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  • Can the AI Industry Regulate Itself? All-In on Demis Hassabis’s SRO Proposal, Stripe’s PayPal Bid, Apple vs OpenAI, and New York’s Data Center Ban

    The besties open on the biggest live question in artificial intelligence policy: can the AI industry regulate itself before the government does it for them? Jason Calacanis, Chamath Palihapitiya, David Sacks, and David Friedberg dig into DeepMind co-founder Demis Hassabis’s proposal for a FINRA-style self-regulatory organization for frontier models, then work through a packed docket that runs from Stripe’s audacious bid for PayPal to Apple’s trade-secrets lawsuit against OpenAI, the xAI Grok Build data leak, the economics of token spend, New York’s first-in-the-nation data center moratorium, foreign influence campaigns shaping American attitudes toward AI, and a science corner on an enzyme that reverses skin aging. You can watch the full episode here.

    TLDW

    Demis Hassabis proposed a US-led international AI standards body modeled on FINRA: federally overseen, industry funded, run by independent technical experts, with frontier labs submitting models 30 days before release, voluntary at first and mandatory later. The proposal drew broad endorsement across the industry, and the besties debate whether an SRO beats the alternatives. Sacks says he could get on board only under five strict conditions (broad representation including startups and open source, frontier-only review, catastrophic-risk-only scope, voluntary-first, and substitution for rather than addition to new agencies), and warns the plan is an opening bid that Anthropic will use as a stepping stone toward Dario Amodei’s “FAA for AI.” The show then turns to Stripe, Block, and Advent bidding roughly $53 billion for PayPal and what it means for Visa and Mastercard, a wave of AI-native operators reviving stale digital businesses (Bending Spoons, Ryan Cohen), Apple’s lawsuit accusing OpenAI of stealing trade secrets, xAI’s Grok Build silently uploading entire codebases despite a privacy setting, the enormous spread in token costs and Ramp’s new spend controls, Apple’s local-model opportunity with M7 Ultra silicon, America’s looming energy deficit and behind-the-meter power, New York’s hyperscale data center moratorium, alleged Russian and PRC influence operations shaping anti-GMO and anti-data-center sentiment, and a science corner on a Calico enzyme that degrades glycation products to reverse skin aging.

    Thoughts

    The most important idea in this episode is not the SRO itself but Sacks’s framing of it as an opening bid. His five conditions are a genuinely useful blueprint for how self-regulation could work without curdling into regulatory capture, and his instinct that catastrophic-risk-only scope (cyber and CBRN, not disinformation or “microaggressions”) is the only defensible mandate is the right line to draw. But the deeper point is structural: when an industry walks into government and says “please regulate me,” almost no one in government answers “we’re not qualified.” They say thank you and come back for more. That asymmetry, not any specific rule, is what makes voluntary concessions dangerous. If the SRO is offered for free rather than traded for hard federal preemption written into law, it becomes the floor of a ratchet, not the ceiling of a compromise.

    The Anthropic critique running through the segment deserves to be taken on its merits rather than dismissed as a grudge. The claim is specific and falsifiable: that a company now valued in the trillions is funding a state-by-state strategy of one-upmanship, where each new bill is tougher than the last, deliberately producing a patchwork rather than the single national framework everyone claims to want. Whether or not you accept the motive, the mechanism is real and the incentives are legible. If your cost per million tokens is fifty to a hundred times your competitor’s, and cheaper open models plus fine-tuning can cover the vast majority of tasks, then the fastest way to protect a premium price is to make the cheap alternatives legally or practically harder to ship. That is the ladder-pulling thesis, and the token-cost numbers cited on the show are the reason it is not paranoid.

    The PayPal bid is the clearest signal of a new operating logic in the capital markets. The interesting question Chamath poses is not “what synergies does PayPal have” but “what is the only thing Advent, Stripe, and Block could build together,” and the answer is a genuine competitor to Visa and Mastercard: hundreds of millions of consumer accounts, Stripe’s merchant relationships and risk infrastructure, Block’s point-of-sale and Cash App, and stablecoin rails from Bridge and PYUSD that can push transactions on-us and bypass the card networks. The antitrust twist is elegant. Define the market as merchant APIs and it looks like consolidation; define it as the card duopoly and the same deal is pro-competitive. This deal would have been dead on arrival two years ago, and the fact that it is live now tells you as much about the regulatory climate as it does about payments.

    Underneath the payments story is a broader thesis worth naming: AI-native operators buying mature, founder-less, “stale” digital businesses and modernizing them. Bending Spoons rolling up AOL, Vimeo, Evernote, WeTransfer, and Eventbrite is the template, and Ryan Cohen’s eBay interest is the second dot on the line. The claim is that a modern operator can diagnose where a legacy business overspends, underinvests, and fails to use AI, then fix it with a small team of AI-first executives rather than a McKinsey engagement. It is a persuasive pattern, though PayPal is a harder case than the show admits: a 25-year-old interaction model growing 7% a year is not obviously revived by efficiency alone. Buying 400 million consumer accounts is buying distribution, not a product vision, and the open question is whether anyone can resuscitate the consumer experience rather than just milk it.

    The data center segment is where policy, energy, and information warfare collide, and Friedberg’s anti-GMO analogy is the sharpest thing in it. His argument is that manufactured public sentiment, traceable in one case to a foreign media push, can override the scientific and economic merits of a technology for years, and that the anti-data-center movement rhymes with it: closed-loop cooling that uses trivial amounts of water, land-use efficiency that dwarfs almonds and golf courses, and natural gas that burns clean, all drowned out by a moral panic. Whether or not you buy the specific foreign-influence attribution, the underlying tension is real and unresolved. America is staring at a structural electricity deficit while individual blue states treat data centers as a luxury they can refuse, and behind-the-meter power plus edge compute chasing cheap electrons is emerging as the workaround. The moratorium framing matters most here: a “pause” on data centers is not a few months, it is five years once you count ramp-up, and that is long enough to lose a race that may only be measured in months of lead.

    Key Takeaways

    • Demis Hassabis proposed a US-led international AI standards body modeled on FINRA: federally overseen, industry funded, and run by independent technical experts rather than a new government agency.
    • Under the proposal, frontier labs would submit models roughly 30 days before release; the body would assess risk to cybersecurity, national security, and biological threats, update benchmarks quarterly, and could coordinate a development slowdown if the situation demanded it.
    • The plan would be voluntary at first and mandatory later, and drew endorsement from a broad set of industry figures including Elon Musk, Sam Altman, Anthropic’s Jack Clark, Sundar Pichai, Satya Nadella, and Jack Dorsey.
    • A self-regulatory organization (SRO) like FINRA or the National Futures Association lets the industry set its own testing rules under federal oversight, adjusting faster than a government agency could as the technology changes.
    • Sacks laid out five conditions for supporting an SRO: broad representation including startups and open source; review of true frontier models only; scope limited to catastrophic risk (cyber and CBRN); voluntary before mandatory; and a substitute for, not an addition to, new regulatory agencies.
    • Sacks argued a government “FAA for AI” would be extreme: type certification for a new aircraft design takes 5 to 9 years, and applying that permission-based model to AI would push release timelines from months to years and lose the race to China.
    • He characterized the SRO as an “opening bid” that Anthropic and others would use as a stepping stone toward Dario Amodei’s repeatedly stated goal of an FAA-style regulator, unless it is traded for hard federal preemption written into law.
    • The besties cited a Politico report on Anthropic’s alleged state-by-state strategy of one-upmanship, using California’s SB 53 as a model and then ratcheting each subsequent state’s rules tougher, producing a patchwork rather than a single national framework.
    • Chamath warned of a “torrent of money” trying to influence both political parties toward some form of regulatory capture, and urged establishing industry rules quickly to supersede the need for a federal agency.
    • Stripe and private equity firm Advent, joined by Jack Dorsey’s Block contributing about $17 billion in equity, are jointly bidding roughly $53 billion (about $60 per share) for PayPal, with many expecting the final clearing price closer to $70.
    • The strategic logic is a new competitor to Visa and Mastercard: PayPal’s 400-plus million consumer accounts, Stripe’s merchants and risk infrastructure, Block’s point-of-sale and Cash App, and stablecoin rails from Stripe’s Bridge and PayPal’s PYUSD.
    • The antitrust outcome hinges on market definition: framed as merchant APIs (Stripe vs. Braintree) it looks anti-competitive, but framed against the Visa/Mastercard duopoly it is pro-competitive, and a deal like this would have been blocked two years ago.
    • PayPal peaked around a $322 billion market cap and fell to roughly $30 to 40 billion, which is precisely why it is now attracting bids; Stripe now processes more annual volume than PayPal, but lacks PayPal’s consumer relationship.
    • Sacks traced PayPal’s long stagnation to its 2002 eBay acquisition under Meg Whitman, when the founding team was pushed out; the “PayPal mafia” (which Sacks prefers to call the “PayPal diaspora”) formed as a result.
    • The deal is framed as part of a wave of AI-native operators reviving mature, founder-less digital businesses, with Bending Spoons (AOL, Vimeo, Evernote, WeTransfer, Eventbrite) as the roll-up template and Ryan Cohen’s eBay interest as another data point.
    • M&A is broadly “back on the menu” post-Lina Khan, with deals like Uber acquiring Delivery Hero, driving liquidity and renewed LP appetite for venture alongside SpaceX distributions.
    • Apple filed a 41-page lawsuit against OpenAI on July 10th alleging stolen trade secrets tied to OpenAI’s consumer hardware device; OpenAI’s chief hardware officer Tang Tan is a former Apple VP of iPhone design.
    • The complaint alleges Apple job candidates were directed to bring actual parts to OpenAI interviews for “show and tell,” and cites a text about accessing network storage; OpenAI has reportedly poached over 400 Apple employees.
    • The besties’ rule of thumb: when leaving a company, the only thing you can take is what is in your head; no documents, thumb drives, or files, because Apple rarely litigates and doing so signals something egregious.
    • xAI’s Grok Build, powered by Grok 4.5 and running inside Cursor, was reportedly sending users’ entire codebases (potentially including passwords and API keys) to servers despite a privacy setting meant to prevent it; xAI disabled the upload on July 13th and open-sourced the harness.
    • Chamath’s takeaway: privacy in AI is fragile and brittle, “zero data retention” cannot be guaranteed, and there are non-obvious data-leak vectors and “trap doors” everywhere, arguing for a stratified ecosystem with independent third-party layers between enterprises and models.
    • The “reverse information paradox” (building on Palantir’s Alex Karp) holds that technically capable enterprises want control over their compute, models, weights, data, and “alpha,” via real trust boundaries, private evals, in-tenant learning loops, decoupled orchestration, and the right to fine-tune.
    • Cited token costs per million showed a huge spread: roughly $56 on a premium frontier model, about $26 on another, roughly $1.50 for Grok input, around $1 for Elon’s, and about 50 cents for Chinese models, with a claim that 95 to 98% of tasks could run one tier cheaper.
    • Ramp CEO Eric Glyman launched token spend management because CFOs cannot see or control AI spend; Ramp customers’ token spend has grown 21x in a year, and someone will eventually miss an earnings quarter on runaway AI opex.
    • Engineers optimize for the latest, greatest model while CFOs bear the cost, a misalignment that platforms fine-tuning cheaper open models (like Mira Murati’s Thinking Machines effort) are positioned to exploit.
    • Calacanis called Apple a “screaming buy” on local models: rumored M7 Ultra silicon supporting up to 1.5 terabytes of memory could run last-generation frontier-class models locally on a Mac Studio, putting downward pressure on cloud AI pricing.
    • Edge compute is fragmenting outward: Sunrun announced distributed data center blocks for homes, and Span partnered with Nvidia, with compute increasingly “chasing energy” like cheap solar and battery power.
    • Chamath projected the US will be short 2.5 Californias’ worth of energy by 2050; a recent PJM auction that needed 7 to 8 gigawatts reportedly saw only a fraction show up, underscoring the electricity crunch.
    • “Behind the meter” power lets data centers generate their own electricity on owned property, but clean-air permitting is a major obstacle; Elon reportedly used clustered mobile engines and solutions like Bloom Energy to keep projects under personal-use permits (as with Colossus in Memphis).
    • New York Governor Kathy Hochul announced the nation’s first statewide moratorium on hyperscale data centers; the besties rebutted her claims on power, land, noise, water, and pollution point by point.
    • Modern data centers use closed-loop cooling (one claim compared a typical facility’s water use to a couple of In-N-Out restaurants), occupy trivial land relative to their economic value, generate tax revenue and construction jobs, and are largely powered by clean-burning natural gas.
    • Sacks argued the same political forces slowing domestic data centers are also behind chip export controls that would block data centers in allied countries, raising the question of where the buildout can happen at all.
    • Friedberg drew an anti-GMO analogy: he argued anti-GMO sentiment tracked the US presence of Russia Today (2010 to 2022) rather than the science, and worried a similar manufactured sentiment is now driving anti-data-center attitudes.
    • Sacks cited an OpenAI blog post on PRC-linked influence operations targeting US AI debates, with a congressional investigation reportedly coming, noting China has a clear incentive to slow American AI infrastructure.
    • Sacks framed the moment as a “moral panic”: the catastrophes people fear from AI (cyber, job loss) have not materialized, yet the US risks damaging its crown jewel of free-market innovation with premature regulation over hypothetical risks.
    • The panel questioned Dario Amodei’s prediction that 50% of entry-level knowledge-worker jobs could disappear within one to five years, arguing the harms have not shown up and only a handful of frontier labs (which already do safety testing and red-teaming) even matter.
    • A cited framing of the alleged Anthropic strategy: brand yourself as the safe AI company, ban unsafe AI, then profit; a fresh Chinese model (Kimi K2) was noted as very close to the frontier, suggesting a US lead of only months.
    • Science corner: a paper from Google’s Calico and partner Retro-style researchers used AlphaFold plus directed evolution to engineer a novel enzyme that degrades CML, a key advanced glycation end product in the extracellular matrix that drives aging.
    • The engineered enzyme cleared 52 to 97% of CML from body proteins in vitro and eliminated 55% of CML from donated elderly human skin, effectively reversing that skin’s biological age toward that of a 31-year-old, pointing first toward a potentially trillion-dollar cosmetic market.

    Detailed Summary

    Demis Hassabis’s FINRA-Style SRO for AI

    DeepMind’s Demis Hassabis published a proposal for a US-led international AI standards body modeled on FINRA, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. The design is federally overseen but industry funded and run by independent technical experts. Frontier labs would submit models about 30 days before release, and models would be assessed for risk across cybersecurity, national security, biological threats, and other high-risk domains. Benchmarks would update quarterly, the body could coordinate a development slowdown if warranted, and participation would be voluntary at first and mandatory later. The proposal drew endorsements across the industry, including Elon Musk (who called it thoughtful), Sam Altman, Anthropic’s Jack Clark, Sundar Pichai, Satya Nadella, and Jack Dorsey.

    Friedberg explained the SRO concept: bodies like FINRA and the National Futures Association let financial institutions set their own regulatory rules and check one another, under federal oversight but not federal control, reporting up to Senate and House committees. The AI analogy is that many players are all advancing the technology and none wants a single outside regulator dictating tests, especially after California’s earlier AI legislation was, in his telling, outdated by the time it would have taken effect. An SRO can bring in industry experts, adjust tests over time, and operate faster than a new agency. Chamath endorsed it strongly, warning that a “torrent of money” will try to influence both political parties toward regulatory capture, and that establishing rules quickly is the way to avoid that off-ramp while retaining ultimate federal oversight through Commerce and the DOJ.

    Sacks’s Five Conditions and the “FAA for AI” Warning

    Sacks said he could personally get on board with an SRO because it is “infinitely better” than a new government agency that would become a “DMV for AI,” or worse, Dario Amodei’s “FAA for AI.” He laid out five conditions: the SRO must have broad industry representation including startups and open source (to avoid the three biggest labs capturing it); it should review only true frontier models that represent a step change in capability, not hold up lesser models; its scope should be catastrophic risk only, meaning cyber and CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear), not disinformation or speech; it should be voluntary before mandatory, proving it works first; and it must substitute for, not add to, new regulatory structures.

    He then explained why an FAA model is extreme: the FAA approves new airplane designs through type certification, which takes 5 to 9 years for a new aircraft and 3 to 5 years for major amendments. Applying permission-based regulation to AI, where new model versions ship every couple of months, would push timelines from months to years and lose the race to a China that will not abide by those rules. His conclusion: if the choice is FAA for AI, DMV for AI, or Hassabis’s SRO, the SRO wins, but it has to be kept “honest and pure,” because otherwise it becomes the opening bid in a coming wave of regulation and a vehicle for massive regulatory capture. He argued that companies making concessions to buy off politicians will only invite the government to come back for more, and that at some point these companies have to grow a spine, draw a line, and demand preemption in exchange.

    The Anthropic Regulatory-Capture Debate

    Sacks revisited his October claim that Anthropic was running a “sophisticated regulatory capture strategy based on fear-mongering,” arguing that what looked like beating up on a startup now looks different given Anthropic’s trillion-dollar valuation and industry-leading revenue. He cited a Politico piece, “Inside Anthropic’s state-by-state plan to ratchet up AI rules,” describing a strategy of one-upmanship: pass a model bill like California’s SB 53, then make each subsequent state’s rules stricter, deliberately producing a patchwork instead of a single national framework. The panel noted states have strong sovereignty rights (as with self-driving cars) and Anthropic is “winning” in California, Illinois, New York, and other blue states, because government officials rarely refuse an invitation to regulate.

    Stripe, Block, and Advent Bid for PayPal

    Stripe and private equity firm Advent, joined by Jack Dorsey’s Block contributing about $17 billion in equity, are jointly bidding roughly $53 billion (about $60 per share) for PayPal, with many expecting a final price closer to $70. PayPal still has more than 400 million consumer accounts and processes about $1.7 trillion a year, but its 25-year-old product is growing only about 7% and is seen as legacy. Chamath’s key question was what unique thing this trio could build: a competitor to Visa and Mastercard. Combining PayPal’s consumer accounts, Stripe’s merchant relationships and risk infrastructure, Block’s point-of-sale and Cash App, and stablecoin rails from Stripe’s Bridge and PayPal’s PYUSD would allow far more on-us transactions that bypass the card networks, potentially passing large discounts to merchants and consumers.

    Friedberg walked through the deal structure: the $17 billion equity contribution effectively means Stripe and Block sell equity to cash investors, that cash buys PayPal, and the parties end up cross-owning pieces of each other, with the Stripe team the likely operator post-close. The antitrust question turns on market definition: framed as merchant APIs, it is Stripe versus Braintree and looks like consolidation; framed against the Visa/Mastercard duopoly, adding competition is pro-competitive. Sacks noted the deal would have been “the antitrust equivalent of a colonoscopy” two years ago. He also recounted PayPal’s history: acquired by eBay in 2002 under the corporate-minded Meg Whitman, the founding team was pushed out, creating what he prefers to call the “PayPal diaspora” rather than the “PayPal mafia.”

    AI-Native Operators and the M&A Wave

    Freeberg framed the PayPal and eBay stories as part of an emerging line: AI-native operators buying first-generation digital-native businesses that have gone mature, stale, and founder-less, and that have not yet realized their AI potential or are overspending. Bending Spoons is the roll-up template, having acquired AOL, Vimeo, Evernote, WeTransfer, and Eventbrite and revitalized them from Milan with young, AI-first executives. The panel connected this to Josh Kushner’s and General Catalyst’s roll-ups of traditional services businesses. Calacanis added the macro backdrop: after venture was “on the ropes” under Lina Khan, M&A is “back on the menu,” with deals like Uber acquiring Delivery Hero, renewed LP appetite, and liquidity from SpaceX distributions.

    Apple Sues OpenAI Over Trade Secrets

    Apple filed a 41-page lawsuit against OpenAI on July 10th alleging stolen trade secrets used to develop OpenAI’s consumer hardware device. OpenAI’s chief hardware officer, Tang Tan, is Apple’s former VP of iPhone design; the complaint alleges he directed Apple job candidates interviewing at OpenAI to bring “actual parts” for “show and tell,” and cites a text from a former Apple engineer about accessing network storage. OpenAI has reportedly poached over 400 Apple employees. Chamath noted Apple rarely litigates, so the suit signals something they found egregious, while cautioning that the facts are alleged and unproven. Sacks declined to opine on the specifics but offered a simple rule: when changing jobs, take nothing but what is in your head, no documents, thumb drives, or files.

    The Grok Build Data Leak and AI Privacy

    xAI’s Grok Build, powered by Grok 4.5 and running inside Cursor, was reportedly sending users’ entire codebases (not just the files needed for a task, but potentially passwords, API keys, and change logs) to servers, despite a privacy setting meant to stop it. xAI disabled the upload on July 13th, Elon said previously uploaded data was deleted, and xAI open-sourced the harness. Chamath used it to make a larger point tied to his CNBC comments and Alex Karp’s remarks: privacy in AI is fragile and brittle, “zero data retention” cannot truly be guaranteed, and there are non-obvious leak vectors and “trap doors” everywhere. His conclusion is that enterprises need a stratified ecosystem with independent third-party layers between them and the models to manage exposure (a model his firm 8090 uses in its “software factory”).

    Sacks connected this to a blog post on the “reverse information paradox,” building on Karp’s point that technically capable enterprises want control over their compute, models, weights, data, and “alpha.” The recipe: establish a real trust boundary with private evals, proprietary learning loops inside the tenant, decoupled orchestration, and the explicit right to fine-tune their own outputs. He described an emerging ecosystem forming alternatives to the monolithic closed model stacks that Anthropic and, to some extent, OpenAI want customers locked into.

    Token Economics and Ramp’s Spend Controls

    The panel cited a wide spread in cost per million tokens: roughly $56 on a premium frontier model, about $26 on another (similar to a Claude tier), around $1.50 for Grok input, about $1 for Elon’s, and roughly 50 cents for Chinese models. Calacanis said he built a deep-linking podcast player across models on Perplexity and that the new Grok run cost only $11. Ramp CEO Eric Glyman appeared on Squawk Box to launch token spend management, noting Ramp customers’ token spend has grown 21x in a year and that CFOs struggle to see or control spend on an open-ended tab where rates rise with each new model. The takeaway: engineers optimize for the newest model while CFOs bear the cost, and unless that misalignment is controlled, runaway opex becomes a “money-burning furnace” that will eventually cause a public company to miss earnings. The panel argued 95 to 98% of tasks could run one tier cheaper, which is exactly the opportunity platforms fine-tuning cheaper open models (like Mira Murati’s Thinking Machines) are chasing.

    Apple’s Local-Model Opportunity and Edge Compute

    Calacanis called Apple a “screaming buy,” citing Mark Gurman’s report that a rumored M7 Ultra chip could support up to 1.5 terabytes of memory, double the current ceiling. That would let a Mac Studio run last-generation frontier-class models locally, giving users effectively unlimited tokens on the desktop and putting downward pressure on cloud AI pricing from the likes of Anthropic and OpenAI. Freeberg added that edge compute is fragmenting outward: solar company Sunrun announced distributed data center blocks for homes, and Span partnered with Nvidia. The theme is compute chasing cheap energy, whether excess solar or battery power charged at night.

    The Energy Deficit and Behind-the-Meter Power

    Chamath warned the US will be short about 2.5 Californias’ worth of energy by 2050, and pointed to a recent PJM auction (serving Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland and other states) that needed 7 to 8 gigawatts but reportedly saw only a fraction show up. He explained “behind the meter” power: rather than drawing grid power from a utility line, a data center generates its own electricity on owned property. The obstacle is clean-air permitting. Solar takes too much space and batteries still need a generation source, so operators use gas. He described Elon clustering mobile 18-wheeler-style engines to keep them under personal-use permits, and newer solutions like Bloom Energy that allow large installations under similar rules, which is how projects like Colossus in Memphis got off the ground.

    New York’s Data Center Moratorium

    New York Governor Kathy Hochul announced the nation’s first statewide moratorium on hyperscale data centers, citing power draw, land use, water, and noise pollution. The besties rebutted each claim: behind-the-meter power means facilities bring their own electricity rather than competing with residential ratepayers; data centers are highly land-efficient, and New York State is roughly 70 to 80% undeveloped outside the city; noise can be managed with distance; modern facilities use closed-loop cooling (one comparison put a typical facility’s water use at a couple of In-N-Out restaurants, far less than almonds or golf courses); and natural gas is a clean-burning power source. They noted the tax revenue, construction boom, and ongoing jobs data centers create. Sacks cited a theory that Democrats intend the “moratorium” as leverage: pause construction until they can dictate terms, then lift it under a future administration in exchange for a new regulatory agency and speech controls ported from the social-media trust-and-safety agenda. He stressed a moratorium is effectively a five-year pause once ramp-up is counted, and that the same forces slowing domestic builds are pushing chip export controls that would block data centers in allied countries too.

    Foreign Influence, Anti-GMO, and the AI Moral Panic

    Freeberg drew an extended analogy between anti-data-center sentiment and anti-GMO sentiment. He argued that GMOs were prevalent and uncontroversial from their 1996 launch until anti-GMO sentiment rose in tandem with Russia Today’s US presence (2010 to 2022) and fell after RT was pushed out, and that similar KGB-era “directed measures” influence campaigns can be traced to opposition to nuclear energy in Germany. He cited a poll showing over 50% of Americans believe data centers increase water and electricity costs even where facilities recycle water and generate their own power. Sacks pointed to an OpenAI blog post on PRC-linked influence operations targeting US AI debates, with a congressional investigation reportedly coming, arguing China has a clear incentive to slow US AI infrastructure, kill open source, and constrain cheaper models. Sacks then broadened it to a “moral panic”: the feared catastrophes (cyber, job loss) have not materialized, yet the US risks damaging its crown jewel of free-market innovation over hypothetical risks, questioning Dario Amodei’s prediction that 50% of entry-level knowledge-worker jobs could vanish within one to five years and noting the fresh Chinese model Kimi K2 is close to the frontier.

    Science Corner: An Enzyme That Reverses Skin Aging

    Freeberg closed with a paper from Google’s secretive longevity startup Calico and a pharma partner focused on the extracellular matrix, the space between cells. Over time, sugars and fats bind to proteins there in a process called glycation, accumulating as advanced glycation end products (chiefly a molecule called CML) that stiffen tissue, cause wrinkles and immobility, and drive inflammation, with nothing in the body to break them down. The researchers used AlphaFold to find a protein that could bind and degrade CML, then applied directed evolution across five recursive cycles, DNA-programming thousands of variants to maximize activity. The engineered enzyme cleared 52 to 97% of CML from body proteins like collagen, casein, and hemoglobin in vitro, and eliminated 55% of CML from donated elderly human skin, effectively reversing that skin’s biological age toward a 31-year-old’s. Open questions remain about delivery (cream, shot, supplement, or an RNA therapy that makes the enzyme inside the body), but the panel expects the first market to be a trillion-dollar cosmetic one, and hailed it as a profound demonstration of AI-driven protein engineering.

    Notable Quotes

    “The whole industry is going to need to be regulated and I think the industry needs to regulate themselves. That’s the key to this.”

    Jason Calacanis, replaying his earlier call for AI self-certification

    “If my choices are between FAA for AI or what I would call the DMV for AI, I would much rather go for Demis’ SRO for AI.”

    David Sacks, on why self-regulation beats a new government agency

    “There’s hardly anyone in government who will ever say, oh no no no, we’re not qualified. Most people in the government will say thank you very much, what else can we take.”

    David Sacks, on the asymmetry that makes voluntary concessions dangerous

    “What it prevents is a handful of actors using their balance sheets and their capital to essentially pull the ladder up.”

    Chamath Palihapitiya, on the point of establishing industry rules quickly

    “You are creating a competitor to Visa and Mastercard.”

    Chamath Palihapitiya, on the only thing Stripe, Block, and Advent could build together with PayPal

    “The only thing you can bring to your new job is what’s in your head. Your memories. But never leave with anything else.”

    David Sacks, on avoiding trade-secret disputes when changing employers

    “Privacy in AI is very fragile and it’s very brittle. You are leaking information where you don’t know it.”

    Chamath Palihapitiya, on the limits of zero-data-retention promises

    “Unless you get a control of this and you can directly say how much money you’re making, this is a bridge to nowhere. It is a money burning furnace.”

    Chamath Palihapitiya, on uncontrolled enterprise token spend

    “We’re on the threshold of destroying the crown jewel of our economy, which is the system of free market innovation that we have.”

    David Sacks, on the risk of a premature AI regulatory apparatus

    “Number one, brand yourself as a safe AI company. Number two, ban unsafe AI. Three, profit.”

    David Sacks, summarizing the strategy he attributes to the “safe AI” positioning

    Watch the full conversation here: Can the AI Industry Regulate Itself? on the All-In Podcast.

    Related Reading

    • FINRA the financial-industry self-regulatory organization that Demis Hassabis’s AI proposal is modeled on.
    • AlphaFold (Wikipedia) the protein-structure prediction system behind the age-reversal enzyme discovery in the science corner.
    • PayPal Mafia (Wikipedia) background on the founders Sacks calls the “PayPal diaspora.”
    • The Founders by Jimmy Soni, the definitive history of PayPal’s founding team and its diaspora.
    • Advanced glycation end-products (Wikipedia) the biochemistry of CML and the extracellular-matrix aging the Calico enzyme targets.

  • Benedict Evans on the Economics of AI Usage, Why Foundation Models May Become Commodities, and What Comes Next for SaaS

    Benedict Evans returns to the a16z podcast to update the thesis behind his widely read “AI eats the world” presentation, and the picture he paints is less about hype and more about hard economics. In this conversation he works through what has actually played out in the last year, why agentic coding became the one use case with real product market fit, and why he keeps arguing that foundation models may end up as commodities while the value moves somewhere else entirely. You can watch the full conversation here.

    TLDW

    Benedict Evans argues that the AI moment looks a lot like the early internet, the early PC era, and the rollout of mobile data, which means it is exciting, genuinely transformative, and almost impossible to predict use case by use case. Agentic coding is the only field with clear product market fit right now, with revenue run rates exploding from roughly nine billion to forty seven billion, while consumers still use chatbots weekly rather than daily. His central claim is that foundation models show no obvious network effect or sustainable differentiation, the chatbot is a limited v1 interface, and the model labs cannot build every application, so the value will likely move up the stack the way it did with chips, ISPs, and mobile networks rather than staying with the model providers. He covers the brutal supply and demand disequilibrium driving today’s token pricing and ten thousand dollar surprise bills, the financial gravity problem of hyperscalers spending over half their revenue on capex, the Jevons paradox and consumer surplus that may compete away productivity gains, the way the important questions move out of San Francisco and into industries like law, consulting, finance, and advertising, and the distinction between automating tasks and changing jobs. His closing image is an IBM ad from the 1950s promising “150 extra engineers,” a reminder that every platform shift feels unprecedented and that in twenty years we will simply say of course computers do that.

    Thoughts

    The most useful thing Evans does here is refuse to collapse uncertainty into a clean prediction, and then explain exactly why that refusal is the correct posture rather than a cop out. He distinguishes between the parts where he will commit to a view, that foundation models are probably not a product and the chatbot is probably not the right interface, and the parts where there are simply too many open paths to call. That discipline is rare in AI commentary, where the incentive is to sound certain. The commodity argument is not “models are worthless.” It is a chain of reasoning: there is no visible network effect, no durable differentiation beyond willingness to spend, no lock in comparable to Windows or iOS, and a likely structure of three to six well funded competitors plus open source and edge models all selling the same thing. Ask where price discipline comes from in that picture and the honest answer is that it probably does not, which is how you get a commodity even when demand is effectively infinite.

    The mobile data analogy is the load bearing comparison and it deserves to be taken seriously. Mobile data traffic rose something like fifteen hundred to two thousand times over fifteen years, the networks built an extraordinary piece of global infrastructure, everyone came to depend on it, and yet the operators captured almost none of the value because all the interesting stuff got built on top by someone else. Telco stocks were flat for two decades. If that is the template, then the trillion dollars of capex flowing into AI infrastructure can be both a worthwhile investment and a terrible place to expect outsized equity returns, because building the road is not the same as owning the traffic. The counterpoint Evans keeps fairly on the table is the operating system path, where Windows and iOS did capture value, but he notes they had levers and network effects that LLMs do not appear to have.

    His framing of where the questions live is the part most people in tech underweight. Once a technology works, the interesting questions stop being technology questions. Netflix is not a tech company in the sense that matters, because its real decisions are Los Angeles decisions about shows, talent, and sports, not San Francisco decisions about infrastructure. By the same logic, what AI means for a law firm is mostly a question for people who understand what associates actually do and what clients are actually paying for, not for model researchers. This is why the “the model will just do the whole thing” story keeps running aground. Most valuable software does not solve a problem the customer already knew they had. It often takes years to convince an industry that a problem even exists, and an LLM prompt does not surface latent problems that no one has articulated.

    The economic plumbing he describes is where the near term risk actually sits. We are in extreme disequilibrium, where twenty dollars a month can buy ten thousand dollars of tokens on one side and a weekend of experimentation can produce a ten thousand dollar bill on the other, exactly the pattern mobile data went through around 2009 and 2010. That gets resolved with the boring machinery of caps, throttling, and pricing tiers, not with magic. Layered on top is the financial gravity problem: Microsoft, Meta, and Google heading toward spending more than half of revenue on capex, with roughly seven hundred billion dollars of guidance across the big players, against a hard ceiling because there is not ten trillion dollars a year available to spend. And even when the productivity gains are real, the Jevons paradox and consumer surplus suggest much of the benefit gets competed away. If a discounted cash flow model used to take a week and now takes ten seconds, you do fifty of them and charge the client the same, which is great for clients and unremarkable for margins.

    The honest takeaway for builders is that the answer to “what does this do to software” is more software, probably one or two orders of magnitude more, just as SaaS itself produced an explosion rather than a consolidation. The SaaS apocalypse is real in the sense that some meaningful percentage of existing companies get wiped out, and unknowable in the sense that no one can yet say which ones, which is why thoughtful investors are reluctant to be long software in the dark. For anyone pursuing a more deliberate, purposeful relationship with technology, the closing note is the one to keep: every one of these shifts felt singular and world ending and world making at the time, it reshaped work and put people out of jobs and created things we love, and then it quietly became invisible. The goal is to stay clear eyed about which of those buckets a given change lands in rather than getting swept up in the noise of what someone said at a party yesterday.

    Key Takeaways

    • Agentic coding shifted from “kind of useful” to “really changing everything” at the start of the year, and it is the single field with unambiguous product market fit, where customers are pulling it out of your hands.
    • Coding working first was foreseeable in hindsight: software developers were the ones messing with the tools, and the first thing people do with a new kind of computer is build more computing, just as the first thing people did with PCs was make computers.
    • Anthropic, with less capital raised, chose to focus on coding and got it working, while OpenAI cycled through a more everything all at once strategy before narrowing in.
    • The intense focus on coding comes bundled with a supply crunch, a capacity crunch, and a price and capex imbalance that defines the current moment.
    • Most of the fundamental questions from two or three years ago still have no answers: whether there will be a winner in models, whether models capture value up the stack, how much they can do, and whether consumers will use this daily rather than weekly.
    • There is a wide gap between Valley insiders running clusters of Mac Studios all day and the roughly forty percent of people who say AI is “kind of useful, I used it last week for something.”
    • Outside tech, companies are adopting AI as one at a time point solutions for specific back office processes, like a commodities company using LLMs for better cash flow forecasting, not as a general purpose assistant.
    • Adoption always compounds on prior platforms: you could not have nine hundred million weekly active users in the Netscape era because there were not nine hundred million PCs on the planet.
    • Early in any platform shift almost nothing works smoothly, from sound cards and floppy disks with TCP/IP to computers that froze and lost your work, and AI is at that stage now.
    • Today’s token pricing crunch mirrors the mobile data shock of 2009 to 2010, where flat rate plans collided with surging usage and networks had to realign price with marginal cost through caps, fair use, and throttling.
    • Mobile data traffic rose roughly fifteen hundred to two thousand times in fifteen years, mobile networks earn around a trillion dollars and spend about two hundred billion a year on capex, yet their stocks have been flat for twenty years because all the value moved up the stack.
    • The central LLM question is whether the model can do the whole thing or whether you need hundreds of applications built on top, the same way you needed apps on Windows and iOS.
    • Evans sees no network effect and no sustainable differentiation between models beyond willingness to spend money, which points toward commodity infrastructure sold near marginal cost.
    • Chip companies, ISPs, and mobile operators did not capture the value; Windows and iOS did, but only because they had levers to move up the stack and real network effects, which models lack.
    • A useful comparison is semiconductors, where each generation gets more expensive and the field narrows to fewer players, suggesting three to six frontier model makers spending somewhere between two hundred billion and two trillion dollars a year.
    • Enterprises do not standardize on a model the way they once thought about AWS; the cloud and the model get abstracted away, so customers do not even know which one their SaaS product runs on.
    • Demand for tokens being effectively infinite does not prevent a price equilibrium, exactly as infinite demand for mobile bits still produced murderous price wars between commodity carriers.
    • History teaches that something will happen but rarely what; the smartest people in tech wrongly predicted Android would crush the iPhone on open versus closed grounds.
    • One characteristic of tech is that the moment you understand how something works is the moment to move on, which is why Evans stopped updating his Apple spreadsheet years ago.
    • The people who are good at using a tool are usually not the people who are good at designing what the tool should be, which is why model labs cannot build every skill or vertical application.
    • Claude skills and similar templates resemble file new in Excel: useful starting points that users eventually outgrow, raising the question of who builds the real software.
    • The questions increasingly move out of technology and into specific industries; what AI means for law, consulting, advertising, or accounting is partly an AI question and partly a deep domain question.
    • Netflix is not a tech company in the way that matters, because its real questions are media industry questions about shows, talent, and sports, not infrastructure; the same logic now applies across industries facing AI.
    • AI differs from prior platform shifts because the physical limits are unknown; in 1995 you knew PCs cost three thousand dollars and broadband could not reach everyone overnight, but no one knows how cheap, fast, or capable models will get.
    • Evans offers four buttons to press on any use case: is it just price elasticity and the Jevons paradox, does it remove a cost barrier to entry, does it unlock a new business model, or does it make something previously impossible now possible like trains over horses or Spotify over CDs.
    • Advertising and e-commerce are a standout opportunity because today’s systems know a SKU and a metadata field but not what a product actually is or why people buy it, and LLMs could change that level of understanding.
    • The valuable shift is not doing the old thing more, like more spreadsheets or better email, but doing genuinely new things, such as asking an LLM how to change prices to improve churn using all your call recordings, CRM flows, and product telemetry.
    • Enterprise software today splits into three buckets: big horizontal systems like SAP and Workday, three to four hundred vertical SaaS apps plus a thousand internal apps, and a fuzzy improvised middle of Excel, email, and shared files, with AI arriving as a new option across all three.
    • A core design tension is where to put the probabilistic software that can make mistakes versus the deterministic database that cannot, and whether the LLM sits at the top or the bottom of the stack; the answer is probably both depending on the task.
    • The net effect on software is way more software, since SaaS itself produced one to two orders of magnitude more software and all software companies exist to solve problems created by other software companies.
    • The SaaS apocalypse is real but unknowable: some percentage of SaaS companies get wiped out, but no one knows which, so you should not derate the whole sector fifty percent and many investors are wary of being long software for now.
    • Much of what an organization does is implicit, undocumented, and not in the training data, which is exactly the value McKinsey, Bain, and BCG provide by getting license to map how a company really works.
    • The real decisions are usually exception handling: the question is always what you cannot automate and what still requires human judgment about cases that were never written down.
    • Distinguish tasks from jobs: accountants spend almost none of their time the way they did fifty years ago, yet to the client the job looks the same.
    • LLMs excel where you want the average, the answer anyone would give, and struggle where you specifically do not want the average and cannot fully explain why you did it differently.
    • There is a financial gravity ceiling: Microsoft, Meta, and Google are on track to spend over fifty percent of revenue on capex versus fifteen to twenty percent for capital intensive telecoms, with seven hundred billion in guidance this year and no path to ten trillion.
    • Hyperscalers face an existential FOMO trap: returns look positive now, but they cannot let rivals build the future of compute without participating, even as the CFO asks how much participation is enough.
    • Token maxing will face a reckoning as the disequilibrium resolves, but measuring ROI is hard because most reported benefits so far, like better analytics, support, and productivity, are tough to put a financial value on.
    • Consumer surplus means many gains get competed away: if analysis that took a week now takes a day, you do five times more analysis and charge the same, the way investment banks did with spreadsheets.
    • Evans closes with a 1950s IBM ad promising “150 extra engineers,” a reminder that every fundamental technology change feels unprecedented, and that in twenty years AI will simply be invisible magic we take for granted.

    Detailed Summary

    What changed in the last year

    Evans frames the past year as a narrowing of focus. A year and a half after the first version of his presentation, the field has developed a much clearer sense of diverging product strategies and competitive tension that goes beyond simply building a bigger model with more compute. The dominant shift is that agentic coding started genuinely working, and the entire industry narrowed in on it because it has absolute product market fit, the kind where customers pull the product out of your hands. That success arrives alongside the supply crunch, capacity constraints, and price imbalance that now define the moment. At the same time, the charts keep climbing, models keep getting bigger, capex keeps growing, and usage keeps growing, while the deep questions from a few years ago remain unanswered.

    Why coding worked first

    That coding led was predictable at a naive level: the people experimenting with the tools were software developers, and they naturally tried to make software development work. Evans compares the moment to the internet around 1997 and 1998, and also to PCs in the late seventies and early eighties, when the technology was exciting but it was not clear what it was for and it did not quite work yet. The first thing people did with PCs was make computers, and since LLMs are in a sense computers, the first thing people are doing with them is making more compute. What was harder to foresee was the precise timing of the shift, the moment when agentic coding flipped from useful to transformative at the start of this year.

    Jobs, juniors, and what we have not learned

    On the question of what this means for engineers and team structure, Evans is blunt that we have learned almost nothing yet, because this did not even work six months ago and everyone is scrambling to interpret it. The pricing crunch alone means it will take a couple of years to settle. The newly concrete questions include whether you still hire junior people and what they would do, and why you were hiring juniors in the first place, whether to do the work itself or to develop people. Because software development now genuinely automates a class of work that used to be done by people, those questions have moved from theoretical to real, but no one can responsibly claim to know what a software team or a software career looks like in three years.

    OpenAI, Anthropic, and the strategy split

    Evans dryly notes the drama around the model labs, including the disruption of a senior leadership medical leave at OpenAI. In the latter part of last year, OpenAI’s question was essentially what to build on top of the models, an everything all at once approach that looked almost like asking the model for fifteen ideas and then doing all of them. Anthropic, with less capital raised, instead committed to coding and got it working, whether by deliberate strategy or by stumbling into it. The result is that software development plus a few other fields are where things genuinely work, surrounded by a large population of people excited around the edges and corporations quietly automating specific back office processes. He cites a commodities company that wants LLMs for better cash flow forecasting across many small producers, a very different thing from asking a chatbot to summarize your meetings.

    The mobile data analogy and value capture

    The richest section is the comparison to mobile. Adoption always compounds on prior platforms, so AI inherits a far larger installed base than the internet or mobile did at their starts. Early on, nothing works smoothly, and Evans recalls the era of buying a three hundred dollar sound card or wrestling a floppy disk of TCP/IP into a machine. The pricing dynamics directly echo mobile data around 2009 and 2010, when flat rate plans met exploding usage and ten thousand dollar bills, forcing networks to realign price with marginal cost. Crucially, mobile data traffic then rose fifteen hundred to two thousand times, the networks built extraordinary global infrastructure with around a trillion dollars of revenue and two hundred billion in annual capex, and yet their stocks stayed flat for twenty years because all the cool stuff and all the value got built and captured by someone else higher up the stack. Chip companies, ISPs, and mobile operators did not capture value; Windows and iOS did, but they had levers and network effects that models do not appear to share.

    The case that models become commodities

    Evans lays out the building blocks of his commodity thesis. First, there is no clear way to build a model that is sustainably and fundamentally better than everyone else’s, with no visible network effect and no strategic lever comparable to what Instagram, YouTube, or Google search enjoy. Differences in emphasis and taste exist, but not durable competitive moats beyond spending. Second, the chatbot is a weird, limited v1 interface that works well for some tasks and people but requires tooling, the right data, configuration, control, and thoughtful design for most real jobs, and the people good at a job are rarely the people good at designing the tool for it. Third, the labs cannot build every application any more than Microsoft or Apple could build every Windows or iPhone app. Enterprises do not standardize on a model the way they never standardized on a visible cloud provider, because it gets abstracted away. Taken together, that points to low level infrastructure sold by perhaps half a dozen competitors plus open source and edge, with no obvious source of price discipline, which is the definition of a commodity even when demand is infinite.

    The questions move out of technology

    One of the next big questions is when models become good enough that you no longer need the largest, fastest, most expensive model, and can use an older model, an open source model, or one running on device where compute is effectively free to the developer. But the deeper shift is that the important questions move out of technology and into industries. Drawing on his own essays “content isn’t king” and “Netflix isn’t a tech company,” Evans argues that Netflix’s real decisions are Los Angeles media questions, not San Francisco infrastructure questions, and San Francisco does not even know what the right questions are. By the same logic, what AI means for a law firm is mostly a question for people who understand law firms, what generative video means for Hollywood is a question Ben Affleck can answer better than he can, and the questions become half AI and half something else.

    Four buttons and the new things AI unlocks

    To reason about impact, Evans offers four buttons. Is a use case just price elasticity, the Jevons paradox of doing the same thing for less or more for the same money. Does it remove a cost that was a barrier to entry, like a newspaper’s printing press. Does it unlock something in your business model. Or does it make something previously impossible now possible, the way steam engines made trains possible regardless of how many horses you bought, or Spotify turned fifteen dollars a month into all the music there is. He stresses that the same broad change can mean wildly different things by industry, just as the internet devastated newspapers but barely touched movie studios. His favorite tractable example is advertising and e-commerce, a trillion dollar advertising market against twenty five trillion in retail, where today’s systems know a SKU and a metadata field and that people who bought one thing bought another, but do not know what a product is or why people buy it. An LLM could in principle understand the product, recommend ten coats at different prices with pros and cons, or look at your Instagram and suggest a winter coat that changes your look but not too much, which would have been science fiction three years ago.

    More software, the SaaS apocalypse, and tasks versus jobs

    For software specifically, Evans expects more competition, cheaper and quicker building, and new categories that were impossible before, all under an uncertain new margin structure where outcome based pricing is hard because most software work cannot be tied cleanly to profit and loss. He frames enterprise software as three buckets, big horizontal systems, hundreds of vertical and internal apps, and a fuzzy improvised middle of Excel and email, with AI arriving as another option across all of them. The deeper design tension is where to place probabilistic software that can make mistakes versus deterministic systems that cannot, and whether the LLM sits at the top or bottom of the stack, with the answer being both depending on the task. The net result is way more software, since SaaS itself produced orders of magnitude more software and software exists to solve problems created by other software. That fuels the SaaS apocalypse anxiety: some companies clearly get wiped out, but since no one knows which, you should not derate the whole sector, even as many investors stay cautious about being long software.

    Implicit knowledge, exception handling, and where the average fails

    Much of what organizations do is implicit, undocumented, and absent from any training data, which is precisely the value of strategy consultancies that get license to map how a company really works versus how it is supposed to work. The real decisions tend to be exception handling, the cases that require human judgment because they were never written down or do not look like before. Evans separates tasks from jobs, noting accountants do almost nothing the way they did fifty years ago while the client still buys the same thing. And he offers a sharp test: LLMs are excellent where you want the average, the answer anyone would give, and weak where you specifically do not want the average and cannot fully articulate why you did it differently.

    Capex, financial gravity, and the ROI question

    On spending, Evans describes a financial gravity problem. Microsoft, Meta, and Google are on line to spend over half their revenue on capex this year, against fifteen to twenty percent for capital intensive telecoms, with roughly seven hundred billion in guidance across the big players, a sum comparable to all of telecom or oil and gas. They cannot sustainably leap to one and a half trillion next year because the money is not there, so the curve must eventually taper. The hyperscalers are caught in an existential FOMO trap: returns look positive now, but they cannot sit out what might be the future of compute without risking becoming the next stranded incumbent, even as the CFO asks how much is enough. On token maxing, he expects a reckoning as the disequilibrium resolves, but measuring ROI is genuinely hard because most reported benefits so far are soft and hard to value, and consumer surplus means much of the gain gets competed away, the way faster spreadsheets simply meant more analysis at the same price.

    Closing image

    Evans ends with an IBM advertisement from the early 1950s showing a sea of engineers holding slide rules, with the tagline that an IBM electronic calculator gives you 150 extra engineers, exactly the pitch behind countless modern startup decks. We move through these fundamental technology waves every ten or fifteen or twenty years, each one feeling completely unlike anything before, and AI is amazing and transformative in the same way mobile, the internet, and PCs were. The base case is that it will produce wonderful things, ruin some livelihoods, put people out of work, and eventually become invisible. His one line description of where it all ends up is that it will be magic, and in twenty years we will simply say of course computers do that, the way an hour of crash free streaming HD video over Wi-Fi already feels unremarkable.

    Notable Quotes

    “Agentic coding went from being kind of useful to really changing everything.”

    Benedict Evans, on the pivotal shift at the start of the year

    “We are in this extreme scarcity. We can’t spend $10 trillion a year on AI infrastructure cuz there isn’t $10 trillion a year there to spend on it.”

    Benedict Evans, on the hard ceiling of AI capex

    “I don’t think foundation models are a product. I don’t think a chatbot is a product. I think the value will be further up.”

    Benedict Evans, stating the core of his thesis

    “They built this amazing piece of global incredibly sophisticated very expensive global infrastructure with enormous growth in use, and they didn’t make any money from it because all the value moved up stack.”

    Benedict Evans, on the mobile network analogy

    “The moment that you understand something and you know how it works and what’s going to happen is the moment you should move on to something else.”

    Benedict Evans, on how to pay attention in tech

    “These are all Los Angeles questions. These are not San Francisco questions. No one in San Francisco even knows what the right questions are.”

    Benedict Evans, on why Netflix is not a tech company

    “The important stuff is not doing the old thing but more. It’s doing something new that you couldn’t have done with the old thing.”

    Benedict Evans, on where the real value of a new technology shows up

    “All software companies exist to solve problems created by other software companies.”

    Benedict Evans, on why AI produces more software, not less

    “It’s going to be magic, and in 20 years time we’ll just say, well, of course that’s how it is. Computers have always done that.”

    Benedict Evans, on how the whole shift ends up

    This is a dense, clear eyed conversation that rewards a full listen, especially if you are trying to think past the hype cycle about where AI value actually lands. Watch the full conversation here, and check out the “AI eats the world” presentation referenced throughout.

    Related Reading

    • Benedict Evans’ website home of the “AI eats the world” presentation and his newsletter referenced throughout the conversation.
    • Andreessen Horowitz (a16z) the venture firm whose podcast hosted this discussion and where Evans was formerly a partner.
    • Jevons paradox (Wikipedia) background on the price elasticity idea Evans uses to explain how cheaper AI may lead to more usage rather than savings.
    • Stratechery by Ben Thompson the analysis Evans cites on software as a designed workflow versus a process that grows out of how a business runs.
    • The Pursuit of Purpose a PJFP look at finding direction and meaning in work as automation reshapes careers and industries.