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  • Bill Ackman on Investment Strategy, What the Market Is Missing, and How AI Breaks Businesses

    Bill Ackman, founder and CEO of Pershing Square, joined the All-In Podcast for a conversation about how his investment approach has shifted toward permanent, long-term ownership, why he believes the highest-quality companies are being left behind by a market chasing the new new thing, and how AI is raising the risk of disruption for almost every business. He also lays out his plan to turn Howard Hughes into a Berkshire Hathaway-style compounding machine built on insurance. You can watch the full conversation here. Below is a structured breakdown of the ideas, the stories, and the frameworks he uses to underwrite a business.

    TLDW

    Ackman explains how his philosophy evolved from a smaller, more liquid activist toward concentrated, permanent ownership of durable, non-disruptible businesses, with much of his activism now playing out on X rather than in the boardroom. He tells the origin story of his first big trade, Wendy’s and the Tim Hortons spin-off, and explains why a large long-term shareholder on a board is an antidote to short-term markets. On AI, he argues that this is the greatest era in history to build a company, which means the risk of being disrupted has gone up enormously, and that the market is mispricing high-quality compounders like Microsoft, Meta, and Amazon while crowding into chips, semiconductors, and energy. He works through the SaaS question and why niche software is more at risk than platforms, how he underwrites SpaceX, xAI, OpenAI, Anthropic, and Palantir like late-stage venture bets using a people, opportunity, context, deal framework, and why founder-led companies have an edge in making radical calls. The back half covers his Howard Hughes plan to copy Buffett’s insurance-float model, the role of cost of capital and reflexivity in markets, the meme-stock era, going direct on social media, and the three different ways an investor can put money to work with Pershing Square.

    Thoughts

    The most useful idea in the interview is the way Ackman reframes disruption as the central investing problem of the AI era. His point is that the same forces making this the best time in history to start a company, meaning near-unlimited compute, capital, and talent, also raise the odds that any given incumbent gets disrupted. That reframes the word quality. It is no longer mostly about margins and moats. It becomes about non-disruptibility, which is a much higher bar than most quality investors were using a decade ago, and it is why he says most of his research time now goes into assessing that single risk.

    The what-the-market-is-missing thesis is classic contrarian Ackman. Arguing that Microsoft, Meta, and Amazon are the new old-fashioned, undervalued names while capital piles into semiconductors and energy is a direct echo of 2000, when Berkshire Hathaway bottomed precisely because money was chasing internet stocks. It is worth keeping in mind that he owns all three, so the call is also his book. The durable signal here is the framework, not the specific tickers: capital reliably chases the new new thing, and genuinely high-quality businesses get left behind during those rotations.

    The Howard Hughes plan is the most concrete bet in the conversation. Copying Buffett’s insurance-float playbook, short-term treasuries for policyholder money and equities for the surplus, onto a discounted real-estate holding company is elegant. The hard part is exactly what Ackman flags about insurance as an industry: the best investors go to hedge funds, not insurers, so most insurance companies only ever manage the liability side well. Pershing Square’s edge is that Ackman can both write the business and invest the float, which is the same reason it worked for Buffett. The framing of going from a four billion dollar company to a trillion over fifty years is a statement of intent, not a forecast, and should be read that way.

    Underneath all of it sits cost of capital and reflexivity. His observation that a higher stock price literally makes a company more valuable, because it lowers the cost of capital and creates acquisition currency, is the mechanism behind both Elon Musk’s empire and the meme-stock era he is wary of. Going direct on X is the same lever pointed at himself: communicate the vision, lower your own cost of capital, and make the bet easier for other people to place. It is a coherent worldview in which narrative and balance sheet continuously feed each other, and it explains a lot of his behavior over the last few years.

    Key Takeaways

    • The biggest change in Ackman’s approach over time is an appreciation for business quality, meaning long-term, durable, protected, non-disruptible growth as the most important factor.
    • He says he is as activist as ever, but more of it now happens on X than in the traditional corporate context.
    • His first big investment was Wendy’s, which owned Tim Hortons. The simple thesis was to buy Wendy’s, spin off Tim Hortons, and double the money.
    • Early on no one returned his calls, so he had Steve Schwarzman’s Blackstone write a fairness opinion, filed it publicly, and the company spun off Tim Hortons six weeks later. The CEO later thanked him after being fired with a large exit package.
    • Reputation compounds. Where Pershing Square once had to bang down the door, companies now sometimes tweet a welcome when it buys a stake.
    • A large long-term shareholder on a board is a counterweight to short-term markets, letting management test ideas privately and pursue initiatives that hurt the next few quarters of earnings.
    • Pershing Square owns Microsoft, Meta, and Amazon. Ackman argues you are either invested in AI directly or indirectly, or it is a threat, so you have to understand it.
    • The hardest and most important job for a concentrated investor is judging the risk of disruption, and that risk has risen dramatically.
    • This is the greatest era in history to build a business because of near-unlimited access to compute, capital, and talent, which is exactly why the probability of being disrupted has gone up enormously.
    • Markets bring their eye to the new new thing, currently chips, semiconductors, and energy, while high-quality companies get left behind.
    • He draws an analogy to 2000, when Berkshire Hathaway traded at one of its lowest valuations because everyone chased internet stocks. He sees a similar dynamic around Amazon, Meta, and Microsoft today.
    • On the SaaS question, he worries more about a Salesforce than a platform like Microsoft, because niche software charging high per-seat or per-year prices is most exposed, while low-priced platforms are safer.
    • Any software company today has to be as AI-enabled as possible, or risk losing the monopolistic pricing it once enjoyed.
    • His famous March 2020 CNBC appearance was an attempt to reach President Trump and argue for a short shutdown, paired with the view that stocks were incredibly cheap and worth buying.
    • He describes valuation as a tether on the market: when prices stretch too high they snap back, and when they get too cheap the same rubber band pulls valuations up. Calling that out publicly can trigger a psychological reset.
    • His recent bullish call came because stocks of really high-quality companies had gotten crazy cheap on fundamentals, meaning the present value of the cash they generate.
    • He underwrites high-multiple names like SpaceX as venture investments using a framework from business school: people, opportunity, context, deal.
    • On SpaceX, people and opportunity are one of one, the context is incredible, and Starlink plus near-monopoly low-cost launch make it strategically valuable. The complicated part is the deal, meaning the valuation. He invested via an SPV after Ron Baron’s nudge, and also invested in xAI.
    • He treats OpenAI, Anthropic, and Palantir as late-stage venture bets that have proven they can generate real revenue, and says OpenAI should do a better job communicating how it thinks about its enormous capital commitments.
    • Every CEO in America is asking how to use AI, how it applies to their business, and how it is a threat. It is top of mind and boards open every meeting with it.
    • He has not seen much enterprise AI success yet, citing a McKinsey study that 95 percent of enterprise initiatives fail and the rise of the forward deployed engineer as the hot role bridging promise and ROI. Pershing Square itself uses AI mainly for legal, compliance, and back-office work.
    • Founder-led companies have an advantage because founders have the authority and the economic stake to make radical calls, while the average S&P 500 CEO has a roughly three to four year tenure and is incentivized not to make mistakes.
    • He cites Mark Zuckerberg buying Instagram and WhatsApp as the kind of shocking-at-the-time calls that a founder with a track record can make.
    • Ben Graham’s enduring lesson is that a stock is an interest in a business, not a piece of paper, but Graham mostly invested in liquidations and cash-rich shells, and made most of his money on Geico.
    • Most of Buffett’s value at Berkshire came from owning insurance operations and focusing on the asset side of the balance sheet, not just the liability side.
    • Insurance is hard to copy because top investors do not go to work for insurers. Buffett owned half his company and was a great investor, which is why it worked.
    • Howard Hughes came out of the General Growth bankruptcy and owns master-planned cities like Summerlin, with 26,000 acres in the Las Vegas area, comparable to the Irvine Company that built roughly a hundred billion dollars of wealth for Donald Bren.
    • The plan is to reinvest the cash Howard Hughes generates into insurance, put policyholder float in short-term treasuries and the surplus in common stocks, and build a compounding machine over fifty years, buying it at roughly sixty cents on the dollar.
    • A company must earn a return above its cost of capital for the stock to rise. Elon Musk has kept his companies’ cost of capital extremely low, and a SpaceX IPO near a 1.75 trillion dollar valuation could be one of the lowest cost of equity capital transactions ever.
    • Markets have changed less because of Ackman and more because of figures like Ryan Cohen and GameStop, where a stock can trade well above its value on personality and an army of followers.
    • Higher valuations are reflexive: a rising stock price lowers cost of capital and creates currency to issue stock and acquire businesses, which is part of how Elon built Tesla.
    • There are three ways to invest with Pershing Square: the management company itself (a royalty on compounding assets with no capex), PSUS (a portfolio of best ideas trading at an 18 percent discount), and Howard Hughes (a bet on building the next Berkshire). A dollar invested 22 years ago became roughly 27 to 28 times net of fees.
    • Going direct on X, with 2.2 million followers, lets him communicate his vision and lower the friction for others to back his bets, even as his very long tweets have become a running meme.

    Detailed Summary

    From activist trades to permanent capital

    Ackman frames the evolution of his career as a steady move toward business quality. As a smaller, more liquid investor early on, he did not have to think as long-term. As Pershing Square became a bigger, more concentrated investor, durable growth became the dominant factor in every decision. He insists he is still as activist as ever, but a lot of that energy has shifted to X, where he can argue a position publicly rather than only inside a boardroom. The best investments, he notes, are the ones where you do not need to join the board and do anything at all.

    The Wendy’s and Tim Hortons origin story

    One of Pershing Square’s first investments was Wendy’s, which owned the Canadian coffee and donut chain Tim Hortons. The value of Tim Hortons alone was greater than the entire value of Wendy’s, so the idea was simple: buy Wendy’s, spin off Tim Hortons, and double the money. Ackman bought ten percent of the company and could not get the CEO to return a single call, so he had a contact at Blackstone, with Steve Schwarzman’s sign-off, write a fairness opinion on what Wendy’s would be worth after a spin-off, filed it publicly, and watched the spin-off happen six weeks later. The CEO eventually called back to thank him, having been fired but rewarded with a large exit package. Over the years that scrappy approach gave way to a reputation that now opens doors on its own.

    Why a long-term shareholder on the board matters

    The core problem of being a public company, in Ackman’s telling, is the short-term nature of markets and analysts, when a good business should be run in the context of years and even decades. A large, supportive shareholder on the board gives management a place to test ideas before exposing them to the public and a credible voice willing to back initiatives that hurt earnings for a few quarters. That is the value-add he believes a constructive activist can bring to a mature public company, as opposed to a startup where the best outcome is simply to own a great business and stay out of the way.

    AI and the rising risk of disruption

    For a concentrated, long-term investor, the most challenging task is judging the risk that two people from Stanford in a garage build something that destroys your thesis. Ackman argues that risk has climbed dramatically because this is the greatest era in history to build a company, with near-unlimited access to compute, capital, and talent. The paradox is that the conditions that make building easier also make incumbents more fragile, so the bulk of his research now centers on assessing how disruptible a business really is.

    What the market is missing

    Investors bring their attention to the new new thing, currently chips, semiconductors, and energy, which leaves high-quality companies behind. Ackman compares the moment to 2000, when Berkshire Hathaway traded at one of its lowest valuations ever because capital was chasing internet stocks. He sees an echo today in how Amazon, Meta, and Microsoft are treated as old-fashioned, and he considers them undervalued on fundamentals, where value is the present value of the cash a business generates over its life. His recent bullish call, like his March 2020 appearance, came because stocks of really high-quality companies had simply gotten too cheap.

    The SaaS question and AI-enabled software

    On the so-called SaaS apocalypse, Ackman says it is a company-by-company analysis. He worries more about something like Salesforce than about a low-priced platform. The companies most at risk are those that extracted near-monopolistic profits by charging a high annual price for a niche product, because AI lowers the barrier to replicating that functionality. A platform where the average customer pays a small amount per seat, like Microsoft, is far less exposed. The takeaway for any software company is to become as AI-enabled as it possibly can.

    Underwriting SpaceX, xAI, and the AI labs like venture

    For the highest-multiple private companies, Ackman uses a venture lens and a framework a business school professor taught him: people, opportunity, context, deal. SpaceX scores as one of one on people and opportunity, with an incredible context and a near-monopoly in low-cost launch through Starlink, which makes even Amazon a likely customer. The complicated variable is the deal, meaning the valuation, and he admits he has not done all the math, having invested through an SPV after Ron Baron encouraged him, along with a position in xAI. He treats OpenAI, Anthropic, and Palantir as late-stage venture bets that have proven real revenue, and argues OpenAI in particular should communicate more clearly how it justifies capital commitments that vastly exceed current revenue.

    Founder-led companies and the authority to act

    Ackman agrees that founder-led companies have a structural advantage in a fast-changing environment. The average S&P 500 CEO has a tenure of roughly three to four years, a small economic stake, and an incentive not to make a career-ending mistake. A founder is betting an entire life and reputation, has the authority of a major voting and economic position, and has usually made several hard, contrarian calls that turned out right. He points to Mark Zuckerberg’s acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp, which looked shocking at the time, as exactly the kind of decision a founder with a track record can make and a hired manager often cannot.

    Howard Hughes as Berkshire Hathaway 2.0

    Ackman points to a detailed financial history of Berkshire Hathaway showing that the vast majority of Buffett’s value creation came from owning insurance and focusing on the asset side of the balance sheet, not just the liability side. Insurance is hard to replicate because skilled investors join hedge funds rather than insurers, but Buffett owned half his company and was a great investor. Pershing Square is applying the same idea to Howard Hughes, a company created out of the General Growth bankruptcy that owns master-planned cities such as Summerlin, with 26,000 acres around Las Vegas, in the spirit of the Irvine Company that made Donald Bren roughly a hundred billion dollars. The plan is to reinvest the company’s cash into insurance, place policyholder float in short-term treasuries and the surplus in common stocks, avoid issuing stock the way Buffett did, and compound for fifty years, all bought at around sixty cents on the dollar.

    Cost of capital, reflexivity, and going direct

    A company only creates value when it earns above its cost of capital, which is why Howard Hughes, seen as a high-cost-of-capital real-estate business, has long traded at a discount, and why Ackman is repurposing its assets into a higher-returning model. He highlights how reflexive markets are: a higher stock price itself makes a company more valuable by lowering its cost of capital and creating currency to raise money and acquire businesses, a lever Elon Musk used to build Tesla. He attributes real market change less to himself and more to figures like Ryan Cohen and GameStop, where personality and a following can lift a stock far above its value. His own going-direct strategy on X, with 2.2 million followers and famously long posts, is the same mechanism applied to communicating a vision and lowering friction for investors. He closes by laying out three ways to invest with Pershing Square: the management company as a royalty on compounding assets, the PSUS portfolio trading at an 18 percent discount, and Howard Hughes as a bet on building the next Berkshire.

    Notable Quotes

    “The best investments are one where you don’t need to join the board and do anything.”

    Bill Ackman, on the kind of business he most wants to own

    “The probability of your being disrupted has gone up enormously.”

    Bill Ackman, on why assessing disruption risk now dominates his research

    “Valuation is like a tether on the market, right? When it gets too high, it’s like this rubber band that’s stretching and inevitably it bounces back.”

    Bill Ackman, on how prices revert at both extremes

    “People, opportunity, context, deal.”

    Bill Ackman, on the business school framework he uses to underwrite companies like SpaceX

    “Every CEO in America today is like, how do I use AI?”

    Bill Ackman, on AI as the top opportunity and threat in every boardroom

    “A closed mouth gathers no foot.”

    Bill Ackman, quoting the line a friend put next to his name in his high school yearbook

    “The increase in value of the company increases the value of the company, right? Because it lowers the cost of capital, it gives you more flexibility, gives you the ability to issue stock, raise capital, acquire other businesses.”

    Bill Ackman, on the reflexivity between stock price and corporate value

    “The company’s got like a $4 billion market cap and the goal is to build it into a trillion dollar thing over time compounding.”

    Bill Ackman, on his fifty-year plan for Howard Hughes

    Taken together, the conversation is a tour of how Ackman now thinks about quality, disruption, and compounding, and a preview of the Berkshire-style machine he wants to build out of Howard Hughes. Watch the full conversation here.

    Related Reading

  • Krishna Rao on Anthropic Going From 9 Billion to 30 Billion ARR in One Quarter and the Compute Strategy Powering Claude

    Krishna Rao, Chief Financial Officer of Anthropic, sat down with Patrick O’Shaughnessy on Invest Like the Best for one of the most detailed public looks yet at the operating engine behind Claude. He covers how Anthropic compounded from $9 billion of run rate revenue at the start of the year to north of $30 billion by the end of Q1, why he spends 30 to 40 percent of his time on compute, the playbook for buying gigawatts of AI infrastructure across Trainium, TPU, and GPU platforms, how Anthropic prices its models, why returns to frontier intelligence keep climbing, and what the Mythos release tells us about the cyber capabilities of the next generation of Claude.

    TLDW

    Anthropic is running the most compute fungible frontier lab in the world, with active deployments across AWS Trainium, Google TPU, and Nvidia GPU, and an internal orchestration layer that lets a chip serve inference in the morning and run reinforcement learning the same evening. Krishna Rao explains the cone of uncertainty that governs gigawatt scale compute procurement, the floor Anthropic refuses to drop below on model development compute, the Jevons paradox unlock from cutting Opus pricing, the 500 percent annualized net dollar retention from enterprise customers, the layer cake of long term deals with Google, Broadcom, Amazon, and the recent xAI Colossus tie up in Memphis, the phased release of the Mythos model in response to spiking cyber capabilities, the internal use of Claude Code to produce statutory financial statements and run a Monthly Financial Review skill, and why the team believes scaling laws are alive and well. The interview also covers fundraising history through Series D and Series E, the $75 billion already raised plus another $50 billion coming, talent density beating talent mass during the Meta poaching wave, and Rao’s belief that biotech and drug discovery represent the most exciting frontier for AI.

    Key Takeaways

    • Anthropic entered the year with about $9 billion of run rate revenue and ended the first quarter with north of $30 billion of run rate revenue, a more than 3x leap driven by model intelligence gains and the products built around them.
    • Compute is described as the lifeblood of the company, the canvas everything else is built on, and the most consequential class of decisions Rao makes. Buy too much and you go bankrupt. Buy too little and you cannot serve customers or stay at the frontier.
    • Rao spends 30 to 40 percent of his time on compute, even today, and the leadership team meets repeatedly on both procurement and ongoing compute allocation.
    • Anthropic is the only frontier language lab actively using all three major chip platforms in production: AWS Trainium, Google TPU, and Nvidia GPU. It is also the only major model available on all three clouds.
    • Flexibility is the central design principle. Anthropic builds flexibility into the deals themselves, into the orchestration layer that maps workloads to chips, and into compilers built from the chip level up.
    • The cone of uncertainty frames procurement. Small differences in weekly or monthly growth compound into wildly different two year outcomes, so the team plans across a range of scenarios rather than a single point estimate, and ranges toward the upper end while protecting downside.
    • Compute allocation across the company sits in three buckets: model development and research, internal employee acceleration, and external customer serving. A non negotiable floor protects model development even when customer demand is tight.
    • Anthropic estimates that if it cut off internal employee use of its own models, the freed compute could serve billions of dollars of additional revenue. It chooses not to, because internal use compounds into better future models.
    • Intelligence is multi dimensional, not a single IQ score. Anthropic measures real world capability through customer feedback, long horizon task performance, tool use, computer use, and speed at agentic tasks, not just leaderboard benchmarks that have largely saturated.
    • Each Opus generation, 4 to 4.5 to 4.6 to 4.7, delivers both capability improvements and an efficiency multiplier on token processing. New models often serve customers at a fraction of the prior cost while doing more.
    • Reinforcement learning is described as inference inside a sandbox with a reward function, so model efficiency gains directly improve internal RL throughput. The flywheel is tightly coupled.
    • Over 90 percent of code at Anthropic is now written by Claude Code, and a large share of Claude Code itself is written by Claude Code.
    • Anthropic shipped roughly 30 distinct product and feature releases in January and the pace has accelerated since.
    • Scaling laws, in Anthropic’s internal data, are alive and well. The team holds itself to a skeptical scientific standard and still does not see them slowing down.
    • Anthropic recently signed a 5 gigawatt deal with Google and Broadcom for TPUs starting in 2027, plus an Amazon Trainium agreement for up to 5 gigawatts, totaling more than $100 billion in commitments. A significant portion lands this year and next year.
    • A new partnership for capacity at the xAI Colossus facility in Memphis was announced just before the interview, aimed at expanding consumer and prosumer capacity.
    • Pricing has been remarkably stable across Haiku, Sonnet, and Opus. The biggest deliberate change was lowering Opus pricing, which produced a textbook Jevons paradox: consumption rose far faster than the price drop, and the new Opus 4.6 and 4.7 slot in at the same price point.
    • Mythos is the first model Anthropic chose to release in a phased way because of a sharp spike in cyber capability. In an open source codebase where a prior model found 22 security vulnerabilities, Mythos found roughly 250.
    • The Mythos release framework focuses on defensive use first, expands access over time, and is presented as a template for future capability spikes.
    • Anthropic now sells to 9 of the Fortune 10 and reports net dollar retention above 500 percent on an annualized basis. These are not pilots. Rao describes signing two double digit million dollar commitments during a 20 minute Uber ride to the studio.
    • The platform strategy is mostly horizontal. Anthropic will go vertical with offerings like Claude for Financial Services, Claude for Life Sciences, and Claude Security where it can demonstrate the model’s capabilities, but expects most application value to accrue to customers building on top.
    • Investors raised over $75 billion in equity since Rao joined, with another $50 billion in commitments tied to the Amazon and Google deals. Capital intensity is real, but the raises fund the upper end of the cone of uncertainty more than they fund current losses.
    • The Series E close coincided with the day the DeepSeek news broke, forcing investors to reassess their AI thesis in real time. Anthropic closed the round anyway.
    • Inside finance, Claude now produces statutory financial statements for every Anthropic legal entity, with a human checker. A library of more than 70 finance specific skills underpins workflows.
    • A custom Monthly Financial Review skill produces a 90 to 95 percent ready monthly close report, so leadership discussion shifts from reconciling numbers to debating implications.
    • An internal real time analytics platform called Anthrop Stats compresses weekly insight cycles from hours to about 30 minutes.
    • The biggest token user inside Anthropic’s finance team is the head of tax, focused on tax policy engines and workflow automation. The most senior people, not the youngest, are leading internal adoption.
    • Talent density beats talent mass. When Meta and others ran aggressive offer waves, Anthropic lost two people while peer labs lost dozens.
    • All seven Anthropic co founders remain at the company, as does most of the first 20 to 30 employees, which Rao credits to a collaborative, transparent, debate friendly culture and a real culture interview that can veto otherwise top tier candidates.
    • Dario Amodei holds an open all hands every two weeks, writes a short prepared document, and takes unscripted questions from anyone at the company.
    • AI safety investments in interpretability and alignment have a commercial side effect. Looking inside the model helps Anthropic build better models, and enterprises selling sensitive workloads want to trust the lab they hand customer data to.
    • Anthropic explicitly identifies as America first in its approach to model development, and engages closely with the US administration on capability releases such as Mythos.
    • The longer term product vision is the virtual collaborator: an agent with organizational context, access to the company’s tools, persistent memory, and the ability to work on ideas, not just tasks, over long horizons.
    • CoWork, Anthropic’s extension of the Claude Code paradigm into general knowledge work, is being adopted faster than Claude Code itself when indexed to the same point in its launch curve.
    • Anthropic’s product teams ship daily, with a fleet of agents working across the company on specific tasks. Everyone effectively becomes a manager of agents.
    • The dominant downside risks to Anthropic’s high end forecast are slower customer diffusion of model capability into real workflows, scaling laws flattening unexpectedly, and Anthropic losing its position at the frontier.
    • Rao is most excited about biotech and healthcare outcomes, especially the prospect that AI could push drug discovery and lab throughput up 10x or 100x, turning currently incurable diagnoses into treatable ones within a patient’s lifetime.

    Detailed Summary

    Compute as Lifeblood and the Cone of Uncertainty

    Rao opens with the claim that compute is the most important resource at Anthropic, and the most consequential decision class in the company. You cannot buy a gigawatt of compute next week. You have to anticipate demand a year or two in advance, and the cost of being wrong in either direction is high. Buy too much and the unit economics collapse. Buy too little and you cannot serve customers or stay at the frontier, which are described as the same failure mode. To navigate this, the team uses a cone of uncertainty rather than point estimates. Small differences in weekly growth compound into vastly different two year outcomes, and Anthropic tries to position itself toward the upper end of that cone while preserving optionality. Rao notes he has had to consciously break a lifetime of linear thinking and force himself into exponential models.

    Three Chip Platforms, One Orchestration Layer

    Anthropic uses Amazon’s Trainium, Google’s TPUs, and Nvidia’s GPUs fungibly. That was not free. Adopting TPUs at scale started around the third TPU generation, when outside observers thought it was a strange choice. Anthropic invested years into compilers and orchestration so workloads can flow across chips by generation and by job type. The team works deeply with Annapurna Labs at AWS to influence Trainium roadmaps because Anthropic stresses these chips harder than almost anyone. The result is what Rao believes is the most efficient utilization of compute across any frontier lab, with a dollar of compute going further inside Anthropic than anywhere else.

    Three Buckets and the Model Development Floor

    Compute gets allocated across model development, internal acceleration of employees, and customer serving. The conversations are collaborative rather than zero sum, but there is a hard floor on model development that the company refuses to cross even if it makes customer demand harder to serve in the short term. The thesis is simple. The returns to frontier intelligence are extremely high, especially in enterprise, so cutting model investment to chase near term revenue is a bad trade. Internal employee use is also explicitly protected. Rao notes that diverting that internal usage to external customers would unlock billions of additional revenue today, but the compounding benefit of accelerating researchers and engineers outweighs that.

    Intelligence Is Multi Dimensional

    Rao pushes back hard on the IQ framing of model progress. Benchmarks saturate quickly, and the real signal comes from how customers actually use the models. Anthropic looks at long horizon task completion, tool use, computer use, and time to result on agentic tasks. Two equally capable agents who differ only in speed produce dramatically different value, because the faster one compounds into more attempts and more outcomes. Frontier model leaps are also fuel efficient. The sedan to sports car analogy breaks down because each Opus generation, 4 to 4.5 to 4.6 to 4.7, delivers a step up in capability and a multiplier on per token efficiency.

    From 9 Billion to 30 Billion ARR in One Quarter

    The headline number for the quarter is a leap from about $9 billion of run rate revenue to over $30 billion, accomplished without onboarding a corresponding step up in compute, because new compute lands on ramps locked in 12 months prior. Rao attributes the leap to model capability gains, products that surface that intelligence in usable form factors, and an enterprise customer base that pulls more workloads onto Claude as each generation unlocks new use cases. Coding started the wave with Sonnet 3.5 and 3.6, and the same pattern is now playing out elsewhere in the economy.

    Recursive Self Improvement and Talent Density

    Over 90 percent of Anthropic’s code is now written by Claude Code, including most of Claude Code itself. Rao describes this as a structural reason to keep allocating internal compute to employees even when external demand is hungry. Recursive self improvement is not happening through models that need no humans. It is happening through researchers who set direction and use frontier models to compress months of work into days. Talent density beats talent mass. When Meta and other labs went after Anthropic researchers with very large packages, Anthropic lost two people while peer labs lost dozens.

    Procurement Strategy and the Layer Cake

    Compute lands as a layer cake. Last month Anthropic signed a 5 gigawatt TPU deal with Google and Broadcom starting in 2027, alongside an Amazon Trainium agreement for up to 5 gigawatts. The total is north of $100 billion in commitments. A new tie up with xAI’s Colossus facility in Memphis was announced just before the interview, intended for nearer term capacity to support consumer and prosumer growth. Anthropic evaluates near term and long term compute deals against the same set of variables: price, duration, location, chip type, and how efficiently the team can run it. The relationships are deeper than procurement. The hyperscalers are also distribution channels for the model.

    Platform First, Selective Vertical Bets

    Rao describes Anthropic as a platform first business, with most expected value accruing to customers building on the platform. The team will only go vertical when it can either demonstrate capabilities that are skating to where the puck is going, like Claude Code did before the models could fully support it, or when it wants to set a template for an industry vertical, as with Claude for Financial Services, Claude for Life Sciences, and Claude Security. He acknowledges that surprise capability jumps make customers anxious about the platform competing with them, and frames Anthropic’s mitigation as deeper partnerships, early access programs, and an emphasis on accelerating customer building rather than disintermediating it.

    Pricing, Jevons Paradox, and Return on Compute

    Pricing across Haiku, Sonnet, and Opus has been stable. The notable exception is Opus, which Anthropic deliberately repriced lower when launching Opus 4.5 because Opus class problems were being squeezed into Sonnet workloads. Efficiency gains made it possible to serve Opus profitably at the new level. The consumption response was a classic Jevons paradox, with usage rising far more than the price reduction would have predicted, and Opus 4.6 then slotted in at the same price with a capability bump. Margins are not framed as a per token markup. Compute is fungible across model development, internal acceleration, and customer serving, so Anthropic measures return on the entire compute envelope rather than software style variable cost per call.

    Fundraising, DeepSeek, and Capital Intensity

    Rao joined while Anthropic was closing its Series D, mid frontier model launch and during the FTX share liquidation. Investors initially questioned whether Anthropic needed a frontier model, whether AI safety and a real business could coexist, and why the sales team was so small. The Series E closed the same day the DeepSeek news broke, with markets violently re pricing AI in real time. Since Rao joined, Anthropic has raised over $75 billion, with another $50 billion tied to the Amazon and Google compute deals. The reason for the size of the raises is the cone of uncertainty, not current losses. Returns on compute today are described as robust.

    Mythos, Cyber Capability, and Phased Releases

    The Mythos release marks the first time Anthropic shipped a model under a deliberately phased rollout because of a specific capability spike. Cyber is the dimension that spiked. Where a prior model found 22 vulnerabilities in an open source codebase, Mythos found roughly 250. The defensive applications, automatically patching massive codebases, are genuinely valuable, but the offensive risk is real enough that Anthropic chose to release to a smaller group first and expand access over time. Rao positions this as a template for future capability spikes, not a permanent restriction. He also describes the relationship with the US administration as cooperative, including the Department of War interaction, with Anthropic supporting a regulatory framework that does not strangle innovation but takes responsibility seriously.

    Claude Inside Finance

    Anthropic’s finance team is one of the strongest internal case studies. Statutory financial statements for every legal entity are produced by Claude, with a human reviewer. A skill library of more than 70 finance specific skills underpins a Monthly Financial Review skill that drafts the monthly close at 90 to 95 percent ready, so leadership meetings shift from explaining the numbers to discussing what to do about them. An internal analytics platform called Anthrop Stats compresses weekly insight cycles from hours to 30 minutes. The biggest internal token user in finance is the head of tax, building policy engines, which Rao highlights as evidence that adoption is driven by the most senior people, not just younger engineers.

    Culture, Co Founders, and the Race to the Top

    Seven co founders should not, on paper, work as a leadership group. Rao argues it works because the culture was set early around collaboration, intellectual honesty, transparency, and humility. The culture interview is a real veto, not a checkbox. Dario Amodei runs an all hands every two weeks with a short written piece followed by unscripted questions, and decisions, once made, get clean alignment rather than residual politics. Anthropic frames its approach as a race to the top, where being a model for how to build the technology responsibly is itself a recruiting and retention advantage.

    The Virtual Collaborator and the Frontier Ahead

    The product vision Rao describes is the virtual collaborator. Not just a smarter chatbot, but an agent with organizational context, access to the company’s tools, memory, and the ability to work on ideas over long horizons. Coding was the first domain to feel this, but CoWork, Anthropic’s extension of the Claude Code pattern into general knowledge work, is being adopted faster than Claude Code was at the same age. Product development inside Anthropic already looks different. Teams ship daily, with fleets of agents working across the company, and individual humans increasingly act as managers of those fleets.

    Downside Risks and What Excites Him Most

    The three risks Rao names if asked to do a premortem on a softer year are slower customer diffusion of model capability into real workflows, scaling laws unexpectedly flattening, and Anthropic losing its frontier position to competitors. None of these are observed today, but he is unwilling to claim them with certainty. On the upside, he is most excited about biotech and healthcare. Lab throughput rising 10x or 100x, paired with AI assisted clinical workflows, could turn currently incurable diagnoses into treatable ones within a patient’s lifetime. That is the outcome he wants the technology to chase.

    Thoughts

    The most consequential structural point in this interview is the framing of compute as a single fungible resource pool measured by return on the entire envelope, not as a variable cost per inference call. That accounting shift, if you accept it, breaks most of the bear cases about AI lab unit economics. The bear argument almost always assumes that a token served to a customer is the only thing the chip did that day. Rao’s version is that the same fleet trains models in the morning, runs reinforcement learning at lunch, serves customers in the afternoon, and accelerates internal engineers in the evening. If even half of that is real, the right comparison is total compute spend versus total enterprise value created by the platform, and on that ratio Anthropic looks structurally strong rather than weak.

    The Jevons paradox on Opus pricing is the most actionable insight for anyone running an AI product. Most teams default to either chasing premium pricing on the newest model or undercutting to chase volume. Anthropic did something more disciplined: it left Sonnet and Haiku alone, dropped Opus when efficiency gains made it serveable, and watched aggregate usage rise faster than the price cut. The lesson is that frontier model pricing is not really a price problem. It is a capability access problem, and elasticity around the right tier is much higher than the standard SaaS playbook implies.

    The Mythos cyber jump deserves more attention than it has gotten. Going from 22 to 250 vulnerabilities found in the same codebase is the kind of capability discontinuity that genuinely changes the regulatory calculus. Anthropic is signaling that it can identify these discontinuities ahead of release and choose a deployment shape that respects them. Whether peer labs adopt similar discipline is the open question. Anthropic’s race to the top framing assumes they will be forced to. The competitive market may say otherwise.

    The hiring data point is the most underrated investor signal. Two departures while peer labs lost dozens, during the most aggressive talent war in tech history, is not a culture poster. It is a structural advantage that compounds every time another lab tries to buy its way to the frontier. Money can be matched. Conviction in the mission, transparent leadership, and a culture interview that can veto otherwise stellar candidates cannot. If you believe scaling laws hold, talent retention at this density is one of the few moats that actually scales with capital.

    Finally, the most interesting personal admission is that Krishna Rao, a finance leader trained at Blackstone and Cedar, is openly telling investors that linear thinking is the failure mode he had to break out of. The companies that pattern match this moment to prior technology waves are mispricing it, in both directions. The cone of uncertainty Anthropic uses internally is the right metaphor for everyone else too. If you are forecasting AI as if it is cloud in 2010, you are almost certainly wrong, and the magnitude of the error is much larger than it would be in any prior era.

    Watch the full conversation with Krishna Rao on Invest Like the Best here.