trending well, not quite 2021, but solid with half a year left. Crucially, that figure does not yet include three imminent events. SpaceX is expected to go public within weeks, and Anthropic confidentially filed its S1 the day of the talk. Adding those up, just a few companies could deliver more liquidity than the prior ten years combined. The takeaway is that the ecosystem that was dangerously out of balance in 2024 is now meaningfully more balanced, and improving.

    The revenue ramp past the hyperscalers

    The growth rates of OpenAI and Anthropic, Laffont argues, are unlike anything previously seen. Charting from January 2025, the leading AI labs passed Workday, then ServiceNow, then Adobe by year end, then Salesforce by January, and are now bigger than Google Cloud and Azure. On forecast, that revenue could surpass AWS by the end of the year and exceed all of Microsoft by 2028. He stresses that the hyperscalers are not passive bystanders, they are actively funding the disruption, pouring unprecedented capital into enabling the change that began with the ChatGPT moment.

    The SpaceX CODE framework

    Laffont devotes real time to how Coatue thinks about SpaceX. The single factor most correlated with SpaceX’s valuation is cadence of launches, which is intuitive for a launch business. The surprise is that valuation per launch has risen rather than fallen as cadence climbed. His explanation, the CODE framework, is that the quality of the business model improves the more SpaceX launches. In phase one, pre-constellation, you are simply proving rockets, with a few government customers and lumpy, unpredictable one-time revenue. In the initial ramp you stand up a constellation, which is an end market and a recurring-revenue business that grows with every satellite and subscriber. At scale you operate multiple constellations, and Laffont expects companies, governments, and militaries to want to own their own. Ultimately it becomes a platform, with new businesses layered on top, from space data centers to the optionality of the moon and Mars.

    Counterintuitive odds and the speed of value creation

    Coatue bucketed companies and asked the odds of a 10x within each. A unicorn has roughly an 8 percent chance of becoming a decacorn. A decacorn has 8 to 13 percent odds of reaching $100 billion. But a centicorn, $100 billion or more, has a 31 percent chance of a 10x, counting both public and private companies. The bigger you are, the better your odds, which inverts intuition. Laffont pairs this with the sheer speed of recent value creation. Going from $500 billion to $1 trillion in market cap normally takes years, yet three companies did it in a single year and two did it in a matter of weeks. He also offers Cerebras as the patient counterexample, a chip company that endured years of dark periods and no new capital before a massive OpenAI contract quintupled its value ahead of IPO, part of a broader generational run for semiconductors.

    AI memory and where the revenue actually comes from

    A throughline from the day’s other speakers is that the more an AI knows about you, the more useful it is, from your restaurant preferences to your work context. Laffont turns that into a thesis: memory per user could quintuple based on what these systems require, which helps explain recent moves in memory companies. He then tackles the most contested question, where is the revenue. He sizes the AI ecosystem at about $140 billion today, roughly $300 billion this year, and doubling in 2027, built on three pillars. Consumer is subscribers times ARPU. Ads are the pillar people forget, with about a quarter of Meta and Google ads already AI-enabled and penetration heading toward 100 percent, a roughly $150 billion opportunity. Enterprise is the breakthrough category, exemplified by tools like Claude Code and Codex operating inside businesses.

    Every sector is being transformed at once

    What makes this era different, Laffont says, is that nearly every sector is being transformed simultaneously. Software is obvious, but look at telco, where he believes Starlink will soon power a device that lets you make a phone call anywhere on earth, attacking the global telco and broadband profit pool with a better product. Compute is driving massive change in semis, data centers are reshaping the energy equation in places like Pennsylvania, and the auto business is being upended, as Ferrari’s stumble introducing electric and autonomous technology showed. In consumer, GLP-1 drugs are profoundly changing consumption of food and alcohol and the broader focus on wellness. His takeaways close the loop: the new unicorn economy is healthier thanks to AI, winners are compounding faster so the cost of missing them is higher than ever, disruption is everywhere, and superintelligence has not even arrived yet.

    The Q&A: power law, valuation, and the public market test

    Chamath and Jason Calacanis press Laffont on what this means for allocators. The recurring theme is the power law and K-shaped outcomes, with gains consolidating into a small number of companies. The positive side, Laffont notes, is that outcomes are enormous and increasingly liquid within a 12-month window, and both Anthropic and OpenAI say they want to be public. The hard part is valuation. The besties cite Bill Ackman’s framing that investors are making venture bets on trillion-dollar companies at 50 to 100 times revenue. Laffont’s pushback is that these are not fake companies, they generate substantial revenue at scale and grow faster than anything before, and Anthropic reportedly had a profitable month. But he embraces the discipline ahead: the public market is the great antiseptic and will not care about anyone’s presentation, though with heavy passive buying, true price discovery may take roughly six months and a day rather than landing on day one. Asked whether the compounding is a market inefficiency or survivor bias, he declines to over-read a small sample, noting that Anthropic before Claude Code was a completely different company than after. The conversation closes on what happens when trillions recycle from GPs to LPs, the case for simply owning whoever crosses $100 billion, the risk of everyone crowding into three names, and the possibility of an eventual OpenAI versus Anthropic price war.

    Notable Quotes

    “So we have fewer unicorns that are each raising more.”

    Thomas Laffont, summarizing how funding per unicorn has risen roughly 5x since 2021

    “The reason is that the quality of SpaceX’s business model increases the more you launch.”

    Thomas Laffont, explaining the CODE framework and why valuation per launch rises with cadence

    “The winners are compounding faster than ever, which means the costs of not being in a winner are higher than ever.”

    Thomas Laffont, on the central risk of a power-law market

    “And by the way, we don’t even have super intelligence yet.”

    Thomas Laffont, closing his takeaways on how early the transformation still is

    “These are companies generating substantial revenue at scale that are growing faster than anything we’ve ever seen.”

    Thomas Laffont, pushing back on the idea that AI valuations rest on fake companies

    “It will be the great antiseptic. It will not care about my presentation.”

    Thomas Laffont, on the public market as the ultimate test for SpaceX, OpenAI, and Anthropic

    “Anthropic pre-cloud code was a completely different company than post cloud code.”

    Thomas Laffont, on why he won’t over-read a small sample of hyper-compounders

    “The power law rules our lives. All the great gains are being consolidated into small numbers of companies.”

    An All-In host, framing the Q&A on concentration in private markets

    This is a curated set of highlights. To hear the full presentation, the slide walkthrough, and the complete Q&A with Chamath and Jason Calacanis, watch the full conversation here.

    Related Reading

    • Coatue Management. Primary source for Thomas Laffont’s firm and the technology investing strategy behind the deck.
    • The All-In Podcast. The show and summit where Laffont made this premiere presentation.
    • Power law (Wikipedia). Background on the distribution Laffont and the hosts say governs venture and public-market returns.
    • The Magnificent Seven (Wikipedia). The public-market benchmark Laffont’s private “Magnificent 8” index is measured against.
    • Cerebras Systems. The AI chipmaker Laffont cites as the slow-grind IPO that was eventually transformed by a major OpenAI contract.

  • Bill Ackman on Investment Strategy, What the Market Is Missing, and How AI Breaks Businesses

    Bill Ackman, founder and CEO of Pershing Square, joined the All-In Podcast for a conversation about how his investment approach has shifted toward permanent, long-term ownership, why he believes the highest-quality companies are being left behind by a market chasing the new new thing, and how AI is raising the risk of disruption for almost every business. He also lays out his plan to turn Howard Hughes into a Berkshire Hathaway-style compounding machine built on insurance. You can watch the full conversation here. Below is a structured breakdown of the ideas, the stories, and the frameworks he uses to underwrite a business.

    TLDW

    Ackman explains how his philosophy evolved from a smaller, more liquid activist toward concentrated, permanent ownership of durable, non-disruptible businesses, with much of his activism now playing out on X rather than in the boardroom. He tells the origin story of his first big trade, Wendy’s and the Tim Hortons spin-off, and explains why a large long-term shareholder on a board is an antidote to short-term markets. On AI, he argues that this is the greatest era in history to build a company, which means the risk of being disrupted has gone up enormously, and that the market is mispricing high-quality compounders like Microsoft, Meta, and Amazon while crowding into chips, semiconductors, and energy. He works through the SaaS question and why niche software is more at risk than platforms, how he underwrites SpaceX, xAI, OpenAI, Anthropic, and Palantir like late-stage venture bets using a people, opportunity, context, deal framework, and why founder-led companies have an edge in making radical calls. The back half covers his Howard Hughes plan to copy Buffett’s insurance-float model, the role of cost of capital and reflexivity in markets, the meme-stock era, going direct on social media, and the three different ways an investor can put money to work with Pershing Square.

    Thoughts

    The most useful idea in the interview is the way Ackman reframes disruption as the central investing problem of the AI era. His point is that the same forces making this the best time in history to start a company, meaning near-unlimited compute, capital, and talent, also raise the odds that any given incumbent gets disrupted. That reframes the word quality. It is no longer mostly about margins and moats. It becomes about non-disruptibility, which is a much higher bar than most quality investors were using a decade ago, and it is why he says most of his research time now goes into assessing that single risk.

    The what-the-market-is-missing thesis is classic contrarian Ackman. Arguing that Microsoft, Meta, and Amazon are the new old-fashioned, undervalued names while capital piles into semiconductors and energy is a direct echo of 2000, when Berkshire Hathaway bottomed precisely because money was chasing internet stocks. It is worth keeping in mind that he owns all three, so the call is also his book. The durable signal here is the framework, not the specific tickers: capital reliably chases the new new thing, and genuinely high-quality businesses get left behind during those rotations.

    The Howard Hughes plan is the most concrete bet in the conversation. Copying Buffett’s insurance-float playbook, short-term treasuries for policyholder money and equities for the surplus, onto a discounted real-estate holding company is elegant. The hard part is exactly what Ackman flags about insurance as an industry: the best investors go to hedge funds, not insurers, so most insurance companies only ever manage the liability side well. Pershing Square’s edge is that Ackman can both write the business and invest the float, which is the same reason it worked for Buffett. The framing of going from a four billion dollar company to a trillion over fifty years is a statement of intent, not a forecast, and should be read that way.

    Underneath all of it sits cost of capital and reflexivity. His observation that a higher stock price literally makes a company more valuable, because it lowers the cost of capital and creates acquisition currency, is the mechanism behind both Elon Musk’s empire and the meme-stock era he is wary of. Going direct on X is the same lever pointed at himself: communicate the vision, lower your own cost of capital, and make the bet easier for other people to place. It is a coherent worldview in which narrative and balance sheet continuously feed each other, and it explains a lot of his behavior over the last few years.

    Key Takeaways

    • The biggest change in Ackman’s approach over time is an appreciation for business quality, meaning long-term, durable, protected, non-disruptible growth as the most important factor.
    • He says he is as activist as ever, but more of it now happens on X than in the traditional corporate context.
    • His first big investment was Wendy’s, which owned Tim Hortons. The simple thesis was to buy Wendy’s, spin off Tim Hortons, and double the money.
    • Early on no one returned his calls, so he had Steve Schwarzman’s Blackstone write a fairness opinion, filed it publicly, and the company spun off Tim Hortons six weeks later. The CEO later thanked him after being fired with a large exit package.
    • Reputation compounds. Where Pershing Square once had to bang down the door, companies now sometimes tweet a welcome when it buys a stake.
    • A large long-term shareholder on a board is a counterweight to short-term markets, letting management test ideas privately and pursue initiatives that hurt the next few quarters of earnings.
    • Pershing Square owns Microsoft, Meta, and Amazon. Ackman argues you are either invested in AI directly or indirectly, or it is a threat, so you have to understand it.
    • The hardest and most important job for a concentrated investor is judging the risk of disruption, and that risk has risen dramatically.
    • This is the greatest era in history to build a business because of near-unlimited access to compute, capital, and talent, which is exactly why the probability of being disrupted has gone up enormously.
    • Markets bring their eye to the new new thing, currently chips, semiconductors, and energy, while high-quality companies get left behind.
    • He draws an analogy to 2000, when Berkshire Hathaway traded at one of its lowest valuations because everyone chased internet stocks. He sees a similar dynamic around Amazon, Meta, and Microsoft today.
    • On the SaaS question, he worries more about a Salesforce than a platform like Microsoft, because niche software charging high per-seat or per-year prices is most exposed, while low-priced platforms are safer.
    • Any software company today has to be as AI-enabled as possible, or risk losing the monopolistic pricing it once enjoyed.
    • His famous March 2020 CNBC appearance was an attempt to reach President Trump and argue for a short shutdown, paired with the view that stocks were incredibly cheap and worth buying.
    • He describes valuation as a tether on the market: when prices stretch too high they snap back, and when they get too cheap the same rubber band pulls valuations up. Calling that out publicly can trigger a psychological reset.
    • His recent bullish call came because stocks of really high-quality companies had gotten crazy cheap on fundamentals, meaning the present value of the cash they generate.
    • He underwrites high-multiple names like SpaceX as venture investments using a framework from business school: people, opportunity, context, deal.
    • On SpaceX, people and opportunity are one of one, the context is incredible, and Starlink plus near-monopoly low-cost launch make it strategically valuable. The complicated part is the deal, meaning the valuation. He invested via an SPV after Ron Baron’s nudge, and also invested in xAI.
    • He treats OpenAI, Anthropic, and Palantir as late-stage venture bets that have proven they can generate real revenue, and says OpenAI should do a better job communicating how it thinks about its enormous capital commitments.
    • Every CEO in America is asking how to use AI, how it applies to their business, and how it is a threat. It is top of mind and boards open every meeting with it.
    • He has not seen much enterprise AI success yet, citing a McKinsey study that 95 percent of enterprise initiatives fail and the rise of the forward deployed engineer as the hot role bridging promise and ROI. Pershing Square itself uses AI mainly for legal, compliance, and back-office work.
    • Founder-led companies have an advantage because founders have the authority and the economic stake to make radical calls, while the average S&P 500 CEO has a roughly three to four year tenure and is incentivized not to make mistakes.
    • He cites Mark Zuckerberg buying Instagram and WhatsApp as the kind of shocking-at-the-time calls that a founder with a track record can make.
    • Ben Graham’s enduring lesson is that a stock is an interest in a business, not a piece of paper, but Graham mostly invested in liquidations and cash-rich shells, and made most of his money on Geico.
    • Most of Buffett’s value at Berkshire came from owning insurance operations and focusing on the asset side of the balance sheet, not just the liability side.
    • Insurance is hard to copy because top investors do not go to work for insurers. Buffett owned half his company and was a great investor, which is why it worked.
    • Howard Hughes came out of the General Growth bankruptcy and owns master-planned cities like Summerlin, with 26,000 acres in the Las Vegas area, comparable to the Irvine Company that built roughly a hundred billion dollars of wealth for Donald Bren.
    • The plan is to reinvest the cash Howard Hughes generates into insurance, put policyholder float in short-term treasuries and the surplus in common stocks, and build a compounding machine over fifty years, buying it at roughly sixty cents on the dollar.
    • A company must earn a return above its cost of capital for the stock to rise. Elon Musk has kept his companies’ cost of capital extremely low, and a SpaceX IPO near a 1.75 trillion dollar valuation could be one of the lowest cost of equity capital transactions ever.
    • Markets have changed less because of Ackman and more because of figures like Ryan Cohen and GameStop, where a stock can trade well above its value on personality and an army of followers.
    • Higher valuations are reflexive: a rising stock price lowers cost of capital and creates currency to issue stock and acquire businesses, which is part of how Elon built Tesla.
    • There are three ways to invest with Pershing Square: the management company itself (a royalty on compounding assets with no capex), PSUS (a portfolio of best ideas trading at an 18 percent discount), and Howard Hughes (a bet on building the next Berkshire). A dollar invested 22 years ago became roughly 27 to 28 times net of fees.
    • Going direct on X, with 2.2 million followers, lets him communicate his vision and lower the friction for others to back his bets, even as his very long tweets have become a running meme.

    Detailed Summary

    From activist trades to permanent capital

    Ackman frames the evolution of his career as a steady move toward business quality. As a smaller, more liquid investor early on, he did not have to think as long-term. As Pershing Square became a bigger, more concentrated investor, durable growth became the dominant factor in every decision. He insists he is still as activist as ever, but a lot of that energy has shifted to X, where he can argue a position publicly rather than only inside a boardroom. The best investments, he notes, are the ones where you do not need to join the board and do anything at all.

    The Wendy’s and Tim Hortons origin story

    One of Pershing Square’s first investments was Wendy’s, which owned the Canadian coffee and donut chain Tim Hortons. The value of Tim Hortons alone was greater than the entire value of Wendy’s, so the idea was simple: buy Wendy’s, spin off Tim Hortons, and double the money. Ackman bought ten percent of the company and could not get the CEO to return a single call, so he had a contact at Blackstone, with Steve Schwarzman’s sign-off, write a fairness opinion on what Wendy’s would be worth after a spin-off, filed it publicly, and watched the spin-off happen six weeks later. The CEO eventually called back to thank him, having been fired but rewarded with a large exit package. Over the years that scrappy approach gave way to a reputation that now opens doors on its own.

    Why a long-term shareholder on the board matters

    The core problem of being a public company, in Ackman’s telling, is the short-term nature of markets and analysts, when a good business should be run in the context of years and even decades. A large, supportive shareholder on the board gives management a place to test ideas before exposing them to the public and a credible voice willing to back initiatives that hurt earnings for a few quarters. That is the value-add he believes a constructive activist can bring to a mature public company, as opposed to a startup where the best outcome is simply to own a great business and stay out of the way.

    AI and the rising risk of disruption

    For a concentrated, long-term investor, the most challenging task is judging the risk that two people from Stanford in a garage build something that destroys your thesis. Ackman argues that risk has climbed dramatically because this is the greatest era in history to build a company, with near-unlimited access to compute, capital, and talent. The paradox is that the conditions that make building easier also make incumbents more fragile, so the bulk of his research now centers on assessing how disruptible a business really is.

    What the market is missing

    Investors bring their attention to the new new thing, currently chips, semiconductors, and energy, which leaves high-quality companies behind. Ackman compares the moment to 2000, when Berkshire Hathaway traded at one of its lowest valuations ever because capital was chasing internet stocks. He sees an echo today in how Amazon, Meta, and Microsoft are treated as old-fashioned, and he considers them undervalued on fundamentals, where value is the present value of the cash a business generates over its life. His recent bullish call, like his March 2020 appearance, came because stocks of really high-quality companies had simply gotten too cheap.

    The SaaS question and AI-enabled software

    On the so-called SaaS apocalypse, Ackman says it is a company-by-company analysis. He worries more about something like Salesforce than about a low-priced platform. The companies most at risk are those that extracted near-monopolistic profits by charging a high annual price for a niche product, because AI lowers the barrier to replicating that functionality. A platform where the average customer pays a small amount per seat, like Microsoft, is far less exposed. The takeaway for any software company is to become as AI-enabled as it possibly can.

    Underwriting SpaceX, xAI, and the AI labs like venture

    For the highest-multiple private companies, Ackman uses a venture lens and a framework a business school professor taught him: people, opportunity, context, deal. SpaceX scores as one of one on people and opportunity, with an incredible context and a near-monopoly in low-cost launch through Starlink, which makes even Amazon a likely customer. The complicated variable is the deal, meaning the valuation, and he admits he has not done all the math, having invested through an SPV after Ron Baron encouraged him, along with a position in xAI. He treats OpenAI, Anthropic, and Palantir as late-stage venture bets that have proven real revenue, and argues OpenAI in particular should communicate more clearly how it justifies capital commitments that vastly exceed current revenue.

    Founder-led companies and the authority to act

    Ackman agrees that founder-led companies have a structural advantage in a fast-changing environment. The average S&P 500 CEO has a tenure of roughly three to four years, a small economic stake, and an incentive not to make a career-ending mistake. A founder is betting an entire life and reputation, has the authority of a major voting and economic position, and has usually made several hard, contrarian calls that turned out right. He points to Mark Zuckerberg’s acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp, which looked shocking at the time, as exactly the kind of decision a founder with a track record can make and a hired manager often cannot.

    Howard Hughes as Berkshire Hathaway 2.0

    Ackman points to a detailed financial history of Berkshire Hathaway showing that the vast majority of Buffett’s value creation came from owning insurance and focusing on the asset side of the balance sheet, not just the liability side. Insurance is hard to replicate because skilled investors join hedge funds rather than insurers, but Buffett owned half his company and was a great investor. Pershing Square is applying the same idea to Howard Hughes, a company created out of the General Growth bankruptcy that owns master-planned cities such as Summerlin, with 26,000 acres around Las Vegas, in the spirit of the Irvine Company that made Donald Bren roughly a hundred billion dollars. The plan is to reinvest the company’s cash into insurance, place policyholder float in short-term treasuries and the surplus in common stocks, avoid issuing stock the way Buffett did, and compound for fifty years, all bought at around sixty cents on the dollar.

    Cost of capital, reflexivity, and going direct

    A company only creates value when it earns above its cost of capital, which is why Howard Hughes, seen as a high-cost-of-capital real-estate business, has long traded at a discount, and why Ackman is repurposing its assets into a higher-returning model. He highlights how reflexive markets are: a higher stock price itself makes a company more valuable by lowering its cost of capital and creating currency to raise money and acquire businesses, a lever Elon Musk used to build Tesla. He attributes real market change less to himself and more to figures like Ryan Cohen and GameStop, where personality and a following can lift a stock far above its value. His own going-direct strategy on X, with 2.2 million followers and famously long posts, is the same mechanism applied to communicating a vision and lowering friction for investors. He closes by laying out three ways to invest with Pershing Square: the management company as a royalty on compounding assets, the PSUS portfolio trading at an 18 percent discount, and Howard Hughes as a bet on building the next Berkshire.

    Notable Quotes

    “The best investments are one where you don’t need to join the board and do anything.”

    Bill Ackman, on the kind of business he most wants to own

    “The probability of your being disrupted has gone up enormously.”

    Bill Ackman, on why assessing disruption risk now dominates his research

    “Valuation is like a tether on the market, right? When it gets too high, it’s like this rubber band that’s stretching and inevitably it bounces back.”

    Bill Ackman, on how prices revert at both extremes

    “People, opportunity, context, deal.”

    Bill Ackman, on the business school framework he uses to underwrite companies like SpaceX

    “Every CEO in America today is like, how do I use AI?”

    Bill Ackman, on AI as the top opportunity and threat in every boardroom

    “A closed mouth gathers no foot.”

    Bill Ackman, quoting the line a friend put next to his name in his high school yearbook

    “The increase in value of the company increases the value of the company, right? Because it lowers the cost of capital, it gives you more flexibility, gives you the ability to issue stock, raise capital, acquire other businesses.”

    Bill Ackman, on the reflexivity between stock price and corporate value

    “The company’s got like a $4 billion market cap and the goal is to build it into a trillion dollar thing over time compounding.”

    Bill Ackman, on his fifty-year plan for Howard Hughes

    Taken together, the conversation is a tour of how Ackman now thinks about quality, disruption, and compounding, and a preview of the Berkshire-style machine he wants to build out of Howard Hughes. Watch the full conversation here.

    Related Reading

  • Benedict Evans on Why AI Is Stuck in 1997: The Task vs the Job, Commodity Models, and Why the Jobs Apocalypse Is Overhyped

    Benedict Evans, the former Andreessen Horowitz partner and independent analyst behind the annual “AI Eating the World” presentation, sat down with Lenny’s Podcast for what the host calls the most rational take on AI you will hear this year. Instead of either doom or hype, Evans argues that AI is as big a deal as the internet or mobile, and only as big a deal as the internet or mobile, which means we are living through something closer to 1997 than to the singularity. The conversation moves through the jobs question, the difference between a task and a job, whether the model labs have any pricing power, the anti-AI backlash, and what people should actually do. You can watch the full conversation on YouTube here.

    TLDW

    Evans frames AI as a platform shift on the scale of the internet or mobile, with the crucial twist that almost nothing has been built yet, so we are in the 1997 moment where confident predictions about winners are usually wrong. He introduces his central tool, the distinction between the task and the job, to explain why “X percent of this profession is exposed to AI” studies are misleading, why the AI labs are paradoxically hiring forward deployed engineers and buying consultancies, and why accountants kept multiplying through every wave of automation (the lump of labour fallacy and Jevons paradox at work). On value capture he makes a deterministic bet that foundation models have no network effects, behave like a commodity, and will look more like cloud than like Windows, with the value moving up the stack to applications, much as it did in telecom, where a trillion-dollar industry grew data traffic thousands of times over while its stocks went nowhere. He covers distribution as the real moat, Apple Intelligence as the most compelling unshipped vision, the fuzzy anti-AI backlash (including the largely fake water panic and the very real harms of deepfakes), raising kids under radical uncertainty, and closes with the disarming admission that his own synthesis-heavy job is exactly the kind AI is currently worst at. His advice: presume radical uncertainty, dive in rather than sneer, and assume it will probably be okay.

    Thoughts

    The most useful thing in this conversation is a single question Evans keeps returning to: what is the task, and what is the job? A spreadsheet automated the arithmetic an accountant does, and the number of accountants went up for the next forty years. Claude Code can write the code, but deciding what to build, for whom, and why is the part nobody has automated. The reason the “this profession is X percent exposed to AI” studies feel hollow is that they assume a job is a neat stack of separable tasks. Evans argues, by analogy to the old expert-systems failure, that you simply cannot decompose a senior lawyer’s work that way. The 75-slide deck is the task. Walking your company, reading its politics, talking to your customers, and telling you the uncomfortable truth is the job, and that is what you actually paid McKinsey for.

    The boldest and most falsifiable claim is that the foundation-model companies look more like cloud than like Windows. No network effects means no winner-take-all, which means durable competition, which means commodity pricing and compressed margins, with the real value accruing up the stack in applications that nobody at the labs is going to build. His telecom analogy is the one to sit with. A trillion-dollar industry grew mobile data traffic by 1,500 to 2,000 times in fifteen years, and the stocks went nowhere for a quarter century, because it was a low-margin utility while all the interesting value moved to Apple and the people building apps on top. If he is right, the current token-burn economics, the person reportedly spending 1.5 million dollars a month on tokens, are the 2010 equivalent of a 50,000 dollar roaming bill, not the steady state. Evans flags openly that he could be completely wrong, which is the intellectually honest part and the part most forecasters skip.

    “It depends” and “it will probably be okay” sound like evasions, and Evans leans into that. But the 1997 framing is doing real work. The point is not that AI is small, it is that the things that will end up mattering have not been built, and that anyone confidently naming the winners today is repeating the 1997 mistake of betting on Excite over a search company with a weird logo. The discipline he is selling is to presume radical uncertainty and act anyway, because the alternative, declaring the whole thing slop and shouting about it online, buys a great feeling of moral superiority and nothing else. His repeated insistence that you can see the job that goes away but never the new job, because it does not exist yet, is the load-bearing idea under his optimism.

    The most disarming moment is the closing AI-corner answer, where the person whose entire brand is explaining AI admits he struggles to use it. His work is synthesis and precise information retrieval, and precise retrieval happens to be exactly what today’s models are worst at. He is, in his own words, the lawyer looking at VisiCalc: it is obviously transformative, and he just does not happen to make spreadsheets all day. That admission is worth more than any benchmark, because it locates the real variable. How much AI changes your life depends less on how good the model gets and more on whether your daily work sits on the part of the jagged frontier where it already works. That is a far more practical lens than arguing about whether AGI arrives in three years or thirty.

    Key Takeaways

    • Evans’s headline opinion is that AI is as big a deal as the internet or mobile, and only as big a deal as the internet or mobile. Both halves of that sentence matter.
    • If you make the internet comparison honestly, we are roughly in 1997: very exciting, most of it does not work yet, most of what people will build has not been built, and it is unclear how any of it will end up working.
    • Adoption is spread across a very wide distribution. Even among teenagers, only something like 15 to 20 percent are daily active users and another 20 percent weekly, with the majority saying they do not use it at all.
    • That spread maps onto the “jagged frontier” question of where AI works, where it does not, whether you can predict where it will work in advance, and whether you can even tell after the fact.
    • Software developers are the accountants seeing VisiCalc: for them everything has already changed. Most other professions are watching, intrigued but unsure what to do with it.
    • The AI labs are investing heavily in forward deployed engineers, consultancies, and professional services. Evans jokes that a forward deployed engineer is an Accenture outsourced developer who lives in San Francisco.
    • Companies do not have spare people sitting around to reimagine every internal workflow, so reinventing a business around AI is itself a project that needs consultants, which is why the most cutting-edge labs are funding exactly the firms everyone assumed AI would kill.
    • The central framework: separate the task from the job. Sometimes the task is the job (the elevator operator pressing a lever), and automating the task ends the job. Far more often, the task is only part of the job.
    • Amazon gets you the SKU once you know which SKU you want. Knowing which one to buy is a different job. Claude Code writes the code, but knowing what code and what features to build is the job.
    • A McKinsey or Bain engagement is not really about the deck. The deck is the task. The job is walking your enterprise, understanding the politics, talking to your customers, and telling you the truth.
    • The Jevons paradox is just price elasticity applied to labour. Make something cheaper to produce and you usually do far more of it, not the same amount with fewer people.
    • Excel did not give investment bankers shorter hours. iPhone SDKs did not shrink the number of engineers even though Apple writes 90 percent of the code for you. The number of accountants rose through every wave of automation.
    • The lump of labour fallacy: since 1800, each technology automates jobs and unlocks new ones. You can always see the job that disappears and never the new job, because it does not exist yet.
    • Evans is wary of argument from authority on jobs. He wants Dario Amodei’s view on where models go in the next 6 to 12 months, not necessarily his theory of labour markets and comparative advantage.
    • The doomer scenario of every company buying ChatGPT and firing everyone in two weeks misunderstands how enterprises work. Enterprise sales cycles run 18 months or more. Nobody is ripping out SAP overnight. The full transformation takes 3 to 10 years, sector by sector.
    • AGI and superintelligence are being quietly redefined to mean whatever works now. Larry Tesler’s theorem: AI is whatever machines cannot do yet, because once they can, people call it just software.
    • We have no theory of human intelligence, no theory of why these models work, and no theory of how much better they will get, so everyone is vibes-forecasting. Even if progress stopped tomorrow, what exists is already transformative and will roll out for a decade.
    • On value capture, Evans argues models show no network effects, so no single one runs away with the market. Persistent competition plus little real product differentiation means little pricing power.
    • Sam Altman’s pitch of selling intelligence on a meter like electricity ignores the brutal margin structure of utilities. Your TV maker does not pay the power company a cut of your bill.
    • The telecom analogy: a roughly trillion-dollar mobile industry spends 15 to 20 percent of revenue on capex, grew data consumption 1,500 to 2,000 times since 2010, and its stocks went nowhere for 25 years because it is a low-margin commodity utility.
    • The elemental question: does the model do the whole thing, or does it need thousands of different apps built by different people? If it needs apps, the labs cannot build them all, just as Microsoft did not, so it looks more like AWS than like Windows.
    • If the product is a commodity, distribution becomes the moat. Google pushes Gemini through its surfaces, Meta sprayed AI across its apps and quietly ranked between ChatGPT and Gemini in usage, and incumbents with distribution have a structural edge.
    • Browsers are the warning: Microsoft used distribution to win the browser war, then it turned out winning browsers did not matter because the value was further up the stack.
    • Apple Intelligence, as shown at WWDC 2024, was the most compelling vision of a personal AI assistant Evans has seen. Apple could not ship it, but neither could anyone else, because tool-using on-device agents with no hallucinations across thousands of apps is genuinely hard.
    • The model is “the dumb thing underneath” that powers a feature. The same commodity model can sit beneath both Gemini on Android and Apple Intelligence on iOS while the products and distribution differ entirely.
    • The anti-AI backlash is a big fuzzy mess. Some is real (local electricity bills, deepfakes, real job anxiety), some is sort of true, and some is simply false.
    • The data-center water panic is largely fake. A Livermore lab study put US data-center water consumption at about 0.017 percent of US water use. Local well conflicts are planning problems, not data-center problems.
    • We have shockingly little hard data. The model labs do not publish meaningful usage numbers. There is no public daily active user figure for ChatGPT, so economists are reverse-engineering effects from government surveys.
    • Real new harms do appear with each wave. A teenager could not use Photoshop to make explicit fakes of every classmate and send them to the whole school in an afternoon. Now they can, and turn them into video.
    • The UK Post Office Horizon scandal (buggy Fujitsu software wrongly showing cash shortfalls, leading to prosecutions, bankruptcies, and suicides) is a reminder that every technology brings new ways to ruin lives, by malice or by accident.
    • You cannot reliably predict what gets exposed. In 1997 people thought taxis were safe from the internet and newspapers would be fine. The opposite happened. Today, “AI-proof” jobs like personal trainer may not be as safe as they look.
    • Uber and Airbnb show that similar-sounding companies can have very different market impact. Uber demolished and then grew the taxi market, while Airbnb’s effect on hotels was fairly marginal because business travel still wants a hotel.
    • Every new technology first lets you do the old thing but more, then unlocks things that were not possible before. Recorded music revenue is U-shaped: first “what if I do not pay 15 dollars for a CD,” then “what if 15 dollars a month gives me all the music there is.” Spotify is not an online music store, it is something else.
    • Coding was supposed to be one of the last things automated, and instead it is the most transformed role of all, which is itself a lesson in how badly we predict exposure.
    • Practical advice: do not stick your head in the sand. Dive in, submerge yourself, and come out understanding what you can do with it. Going into a shrinking job market announcing you will never use AI is not the right posture.
    • Evans’s honest coda: he struggles to find AI use cases because his job is synthesis and precise retrieval, the things models are worst at. He uses it for proofreading, images, redecorating his apartment, and dictation. He is the lawyer looking at VisiCalc.

    Detailed Summary

    AI is as big as the internet, and we are living in 1997

    Evans opens with the opinion he calls his most controversial: AI is as big a deal as the internet or mobile, and only as big a deal as the internet or mobile. To some in tech that sounds dismissive, as if he is underrating a once-in-history event. His reply is that smartphones and the internet were themselves enormous, and we are talking over the internet right now. The deeper point is the comparison’s timing. If this is like the internet, then it is like the internet in 1997: thrilling, but most of it does not work yet, most of what will be built has not been built, and nobody knows how the pieces will fit. His latest 80-slide presentation, he jokes, is essentially 80 ways of saying “we do not know,” which is partly facetious and partly the entire point.

    The jagged frontier and the wide spread of adoption

    Adoption is not uniform, it is a wide distribution. Some people in tech have bought clusters of Mac minis and stopped using Google, while most people outside tech who use AI at all touch it once every week or two. Even among 13 to 18 year olds, daily active use sits around 15 to 20 percent, weekly use adds another 20 percent, and roughly 60 percent say they do not use it. That spread maps onto what Evans calls the jagged frontier: whether a given task works, whether you can predict in advance that it will work, whether it is intuitive, and whether you can even tell after the fact. Software developers are the accountants who just saw VisiCalc, living in a clear before-and-after. Everyone else is somewhere on the curve, picking it up to varying degrees and a little puzzled about what it is for.

    Why the AI labs are buying consultancies

    One of the most counterintuitive trends is that the leading labs are pouring money into forward deployed engineers and professional services, the very category many assumed AI would erase. Evans’s explanation is grounded in how companies actually operate. Firms do not keep spare people sitting around to redesign stores, hunt down churn, or rebuild a tech stack, which is exactly why they hire Bain, BCG, McKinsey, Accenture, or Infosys when a big project appears. Reimagining every internal workflow around AI, then actually plugging vertical and horizontal systems together and retraining people, is itself a multi-month project requiring people you do not have. So the work gets outsourced, and the most advanced labs are funding the firms that do it. His joke lands the point: a forward deployed engineer is a statistician, or an Accenture developer, who happens to work in San Francisco.

    The task versus the job

    This is the spine of the conversation. Ask what the hard part of a job really is. Sometimes the task is the job: the elevator attendant’s whole job was driving the car, the task got automated, the job ended. Much more often the visible task is only a slice. Amazon gets you the SKU once you know which SKU you want, but knowing what to buy is a separate job. Claude Code writes the code, but deciding what to build, for whom, and how to take it to market is the job. A consulting deck is the task, while the reason you pay Bain is for them to walk your company, understand its politics, talk to your customers, and tell you the truth. Evans notes you can already generate a bad McKinsey deck with AI, and the LinkedIn grifters who do are missing that the deck was never the thing you were buying.

    Jevons paradox and the lump of labour fallacy

    The Jevons paradox is just price elasticity applied to labour: make something cheaper to do and you usually do much more of it. Excel did not hand junior bankers their Friday afternoons off, it expanded the work. iPhone developers write a fraction of the raw code because Apple wrote the drivers and file system, and there are not a tenth as many engineers, there are far more. The count of accountants climbed through adding machines, punch cards, mainframes, databases, ERP, spreadsheets, and cloud. The lump of labour fallacy is the broader version: since 1800 every technology has removed jobs and unlocked new ones, the removed jobs usually look bad in hindsight, the new ones tend to be better, and GDP keeps rising. You can always see the job that disappears and never the one that does not exist yet.

    The jobs question, Dario, and the enterprise sales cycle

    On the coming jobs apocalypse, Evans is cautious about argument from authority. Running an AI lab makes Dario Amodei worth listening to on where models go in the next 6 to 12 months, not necessarily on labour economics and comparative advantage. The doomer image of companies buying ChatGPT and firing everyone within weeks misreads reality: enterprise sales cycles run 18 months or longer, nobody is tearing out SAP overnight, and the full transformation will take 3 to 10 years, sector by sector, as people slowly work out what to do. He points to the lag in software itself. Many SaaS companies founded the day before ChatGPT launched could have been built a decade earlier, and were not, because the delay was someone realizing a problem existed and that this was the way to solve it.

    Redefining AGI and superintelligence

    Evans is skeptical of the moving terminology. He cites Larry Tesler’s line that AI is whatever machines cannot do yet, because the moment they can, people call it just software. Machine learning, image recognition, and sentiment analysis all got reclassified as not really AI once they worked, the same way jet airliners were once high technology and are now just planes. AGI is now often quietly redefined as doing some percentage of economically valuable work, which a 1975 mainframe also did, rather than anything about consciousness or a soul. Whether we reach human-level intelligence is, in his view, genuinely unknowable right now. The reassuring point is that you do not need to resolve it. Even if models hit a brick wall tomorrow, what already exists is transformative and will take a decade to deploy.

    Where the value accrues: commodity models and the telecom analogy

    Here Evans makes his most deterministic argument. Foundation models appear to lack network effects, so no single model runs away from the pack, competition persists, and product differentiation as users experience it is thin. Without differentiation or lock-in, where does pricing power come from? He skewers Sam Altman’s image of selling intelligence on a meter like electricity by pointing out that utilities have terrible margins and nobody pays the power company a cut of their TV. His telecom career supplies the analogy: mobile is a roughly trillion-dollar industry that spends 15 to 20 percent of revenue on capex, grew data traffic 1,500 to 2,000 times since 2010, and whose stocks went nowhere for 25 years because it is a low-margin commodity utility while the value sits up the stack with Apple and the app makers. If models are commodities and the real product is thousands of apps the labs will not build, the outcome looks like cloud, not like Windows.

    Distribution as the moat

    If the product is a commodity, distribution decides the winners. The web browser is the cautionary tale: the browser product is a thin wrapper around a rendering engine, tab browsing was the last real innovation 20-plus years ago, Microsoft used distribution to win, and then winning browsers turned out not to matter because the value was elsewhere. Now Google drives Gemini through its surfaces and Meta sprayed AI across its apps and, in survey data, sat between ChatGPT and Gemini in usage despite tech writing it off. An adequate product with great distribution and brand becomes a big deal, which is why OpenAI spent last year trying everything to build a flywheel before the giants defaulted everyone onto their own offering. The power of the default and sheer inertia do a lot of work.

    Apple Intelligence and the model as the dumb thing underneath

    Evans calls the Apple Intelligence segment of WWDC 2024 the most compelling vision of a personal AI assistant he has seen: tool-using, on-device, agentic, with no prompt injection or hallucinations across a standardized API spanning thousands of apps. Apple could not ship it, but neither could anyone else, because that is genuinely hard. The episode illustrates his framing that the model is “the dumb thing underneath” that powers a feature. The same commodity model can sit beneath Gemini intelligence on Android and Apple Intelligence on iOS, with different products, different distribution, and different decisions about what the feature should be. Apple has a billion edge-capable devices, while Google’s “coming soon to our most powerful devices” really means it will not work on most Android phones.

    The anti-AI backlash, water, and real harms

    The backlash, Evans says, is a big fuzzy mess of very different things. Some is tangible, like a higher local electricity bill in a small number of places. Some is essentially fake, like the water panic. He dug into a Livermore lab study putting US data-center water use at about 0.017 percent of national consumption. Local well conflicts are planning failures, not data-center failures. The jobs piece is genuinely unresolved, with charts pointing both ways and a youth employment slowdown that shows up regardless of degree or AI exposure. He stresses how little hard data exists, since the labs publish no meaningful usage numbers and there is no public daily active user figure for ChatGPT. He compares the moment to the social media backlash, compressed, where some fears were true, some half true, and some simply false. The real new harms are real, though: deepfakes let a teenager generate explicit fakes of an entire school in an afternoon, and the UK Post Office Horizon scandal shows how buggy software plus institutional denial can destroy lives.

    You cannot predict what gets exposed, and what to actually do

    Evans dismisses the O*NET-style exercise of scoring what percentage of each profession AI can do as deluded, the modern version of the expert-systems problem, where you try to describe a job as 700 logical steps and it never works. You cannot say a senior partner’s work is 17 percent automatable. The history of prediction is humbling: in 1997 people thought taxis were safe from the internet and newspapers would simply save on printing, and both were wrong. Coding, supposedly one of the last things to automate, became the most transformed role of all. Personal trainers might be next once your phone can watch your form. His closing advice is to presume radical uncertainty and act anyway: do not retreat into sneering moral superiority, dive in, internalize what the tools can do, and make yourself a great hire. He ends with a candid admission that his own synthesis-and-retrieval job is exactly what AI is currently worst at, so he is the lawyer looking at VisiCalc, sure it changes everything while not personally making spreadsheets all day.

    Notable Quotes

    “My most controversial opinion is that I think that AI is as big a deal as the internet or mobile, and only as big a deal as the internet or mobile.”

    Benedict Evans, stating the thesis that frames the whole conversation

    “If you’re going to make the internet comparison, it’s like we’re in 1997. It’s very exciting. Most stuff kind of doesn’t work yet. Most of the stuff that people are going to do hasn’t been built yet.”

    Benedict Evans, on why confident predictions about AI winners are usually wrong

    “You can’t look at a senior partner at a law firm and say, well, 17 percent of their work could be automated. This is horseshit.”

    Benedict Evans, on why O*NET-style job-exposure scoring fails

    “Claude Code can write you the code, but what code do you want? It can make you the features, sure, but what features do you want? Who’s your customer? What’s the right product for that customer?”

    Benedict Evans, drawing the line between the task and the job

    “There’s this quote from Sam Altman where he said we’re going to be selling AI intelligence on a meter like water or electricity, and you look at this and think, my dear sweet child, you need me to explain the margin structure of the utility industry to you.”

    Benedict Evans, on why model labs may lack pricing power

    “The model is just the dumb thing underneath that powers the feature. The model is the commodity that powers different decisions about what the feature should be.”

    Benedict Evans, on why value moves up the stack to applications

    “Every time we have a new technology it automates away a bunch of jobs, and then that automation unlocks a bunch of new jobs, and you don’t know the new job because it doesn’t exist yet.”

    Benedict Evans, on the lump of labour fallacy and 200 years of automation

    “Don’t stick your head in the sand and say I hate all of this stuff. That gives you a great feeling of moral superiority, but that’s not going to help. What helps is you diving into this and coming out understanding what you can do with it.”

    Benedict Evans, on what to actually do about AI right now

    “AI is good at stuff that computers are bad at, and bad at stuff that computers are good at.”

    Benedict Evans, quoting an observation that explains why he struggles to use AI in his own work

    This is a curated set of pulls, not a transcript. To hear the full argument in context, including the telecom and recorded-music charts and the lightning round, watch the full conversation on YouTube here.

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