TL;DR:
Bill Ackman’s Pershing Square Capital Management just released a 28-page investor presentation urging the Trump administration to immediately (1) deem the Treasury’s Senior Preferred Stock repaid, (2) exercise the 79.9% warrants, and (3) relist Fannie Mae (FNMA) and Freddie Mac (FMCC) on the NYSE — all while keeping the GSEs in conservatorship. They claim this can be done before the end of November 2025 and would instantly value the U.S. taxpayer’s stake at over $300 billion without disrupting mortgage affordability.
Key Takeaways
- Fannie & Freddie OTC shares have already more than doubled in 2025 on Trump administration statements.
- The three-step plan (repay SPS → exercise warrants → NYSE relisting) can be executed immediately by Treasury and FHFA.
- Post-relisting, Treasury would own 79.9% of two NYSE-listed companies worth a combined ~$387 billion (Pershing estimate).
- Taxpayers have already received $301 billion in dividends — $25 billion more than required under the original 10% deal.
- Pershing strongly opposes any conversion of Senior Preferred into common — calls it value-destructive and legally risky.
- Relisting unlocks massive institutional buying (many funds are barred from OTC stocks) and fulfills Trump’s campaign promise timing.
- Conservatorship continues for years, giving the administration runway to finalize capital rules, backstop structure, and governance.
Detailed Summary of the Pershing Square Presentation (November 2025)
In a presentation titled “Promises Made, Promises Kept”, Pershing Square lays out a politically and financially attractive path for the second Trump administration to deliver on its GSE reform pledges without raising mortgage rates or rushing a full privatization.
The core argument: the government has already been fully repaid (and then some) via $301 billion of dividends since 2008. The Obama-era 2012 “Net Worth Sweep” was paused under Mnuchin, but never fully reversed. Pershing says a simple letter agreement between Treasury and FHFA can officially retire the Senior Preferred Stock today.
Once the SPS is gone, Treasury can exercise its long-held warrants for 79.9% of the common stock at essentially zero cost. The GSEs already meet every NYSE listing requirement (market cap, float, share price, shareholder count, etc.). FHFA can approve relisting while keeping full conservatorship powers intact — no change to operations, no new capital raises, no dividend payments to juniors until fully recapitalized.
Pershing’s valuation math (as of 12/31/2025):
- Fannie Mae: 16× 2026E EPS → ~$42–45/share → Treasury 79.9% stake ≈ $196 billion
- Freddie Mac: 13× 2026E EPS → ~$44/share → Treasury 79.9% stake ≈ $114 billion
- Total taxpayer value: >$310 billion (plus junior preferred)
They explicitly reject the idea of converting Senior Preferred into common, warning it would trigger new litigation, force government consolidation onto the federal balance sheet, and slash valuations by 27–56% depending on the multiple the market would assign to a company that wiped out private shareholders.
My Thoughts
This is classic Ackman: aggressive, detailed, and perfectly timed to influence policy while he has a massive economic interest (Pershing owns large common positions in both GSEs). The beauty of the proposal is that it is genuinely low-risk from a mortgage-market standpoint and gives the administration an instant “win” before Thanksgiving 2025.
The politics line up perfectly: Trump gets to post on Truth Social that he turned two “bailed-out” companies into a $300 billion+ taxpayer windfall, keeps 30-year mortgage rates stable (or even lower), and still retains total control to shape the final exit over the next three years.
If Treasury and FHFA actually follow the three steps before November 30, 2025, the OTC-to-NYSE pop could be one of the largest wealth-transfer events in market history — and almost entirely to existing common shareholders (retail + hedge funds that held on since 2008).
Watch for any joint Treasury/FHFA announcement or letter agreement in the next two weeks. That will be the trigger.
Disclosure: Like Pershing Square, the author may have direct or indirect exposure to FNMA/FMCC securities.