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  • Benedict Evans on the Economics of AI Usage, Why Foundation Models May Become Commodities, and What Comes Next for SaaS

    Benedict Evans returns to the a16z podcast to update the thesis behind his widely read “AI eats the world” presentation, and the picture he paints is less about hype and more about hard economics. In this conversation he works through what has actually played out in the last year, why agentic coding became the one use case with real product market fit, and why he keeps arguing that foundation models may end up as commodities while the value moves somewhere else entirely. You can watch the full conversation here.

    TLDW

    Benedict Evans argues that the AI moment looks a lot like the early internet, the early PC era, and the rollout of mobile data, which means it is exciting, genuinely transformative, and almost impossible to predict use case by use case. Agentic coding is the only field with clear product market fit right now, with revenue run rates exploding from roughly nine billion to forty seven billion, while consumers still use chatbots weekly rather than daily. His central claim is that foundation models show no obvious network effect or sustainable differentiation, the chatbot is a limited v1 interface, and the model labs cannot build every application, so the value will likely move up the stack the way it did with chips, ISPs, and mobile networks rather than staying with the model providers. He covers the brutal supply and demand disequilibrium driving today’s token pricing and ten thousand dollar surprise bills, the financial gravity problem of hyperscalers spending over half their revenue on capex, the Jevons paradox and consumer surplus that may compete away productivity gains, the way the important questions move out of San Francisco and into industries like law, consulting, finance, and advertising, and the distinction between automating tasks and changing jobs. His closing image is an IBM ad from the 1950s promising “150 extra engineers,” a reminder that every platform shift feels unprecedented and that in twenty years we will simply say of course computers do that.

    Thoughts

    The most useful thing Evans does here is refuse to collapse uncertainty into a clean prediction, and then explain exactly why that refusal is the correct posture rather than a cop out. He distinguishes between the parts where he will commit to a view, that foundation models are probably not a product and the chatbot is probably not the right interface, and the parts where there are simply too many open paths to call. That discipline is rare in AI commentary, where the incentive is to sound certain. The commodity argument is not “models are worthless.” It is a chain of reasoning: there is no visible network effect, no durable differentiation beyond willingness to spend, no lock in comparable to Windows or iOS, and a likely structure of three to six well funded competitors plus open source and edge models all selling the same thing. Ask where price discipline comes from in that picture and the honest answer is that it probably does not, which is how you get a commodity even when demand is effectively infinite.

    The mobile data analogy is the load bearing comparison and it deserves to be taken seriously. Mobile data traffic rose something like fifteen hundred to two thousand times over fifteen years, the networks built an extraordinary piece of global infrastructure, everyone came to depend on it, and yet the operators captured almost none of the value because all the interesting stuff got built on top by someone else. Telco stocks were flat for two decades. If that is the template, then the trillion dollars of capex flowing into AI infrastructure can be both a worthwhile investment and a terrible place to expect outsized equity returns, because building the road is not the same as owning the traffic. The counterpoint Evans keeps fairly on the table is the operating system path, where Windows and iOS did capture value, but he notes they had levers and network effects that LLMs do not appear to have.

    His framing of where the questions live is the part most people in tech underweight. Once a technology works, the interesting questions stop being technology questions. Netflix is not a tech company in the sense that matters, because its real decisions are Los Angeles decisions about shows, talent, and sports, not San Francisco decisions about infrastructure. By the same logic, what AI means for a law firm is mostly a question for people who understand what associates actually do and what clients are actually paying for, not for model researchers. This is why the “the model will just do the whole thing” story keeps running aground. Most valuable software does not solve a problem the customer already knew they had. It often takes years to convince an industry that a problem even exists, and an LLM prompt does not surface latent problems that no one has articulated.

    The economic plumbing he describes is where the near term risk actually sits. We are in extreme disequilibrium, where twenty dollars a month can buy ten thousand dollars of tokens on one side and a weekend of experimentation can produce a ten thousand dollar bill on the other, exactly the pattern mobile data went through around 2009 and 2010. That gets resolved with the boring machinery of caps, throttling, and pricing tiers, not with magic. Layered on top is the financial gravity problem: Microsoft, Meta, and Google heading toward spending more than half of revenue on capex, with roughly seven hundred billion dollars of guidance across the big players, against a hard ceiling because there is not ten trillion dollars a year available to spend. And even when the productivity gains are real, the Jevons paradox and consumer surplus suggest much of the benefit gets competed away. If a discounted cash flow model used to take a week and now takes ten seconds, you do fifty of them and charge the client the same, which is great for clients and unremarkable for margins.

    The honest takeaway for builders is that the answer to “what does this do to software” is more software, probably one or two orders of magnitude more, just as SaaS itself produced an explosion rather than a consolidation. The SaaS apocalypse is real in the sense that some meaningful percentage of existing companies get wiped out, and unknowable in the sense that no one can yet say which ones, which is why thoughtful investors are reluctant to be long software in the dark. For anyone pursuing a more deliberate, purposeful relationship with technology, the closing note is the one to keep: every one of these shifts felt singular and world ending and world making at the time, it reshaped work and put people out of jobs and created things we love, and then it quietly became invisible. The goal is to stay clear eyed about which of those buckets a given change lands in rather than getting swept up in the noise of what someone said at a party yesterday.

    Key Takeaways

    • Agentic coding shifted from “kind of useful” to “really changing everything” at the start of the year, and it is the single field with unambiguous product market fit, where customers are pulling it out of your hands.
    • Coding working first was foreseeable in hindsight: software developers were the ones messing with the tools, and the first thing people do with a new kind of computer is build more computing, just as the first thing people did with PCs was make computers.
    • Anthropic, with less capital raised, chose to focus on coding and got it working, while OpenAI cycled through a more everything all at once strategy before narrowing in.
    • The intense focus on coding comes bundled with a supply crunch, a capacity crunch, and a price and capex imbalance that defines the current moment.
    • Most of the fundamental questions from two or three years ago still have no answers: whether there will be a winner in models, whether models capture value up the stack, how much they can do, and whether consumers will use this daily rather than weekly.
    • There is a wide gap between Valley insiders running clusters of Mac Studios all day and the roughly forty percent of people who say AI is “kind of useful, I used it last week for something.”
    • Outside tech, companies are adopting AI as one at a time point solutions for specific back office processes, like a commodities company using LLMs for better cash flow forecasting, not as a general purpose assistant.
    • Adoption always compounds on prior platforms: you could not have nine hundred million weekly active users in the Netscape era because there were not nine hundred million PCs on the planet.
    • Early in any platform shift almost nothing works smoothly, from sound cards and floppy disks with TCP/IP to computers that froze and lost your work, and AI is at that stage now.
    • Today’s token pricing crunch mirrors the mobile data shock of 2009 to 2010, where flat rate plans collided with surging usage and networks had to realign price with marginal cost through caps, fair use, and throttling.
    • Mobile data traffic rose roughly fifteen hundred to two thousand times in fifteen years, mobile networks earn around a trillion dollars and spend about two hundred billion a year on capex, yet their stocks have been flat for twenty years because all the value moved up the stack.
    • The central LLM question is whether the model can do the whole thing or whether you need hundreds of applications built on top, the same way you needed apps on Windows and iOS.
    • Evans sees no network effect and no sustainable differentiation between models beyond willingness to spend money, which points toward commodity infrastructure sold near marginal cost.
    • Chip companies, ISPs, and mobile operators did not capture the value; Windows and iOS did, but only because they had levers to move up the stack and real network effects, which models lack.
    • A useful comparison is semiconductors, where each generation gets more expensive and the field narrows to fewer players, suggesting three to six frontier model makers spending somewhere between two hundred billion and two trillion dollars a year.
    • Enterprises do not standardize on a model the way they once thought about AWS; the cloud and the model get abstracted away, so customers do not even know which one their SaaS product runs on.
    • Demand for tokens being effectively infinite does not prevent a price equilibrium, exactly as infinite demand for mobile bits still produced murderous price wars between commodity carriers.
    • History teaches that something will happen but rarely what; the smartest people in tech wrongly predicted Android would crush the iPhone on open versus closed grounds.
    • One characteristic of tech is that the moment you understand how something works is the moment to move on, which is why Evans stopped updating his Apple spreadsheet years ago.
    • The people who are good at using a tool are usually not the people who are good at designing what the tool should be, which is why model labs cannot build every skill or vertical application.
    • Claude skills and similar templates resemble file new in Excel: useful starting points that users eventually outgrow, raising the question of who builds the real software.
    • The questions increasingly move out of technology and into specific industries; what AI means for law, consulting, advertising, or accounting is partly an AI question and partly a deep domain question.
    • Netflix is not a tech company in the way that matters, because its real questions are media industry questions about shows, talent, and sports, not infrastructure; the same logic now applies across industries facing AI.
    • AI differs from prior platform shifts because the physical limits are unknown; in 1995 you knew PCs cost three thousand dollars and broadband could not reach everyone overnight, but no one knows how cheap, fast, or capable models will get.
    • Evans offers four buttons to press on any use case: is it just price elasticity and the Jevons paradox, does it remove a cost barrier to entry, does it unlock a new business model, or does it make something previously impossible now possible like trains over horses or Spotify over CDs.
    • Advertising and e-commerce are a standout opportunity because today’s systems know a SKU and a metadata field but not what a product actually is or why people buy it, and LLMs could change that level of understanding.
    • The valuable shift is not doing the old thing more, like more spreadsheets or better email, but doing genuinely new things, such as asking an LLM how to change prices to improve churn using all your call recordings, CRM flows, and product telemetry.
    • Enterprise software today splits into three buckets: big horizontal systems like SAP and Workday, three to four hundred vertical SaaS apps plus a thousand internal apps, and a fuzzy improvised middle of Excel, email, and shared files, with AI arriving as a new option across all three.
    • A core design tension is where to put the probabilistic software that can make mistakes versus the deterministic database that cannot, and whether the LLM sits at the top or the bottom of the stack; the answer is probably both depending on the task.
    • The net effect on software is way more software, since SaaS itself produced one to two orders of magnitude more software and all software companies exist to solve problems created by other software companies.
    • The SaaS apocalypse is real but unknowable: some percentage of SaaS companies get wiped out, but no one knows which, so you should not derate the whole sector fifty percent and many investors are wary of being long software for now.
    • Much of what an organization does is implicit, undocumented, and not in the training data, which is exactly the value McKinsey, Bain, and BCG provide by getting license to map how a company really works.
    • The real decisions are usually exception handling: the question is always what you cannot automate and what still requires human judgment about cases that were never written down.
    • Distinguish tasks from jobs: accountants spend almost none of their time the way they did fifty years ago, yet to the client the job looks the same.
    • LLMs excel where you want the average, the answer anyone would give, and struggle where you specifically do not want the average and cannot fully explain why you did it differently.
    • There is a financial gravity ceiling: Microsoft, Meta, and Google are on track to spend over fifty percent of revenue on capex versus fifteen to twenty percent for capital intensive telecoms, with seven hundred billion in guidance this year and no path to ten trillion.
    • Hyperscalers face an existential FOMO trap: returns look positive now, but they cannot let rivals build the future of compute without participating, even as the CFO asks how much participation is enough.
    • Token maxing will face a reckoning as the disequilibrium resolves, but measuring ROI is hard because most reported benefits so far, like better analytics, support, and productivity, are tough to put a financial value on.
    • Consumer surplus means many gains get competed away: if analysis that took a week now takes a day, you do five times more analysis and charge the same, the way investment banks did with spreadsheets.
    • Evans closes with a 1950s IBM ad promising “150 extra engineers,” a reminder that every fundamental technology change feels unprecedented, and that in twenty years AI will simply be invisible magic we take for granted.

    Detailed Summary

    What changed in the last year

    Evans frames the past year as a narrowing of focus. A year and a half after the first version of his presentation, the field has developed a much clearer sense of diverging product strategies and competitive tension that goes beyond simply building a bigger model with more compute. The dominant shift is that agentic coding started genuinely working, and the entire industry narrowed in on it because it has absolute product market fit, the kind where customers pull the product out of your hands. That success arrives alongside the supply crunch, capacity constraints, and price imbalance that now define the moment. At the same time, the charts keep climbing, models keep getting bigger, capex keeps growing, and usage keeps growing, while the deep questions from a few years ago remain unanswered.

    Why coding worked first

    That coding led was predictable at a naive level: the people experimenting with the tools were software developers, and they naturally tried to make software development work. Evans compares the moment to the internet around 1997 and 1998, and also to PCs in the late seventies and early eighties, when the technology was exciting but it was not clear what it was for and it did not quite work yet. The first thing people did with PCs was make computers, and since LLMs are in a sense computers, the first thing people are doing with them is making more compute. What was harder to foresee was the precise timing of the shift, the moment when agentic coding flipped from useful to transformative at the start of this year.

    Jobs, juniors, and what we have not learned

    On the question of what this means for engineers and team structure, Evans is blunt that we have learned almost nothing yet, because this did not even work six months ago and everyone is scrambling to interpret it. The pricing crunch alone means it will take a couple of years to settle. The newly concrete questions include whether you still hire junior people and what they would do, and why you were hiring juniors in the first place, whether to do the work itself or to develop people. Because software development now genuinely automates a class of work that used to be done by people, those questions have moved from theoretical to real, but no one can responsibly claim to know what a software team or a software career looks like in three years.

    OpenAI, Anthropic, and the strategy split

    Evans dryly notes the drama around the model labs, including the disruption of a senior leadership medical leave at OpenAI. In the latter part of last year, OpenAI’s question was essentially what to build on top of the models, an everything all at once approach that looked almost like asking the model for fifteen ideas and then doing all of them. Anthropic, with less capital raised, instead committed to coding and got it working, whether by deliberate strategy or by stumbling into it. The result is that software development plus a few other fields are where things genuinely work, surrounded by a large population of people excited around the edges and corporations quietly automating specific back office processes. He cites a commodities company that wants LLMs for better cash flow forecasting across many small producers, a very different thing from asking a chatbot to summarize your meetings.

    The mobile data analogy and value capture

    The richest section is the comparison to mobile. Adoption always compounds on prior platforms, so AI inherits a far larger installed base than the internet or mobile did at their starts. Early on, nothing works smoothly, and Evans recalls the era of buying a three hundred dollar sound card or wrestling a floppy disk of TCP/IP into a machine. The pricing dynamics directly echo mobile data around 2009 and 2010, when flat rate plans met exploding usage and ten thousand dollar bills, forcing networks to realign price with marginal cost. Crucially, mobile data traffic then rose fifteen hundred to two thousand times, the networks built extraordinary global infrastructure with around a trillion dollars of revenue and two hundred billion in annual capex, and yet their stocks stayed flat for twenty years because all the cool stuff and all the value got built and captured by someone else higher up the stack. Chip companies, ISPs, and mobile operators did not capture value; Windows and iOS did, but they had levers and network effects that models do not appear to share.

    The case that models become commodities

    Evans lays out the building blocks of his commodity thesis. First, there is no clear way to build a model that is sustainably and fundamentally better than everyone else’s, with no visible network effect and no strategic lever comparable to what Instagram, YouTube, or Google search enjoy. Differences in emphasis and taste exist, but not durable competitive moats beyond spending. Second, the chatbot is a weird, limited v1 interface that works well for some tasks and people but requires tooling, the right data, configuration, control, and thoughtful design for most real jobs, and the people good at a job are rarely the people good at designing the tool for it. Third, the labs cannot build every application any more than Microsoft or Apple could build every Windows or iPhone app. Enterprises do not standardize on a model the way they never standardized on a visible cloud provider, because it gets abstracted away. Taken together, that points to low level infrastructure sold by perhaps half a dozen competitors plus open source and edge, with no obvious source of price discipline, which is the definition of a commodity even when demand is infinite.

    The questions move out of technology

    One of the next big questions is when models become good enough that you no longer need the largest, fastest, most expensive model, and can use an older model, an open source model, or one running on device where compute is effectively free to the developer. But the deeper shift is that the important questions move out of technology and into industries. Drawing on his own essays “content isn’t king” and “Netflix isn’t a tech company,” Evans argues that Netflix’s real decisions are Los Angeles media questions, not San Francisco infrastructure questions, and San Francisco does not even know what the right questions are. By the same logic, what AI means for a law firm is mostly a question for people who understand law firms, what generative video means for Hollywood is a question Ben Affleck can answer better than he can, and the questions become half AI and half something else.

    Four buttons and the new things AI unlocks

    To reason about impact, Evans offers four buttons. Is a use case just price elasticity, the Jevons paradox of doing the same thing for less or more for the same money. Does it remove a cost that was a barrier to entry, like a newspaper’s printing press. Does it unlock something in your business model. Or does it make something previously impossible now possible, the way steam engines made trains possible regardless of how many horses you bought, or Spotify turned fifteen dollars a month into all the music there is. He stresses that the same broad change can mean wildly different things by industry, just as the internet devastated newspapers but barely touched movie studios. His favorite tractable example is advertising and e-commerce, a trillion dollar advertising market against twenty five trillion in retail, where today’s systems know a SKU and a metadata field and that people who bought one thing bought another, but do not know what a product is or why people buy it. An LLM could in principle understand the product, recommend ten coats at different prices with pros and cons, or look at your Instagram and suggest a winter coat that changes your look but not too much, which would have been science fiction three years ago.

    More software, the SaaS apocalypse, and tasks versus jobs

    For software specifically, Evans expects more competition, cheaper and quicker building, and new categories that were impossible before, all under an uncertain new margin structure where outcome based pricing is hard because most software work cannot be tied cleanly to profit and loss. He frames enterprise software as three buckets, big horizontal systems, hundreds of vertical and internal apps, and a fuzzy improvised middle of Excel and email, with AI arriving as another option across all of them. The deeper design tension is where to place probabilistic software that can make mistakes versus deterministic systems that cannot, and whether the LLM sits at the top or bottom of the stack, with the answer being both depending on the task. The net result is way more software, since SaaS itself produced orders of magnitude more software and software exists to solve problems created by other software. That fuels the SaaS apocalypse anxiety: some companies clearly get wiped out, but since no one knows which, you should not derate the whole sector, even as many investors stay cautious about being long software.

    Implicit knowledge, exception handling, and where the average fails

    Much of what organizations do is implicit, undocumented, and absent from any training data, which is precisely the value of strategy consultancies that get license to map how a company really works versus how it is supposed to work. The real decisions tend to be exception handling, the cases that require human judgment because they were never written down or do not look like before. Evans separates tasks from jobs, noting accountants do almost nothing the way they did fifty years ago while the client still buys the same thing. And he offers a sharp test: LLMs are excellent where you want the average, the answer anyone would give, and weak where you specifically do not want the average and cannot fully articulate why you did it differently.

    Capex, financial gravity, and the ROI question

    On spending, Evans describes a financial gravity problem. Microsoft, Meta, and Google are on line to spend over half their revenue on capex this year, against fifteen to twenty percent for capital intensive telecoms, with roughly seven hundred billion in guidance across the big players, a sum comparable to all of telecom or oil and gas. They cannot sustainably leap to one and a half trillion next year because the money is not there, so the curve must eventually taper. The hyperscalers are caught in an existential FOMO trap: returns look positive now, but they cannot sit out what might be the future of compute without risking becoming the next stranded incumbent, even as the CFO asks how much is enough. On token maxing, he expects a reckoning as the disequilibrium resolves, but measuring ROI is genuinely hard because most reported benefits so far are soft and hard to value, and consumer surplus means much of the gain gets competed away, the way faster spreadsheets simply meant more analysis at the same price.

    Closing image

    Evans ends with an IBM advertisement from the early 1950s showing a sea of engineers holding slide rules, with the tagline that an IBM electronic calculator gives you 150 extra engineers, exactly the pitch behind countless modern startup decks. We move through these fundamental technology waves every ten or fifteen or twenty years, each one feeling completely unlike anything before, and AI is amazing and transformative in the same way mobile, the internet, and PCs were. The base case is that it will produce wonderful things, ruin some livelihoods, put people out of work, and eventually become invisible. His one line description of where it all ends up is that it will be magic, and in twenty years we will simply say of course computers do that, the way an hour of crash free streaming HD video over Wi-Fi already feels unremarkable.

    Notable Quotes

    “Agentic coding went from being kind of useful to really changing everything.”

    Benedict Evans, on the pivotal shift at the start of the year

    “We are in this extreme scarcity. We can’t spend $10 trillion a year on AI infrastructure cuz there isn’t $10 trillion a year there to spend on it.”

    Benedict Evans, on the hard ceiling of AI capex

    “I don’t think foundation models are a product. I don’t think a chatbot is a product. I think the value will be further up.”

    Benedict Evans, stating the core of his thesis

    “They built this amazing piece of global incredibly sophisticated very expensive global infrastructure with enormous growth in use, and they didn’t make any money from it because all the value moved up stack.”

    Benedict Evans, on the mobile network analogy

    “The moment that you understand something and you know how it works and what’s going to happen is the moment you should move on to something else.”

    Benedict Evans, on how to pay attention in tech

    “These are all Los Angeles questions. These are not San Francisco questions. No one in San Francisco even knows what the right questions are.”

    Benedict Evans, on why Netflix is not a tech company

    “The important stuff is not doing the old thing but more. It’s doing something new that you couldn’t have done with the old thing.”

    Benedict Evans, on where the real value of a new technology shows up

    “All software companies exist to solve problems created by other software companies.”

    Benedict Evans, on why AI produces more software, not less

    “It’s going to be magic, and in 20 years time we’ll just say, well, of course that’s how it is. Computers have always done that.”

    Benedict Evans, on how the whole shift ends up

    This is a dense, clear eyed conversation that rewards a full listen, especially if you are trying to think past the hype cycle about where AI value actually lands. Watch the full conversation here, and check out the “AI eats the world” presentation referenced throughout.

    Related Reading

    • Benedict Evans’ website home of the “AI eats the world” presentation and his newsletter referenced throughout the conversation.
    • Andreessen Horowitz (a16z) the venture firm whose podcast hosted this discussion and where Evans was formerly a partner.
    • Jevons paradox (Wikipedia) background on the price elasticity idea Evans uses to explain how cheaper AI may lead to more usage rather than savings.
    • Stratechery by Ben Thompson the analysis Evans cites on software as a designed workflow versus a process that grows out of how a business runs.
    • The Pursuit of Purpose a PJFP look at finding direction and meaning in work as automation reshapes careers and industries.

  • Krishna Rao on Anthropic Going From 9 Billion to 30 Billion ARR in One Quarter and the Compute Strategy Powering Claude

    Krishna Rao, Chief Financial Officer of Anthropic, sat down with Patrick O’Shaughnessy on Invest Like the Best for one of the most detailed public looks yet at the operating engine behind Claude. He covers how Anthropic compounded from $9 billion of run rate revenue at the start of the year to north of $30 billion by the end of Q1, why he spends 30 to 40 percent of his time on compute, the playbook for buying gigawatts of AI infrastructure across Trainium, TPU, and GPU platforms, how Anthropic prices its models, why returns to frontier intelligence keep climbing, and what the Mythos release tells us about the cyber capabilities of the next generation of Claude.

    TLDW

    Anthropic is running the most compute fungible frontier lab in the world, with active deployments across AWS Trainium, Google TPU, and Nvidia GPU, and an internal orchestration layer that lets a chip serve inference in the morning and run reinforcement learning the same evening. Krishna Rao explains the cone of uncertainty that governs gigawatt scale compute procurement, the floor Anthropic refuses to drop below on model development compute, the Jevons paradox unlock from cutting Opus pricing, the 500 percent annualized net dollar retention from enterprise customers, the layer cake of long term deals with Google, Broadcom, Amazon, and the recent xAI Colossus tie up in Memphis, the phased release of the Mythos model in response to spiking cyber capabilities, the internal use of Claude Code to produce statutory financial statements and run a Monthly Financial Review skill, and why the team believes scaling laws are alive and well. The interview also covers fundraising history through Series D and Series E, the $75 billion already raised plus another $50 billion coming, talent density beating talent mass during the Meta poaching wave, and Rao’s belief that biotech and drug discovery represent the most exciting frontier for AI.

    Key Takeaways

    • Anthropic entered the year with about $9 billion of run rate revenue and ended the first quarter with north of $30 billion of run rate revenue, a more than 3x leap driven by model intelligence gains and the products built around them.
    • Compute is described as the lifeblood of the company, the canvas everything else is built on, and the most consequential class of decisions Rao makes. Buy too much and you go bankrupt. Buy too little and you cannot serve customers or stay at the frontier.
    • Rao spends 30 to 40 percent of his time on compute, even today, and the leadership team meets repeatedly on both procurement and ongoing compute allocation.
    • Anthropic is the only frontier language lab actively using all three major chip platforms in production: AWS Trainium, Google TPU, and Nvidia GPU. It is also the only major model available on all three clouds.
    • Flexibility is the central design principle. Anthropic builds flexibility into the deals themselves, into the orchestration layer that maps workloads to chips, and into compilers built from the chip level up.
    • The cone of uncertainty frames procurement. Small differences in weekly or monthly growth compound into wildly different two year outcomes, so the team plans across a range of scenarios rather than a single point estimate, and ranges toward the upper end while protecting downside.
    • Compute allocation across the company sits in three buckets: model development and research, internal employee acceleration, and external customer serving. A non negotiable floor protects model development even when customer demand is tight.
    • Anthropic estimates that if it cut off internal employee use of its own models, the freed compute could serve billions of dollars of additional revenue. It chooses not to, because internal use compounds into better future models.
    • Intelligence is multi dimensional, not a single IQ score. Anthropic measures real world capability through customer feedback, long horizon task performance, tool use, computer use, and speed at agentic tasks, not just leaderboard benchmarks that have largely saturated.
    • Each Opus generation, 4 to 4.5 to 4.6 to 4.7, delivers both capability improvements and an efficiency multiplier on token processing. New models often serve customers at a fraction of the prior cost while doing more.
    • Reinforcement learning is described as inference inside a sandbox with a reward function, so model efficiency gains directly improve internal RL throughput. The flywheel is tightly coupled.
    • Over 90 percent of code at Anthropic is now written by Claude Code, and a large share of Claude Code itself is written by Claude Code.
    • Anthropic shipped roughly 30 distinct product and feature releases in January and the pace has accelerated since.
    • Scaling laws, in Anthropic’s internal data, are alive and well. The team holds itself to a skeptical scientific standard and still does not see them slowing down.
    • Anthropic recently signed a 5 gigawatt deal with Google and Broadcom for TPUs starting in 2027, plus an Amazon Trainium agreement for up to 5 gigawatts, totaling more than $100 billion in commitments. A significant portion lands this year and next year.
    • A new partnership for capacity at the xAI Colossus facility in Memphis was announced just before the interview, aimed at expanding consumer and prosumer capacity.
    • Pricing has been remarkably stable across Haiku, Sonnet, and Opus. The biggest deliberate change was lowering Opus pricing, which produced a textbook Jevons paradox: consumption rose far faster than the price drop, and the new Opus 4.6 and 4.7 slot in at the same price point.
    • Mythos is the first model Anthropic chose to release in a phased way because of a sharp spike in cyber capability. In an open source codebase where a prior model found 22 security vulnerabilities, Mythos found roughly 250.
    • The Mythos release framework focuses on defensive use first, expands access over time, and is presented as a template for future capability spikes.
    • Anthropic now sells to 9 of the Fortune 10 and reports net dollar retention above 500 percent on an annualized basis. These are not pilots. Rao describes signing two double digit million dollar commitments during a 20 minute Uber ride to the studio.
    • The platform strategy is mostly horizontal. Anthropic will go vertical with offerings like Claude for Financial Services, Claude for Life Sciences, and Claude Security where it can demonstrate the model’s capabilities, but expects most application value to accrue to customers building on top.
    • Investors raised over $75 billion in equity since Rao joined, with another $50 billion in commitments tied to the Amazon and Google deals. Capital intensity is real, but the raises fund the upper end of the cone of uncertainty more than they fund current losses.
    • The Series E close coincided with the day the DeepSeek news broke, forcing investors to reassess their AI thesis in real time. Anthropic closed the round anyway.
    • Inside finance, Claude now produces statutory financial statements for every Anthropic legal entity, with a human checker. A library of more than 70 finance specific skills underpins workflows.
    • A custom Monthly Financial Review skill produces a 90 to 95 percent ready monthly close report, so leadership discussion shifts from reconciling numbers to debating implications.
    • An internal real time analytics platform called Anthrop Stats compresses weekly insight cycles from hours to about 30 minutes.
    • The biggest token user inside Anthropic’s finance team is the head of tax, focused on tax policy engines and workflow automation. The most senior people, not the youngest, are leading internal adoption.
    • Talent density beats talent mass. When Meta and others ran aggressive offer waves, Anthropic lost two people while peer labs lost dozens.
    • All seven Anthropic co founders remain at the company, as does most of the first 20 to 30 employees, which Rao credits to a collaborative, transparent, debate friendly culture and a real culture interview that can veto otherwise top tier candidates.
    • Dario Amodei holds an open all hands every two weeks, writes a short prepared document, and takes unscripted questions from anyone at the company.
    • AI safety investments in interpretability and alignment have a commercial side effect. Looking inside the model helps Anthropic build better models, and enterprises selling sensitive workloads want to trust the lab they hand customer data to.
    • Anthropic explicitly identifies as America first in its approach to model development, and engages closely with the US administration on capability releases such as Mythos.
    • The longer term product vision is the virtual collaborator: an agent with organizational context, access to the company’s tools, persistent memory, and the ability to work on ideas, not just tasks, over long horizons.
    • CoWork, Anthropic’s extension of the Claude Code paradigm into general knowledge work, is being adopted faster than Claude Code itself when indexed to the same point in its launch curve.
    • Anthropic’s product teams ship daily, with a fleet of agents working across the company on specific tasks. Everyone effectively becomes a manager of agents.
    • The dominant downside risks to Anthropic’s high end forecast are slower customer diffusion of model capability into real workflows, scaling laws flattening unexpectedly, and Anthropic losing its position at the frontier.
    • Rao is most excited about biotech and healthcare outcomes, especially the prospect that AI could push drug discovery and lab throughput up 10x or 100x, turning currently incurable diagnoses into treatable ones within a patient’s lifetime.

    Detailed Summary

    Compute as Lifeblood and the Cone of Uncertainty

    Rao opens with the claim that compute is the most important resource at Anthropic, and the most consequential decision class in the company. You cannot buy a gigawatt of compute next week. You have to anticipate demand a year or two in advance, and the cost of being wrong in either direction is high. Buy too much and the unit economics collapse. Buy too little and you cannot serve customers or stay at the frontier, which are described as the same failure mode. To navigate this, the team uses a cone of uncertainty rather than point estimates. Small differences in weekly growth compound into vastly different two year outcomes, and Anthropic tries to position itself toward the upper end of that cone while preserving optionality. Rao notes he has had to consciously break a lifetime of linear thinking and force himself into exponential models.

    Three Chip Platforms, One Orchestration Layer

    Anthropic uses Amazon’s Trainium, Google’s TPUs, and Nvidia’s GPUs fungibly. That was not free. Adopting TPUs at scale started around the third TPU generation, when outside observers thought it was a strange choice. Anthropic invested years into compilers and orchestration so workloads can flow across chips by generation and by job type. The team works deeply with Annapurna Labs at AWS to influence Trainium roadmaps because Anthropic stresses these chips harder than almost anyone. The result is what Rao believes is the most efficient utilization of compute across any frontier lab, with a dollar of compute going further inside Anthropic than anywhere else.

    Three Buckets and the Model Development Floor

    Compute gets allocated across model development, internal acceleration of employees, and customer serving. The conversations are collaborative rather than zero sum, but there is a hard floor on model development that the company refuses to cross even if it makes customer demand harder to serve in the short term. The thesis is simple. The returns to frontier intelligence are extremely high, especially in enterprise, so cutting model investment to chase near term revenue is a bad trade. Internal employee use is also explicitly protected. Rao notes that diverting that internal usage to external customers would unlock billions of additional revenue today, but the compounding benefit of accelerating researchers and engineers outweighs that.

    Intelligence Is Multi Dimensional

    Rao pushes back hard on the IQ framing of model progress. Benchmarks saturate quickly, and the real signal comes from how customers actually use the models. Anthropic looks at long horizon task completion, tool use, computer use, and time to result on agentic tasks. Two equally capable agents who differ only in speed produce dramatically different value, because the faster one compounds into more attempts and more outcomes. Frontier model leaps are also fuel efficient. The sedan to sports car analogy breaks down because each Opus generation, 4 to 4.5 to 4.6 to 4.7, delivers a step up in capability and a multiplier on per token efficiency.

    From 9 Billion to 30 Billion ARR in One Quarter

    The headline number for the quarter is a leap from about $9 billion of run rate revenue to over $30 billion, accomplished without onboarding a corresponding step up in compute, because new compute lands on ramps locked in 12 months prior. Rao attributes the leap to model capability gains, products that surface that intelligence in usable form factors, and an enterprise customer base that pulls more workloads onto Claude as each generation unlocks new use cases. Coding started the wave with Sonnet 3.5 and 3.6, and the same pattern is now playing out elsewhere in the economy.

    Recursive Self Improvement and Talent Density

    Over 90 percent of Anthropic’s code is now written by Claude Code, including most of Claude Code itself. Rao describes this as a structural reason to keep allocating internal compute to employees even when external demand is hungry. Recursive self improvement is not happening through models that need no humans. It is happening through researchers who set direction and use frontier models to compress months of work into days. Talent density beats talent mass. When Meta and other labs went after Anthropic researchers with very large packages, Anthropic lost two people while peer labs lost dozens.

    Procurement Strategy and the Layer Cake

    Compute lands as a layer cake. Last month Anthropic signed a 5 gigawatt TPU deal with Google and Broadcom starting in 2027, alongside an Amazon Trainium agreement for up to 5 gigawatts. The total is north of $100 billion in commitments. A new tie up with xAI’s Colossus facility in Memphis was announced just before the interview, intended for nearer term capacity to support consumer and prosumer growth. Anthropic evaluates near term and long term compute deals against the same set of variables: price, duration, location, chip type, and how efficiently the team can run it. The relationships are deeper than procurement. The hyperscalers are also distribution channels for the model.

    Platform First, Selective Vertical Bets

    Rao describes Anthropic as a platform first business, with most expected value accruing to customers building on the platform. The team will only go vertical when it can either demonstrate capabilities that are skating to where the puck is going, like Claude Code did before the models could fully support it, or when it wants to set a template for an industry vertical, as with Claude for Financial Services, Claude for Life Sciences, and Claude Security. He acknowledges that surprise capability jumps make customers anxious about the platform competing with them, and frames Anthropic’s mitigation as deeper partnerships, early access programs, and an emphasis on accelerating customer building rather than disintermediating it.

    Pricing, Jevons Paradox, and Return on Compute

    Pricing across Haiku, Sonnet, and Opus has been stable. The notable exception is Opus, which Anthropic deliberately repriced lower when launching Opus 4.5 because Opus class problems were being squeezed into Sonnet workloads. Efficiency gains made it possible to serve Opus profitably at the new level. The consumption response was a classic Jevons paradox, with usage rising far more than the price reduction would have predicted, and Opus 4.6 then slotted in at the same price with a capability bump. Margins are not framed as a per token markup. Compute is fungible across model development, internal acceleration, and customer serving, so Anthropic measures return on the entire compute envelope rather than software style variable cost per call.

    Fundraising, DeepSeek, and Capital Intensity

    Rao joined while Anthropic was closing its Series D, mid frontier model launch and during the FTX share liquidation. Investors initially questioned whether Anthropic needed a frontier model, whether AI safety and a real business could coexist, and why the sales team was so small. The Series E closed the same day the DeepSeek news broke, with markets violently re pricing AI in real time. Since Rao joined, Anthropic has raised over $75 billion, with another $50 billion tied to the Amazon and Google compute deals. The reason for the size of the raises is the cone of uncertainty, not current losses. Returns on compute today are described as robust.

    Mythos, Cyber Capability, and Phased Releases

    The Mythos release marks the first time Anthropic shipped a model under a deliberately phased rollout because of a specific capability spike. Cyber is the dimension that spiked. Where a prior model found 22 vulnerabilities in an open source codebase, Mythos found roughly 250. The defensive applications, automatically patching massive codebases, are genuinely valuable, but the offensive risk is real enough that Anthropic chose to release to a smaller group first and expand access over time. Rao positions this as a template for future capability spikes, not a permanent restriction. He also describes the relationship with the US administration as cooperative, including the Department of War interaction, with Anthropic supporting a regulatory framework that does not strangle innovation but takes responsibility seriously.

    Claude Inside Finance

    Anthropic’s finance team is one of the strongest internal case studies. Statutory financial statements for every legal entity are produced by Claude, with a human reviewer. A skill library of more than 70 finance specific skills underpins a Monthly Financial Review skill that drafts the monthly close at 90 to 95 percent ready, so leadership meetings shift from explaining the numbers to discussing what to do about them. An internal analytics platform called Anthrop Stats compresses weekly insight cycles from hours to 30 minutes. The biggest internal token user in finance is the head of tax, building policy engines, which Rao highlights as evidence that adoption is driven by the most senior people, not just younger engineers.

    Culture, Co Founders, and the Race to the Top

    Seven co founders should not, on paper, work as a leadership group. Rao argues it works because the culture was set early around collaboration, intellectual honesty, transparency, and humility. The culture interview is a real veto, not a checkbox. Dario Amodei runs an all hands every two weeks with a short written piece followed by unscripted questions, and decisions, once made, get clean alignment rather than residual politics. Anthropic frames its approach as a race to the top, where being a model for how to build the technology responsibly is itself a recruiting and retention advantage.

    The Virtual Collaborator and the Frontier Ahead

    The product vision Rao describes is the virtual collaborator. Not just a smarter chatbot, but an agent with organizational context, access to the company’s tools, memory, and the ability to work on ideas over long horizons. Coding was the first domain to feel this, but CoWork, Anthropic’s extension of the Claude Code pattern into general knowledge work, is being adopted faster than Claude Code was at the same age. Product development inside Anthropic already looks different. Teams ship daily, with fleets of agents working across the company, and individual humans increasingly act as managers of those fleets.

    Downside Risks and What Excites Him Most

    The three risks Rao names if asked to do a premortem on a softer year are slower customer diffusion of model capability into real workflows, scaling laws unexpectedly flattening, and Anthropic losing its frontier position to competitors. None of these are observed today, but he is unwilling to claim them with certainty. On the upside, he is most excited about biotech and healthcare. Lab throughput rising 10x or 100x, paired with AI assisted clinical workflows, could turn currently incurable diagnoses into treatable ones within a patient’s lifetime. That is the outcome he wants the technology to chase.

    Thoughts

    The most consequential structural point in this interview is the framing of compute as a single fungible resource pool measured by return on the entire envelope, not as a variable cost per inference call. That accounting shift, if you accept it, breaks most of the bear cases about AI lab unit economics. The bear argument almost always assumes that a token served to a customer is the only thing the chip did that day. Rao’s version is that the same fleet trains models in the morning, runs reinforcement learning at lunch, serves customers in the afternoon, and accelerates internal engineers in the evening. If even half of that is real, the right comparison is total compute spend versus total enterprise value created by the platform, and on that ratio Anthropic looks structurally strong rather than weak.

    The Jevons paradox on Opus pricing is the most actionable insight for anyone running an AI product. Most teams default to either chasing premium pricing on the newest model or undercutting to chase volume. Anthropic did something more disciplined: it left Sonnet and Haiku alone, dropped Opus when efficiency gains made it serveable, and watched aggregate usage rise faster than the price cut. The lesson is that frontier model pricing is not really a price problem. It is a capability access problem, and elasticity around the right tier is much higher than the standard SaaS playbook implies.

    The Mythos cyber jump deserves more attention than it has gotten. Going from 22 to 250 vulnerabilities found in the same codebase is the kind of capability discontinuity that genuinely changes the regulatory calculus. Anthropic is signaling that it can identify these discontinuities ahead of release and choose a deployment shape that respects them. Whether peer labs adopt similar discipline is the open question. Anthropic’s race to the top framing assumes they will be forced to. The competitive market may say otherwise.

    The hiring data point is the most underrated investor signal. Two departures while peer labs lost dozens, during the most aggressive talent war in tech history, is not a culture poster. It is a structural advantage that compounds every time another lab tries to buy its way to the frontier. Money can be matched. Conviction in the mission, transparent leadership, and a culture interview that can veto otherwise stellar candidates cannot. If you believe scaling laws hold, talent retention at this density is one of the few moats that actually scales with capital.

    Finally, the most interesting personal admission is that Krishna Rao, a finance leader trained at Blackstone and Cedar, is openly telling investors that linear thinking is the failure mode he had to break out of. The companies that pattern match this moment to prior technology waves are mispricing it, in both directions. The cone of uncertainty Anthropic uses internally is the right metaphor for everyone else too. If you are forecasting AI as if it is cloud in 2010, you are almost certainly wrong, and the magnitude of the error is much larger than it would be in any prior era.

    Watch the full conversation with Krishna Rao on Invest Like the Best here.