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  • Paul Graham and Jessica Livingston on Resilience at Y Combinator: Founder Mode, Cockroaches, Sticking to Your North Star, and Why AI and Climate Keep Them Up at Night

    For the very first episode of Disaster Proof, the conversation goes to a garage in Palo Alto to sit down with Paul Graham and Jessica Livingston, the founders of Y Combinator. They have backed thousands of companies, including many now working in the resilience space, and the discussion covers what makes startups durable, why adaptability beats expertise, how Brian Chesky stumbled into founder mode at Airbnb, why the best ideas grow out of a founder’s own life, and the two specific risks (AI and climate change) that Paul says are the only ones he treats as genuinely game over. You can watch the full conversation on YouTube here.

    TLDW

    Paul Graham and Jessica Livingston explain why constant change favors young, flexible founders, and why Y Combinator picks people over ideas precisely so its judgment never goes obsolete. They unpack adaptability as the trait they hunt for in interviews, the “founder mode” story behind Brian Chesky steering Airbnb through COVID, and the 2008 strategy of funding tough, close-to-revenue “cockroaches.” Paul argues a company survives turbulence by sticking to a North Star instead of acting as a weather vane in shifting moral fashions, using the biosphere tree that collapses without wind as his metaphor for resilience. They turn to climate and energy as the next great market, the difficulty of selling into utilities, the Gridware success story, fusion no longer being thirty years away, and the trap of guilt-based business models versus the reliable assumption that users are selfish, greedy, and lazy. The personal-resilience half covers surviving Twitter mobs, Paul’s obsessive essay process, raising kids by indulging curiosity and picking your battles, prepping by living among reasonable people, political polarization, and why AI and climate are the two things that keep them up at night.

    Thoughts

    The most useful idea in this conversation is also the most counterintuitive: a world that feels like it is ending is structurally good for the people least invested in how it used to work. Paul’s point to terrified founders is that change is only a threat if you have sunk costs in the old order. A young founder has been doing the current plan for two weeks, so a step-function shift in the landscape costs them almost nothing to abandon. The incumbents with elaborate machinery and a decade of assumptions are the ones who should be afraid. That reframes resilience away from defense and toward optionality. The resilient party is not the one with the thickest walls, it is the one with the least to unlearn.

    The founder mode discussion is worth sitting with because it quietly overturns a generation of management orthodoxy. The old rule was that a good CEO hires executives and gets out of their way, and that getting into the details is micromanaging. Brian Chesky’s COVID experience at Airbnb broke that rule under maximum pressure. With bankruptcy on the table and a travel company facing a world that stopped traveling, he went line by line through the business and told people what good looked like, then gave them freedom to execute against that standard while still demanding visibility. The interesting nuance is the permission structure. A crisis granted Chesky the license to be involved that normal operating conditions would have framed as meddling. The lesson is not “always be in the weeds,” it is that the founder’s deep understanding and disproportionate caring are assets you are wasting if you reflexively delegate them away.

    Paul’s North Star argument is the part most likely to age well. His claim is that companies fail at resilience when they behave like weather vanes, swinging with each gust of public moral fashion. He pairs it with the biosphere tree that grows weak and topples because it was never exposed to wind. Both metaphors point at the same thing: resilience is built by surviving stress while holding your shape, not by avoiding stress and not by reshaping yourself to whatever the crowd currently rewards. The carbon-credit companies he mentions are the cautionary case. They built their entire premise on a fashion (customer guilt about carbon) and went out of business when the wind changed direction. Durable businesses convert a permanent human motive into value, which is why he prefers the brutally honest assumption that the user is selfish, greedy, and lazy, and that your job is to build something that produces good outcomes anyway.

    The climate and energy section reframes a worthy cause as a market-timing bet rather than a moral appeal, and that is the more powerful version. The comparison to fintech in 2008 is the tell. Banking technology was a sleepy, unglamorous sector that venture investors avoided until a crisis cracked it open and made it one of the best categories of the following decade. The argument is that energy and the physical world are sitting at a similar precipice, made newly viable because hardware is starting to behave more like software (order components, assemble, do not build everything from scratch) and because AI’s hunger for power has made energy the binding constraint on the whole industry. The Gridware story crystallizes the founder lesson underneath all of it. The best founder for a hard physical problem was a lineman who worked the electric lines and lived through the fires. The idea grew authentically out of his life, which is the same pattern Jessica keeps returning to and the same advice they give for raising kids.

    Finally, the personal-resilience material is more practical than it first appears. Paul’s method for surviving a Twitter mob is pattern recognition: once it has happened twenty times, you know it ends in two days and they move on to the next target, so you wait it out instead of capitulating. His essay process is the same conviction-building engine applied to ideas. He goes sentence by sentence until there is no false statement left to attack, which is why his challenge to angry readers (“point out the incorrect statement”) almost never gets answered. The throughline across the company advice, the parenting advice, and the personal advice is identical. You build durable conviction not by sitting in a room thinking, but by working the problem until it is right, then refusing to be blown off course by people who never actually engaged with the substance.

    Key Takeaways

    • Experts are frequently wrong because they are experts in a previous version of the world, so Paul deliberately avoids permanent beliefs about the current state of technology.
    • Y Combinator picks startups by picking founders, not ideas, because the founders know more about the ideas than the investors do.
    • Living in England and visiting for each batch lets Paul arrive every quarter expecting the world to be different, which keeps his mind open instead of anchored.
    • A world of constant change feels bad but is actually good for a young, flexible founder who has only been on the current plan for two weeks and can switch easily.
    • Vibe coding went from kind-of-works to reliably works, and even experienced programmers now generate huge volumes of code with AI.
    • There is still a software business even with AI, because someone has to know what to tell the AI to write, and no company is going to write its own database from scratch.
    • The scenario Paul worries about is model companies spinning up agents to start all the startups themselves, removing the need for human founders.
    • The founder traits Jessica looks for are unchanged over the years: determined, flexible-minded, and willing to adapt.
    • In interviews you can spot rigid founders because they answer the question they prepared rather than the one they were asked, and the gears visibly grind when you redirect them.
    • A good adaptability signal is a founder who says “I haven’t thought about that, but here is how I would think about it” instead of freezing.
    • Founder mode, the term, came from Brian Chesky’s experience steering Airbnb through COVID, when bankruptcy was openly discussed in board meetings.
    • Ken Chenault, the former American Express CEO on Airbnb’s board, told Chesky the moment was ten times worse than 9/11 and could define the company.
    • Founder mode meant Chesky understood every line item, told people what good looked like, then gave them freedom to execute while still wanting to see it.
    • Founders see through the fog because they understand the company better than anyone and they care more than anyone, and combining understanding with caring lets them see more.
    • There is always some disaster at Y Combinator, the way a hospital always has someone coding, so a crisis is the normal operating environment, not an exception.
    • During the 2008 crash, YC kept funding because it is always a good time to start a startup, but focused on people close to making money and very tough founders they called cockroaches.
    • Airbnb was the ultimate cockroach, seemingly indestructible, which is exactly why they liked it during the meltdown.
    • YC rests on two axioms: startups matter, and founders are the most important ingredient in startups. As long as those hold, YC has room to exist.
    • Company values are usually written down a few years in, documenting principles that already existed rather than inventing new ones.
    • You cannot move with fashion; you have to stick to your North Star, especially during turbulent, noisy times.
    • Trees grown inside a biosphere fell over because they were never exposed to wind, so being blown around is a necessary part of becoming strong enough to stand.
    • What preserves YC most is that it is a fundamentally good idea: it gives lonely founders money, the right peers, and colleagues they would never otherwise have.
    • The measure of a good startup idea is revenue, and any other metric you care about matters only because it predicts revenue.
    • At the early stage you can afford to be virtuous and even tell founders to go back to college, because the power law means one startup in the batch will carry the returns.
    • Every startup has to find early adopters, who decide quickly, usually do not have much money, and tend to be sophisticated, which means utilities are rarely your first customer.
    • A company that ultimately sells to utilities should start by selling to something that says yes faster, like running a pilot on a single corporate campus.
    • Utilities are under so much stress from wildfire liability, renewables, EV charging, and AI demand that they are unusually willing to try new things out of necessity.
    • Gridware, founded by a former lineman who lived through major fires, is now backed by Sequoia with PG&E as a huge customer, an example of an idea growing out of the founder’s life.
    • The second-biggest chunk of YC startups after AI is hard tech and physical products, not because software is dead but because building physical things is getting more possible.
    • Energy is one of AI’s fundamental constraints; if Sam Altman could have two things for Christmas, they would be energy and GPUs.
    • Nobody says fusion is thirty years away anymore, and the old thirty-year number existed because it was far enough out to avoid demands for results but close enough to keep attention.
    • Energy and physical markets may be where fintech was in 2008, a sleepy sector about to be cracked open by crisis into a great decade.
    • Guilt is a fragile business model because fashions change what people feel guilty about, which is why carbon-credit companies collapsed when the winds shifted.
    • Assume the user is selfish, greedy, and lazy, then build something that causes good things to happen anyway, like clean power that is simply cheaper and more reliable.
    • To survive Twitter mobs, remember they move on in about two days, half are bots or people you would never talk to in real life, and you cannot become a weather vane for moral fashions.
    • You build conviction by working on and developing an idea, not by sitting in a room thinking, unless it is pure thought like math.
    • Paul writes essays sentence by sentence until nothing in them is false, which is why his challenge to point out an incorrect statement almost never gets answered.
    • The best startup ideas, and the best projects in life generally, grow authentically out of the founder’s own interests and experiences.
    • Their parenting philosophy is to give kids confidence and a stable base, indulge their curiosity, and encourage projects nobody told them to do.
    • You pick your battles with kids: put your foot down on cruelty, but accept defeat on things like food and screen time.
    • A useful interview question for anyone with an unusual experience is not “what was it like” but “how was it different than you expected,” which surfaces the genuinely novel detail.
    • In a time of turbulence, bet on an island full of reasonable people; the English may not be very dynamic, but they are reasonable.
    • The hope on political polarization is to build resilient institutions that act as a cage around any single leader, so that throwing the rattle makes no difference.
    • AI and climate change are the two things Paul worries about most because they are both potentially game over, like the Gulf Stream reversing and turning Europe into a frozen wasteland.

    Detailed Summary

    Staying an expert when the world keeps changing

    The conversation opens on Paul Graham’s essay “How to Be an Expert in a Changing World,” whose core point is that experts are often wrong because they are experts in a previous version of the world. Asked how he keeps his own beliefs from going obsolete when the landscape can shift in ninety days, Paul says he focuses on people. YC picks founders rather than ideas because the founders know the ideas better than any investor could. He deliberately holds no permanent beliefs about the current state of technology, and the rhythm of flying in from England for each batch helps: he arrives every quarter already expecting everything to be different. One quarter the story is everyone training open-source models, the next quarter it is Claude code and nobody bothers with open-source models because the frontier versions are better anyway. He comes in with a completely open mind. Jessica and Paul note that today’s founders are more frightened, asking what is even still true, but the message Paul gives them is that constant change favors the young and flexible. If you have only been executing a plan for two weeks, a disruption costs you nothing; you just switch.

    What adaptability looks like in a founder

    Jessica describes the founders she funds as determined, flexible-minded, and willing to adapt, and calls adaptability a key trait always, but especially in uncertain times. In interviews, the rigid applicants reveal themselves by answering the question they planned to answer rather than the one they were asked, and you can almost hear the gears grind when you redirect them. Paul does not let that slide; if they dodge, he just asks again. The positive signal is a founder who, faced with a question they have not considered, says “here is how I would think about it” and reasons live. Both point out that YC itself had to adapt, and that the company they funded the interviewer’s startup as in 2009 looked very different by the end. They funded him in May 2009, in the thick of the financial crisis, after he had quit his job in August 2008 and briefly felt he had made a terrible mistake.

    Founder mode and seeing through the fog

    Paul points to Brian Chesky as the defining example of weathering disaster, a story he explored on This Week in Startups. When COVID hit a travel company like Airbnb, the word bankruptcy was being used in board meetings, and Ken Chenault, the former American Express CEO on the board, warned it was ten times worse than 9/11. Chesky went into what would later be named founder mode, getting into every line item, understanding exactly what was needed, telling people what good looked like, and then giving them freedom to execute while still insisting on visibility. The crisis gave him permission to be the involved CEO he had always wanted to be, the kind of involvement that normal operating conditions would have labeled micromanaging. Paul argues founders see through fog that blinds everyone else for a simple, rational reason: they understand the company better than anyone because they have been there longest and thought of most of it, and they also care more than anyone. Combine deep understanding with deep caring and of course they see more.

    Cockroaches, the North Star, and the biosphere tree

    Returning to 2008, when YC was self-funded and unsure whether anyone would invest by March, they decided to keep going on the principle that it is always a good time to start a startup, but to fund people close to making money and very tough founders they called cockroaches, after the creatures that survive nuclear war. Airbnb was the ultimate cockroach. Paul frames YC’s longevity around two axioms (startups matter, founders are the most important ingredient) and around resilience built through stress. He tells the story of trees grown inside a biosphere that fell over because they were never exposed to wind, since being blown about is a necessary part of a tree becoming strong enough to support its own weight. YC has been blown around and is still standing, which is exactly what gave it practice. The companion idea is the North Star: you cannot move with fashion or act as a weather vane swinging with other people’s moral fashions, you have to hold your founding principles, which Paul eventually wrote down rather than let a 23-year-old new hire do it.

    Climate, energy, and selling into hard markets

    The interviewer’s own path (a curiosity about wildfire that grew from living in California, watching PG&E go bankrupt, a fire on his Mendocino property, volunteering as a firefighter) becomes the case for ideas that grow authentically out of a founder’s life. Climate is framed broadly as energy, the built environment, and transportation, essentially the physical world, and those are hard markets where the buyers are utilities, governments, real estate, and insurance. The advice is to find early adopters who decide quickly, which usually means not starting with a utility but with something like a single corporate campus that will say yes faster. Utilities, though, are under so much stress from wildfire liability, renewables, EV charging, and AI demand that they are increasingly willing to try new things. Gridware, founded by a former lineman who lived through major fires, is the proof point: backed by Sequoia, with PG&E as a major customer. Paul notes the second-biggest chunk of YC startups after AI is hard tech, not because software died but because building physical things is getting more possible, more like ordering and assembling components. Energy is the binding constraint on AI, fusion no longer feels thirty years away, and the bet is that energy and physical markets are where fintech was in 2008, about to be cracked open.

    Guilt versus greed as a business model

    On the question of whether climate companies should sell on guilt (recycle, pay more because it is sustainable), Paul is blunt that guilt is fragile because fashions change what you are supposed to feel guilty about. The carbon-credit companies thrived until buying carbon credits stopped being cool, then went out of business. A founder’s own concern for the world can drive great companies, but depending on a customer’s guilt is shallow. The durable move is to assume the user is selfish, greedy, and lazy, someone who just wants to eat pizza and watch Netflix, and to build something that produces good outcomes despite that. Clean power is the perfect example: nobody watching Netflix is upset that fusion powers their television, and if it is cheaper and more reliable, that is simply more Netflix and more money for pizza.

    Personal resilience, Twitter mobs, and the essay process

    On surviving public criticism, Paul’s method is pattern recognition: after twenty mobs you stop counting and know it will be over in two days when they move to the next topic, so you wait it out even though it genuinely feels miserable. Half of them are bots or people you would never talk to in real life, but the deeper point is that companies and people stay resilient by not succumbing to mobs and not becoming weather vanes for moral fashions. Conviction is built by working on an idea, not sitting in a room thinking about it, unless it is pure thought like math. His essays are the engine: he writes a version one, notices everything wrong, and fixes it sentence by sentence until there is no false statement left. He will read an entire book for a single sentence because he would be mortified to publish something false and, having no deadlines, has no excuse. That is why his standing challenge to angry readers, to point out one incorrect statement, almost never gets answered.

    Raising kids, prepping, and the things that keep them up at night

    Their parenting philosophy is to give kids confidence and a stable base, indulge curiosity, and encourage projects nobody assigned, like the living room overrun by one son’s Lego. They pick their battles: they put their foot down on cruelty but admit total defeat on food, devices, and screen time. Paul’s favorite question for anyone with an unusual experience is not “what was it like” but “how was it different than you expected,” which surfaces the genuinely novel detail, and the meta-version of that became the show’s recurring question to all guests. On prepping, they joke that living in the English countryside is itself a form of preparation, and that in turbulent times you should bet on an island full of reasonable people. The episode closes on what keeps them up at night: AI and climate change, the two things Paul treats as uniquely game over, illustrated by the prospect of the Gulf Stream reversing and leaving Europe, which sits as far north as Alaska, a frozen wasteland. Jessica notes her YC superhero name was Panic, and the conversation ends, after a detour through political polarization and a child who insisted for six months on being called SR-71 forecast 80 leaping leopard, on the admission that they manage screen time by being utterly defeated.

    Notable Quotes

    “If you’re a startup founder, a world where things are constantly changing is actually good for you. It feels bad, but you’re better off than anybody else.”

    Paul Graham, on why turbulence favors young, flexible founders

    “You can’t move with fashion. You have to stick to your North Star.”

    Paul Graham, on holding founding principles during noisy, turbulent times

    “There’s always some kind of disaster. It’s almost a rule of thumb at Y Combinator that there’s always some disaster going on, just like in a hospital. There’s always somebody who’s coding.”

    Paul Graham, on crisis as the normal operating environment for startups

    “The measure of a good startup idea is revenue, sure. Let’s not pretend companies are supposed to do something else.”

    Paul Graham, on how to judge whether an idea is actually good

    “Assume that the user is selfish and lazy, and make something. Selfish, greedy, and lazy. And make something that causes good things to happen despite that.”

    Paul Graham, on why guilt is a weak business model and greed is a source of energy

    “This is where the best startup ideas come from. They grow authentically out of the founders’ lives.”

    Jessica Livingston, on a wildfire curiosity turning into a company

    “Please point out the incorrect statement I’ve made in this essay. And no one ever does that.”

    Paul Graham, on writing essays sentence by sentence until nothing in them is false

    “AI and climate change have something in common. They’re the two big things I worry about the most, because they’re both game overs.”

    Paul Graham, on what keeps him up at night

    This is the first episode of Disaster Proof, a series exploring the people and technologies building resilience in an increasingly volatile world. You can watch the full conversation with Paul Graham and Jessica Livingston on YouTube here.

    Related Reading

  • Bill Ackman on Investment Strategy, What the Market Is Missing, and How AI Breaks Businesses

    Bill Ackman, founder and CEO of Pershing Square, joined the All-In Podcast for a conversation about how his investment approach has shifted toward permanent, long-term ownership, why he believes the highest-quality companies are being left behind by a market chasing the new new thing, and how AI is raising the risk of disruption for almost every business. He also lays out his plan to turn Howard Hughes into a Berkshire Hathaway-style compounding machine built on insurance. You can watch the full conversation here. Below is a structured breakdown of the ideas, the stories, and the frameworks he uses to underwrite a business.

    TLDW

    Ackman explains how his philosophy evolved from a smaller, more liquid activist toward concentrated, permanent ownership of durable, non-disruptible businesses, with much of his activism now playing out on X rather than in the boardroom. He tells the origin story of his first big trade, Wendy’s and the Tim Hortons spin-off, and explains why a large long-term shareholder on a board is an antidote to short-term markets. On AI, he argues that this is the greatest era in history to build a company, which means the risk of being disrupted has gone up enormously, and that the market is mispricing high-quality compounders like Microsoft, Meta, and Amazon while crowding into chips, semiconductors, and energy. He works through the SaaS question and why niche software is more at risk than platforms, how he underwrites SpaceX, xAI, OpenAI, Anthropic, and Palantir like late-stage venture bets using a people, opportunity, context, deal framework, and why founder-led companies have an edge in making radical calls. The back half covers his Howard Hughes plan to copy Buffett’s insurance-float model, the role of cost of capital and reflexivity in markets, the meme-stock era, going direct on social media, and the three different ways an investor can put money to work with Pershing Square.

    Thoughts

    The most useful idea in the interview is the way Ackman reframes disruption as the central investing problem of the AI era. His point is that the same forces making this the best time in history to start a company, meaning near-unlimited compute, capital, and talent, also raise the odds that any given incumbent gets disrupted. That reframes the word quality. It is no longer mostly about margins and moats. It becomes about non-disruptibility, which is a much higher bar than most quality investors were using a decade ago, and it is why he says most of his research time now goes into assessing that single risk.

    The what-the-market-is-missing thesis is classic contrarian Ackman. Arguing that Microsoft, Meta, and Amazon are the new old-fashioned, undervalued names while capital piles into semiconductors and energy is a direct echo of 2000, when Berkshire Hathaway bottomed precisely because money was chasing internet stocks. It is worth keeping in mind that he owns all three, so the call is also his book. The durable signal here is the framework, not the specific tickers: capital reliably chases the new new thing, and genuinely high-quality businesses get left behind during those rotations.

    The Howard Hughes plan is the most concrete bet in the conversation. Copying Buffett’s insurance-float playbook, short-term treasuries for policyholder money and equities for the surplus, onto a discounted real-estate holding company is elegant. The hard part is exactly what Ackman flags about insurance as an industry: the best investors go to hedge funds, not insurers, so most insurance companies only ever manage the liability side well. Pershing Square’s edge is that Ackman can both write the business and invest the float, which is the same reason it worked for Buffett. The framing of going from a four billion dollar company to a trillion over fifty years is a statement of intent, not a forecast, and should be read that way.

    Underneath all of it sits cost of capital and reflexivity. His observation that a higher stock price literally makes a company more valuable, because it lowers the cost of capital and creates acquisition currency, is the mechanism behind both Elon Musk’s empire and the meme-stock era he is wary of. Going direct on X is the same lever pointed at himself: communicate the vision, lower your own cost of capital, and make the bet easier for other people to place. It is a coherent worldview in which narrative and balance sheet continuously feed each other, and it explains a lot of his behavior over the last few years.

    Key Takeaways

    • The biggest change in Ackman’s approach over time is an appreciation for business quality, meaning long-term, durable, protected, non-disruptible growth as the most important factor.
    • He says he is as activist as ever, but more of it now happens on X than in the traditional corporate context.
    • His first big investment was Wendy’s, which owned Tim Hortons. The simple thesis was to buy Wendy’s, spin off Tim Hortons, and double the money.
    • Early on no one returned his calls, so he had Steve Schwarzman’s Blackstone write a fairness opinion, filed it publicly, and the company spun off Tim Hortons six weeks later. The CEO later thanked him after being fired with a large exit package.
    • Reputation compounds. Where Pershing Square once had to bang down the door, companies now sometimes tweet a welcome when it buys a stake.
    • A large long-term shareholder on a board is a counterweight to short-term markets, letting management test ideas privately and pursue initiatives that hurt the next few quarters of earnings.
    • Pershing Square owns Microsoft, Meta, and Amazon. Ackman argues you are either invested in AI directly or indirectly, or it is a threat, so you have to understand it.
    • The hardest and most important job for a concentrated investor is judging the risk of disruption, and that risk has risen dramatically.
    • This is the greatest era in history to build a business because of near-unlimited access to compute, capital, and talent, which is exactly why the probability of being disrupted has gone up enormously.
    • Markets bring their eye to the new new thing, currently chips, semiconductors, and energy, while high-quality companies get left behind.
    • He draws an analogy to 2000, when Berkshire Hathaway traded at one of its lowest valuations because everyone chased internet stocks. He sees a similar dynamic around Amazon, Meta, and Microsoft today.
    • On the SaaS question, he worries more about a Salesforce than a platform like Microsoft, because niche software charging high per-seat or per-year prices is most exposed, while low-priced platforms are safer.
    • Any software company today has to be as AI-enabled as possible, or risk losing the monopolistic pricing it once enjoyed.
    • His famous March 2020 CNBC appearance was an attempt to reach President Trump and argue for a short shutdown, paired with the view that stocks were incredibly cheap and worth buying.
    • He describes valuation as a tether on the market: when prices stretch too high they snap back, and when they get too cheap the same rubber band pulls valuations up. Calling that out publicly can trigger a psychological reset.
    • His recent bullish call came because stocks of really high-quality companies had gotten crazy cheap on fundamentals, meaning the present value of the cash they generate.
    • He underwrites high-multiple names like SpaceX as venture investments using a framework from business school: people, opportunity, context, deal.
    • On SpaceX, people and opportunity are one of one, the context is incredible, and Starlink plus near-monopoly low-cost launch make it strategically valuable. The complicated part is the deal, meaning the valuation. He invested via an SPV after Ron Baron’s nudge, and also invested in xAI.
    • He treats OpenAI, Anthropic, and Palantir as late-stage venture bets that have proven they can generate real revenue, and says OpenAI should do a better job communicating how it thinks about its enormous capital commitments.
    • Every CEO in America is asking how to use AI, how it applies to their business, and how it is a threat. It is top of mind and boards open every meeting with it.
    • He has not seen much enterprise AI success yet, citing a McKinsey study that 95 percent of enterprise initiatives fail and the rise of the forward deployed engineer as the hot role bridging promise and ROI. Pershing Square itself uses AI mainly for legal, compliance, and back-office work.
    • Founder-led companies have an advantage because founders have the authority and the economic stake to make radical calls, while the average S&P 500 CEO has a roughly three to four year tenure and is incentivized not to make mistakes.
    • He cites Mark Zuckerberg buying Instagram and WhatsApp as the kind of shocking-at-the-time calls that a founder with a track record can make.
    • Ben Graham’s enduring lesson is that a stock is an interest in a business, not a piece of paper, but Graham mostly invested in liquidations and cash-rich shells, and made most of his money on Geico.
    • Most of Buffett’s value at Berkshire came from owning insurance operations and focusing on the asset side of the balance sheet, not just the liability side.
    • Insurance is hard to copy because top investors do not go to work for insurers. Buffett owned half his company and was a great investor, which is why it worked.
    • Howard Hughes came out of the General Growth bankruptcy and owns master-planned cities like Summerlin, with 26,000 acres in the Las Vegas area, comparable to the Irvine Company that built roughly a hundred billion dollars of wealth for Donald Bren.
    • The plan is to reinvest the cash Howard Hughes generates into insurance, put policyholder float in short-term treasuries and the surplus in common stocks, and build a compounding machine over fifty years, buying it at roughly sixty cents on the dollar.
    • A company must earn a return above its cost of capital for the stock to rise. Elon Musk has kept his companies’ cost of capital extremely low, and a SpaceX IPO near a 1.75 trillion dollar valuation could be one of the lowest cost of equity capital transactions ever.
    • Markets have changed less because of Ackman and more because of figures like Ryan Cohen and GameStop, where a stock can trade well above its value on personality and an army of followers.
    • Higher valuations are reflexive: a rising stock price lowers cost of capital and creates currency to issue stock and acquire businesses, which is part of how Elon built Tesla.
    • There are three ways to invest with Pershing Square: the management company itself (a royalty on compounding assets with no capex), PSUS (a portfolio of best ideas trading at an 18 percent discount), and Howard Hughes (a bet on building the next Berkshire). A dollar invested 22 years ago became roughly 27 to 28 times net of fees.
    • Going direct on X, with 2.2 million followers, lets him communicate his vision and lower the friction for others to back his bets, even as his very long tweets have become a running meme.

    Detailed Summary

    From activist trades to permanent capital

    Ackman frames the evolution of his career as a steady move toward business quality. As a smaller, more liquid investor early on, he did not have to think as long-term. As Pershing Square became a bigger, more concentrated investor, durable growth became the dominant factor in every decision. He insists he is still as activist as ever, but a lot of that energy has shifted to X, where he can argue a position publicly rather than only inside a boardroom. The best investments, he notes, are the ones where you do not need to join the board and do anything at all.

    The Wendy’s and Tim Hortons origin story

    One of Pershing Square’s first investments was Wendy’s, which owned the Canadian coffee and donut chain Tim Hortons. The value of Tim Hortons alone was greater than the entire value of Wendy’s, so the idea was simple: buy Wendy’s, spin off Tim Hortons, and double the money. Ackman bought ten percent of the company and could not get the CEO to return a single call, so he had a contact at Blackstone, with Steve Schwarzman’s sign-off, write a fairness opinion on what Wendy’s would be worth after a spin-off, filed it publicly, and watched the spin-off happen six weeks later. The CEO eventually called back to thank him, having been fired but rewarded with a large exit package. Over the years that scrappy approach gave way to a reputation that now opens doors on its own.

    Why a long-term shareholder on the board matters

    The core problem of being a public company, in Ackman’s telling, is the short-term nature of markets and analysts, when a good business should be run in the context of years and even decades. A large, supportive shareholder on the board gives management a place to test ideas before exposing them to the public and a credible voice willing to back initiatives that hurt earnings for a few quarters. That is the value-add he believes a constructive activist can bring to a mature public company, as opposed to a startup where the best outcome is simply to own a great business and stay out of the way.

    AI and the rising risk of disruption

    For a concentrated, long-term investor, the most challenging task is judging the risk that two people from Stanford in a garage build something that destroys your thesis. Ackman argues that risk has climbed dramatically because this is the greatest era in history to build a company, with near-unlimited access to compute, capital, and talent. The paradox is that the conditions that make building easier also make incumbents more fragile, so the bulk of his research now centers on assessing how disruptible a business really is.

    What the market is missing

    Investors bring their attention to the new new thing, currently chips, semiconductors, and energy, which leaves high-quality companies behind. Ackman compares the moment to 2000, when Berkshire Hathaway traded at one of its lowest valuations ever because capital was chasing internet stocks. He sees an echo today in how Amazon, Meta, and Microsoft are treated as old-fashioned, and he considers them undervalued on fundamentals, where value is the present value of the cash a business generates over its life. His recent bullish call, like his March 2020 appearance, came because stocks of really high-quality companies had simply gotten too cheap.

    The SaaS question and AI-enabled software

    On the so-called SaaS apocalypse, Ackman says it is a company-by-company analysis. He worries more about something like Salesforce than about a low-priced platform. The companies most at risk are those that extracted near-monopolistic profits by charging a high annual price for a niche product, because AI lowers the barrier to replicating that functionality. A platform where the average customer pays a small amount per seat, like Microsoft, is far less exposed. The takeaway for any software company is to become as AI-enabled as it possibly can.

    Underwriting SpaceX, xAI, and the AI labs like venture

    For the highest-multiple private companies, Ackman uses a venture lens and a framework a business school professor taught him: people, opportunity, context, deal. SpaceX scores as one of one on people and opportunity, with an incredible context and a near-monopoly in low-cost launch through Starlink, which makes even Amazon a likely customer. The complicated variable is the deal, meaning the valuation, and he admits he has not done all the math, having invested through an SPV after Ron Baron encouraged him, along with a position in xAI. He treats OpenAI, Anthropic, and Palantir as late-stage venture bets that have proven real revenue, and argues OpenAI in particular should communicate more clearly how it justifies capital commitments that vastly exceed current revenue.

    Founder-led companies and the authority to act

    Ackman agrees that founder-led companies have a structural advantage in a fast-changing environment. The average S&P 500 CEO has a tenure of roughly three to four years, a small economic stake, and an incentive not to make a career-ending mistake. A founder is betting an entire life and reputation, has the authority of a major voting and economic position, and has usually made several hard, contrarian calls that turned out right. He points to Mark Zuckerberg’s acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp, which looked shocking at the time, as exactly the kind of decision a founder with a track record can make and a hired manager often cannot.

    Howard Hughes as Berkshire Hathaway 2.0

    Ackman points to a detailed financial history of Berkshire Hathaway showing that the vast majority of Buffett’s value creation came from owning insurance and focusing on the asset side of the balance sheet, not just the liability side. Insurance is hard to replicate because skilled investors join hedge funds rather than insurers, but Buffett owned half his company and was a great investor. Pershing Square is applying the same idea to Howard Hughes, a company created out of the General Growth bankruptcy that owns master-planned cities such as Summerlin, with 26,000 acres around Las Vegas, in the spirit of the Irvine Company that made Donald Bren roughly a hundred billion dollars. The plan is to reinvest the company’s cash into insurance, place policyholder float in short-term treasuries and the surplus in common stocks, avoid issuing stock the way Buffett did, and compound for fifty years, all bought at around sixty cents on the dollar.

    Cost of capital, reflexivity, and going direct

    A company only creates value when it earns above its cost of capital, which is why Howard Hughes, seen as a high-cost-of-capital real-estate business, has long traded at a discount, and why Ackman is repurposing its assets into a higher-returning model. He highlights how reflexive markets are: a higher stock price itself makes a company more valuable by lowering its cost of capital and creating currency to raise money and acquire businesses, a lever Elon Musk used to build Tesla. He attributes real market change less to himself and more to figures like Ryan Cohen and GameStop, where personality and a following can lift a stock far above its value. His own going-direct strategy on X, with 2.2 million followers and famously long posts, is the same mechanism applied to communicating a vision and lowering friction for investors. He closes by laying out three ways to invest with Pershing Square: the management company as a royalty on compounding assets, the PSUS portfolio trading at an 18 percent discount, and Howard Hughes as a bet on building the next Berkshire.

    Notable Quotes

    “The best investments are one where you don’t need to join the board and do anything.”

    Bill Ackman, on the kind of business he most wants to own

    “The probability of your being disrupted has gone up enormously.”

    Bill Ackman, on why assessing disruption risk now dominates his research

    “Valuation is like a tether on the market, right? When it gets too high, it’s like this rubber band that’s stretching and inevitably it bounces back.”

    Bill Ackman, on how prices revert at both extremes

    “People, opportunity, context, deal.”

    Bill Ackman, on the business school framework he uses to underwrite companies like SpaceX

    “Every CEO in America today is like, how do I use AI?”

    Bill Ackman, on AI as the top opportunity and threat in every boardroom

    “A closed mouth gathers no foot.”

    Bill Ackman, quoting the line a friend put next to his name in his high school yearbook

    “The increase in value of the company increases the value of the company, right? Because it lowers the cost of capital, it gives you more flexibility, gives you the ability to issue stock, raise capital, acquire other businesses.”

    Bill Ackman, on the reflexivity between stock price and corporate value

    “The company’s got like a $4 billion market cap and the goal is to build it into a trillion dollar thing over time compounding.”

    Bill Ackman, on his fifty-year plan for Howard Hughes

    Taken together, the conversation is a tour of how Ackman now thinks about quality, disruption, and compounding, and a preview of the Berkshire-style machine he wants to build out of Howard Hughes. Watch the full conversation here.

    Related Reading

  • Uber CEO Dara Khosrowshahi on AI, Autonomous Vehicles, Robotaxis, Drones, and the Future of Transportation

    Uber CEO Dara Khosrowshahi sat down with Patrick O’Shaughnessy on the Invest Like the Best podcast for a long, candid conversation about the forces remaking transportation. There is artificial intelligence inside the company, and there is physical AI out in the real world, meaning autonomous vehicles, robotaxis, and delivery drones. He calls the autonomous opportunity another trillion dollar marketplace and argues it will change how society operates. You can watch the full interview here. What follows is a structured breakdown of the most useful ideas, the strategy behind Uber’s AV bet, and the operating philosophy that runs underneath all of it.

    TLDW

    Dara Khosrowshahi explains how he brought order to the chaos he inherited at Uber in 2017 by treating hard problems like vector mathematics, and how an immigrant childhood shaped his all-in, low-stress operating style. He describes AI hitting Uber on two fronts at once: much larger digital models that predict rider intent, and physical AI that changes how rides and food get fulfilled in the real world. The conversation covers Uber blowing through a full year of AI budget in a single quarter, metering headcount as engineers become superhuman, the more than 30 AV partnerships with Waymo, Nuro, Lucid, Nvidia, Wayve, and Pony AI, and why supply, not demand, is the whole game. It runs through the coexistence model borrowed from travel and Uber Eats, the Uber One membership flywheel at 50 million members, the push from on-demand to planned travel through hotels and Uber Reserve, the economics of cheaper autonomous cars and delivery drones, the regional race from the Middle East to Europe, and the lessons from Barry Diller and Herbert Allen about getting to ground truth and betting on people. It closes on his capital allocation philosophy of prioritizing organic growth and AV commitments over buybacks.

    Thoughts

    The most underappreciated line in the whole interview is the budget one. Blowing a full year of AI spend in a single quarter is the clearest signal yet that frontier intelligence is being consumed far faster than even an AI-native company planned for. Dara’s response has quietly become the default enterprise playbook: explore on the expensive frontier models, then scale the proven interactions onto cheaper or open-source models. The deeper tension is that he is simultaneously telling teams to drive adoption and metering headcount, which is the real story of AI in large companies. The productivity gains are showing up as fewer hires, not only as faster shipping.

    The supply-first framing is the strategic core, and it inverts the demand-first logic he learned at Expedia. In autonomous vehicles this means Uber does not need to win the self-driving race itself. It needs to own the demand layer and aggregate every AV maker’s supply, the same way online travel agents coexist with hotels and Uber Eats coexists with McDonald’s. The 30 percent higher utilization figure for AVs on Uber’s network is the wedge in that argument. It is the reason a Waymo stays on the platform even while building its own brand, because filling more of an expensive asset’s day changes the entire return on the car.

    His premortem answer is unusually honest. Asked what kills the opportunity, he does not name an Uber-specific execution failure. He names AI’s unpopularity with the general public. That is a CEO admitting the gating factor is social license, not technology. The early data he leans on, drivers in Austin and Atlanta earning more and signing up in greater numbers as AVs add incremental demand, is the counter-narrative he is betting the public conversation on. Whether that story holds as AV volume scales from thousands of vehicles to hundreds of thousands is the open risk the entire industry shares.

    Underneath the strategy is one repeated instinct: get to ground truth. It shows up in the Barry Diller story about reading the model from the analyst who built it, in his hunt for the troublemakers who keep a company mutating, and in the fact that he bought an ebike to deliver food in San Francisco. It is the same move applied at every altitude, and it is why he frames AI as a chance to rebuild processes from first principles rather than shave 20 percent off the ones that exist. The leaders who treat AI as an efficiency tool will likely lose to the ones who rebuild from the ground up.

    Key Takeaways

    • Dara took the Uber job in 2017 after Daniel Ek recommended him at the Allen and Company Sun Valley conference and told him, when he hesitated, that life is about impact rather than happiness.
    • He inherited what he calls complete chaos: a board fighting for control, lost trust with regulators and the public, and a committee running the company after Travis Kalanick stepped back.
    • His method for chaos is to treat it like vector mathematics, breaking a seemingly unassailable problem into component dimensions and solving each one.
    • Early moves included bringing in chairman Ron Sugar to unite the board, running a listening tour with stakeholders, and rebuilding the executive team with leaders like Andrew McDonald and Tony West.
    • He credits an engineering mindset and an immigrant childhood for his calm under pressure. His family lost everything leaving Iran when he was nine and rebuilt from nothing.
    • On parenting, he argues that overcoming challenges is what forms people, and that doing everything for your kids is a long-term disservice disguised as a short-term favor.
    • Uber has always operated in a probabilistic real world of traffic, cancellations, and late food, so it has used machine learning longer than most consumer companies.
    • The current inflection is AI on two fronts: larger digital models that predict intent, and physical AI that changes how Uber fulfills in the real world.
    • Uber’s feed and search models are now roughly 10,000 times bigger than the older ones, enabling universal search across rides, eats, and grocery in a single query.
    • Uber can already guess a rider’s destination about three quarters of the time, turning booking into a one-tap interaction.
    • AI adoption is bottoms-up across engineering, legal, and marketing. Developers in India are driving roughly ten times the code commits using autonomous agents.
    • Dara pushes teams to rebuild processes from first principles with AI rather than settling for 20 to 30 percent optimization of an existing process.
    • He wants the rebels and troublemakers to win, and treats unpredictable internal adoption patterns as something to find and promote.
    • Uber blew through its full-year AI budget in a single quarter, which is now forcing it to meter headcount as engineer throughput climbs.
    • The token strategy is to explore on expensive frontier models, then scale proven interactions onto cheaper or open-source models.
    • Uber generates over 10 billion dollars in free cash flow on more than 10 billion trips a year, but it is not a high-margin business, so efficiency funds lower prices and higher earnings.
    • In autonomous vehicles, the thesis is supply: own the demand layer and aggregate every AV maker’s vehicles, the way Uber aggregates drivers and restaurants.
    • Uber has more than 30 AV partnerships, including Waymo, Nuro, Lucid, Nvidia, Wayve, and Pony AI.
    • Uber is building the surrounding ecosystem: depots, charging, fleet partners, a one billion dollar Santander financing line for EV and AV fleets, and autonomous insurance.
    • AVs operating on Uber’s network are about 30 percent busier in trips and revenue per vehicle per day than vehicles not on the network, which transforms the return on an expensive car.
    • The build, partner, or buy answer is coexistence, mirroring how travel agents coexist with hotels and airlines and how Uber Eats coexists with McDonald’s, Starbucks, and Chipotle.
    • His public premortem is that AI’s unpopularity, not Uber-specific execution, is the biggest risk, so the company must move at the pace society will accept to avoid backlash.
    • Early data in Austin and Atlanta shows drivers earning more and more drivers joining, suggesting AVs are adding incremental demand rather than only displacing humans.
    • AV hardware costs typically fall 30 to 40 percent per generation. A Lucid midsize built with Nuro could land around 60,000 to 70,000 dollars and bring transportation costs down.
    • Lower cost expands demand. Uber already dwarfs the taxi market it was once sized against, and Dara expects the same dynamic with AVs.
    • Traditional OEMs are now investing in L4-ready systems and should arrive over the next two to four years. Each AV drives roughly three to four times what a human driver does.
    • Chinese manufacturing capability and bill of materials are described as unrivaled. A low-cost Western, Foxconn-style player for AVs is being worked on but does not exist yet.
    • Drones are gated by battery density. Food and grocery drones should reach real scale in two to five years and become normal in five to ten, with Joby and Zipline cited as examples.
    • The Middle East, including Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Saudi Arabia, is moving fastest thanks to entrepreneurial regulators. Europe is catching up, with London robotaxi pilots expected before year end.
    • Uber Eats wins the number one position more often internationally. The playbook is selection plus reliability, amplified by cross-platform upsell, with about 13 percent of Eats bookings coming from the mobility app.
    • Uber One has 50 million members growing 50 percent year on year. Dara frames it like Netflix, more content for the same price, and accepts a first-year loss for multi-year profit.
    • Uber is pushing from on-demand to planned through hotels, via a deal with Expedia, and through Uber Reserve, now at over a 5 billion dollar run rate with 99 percent-plus reliability.
    • His leadership lessons: from Barry Diller, get to ground truth from source material and tell the truth as a leader. From Herbert Allen, bet on people, not companies.
    • On capital allocation, he prioritizes organic growth and financialized AV commitments over buybacks, while keeping costs growing slower than revenue.

    Detailed Summary

    From chaos to structure: the 2017 turnaround

    Dara came to Uber from 13 years running Expedia under Barry Diller, recruited through a head hunter after Daniel Ek floated his name at the Sun Valley conference. He arrived into what he describes as complete chaos, with the board fighting over control rather than the fate of the company and trust badly damaged with regulators, the public, and employees. His approach was to decompose the situation the way an engineer decomposes a multidimensional problem, solving each dimension and reassembling the whole. Practically that meant a new chairman in Ron Sugar to unite the board, a listening tour to understand stakeholder concerns, and a rebuild of the leadership team that kept strong insiders like Andrew McDonald while adding people like Tony West.

    An engineering mind and an immigrant chip on the shoulder

    His wife Sid calls him a robot, by which she means he does not get rattled. He traces that to an engineering education and to a childhood upheaval. His family left Iran when he was nine and lost the business his father had built, and he watched that loss diminish his father over the years. The experience produced a durable drive to rebuild and a refusal to let external chaos define him internally. He applies a similar philosophy to his kids, arguing that challenges and the act of overcoming them are what form a person, and that helicopter parenting removes the very friction that builds capability.

    AI inside Uber: prediction, agents, and superhuman engineers

    Uber has always lived in a probabilistic world where the digital booking is deterministic but the real-world fulfillment is not, so it adopted machine learning earlier than most consumer companies. The newest models are roughly 10,000 times larger than the prior generation and power universal search and destination prediction that is right about three quarters of the time. Internally, adoption is bottoms-up and uneven in a good way, with engineers in India shipping around ten times the code commits using autonomous agents. Rather than mandate from the top, Dara pushes teams to rebuild whole processes from first principles with AI instead of trimming a fifth off the existing ones.

    The cost of intelligence

    The flip side of fast adoption is cost. Uber blew through its annual AI budget in a single quarter, and that is forcing a real adjustment. Because engineer throughput is climbing, the company is metering headcount increases rather than simply hiring. The operating rule is to keep driving adoption while pursuing efficiency, using frontier models from providers like OpenAI and Anthropic to experiment with new interactions, then moving the scaled experiences onto more efficient or open-source models to bring the per-token cost down. With more than 10 billion dollars of free cash flow on over 10 billion trips, Uber is not a high-margin business, so efficiency directly funds lower prices for riders and higher earnings for drivers.

    Why supply decides the AV race

    At Expedia, Dara learned a demand-first model where you attract consumers and then build inventory to match. Uber is the opposite, a supply company, where securing every car, restaurant, courier, and retailer causes the demand to follow. Applied to autonomous vehicles, the strategy is to be the go-to-market and demand layer for anyone building a digital driver. Uber wants to aggregate the largest pool of AV supply, just as it aggregates human drivers, so that the companies building the actual self-driving software can focus on the driver while Uber handles distribution and utilization.

    Building the ecosystem around the digital driver

    Uber now has more than 30 AV partnerships spanning Waymo, Nuro, Lucid, Nvidia, Wayve, and Pony AI, and it expects many winners rather than one, the same shape as the foundation model market. Around those partners it is assembling the connective infrastructure: depots and charging in cities where the regulatory path is opening, fleet partners, a one billion dollar financing line with Santander for EV and AV fleets, and work on autonomous insurance. It is also collecting street data today that can feed the models, so that when a partner’s cars hit the market there is instant demand waiting. The early proof point is that AVs on Uber’s network run about 30 percent busier than comparable vehicles off it, which materially improves the return on a costly car.

    The premortem and the public’s patience

    Asked what derails the opportunity, Dara points outward rather than inward. The risk is that AI is powerful but unpopular, and the average person experiences it as a threat to electricity costs or a cousin’s job rather than as magic. The same dynamic could hit AVs even though the technology should end up safer than human drivers, which is why questions about emergency services, equitable access, and driver earnings have to be worked through with regulators and communities. The encouraging early signal is in Austin and Atlanta, where drivers are making more money and more are joining because AVs appear to be adding incremental demand. The controllable risk, he says, is access to supply, which is exactly why Uber has partnered with nearly every AV provider across mobility, delivery, and freight.

    A trillion dollar marketplace: cheaper cars and delivery drones

    Dara sizes the autonomous opportunity as another trillion dollar marketplace. As AV software and hardware costs fall, typically 30 to 40 percent per generation, a Lucid midsize built with Nuro could come in around 60,000 to 70,000 dollars, which starts to lower the real cost of transportation. History says lower cost expands demand, and Uber already became multiples larger than the taxi market it was once compared to. Manufacturing scales from hundreds to thousands to hundreds of thousands of vehicles, each driving three to four times what a human does, with traditional OEMs investing in L4-ready systems over the next two to four years and Chinese manufacturers setting the bar on cost and quality. Delivery drones are further out, gated mainly by battery density, but should reach real scale in two to five years and feel normal in five to ten.

    Membership, hotels, and the shift from on-demand to planned

    Uber Eats often reaches the number one position internationally by nailing selection and reliability and then layering on cross-platform advantages, with roughly 13 percent of Eats bookings flowing from the mobility app. Uber One, at 50 million members growing 50 percent year on year, is the loyalty engine, and Dara likens it to Netflix in that members get more for the same price. He explains the membership economics through Amazon Prime, accepting a money-losing first year to earn multi-year profit as members spend more across services. The newest expansion is travel: hotels through a deal with Expedia, and a broader move from Uber’s on-demand brand toward planned bookings, proven out by Uber Reserve at a 5 billion dollar-plus run rate and 99 percent-plus reliability. The end state he wants is a trip where Uber pre-books your ride to the airport, knows your hotel, and brings in-market magic to the whole journey.

    Operating philosophy: ground truth, troublemakers, and capital allocation

    The mentors thread through everything. From Barry Diller, with whom he worked for more than 20 years, he took the discipline of getting unfiltered truth from the source, illustrated by Diller insisting on hearing the Paramount LBO model from the young analyst who built it. From Herbert Allen he took the lesson to bet on people rather than companies, because great people stay great across cycles. In his own practice that becomes radical transparency, a deliberate hunt for the troublemakers who act as the mutations that keep an organism from dying, and a willingness to be wrong, since learning, often through pain, is what he finds interesting. On capital, he treats allocation as an art, prioritizing organic growth, which took Uber Eats from under a billion to over a hundred billion in gross bookings, then AV commitments that can be financialized, with buybacks coming after growth rather than instead of it.

    Notable Quotes

    “I know who I am, and I’m always going to be that same person. I’m not going to let the chaos of the world affect me mentally.”

    Dara Khosrowshahi, on why crisis does not rattle him

    “We blew through our AI budget in a quarter, you know, for the whole year essentially. And it is forcing us to adjust.”

    Dara Khosrowshahi, on the real cost of AI adoption at Uber

    “What’s magical now is going to seem normal to all of us 10 years from now.”

    Dara Khosrowshahi, on how fast riders stop noticing autonomous vehicles

    “We think it’s another trillion dollar marketplace.”

    Dara Khosrowshahi, on the scale of the autonomous vehicle opportunity

    “If we do that, the demand will take care of itself.”

    Dara Khosrowshahi, on why Uber obsesses over securing supply first

    “I’m looking for those mutations. I’m looking for those troublemakers constantly.”

    Dara Khosrowshahi, on keeping a large company adaptive

    “It’s the filtering that gets the edge out of the story or out of the situation. And it’s often the edge that gives you an edge.”

    Dara Khosrowshahi, on a lesson from Barry Diller about going to the source

    “If I’m not wrong, if I’m not making mistakes, it’s just not very interesting.”

    Dara Khosrowshahi, on why learning, often through pain, drives him

    “Meeting her and seeing her operate, I think, finally allowed me to be the person I want to be versus the person I thought I was supposed to be.”

    Dara Khosrowshahi, on his wife Sid, when asked the kindest thing someone has done for him

    The throughline is that Uber intends to be the demand layer for autonomous transportation the way it became the demand layer for human drivers, while rebuilding its own operations around AI from first principles. Whether the public grants the industry enough patience is the open question Dara keeps returning to. Watch the full conversation here.

    Related Reading

    • Uber primary source for the company, products, and AV partnerships discussed in the interview.
    • Dara Khosrowshahi (Wikipedia) background on the CEO’s path from Iran to Expedia to Uber.
    • Invest Like the Best the podcast with Patrick O’Shaughnessy where this conversation took place.
    • Waymo the autonomous driving company behind the Austin and Atlanta partnerships referenced.
    • Barry Diller (Wikipedia) the mentor whose lessons on ground truth shaped Dara’s leadership style.

  • The AI Industrial Revolution: Naval, Guillermo Rauch, Blake Scholl, and Max Hodak on Software Factories, Vibe Coding Hardware, AI Regulation, Healthcare Economics, and What Humans Can Uniquely Do

    This is the full episode of Naval Ravikant’s conversation with three frontier founders: Guillermo Rauch of Vercel, Blake Scholl of Boom Supersonic, and Max Hodak of Science. The premise is that all three are building their own factories rather than assembling off-the-shelf parts, so the interesting question is not what they are building but what they are learning about how to build in the age of AI. Over roughly an hour the discussion moves from software factories and the thousand-x engineer into hardware, regulation, healthcare economics, autonomous companies, and a long closing argument about what humans can still uniquely do. Watch the full conversation on the Naval Podcast YouTube channel. We previously published two segments of this same discussion: part one, Waste Tokens to Save Time, on software factories and whether pure software is dead, and part two, Vibe Coding Hardware, on jet engines, vertical integration, and China’s open-source bet. This post covers the entire episode end to end.

    TLDW

    Four builders argue that AI has turned the engineer’s job from shipping output into building the factory that produces output, which is why token leaderboards are the new vanity metric and why you should waste tokens to save time. Guillermo Rauch frames the thousand-x engineer and the building-block economy, and asks whether pure software is dead now that models speak English. Blake Scholl shows how Boom turned hardware engineering into software, letting two engineers design an entire jet engine and collapsing months of regulatory compliance documentation into minutes. Max Hodak makes the case for extreme vertical integration, a captive MEMS foundry, and a sober counter to Silicon Valley deregulation triumphalism: the bottleneck is the voters and the regulator’s asymmetric incentives, not just bad rules. The group works through healthcare as a fixed-bucket non-market, China’s cost-reduction strategy and its approved implantable brain interface, autonomous software that runs site reliability and security research with thousands of concurrent agents, a company-wide hackathon where the receptionist shipped a real automation, and a long debate on creativity, out-of-distribution surprise, intent, attribution, and the definition of art. The throughline: humans become verifiers, value moves to creativity, taste, and agency, and the single best move is to get extremely good with the tools, because it is people with AI versus people without AI.

    Thoughts

    The strongest idea in the episode is the quiet redefinition of what an engineer is for. Rauch’s point is that you no longer judge a person by how well they ship a single output. You judge them by whether they can build the factory that produces outputs B through Z. That reframe instantly explains why token leaderboards are nonsense. Counting tokens consumed is the same category error as counting lines of code written, a measure of motion mistaken for a measure of progress. Naval’s “waste tokens, save time” is the correct response: tokens are cheaper than people, so optimize for your own wall-clock time and the final output, and throw three models at the same problem if that gets you unstuck faster. The uncomfortable corollary, which the group says out loud, is that leverage in idea domains was never linear. The hundred-x and thousand-x engineer is not a new phenomenon. AI just made it impossible to keep pretending otherwise.

    The second thread that ties the whole hour together is verification. Everyone converges on the same future: humans stop producing the work directly and move up the stack to signing off on it. Rauch is precise about what that means. Saying “I understand this pull request” no longer requires reading every line. It requires being able to say you wrote the test harness, the proofs, the type checkers, and the simulations that let you stand behind it in production. That is a profound shift, because it accepts that the code may be spaghetti you do not fully understand while insisting that the evaluator around it is trustworthy. Blake extends the same logic to regulation, and this is the most underrated argument in the episode. If you treat a 200-page lightning-strike compliance document as a test suite and a regulation as an exit criterion for an agent loop, then a body of rules you once resented becomes a guard rail that lets you move faster, not slower. The cost of change collapses, change aversion drops, and you can finally afford to iterate on physical things.

    Max Hodak is the adult in the room on regulation, and the episode is better for it. The Silicon Valley consensus is that regulation is simply friction to be deleted, and there is plenty of dysfunction to point at: the NRC permitting essentially zero nuclear plants for decades, the FDA’s asymmetric incentives where approving a bad drug ends a career but blocking a good one costs nothing visible. But Hodak keeps pulling the conversation back to the harder truth. This is where the voters are. If you removed the current regulatory package, something very similar would get voted right back in, because the asymmetry reflects how the public actually weighs a visible death against an invisible delay. Real reform is not “deregulate,” it is narrow and surgical: prohibit the FDA from drawing adverse inferences across different users of a compound, build innovation zones where people consent to different rules, or copy Europe’s notified-body model so review capacity can actually scale. That is a far more serious position than the usual abundance-or-bust framing.

    The healthcare segment is the part of this conversation you will not find in the two clips, and it is the most heterodox. Hodak’s diagnosis is that healthcare is a fixed bucket of money that grows with tax receipts, not a technological growth industry where falling prices expand the market the way phones and laptops did. Because there is no real private market, you get a small communist society running inside a larger capitalist one, with the waiting lines and frozen product quality that implies. His prescription is not single payer and not insurance reform. It is to drive the cost of bringing devices and drugs to market so low that a patient can buy a restored sense or an extra decade of life on a credit card, the way they finance a car, and his warning is that China’s lower approval costs and its already-approved implantable brain interface put it on track to do exactly that. Whether or not you buy the twenty-percent-of-income deductible he floats, the framing that a private market is the missing feedback loop is the kind of argument that gets too little airtime.

    The closing debate on creativity is where the four of them disagree most productively, and they are careful enough to notice that their conclusions follow from their definitions. Hodak defines art as meaningful out-of-distribution behavior, which lets a military maneuver or a math proof count, and leads him to think a sufficiently capable model gets there too. Naval defines art as conveying an emotion with intent, which makes attribution load-bearing: the same photo down to the last pixel means more when a human took it, and a startup doing hardware attestation of human authorship suddenly has a real market. The shared observation that should worry every builder is that AI output collapses to a distribution mean. Every Claude-built website ends up the same serif font, the same brown and cream, the same monospace spacing, recognizable as slop precisely because it is in-distribution. The optimistic read, and the one Naval lands the episode on, is that this leaves an enormous and durable lane for humans who can step outside the system, and that the practical move for everyone is simply to become excellent with the tools, because the real divide is people with AI versus people without.

    Key Takeaways

    • The job of an engineer has shifted from shipping a single output to building the factory that produces multiplicative outputs, so people are now judged on the leverage they create rather than the work they personally do.
    • There were always 10x engineers, and in idea, intellectual, and digital domains the real spread is 100x or 1000x. AI leverage just made that gap impossible to deny.
    • Token leaderboards and token consumption are the new lines-of-code: a measure of activity that does not map to value. Measure your own time and the final output instead.
    • Waste tokens to save time. Models are still far cheaper than a human, so throwing Codex, Claude, and Gemini at the same problem repeatedly is rational even when it looks wasteful.
    • Low-quality first-pass code is fine because you can spend more tokens later to harden it for production. The constraint is verifiable domains, not code quality.
    • A model is roughly as good as you are in a domain. The quality of your prompting and reprompting strongly determines the output, though this dependence should fade as models improve.
    • Models graduated from junior to principal engineers: they now return with multiple routes and tradeoffs rather than running away with the first idea, even if their time and cost estimates are often wrong.
    • A junior gets knowledge they could never have produced alone, but an experienced architect still extracts far more juice. Taste and judgment, like picking Postgres versus ClickHouse, remain the human’s edge.
    • Pure software’s moat is in question now that models speak fuzzy, sloppy English. For hardware founders this is a boon, since good software finally becomes cheap to produce.
    • The building-block economy, from Mitchell Hashimoto, argues agents need powerful reusable infrastructure rather than reinventing queues and databases every time. Shared dependencies are a cooperation value, like everyone depending on the same Postgres version.
    • Naval and Max both stopped writing code for years, then started building software they use daily through agents, on the strength of understanding how the pieces fit rather than syntax.
    • With agents you stop getting stuck on narrow debugging problems that used to consume indefinite time. The intrinsic frustration that was once “how you learn” is largely gone.
    • Boom turned siloed hardware engineering, much of it trapped in Excel and VBScript with no source control, into real software with automated testing and repeatable flows.
    • Software engineers now build the architectures and hardware engineers vibe code their pieces, letting two engineers design an entire jet engine where a single turbine-blade analysis once took one engineer a full day across a thousand blades.
    • Enterprise collaboration software and even spreadsheets are getting cooked, because you can now code the exact custom tool you need instead of approximating it.
    • AI will soon generate step files and PCB layouts, bringing the current software boom to mechanical and electrical engineering, likely within the year.
    • China is betting on open-source models because its hardware and supply-chain superiority pairs with on-demand software generation to erase Silicon Valley’s software advantage. Fall behind on generating software and you fall behind on generating everything.
    • In real usage, frontier intelligence dominates the top. Gemini “slaps at scale” as an industrial production model for support and browser automation, while Chinese models are not in the frontier coding tier.
    • Intelligence is an unalloyed good. Because mistakes are invisible and models are cheaper than people, you reach for the smartest available model rather than running a weaker one many times.
    • Max’s vertical integration thesis: when you cannot buy a part, you make it. Science owns a captive MEMS foundry because tighter integration toward a single block of bonded matter yields lower power, smaller size, and longer life.
    • AI’s biggest near-term impact inside hardware companies is regulatory: generating documentation and tracing which of thousands of ISO standards apply, work that used to occupy a quality team for months.
    • Junior engineers got promoted to senior and junior engineering got handed to agents. The same pattern hits law, where basic NDAs and red lines no longer require a lawyer.
    • Humans are becoming verifiers. Signing off on a PR means standing behind its consequences via tests, proofs, and type checkers, not reading every line. Creating software is easy; keeping it secure, tested, and maintained 1000 days out is the real question.
    • A RAG over regulatory documents collapses a 200-page compliance test plan from months to minutes, which cuts change aversion: you can alter the airplane and regenerate compliance instead of crying over rework.
    • Regulations can act as a test suite and exit criteria for agent loops, as long as they are non-contradictory and reasonable. The alternative is shipping slop directly into the air.
    • Physical building is guilty until proven innocent, illustrated by the absurdity of pre-filing a driving plan before every trip. The fix is more enforcement-based regulation rather than pre-approval, though agents on both sides could trigger a red queen race and DDoS overwhelmed agencies.
    • Regulation often fails to make things safer, only slower: the 737 Max shipped a single sensor with full authority over pitch, and the NRC kept us perfectly safe by approving almost no nuclear plants for decades.
    • The deeper problem is the voters and the regulator’s asymmetric incentives. Approve a bad thing and your career ends; block a good thing and nobody notices. Removing one agency just elects its replacement.
    • Targeted fixes beat blanket deregulation: bar adverse inferences across users of a compound, use single-patient IND pathways, create opt-in innovation and YIMBY zones, or adopt Europe’s competitive notified-body reviewers.
    • Healthcare is a fixed bucket of money tied to tax receipts, not a growth industry, so spending 10x more on it would be a catastrophe rather than a triumph. With no private market you run a small communist society inside a capitalist one.
    • The escape is lower cost-to-market, not single payer, so people can finance care like a car. China’s lower approval costs and its already-approved implantable BCI point that direction. LASIK, dental, and plastic surgery advance because patients pay directly.
    • End-of-one medicine works at the high end, as with GitLab’s Sid Sijbrandij outliving his cancer prognosis through a self-built escalation ladder, but it demands enormous agency at the patient’s weakest moment. AI should democratize that knowledge.
    • Vercel automated much of site reliability engineering: anomalies fire alerts, an agent investigates, can open an incident, and begins remediation, stopping just short of changing production itself.
    • Running an open-sourced security tool against the whole monorepo with 10,000 concurrent agents produced several quarters of security research in a couple of days for about $14,000 in tokens. Code translation and optimization are similarly autonomous now.
    • Blake stopped all project work for a week and had everyone, receptionist to engineers, build something with AI and demo it. He expected mostly silly projects and got mostly needle movers, including a real automation from shipping and receiving.
    • The autonomous company of the future may have a workforce that trains the agents doing the work rather than doing it directly, with tooling that extracts reusable skills from your inputs and outputs.
    • Returns are shifting from intelligence toward agency for humans, since agents supply the intelligence. The people best fit for the future open a coding agent and ask what to build instead of defaulting to passive consumption.
    • Maybe 10x more people are coding than a year ago, yet around 99% still never will, because to a non-coder the starting step remains unimaginable. Vibe coding is described as more addictive and entertaining than video games, with real output.
    • AI video lacks taste and judgment for now, but by 2030 expect fan-made films: dozens of Lord of the Rings takes, or generating unmade seasons of The Expanse from the books. The bigger prize is a genuinely new imaginative work, not a remix.
    • What humans uniquely do is generate meaningful surprise out of the training distribution, with intent that makes it mean something. Gödel stepping outside the formal system is the archetype; Claude’s identical-looking websites are the counterexample of in-distribution slop.
    • Higher productivity historically means you hire more, not fewer, of the productive people. Expect a larger number of smaller teams, an entrepreneurship explosion, and generalists winning as credentials matter less than creativity, taste, and judgment.
    • The throughline is people with AI versus people without AI. The single best investment right now is getting genuinely good with the tools and learning the exact edges of what they can and cannot do.

    Detailed Summary

    Software Factories and the Thousand-X Engineer

    Guillermo Rauch opens with the idea that has him “pilled”: the engineer’s job has changed from shipping output directly to building the factory that produces multiplicative outputs. That reframes how you evaluate people and surfaces an old, controversial truth. He used to get flamed on Twitter for asserting 10x engineers, since it offends an equality instinct, but in intellectual and digital domains the real spread is 100x or 1000x, and choosing the right thing to work on is an infinite multiplier on top. AI leverage makes this less controversial, except that people now confuse token spend for productivity. The group agrees token leaderboards are the new lines-of-code. Max Hodak adds that a model is about as good as you are in a domain, so a capable developer gets a powerful collaborator while a junior gets junior-grade help, and the sporadic feedback you give, the reprompting, disproportionately determines the result. Naval’s posture is the opposite of fussy: he ignored every prompt-engineering trick on the bet that the models would improve faster than he could learn to game them, types less and less, and brute-forces problems by throwing multiple models at them. Waste tokens, save time, because tokens are cheaper than people.

    Is Pure Software Dead, and the Building-Block Economy

    Rauch describes models crossing from junior to principal engineer: they now return with several routes and explicit tradeoffs, push back when you try to jam high-cardinality telemetry into Postgres, and suggest ClickHouse or Athena instead. That elevates taste and judgment as the human contribution. He then poses the hard question: is pure software engineering obsolete now that models speak fuzzy, sloppy English and you no longer need code to communicate with them? For hardware founders it is a boon, echoing Patrick Collison’s line that software is art and artists are hard to hire. To temper the “agents reinvent everything” fantasy, he invokes Mitchell Hashimoto’s building-block economy: you do not want your agent rebuilding a queue from first principles every time it sends an email, and shared dependencies like a common Postgres version carry real cooperation value. Reusable infrastructure becomes more valuable in the agentic era, functioning like libraries and dependencies, or even a token cache, so models fork from existing starting points instead of burning a trillion tokens to recreate what exists. Naval and Max both note they had not written code in years and now build daily through agents, because understanding how APIs, data flow, and performance fit together matters more than syntax, and vibe coding is just transmitting intent the way a good engineering leader already did through people.

    Vibe Coding Hardware at Boom Supersonic

    Blake Scholl explains how AI changed the role of software and hardware developers at Boom. A great deal of hardware engineering lives in complex Excel spreadsheets and VBScript on individual laptops, with no source control and no automated testing, and handoffs happen manually over email like it is the 1990s. Boom had long tried to turn these flows into real software but could never afford enough software engineers. The new model is that software engineers create the architectures, because they understand systems, algorithms, and separation of concerns, and hardware engineers vibe code their own pieces. The result is mind-blowing productivity for small teams. His example: a turbine blade is cold at rest and expands when hot, so you must design both the cold and hot shapes and convert between structures and aerodynamics, work that took one engineer a full day per blade across a thousand blades in a jet. With a combined software-and-hardware tool you can now change blade geometry and see structural and aerodynamic results in real time, letting two engineers design an entire jet engine. The group extends this to the death of enterprise collaboration software and even spreadsheets, since you can now code the exact custom tool you need, and predicts AI will soon generate step files and PCB layouts, carrying the boom into mechanical and electrical engineering.

    China, Open Source, and Which Models Actually Get Used

    Naval argues China is going all-in on open-source models because its hardware and supply-chain superiority pairs naturally with on-demand software generation, which erases Silicon Valley’s software edge, and because the Chinese government has a history of funding ecosystem-wide efforts in network-effect businesses. Without frontier coding models there is no self-improvement, so a country that cannot generate frontier software falls behind on generating everything downstream. He notes the irony that almost all the open-source heft now comes from China, since OpenAI is not open, Grok and Google’s local models trail, and Anthropic ships no open models. On real usage, Rauch reports from Vercel’s AI gateway that frontier intelligence dominates the top, with a caveat: frontier intelligence at the right cost and performance, like Gemini, slaps at scale and is the best industrial production model for support and browser automation, while Chinese models are not in the frontier coding tier. Naval frames intelligence as an unalloyed good, since model mistakes are invisible and a smarter model is still cheaper than a person, which pushes everyone toward the most intelligent option and risks an oligopoly in AI.

    Vertical Integration, Verifiers, and the Slop Problem

    Max Hodak lays out Science’s vertical integration: the preference is always to buy, as with cheap PCBs from Asia, but when components do not exist you must make them, and the closer a product gets to a single block of covalently bonded matter the better it performs. Science owns a captive MEMS foundry on the east coast because there was no other way to do the packaging and assembly it needed. He notes AI’s most surprising internal impact so far is regulatory: generating documentation and tracing which of thousands of ISO standards apply, work that once tied up a quality team for months. Rauch raises the slop problem: mountains of AI-generated code arriving as pull requests nobody can read line by line. His standard is that an engineer must be able to say they understand and will stand behind the consequences of a PR, backed by the test harness, proofs, and type checkers, even without reading it all. Naval generalizes this into humans becoming verifiers, with lawyers, engineers, and operators moving to verifying the stack and standing behind it, and Rauch warns that creating software is the easy zero-to-one part while keeping it secure, tested, performant, and maintained a thousand days later is the real test.

    Regulation as Test Suite, and the Voter Problem

    Blake describes building a RAG that compresses a 200-page lightning-strike compliance test plan from months of a “monkey at keyboard” engineer’s work into minutes, with a powerful second-order effect: change the airplane and you regenerate compliance in minutes instead of crying over months of rework, which slashes change aversion and lets a small number of creative engineers iterate. Max reframes regulations as potentially good guard rails, a test suite and exit criteria for agent loops, provided they are non-contradictory and reasonable, since the alternative is shipping slop into the air. Naval warns of a red queen race of agent-on-agent compliance and agencies getting DDoSed by clever entrepreneurs flooding them with documents. Blake pushes for enforcement-based rather than pre-approval regulation, using the analogy that we would never tolerate filing a driving plan before every trip, yet that is exactly how physical infrastructure works: guilty until proven innocent. He cites the 737 Max’s single all-authority sensor and the NRC permitting almost no nuclear plants for decades as proof that this makes us slower, not safer. Hodak supplies the counterweight: the deeper issue is the voters and the regulator’s asymmetric incentives, where approving a bad thing ends a career and blocking a good thing goes unnoticed. Remove an agency and the electorate installs its twin. Naval and Max agree the real reforms are narrow, including innovation zones, opt-in YIMBY zones, and the experimental laboratory of fifty states.

    Drug Discovery, Healthcare Economics, and End-of-One Medicine

    Hodak explains why innovation zones do not solve drug discovery. The right-to-try act and single-patient IND already exist, and the FDA approves over 99% of such requests, sometimes by phone, but dosing requires clinical-grade drug that only the IP owner has, and the FDA will draw an adverse inference against the whole program if a very sick patient does worse. A targeted fix is to prohibit adverse inferences across different users of a compound. He points to Europe’s notified-body system, private certifiers blessed by governments, as a way to scale review capacity, and to China’s CFDA, which already approved an implantable brain-computer interface and brings products to market far cheaper. His core economic argument is that healthcare is a fixed bucket of money that grows only with tax receipts, unlike phones and laptops where falling prices expanded the market, so spending 10x more on healthcare would be a catastrophe rather than the triumph that 10x AI spending would be. With no private market you run a small communist society inside a capitalist one, with the lines and frozen quality that implies. The way out is lower cost-to-market so patients can finance care like a car, which is the direction China is pushing. Naval’s twist is a healthcare plan where the first 20% of income is the deductible to recreate a private market, citing LASIK, dental, and plastic surgery as fields that advance because patients pay directly. The group closes the segment on GitLab’s Sid Sijbrandij, who outlived a rare-cancer prognosis by building his own escalation ladder of drugs, noting that end-of-one medicine works at the high end but demands enormous agency exactly when a patient is weakest, which is where AI should democratize access to knowledge.

    Autonomous Software, Hackathons, and the Autonomous Company

    Asked how much autonomous software they run, Rauch describes Vercel automating much of site reliability engineering: instead of hand-set alarm thresholds, anomalies in error rate, latency, or throughput fire an alert, an agent investigates, can open an incident that loops in people, and begins remediation, stopping just short of changing production. Vercel also runs autonomous optimization and security research, and an open-sourced security tool run against the entire monorepo with 10,000 concurrent agents produced several quarters of security research in a couple of days for about $14,000 in tokens, the equivalent of months of red teaming. Max shares a vibe-coded bug-reporting queue where TestFlight users submit logs and screenshots, a daemon analyzes and fixes issues in the background, and ships him a build to try, raising the prospect of apps effectively built by their users, with the caveat that you would get a Homer Simpson car of every feature. Blake recounts stopping all project work for a week and requiring everyone, from the receptionist to the engineers, to build something with AI and demo it. He expected mostly silly projects and got mostly needle movers, including a genuinely useful automation from the shipping and receiving associate, concluding that most people have an idea worth building but cannot tell a good first idea from a bad one until they can iterate on a real thing. Rauch extends this to a workforce that trains the agents doing the work rather than doing it directly, and a coming feature to extract reusable skills from your inputs and outputs.

    Creativity, Out-of-Distribution Surprise, and What Humans Can Uniquely Do

    On the intelligence-versus-agency split, Max suggests returns to humans tilt toward agency since agents supply intelligence, while Naval counters that you stay 99% intelligence and 1% agency because the agents exercise the agency for you. They agree the humans best suited to the future are the agentic ones who open a coding agent and ask what to build. Coding has perhaps 10x more participants than a year ago, yet roughly 99% still never will, because the first step is unimaginable to a non-coder, even as vibe coding proves more addictive and entertaining than video games while producing something real. On AI video, the group notes it still lacks taste and judgment, but expects fan-made films by 2030, dozens of Lord of the Rings takes or generated seasons of The Expanse, while prizing a genuinely new imaginative work over a remix. The long closing debate turns on definitions. Hodak defines art as meaningful out-of-distribution behavior, broad enough to include a military maneuver, and expects models to reach it. Naval defines art as conveying emotion with intent, which makes attribution decisive: the same photo means more taken by a human, and a hardware-attestation startup gains a real use case. They cite Gödel stepping outside the formal system as the human archetype and the identical look of every Claude-built website as in-distribution slop. Naval lands the episode on optimism: productivity gains mean hiring more, not fewer, of the creative and AI-fluent, the future is a larger number of smaller teams and an entrepreneurship explosion where generalists thrive and credentials fade, and the single best move is to get extremely good with the tools, because it is people with AI versus people without AI.

    Notable Quotes

    “Now clearly there’s 100x or a thousandx engineers and the world hasn’t fully adjusted to this.”

    Guillermo Rauch, on why AI made the spread between engineers impossible to ignore

    “Just waste tokens, save time. Don’t look at the tokens either as inputs or outputs. Just look at your time and look at the final output.”

    Naval Ravikant, on the right way to measure AI’s return

    “We had to learn code to communicate with the models. Now the models speak English and they speak fuzzy sloppy English like a human and they understand things.”

    Guillermo Rauch, asking whether pure software engineering is now obsolete

    “It allows two engineers to design an entire jet engine, which is just wildly different.”

    Blake Scholl, on Boom turning hardware engineering into software

    “You need to be able to say I am signing off on understanding the consequences of this PR.”

    Guillermo Rauch, on what it means to stand behind code you did not read line by line

    “That is absolutely the way we build physical infrastructure in this country. It’s guilty until proven innocent. And what we should actually do is make more of these things enforcement based rather than pre-approval based.”

    Blake Scholl, comparing the permitting process to filing a driving plan before every trip

    “You’re basically running a small communist society inside a larger capitalist society. And that’s what we’re doing in healthcare.”

    Max Hodak, on why there is no real private market in healthcare

    “I expected we would get a large number of silly projects and a small number of needle movers. And what we got was a large number of needle movers and a very small number of silly projects.”

    Blake Scholl, on the week he had the whole company build with AI

    “If a person takes the photo versus AI generates the exact same photo down to the last pixel, the person taking the photo will have more meaning for me.”

    Naval Ravikant, on why intent and attribution make something art

    “It’s about people with AI versus people without AI. And so the single best thing you can be doing right now for yourself is just getting really good with these tools.”

    Naval Ravikant, closing the conversation on the only divide that matters

    Watch the full conversation here: The AI Industrial Revolution on the Naval Podcast YouTube channel.

    Related Reading

    • Part one: Waste Tokens to Save Time, our writeup of the first segment, on software factories, the thousand-x engineer, token leaderboards, and whether pure software is dead.
    • Part two: Vibe Coding Hardware, our writeup of the second segment, on AI-designed jet engines, vertical integration, China’s open-source bet, and humans as verifiers.
    • Naval Ravikant’s official site, the canonical home for Naval’s essays and podcast on technology, judgment, and leverage.
    • Boom Supersonic, Blake Scholl’s company building supersonic aircraft and its own jet engines, source of the turbine-blade and two-engineers example.
    • Science Corporation, Max Hodak’s brain-computer interface company, whose captive MEMS foundry and FDA arguments anchor the hardware and healthcare segments.
    • Vercel, Guillermo Rauch’s company, whose AI gateway data and autonomous SRE work inform the usage and automation discussion.

  • Tim Ferriss, Chris Williamson, and George Mack Go Down the Rabbit Hole: Japanese Immersion, Memory and Forgetting, Brain Stimulation, AI Interfaces, and the Search for Meaning

    This is the third installment of the freewheeling “Rabbit Hole” roundtable from Chris Williamson’s Modern Wisdom, and the cast is stacked: Tim Ferriss, writer George Mack, and the founder behind the ambient-AI app Sky (who posts as @signull). It is a sprawling, two-and-a-half-hour conversation that jumps from why Americans never adopted WhatsApp to whether Tim dreams in Japanese, then keeps tunneling into deeper ground: how language shapes thought, why forgetting is a feature, the frontier of brain stimulation, what the next computing interface looks like, and the search for meaning in a world where AI keeps removing scarcity. You can watch the full conversation on YouTube here.

    TLDW

    The group opens on language: the etymology of “soon,” Malay and Indonesian reduplication, the Sapir-Whorf idea that language shapes thought, and Tim Ferriss recounting how a year of total immersion in a Japanese high school at fifteen made him fluent, with a detour into why adults can learn languages faster than the myth suggests. From there they move into the mind itself, aphantasia versus hyperphantasia, eidetic memory, and the underrated advantages of forgetting, which loops into AI memory, hallucination as a form of confabulation, and the unreliability of eyewitness testimony. A long middle section, anchored by Packy McCormick’s essay “Riding the Leopard,” wrestles with meaning in a post-scarcity world, drawing on Viktor Frankl, Joseph Campbell, Nick Bostrom, and the Dawkins versus Hirsi Ali debate about whether comforting beliefs are rational if they work. Tim then walks through the most concrete material in the episode: his use of accelerated TMS, the one-day protocol, the stellate ganglion block, and why the chemical-imbalance theory of depression is largely debunked. They close on the next interface (ambient AI, camera-equipped AirPods, the post-app phone, Apple’s wait-and-win strategy), a riff on Britain versus America, and the rise of AI-assisted looks-maxing. The throughline, stated and restated, is that friction and scarcity are where meaning and value actually come from.

    Thoughts

    For a conversation that looks like pure chaos, one idea holds it together: friction is where meaning lives, and modern technology is a machine for removing friction. They route the point through Nick Bostrom (the traits we admire in people exist because we have to negotiate a scarce, resistant world), through dating apps and DoorDash (frictionless access cheapens the thing you get), and through chess (still meaningful precisely because there is an opponent pushing back, even though engines crush every human). It reframes the AI-and-meaning panic in a useful way. The danger is not that AI deletes meaning, it is that it makes meaning harder to reach, the same way a calorie-dense food environment does not outlaw health but quietly makes it the harder path. If that is right, the work ahead is less about stopping the technology and more about deliberately reintroducing resistance.

    The most original riff is the treatment of forgetting as a feature rather than a defect, and then turning that lens on AI. Humans prune memory by salience, holding onto the vivid and the painful and letting the middle fade. Current AI memory systems do not prune, so when you stuff a model’s context full of stored “facts” you get noise and forced, spurious connections. The group notes that AI hallucination is really just machine confabulation, and that humans confabulate constantly, the Grenfell Tower “baby caught from the tower” false memory and the general unreliability of eyewitness testimony being the proof. The practical takeaway for anyone building AI products is counterintuitive and correct: the hard problem is not storage, it is principled forgetting.

    Tim Ferriss’s neuromodulation segment is the most concrete and quietly radical part of the episode. The claim worth sitting with is that the chemical-imbalance theory of depression is largely debunked, and the frontier has moved to circuit-level intervention: accelerated TMS, a neuroplasticity agent like d-cycloserine taken beforehand, and a “one-day protocol” that took him from an eight or nine on anxiety and rumination down to a one, with lifelong insomnia resolved. Two honest caveats keep it credible rather than salesy. It does not always work (he is candid that several rounds failed), and the side effects are real (rebound symptoms, temporary anhedonia). The economics are a clean illustration of a pattern that recurs through the whole conversation: roughly thirty thousand dollars out of pocket today is how the unit cost eventually falls to something insurers and ordinary patients can afford, the same arc that electric cars and the first copy-and-paste-less iPhones traveled.

    The meaning-and-religion exchange is where the conversation is most alive, and most revealing about where this cohort has landed. The Dawkins versus Ayaan Hirsi Ali anecdote crystallizes it: a man “optimizing for rationality while ignoring effectiveness,” pressing someone on whether the stone literally moved on the third day, when that someone’s life was demonstrably saved by the belief. Their tentative conclusion, that comforting delusions may be permissible when the measurable outcomes (health, community, longevity, a sense of meaning) are real, would have been near-heresy in the New Atheist moment of fifteen years ago and is now close to consensus among exactly these kinds of people. Whether you buy it or not, it is a sharp barometer of how far the cultural wind has shifted, and it pairs neatly with George Mack’s point that you cannot invalidate a whole framework with a single counterexample the way you can in mathematics.

    Key Takeaways

    • Americans never adopted WhatsApp largely because the US had free SMS early, while Brits paid per text, which is also why a generation grew up compressing messages into 160 characters.
    • The word “soon” was the Anglo-Saxon word for “now.” Because people kept saying “soon” and not acting, the language invented “now” to replace it, and “now” is already drifting the same way (“now now” in South Africa, similar constructions in Latin America).
    • Malay and Indonesian use reduplication instead of plurals (table-table, orang-orang meaning men, the root of orangutan, “man of the forest”), a small example of how different languages carve up the world differently.
    • The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis and Wittgenstein’s line, “the limits of my language are the limits of my world,” frame a recurring theme: we assume we shape language, but language also shapes us, including, some speakers report, having a different personality in a different language.
    • Tim Ferriss became fluent in Japanese through total immersion as a fifteen-year-old exchange student, taking physics and world history in Japanese, helped by the fact that it was pre-smartphone so there was no English escape hatch.
    • Adults can often learn languages faster than children, not slower. Children seem faster mainly because they have no choice and are forced into immersion. Adults already have the conceptual scaffolding (grammar, abstraction, the subjunctive) that a three-year-old lacks.
    • Density of practice beats frequency. Learning a language one hour a week is like trying to learn tennis once a month. The Michel Thomas method and Nassim Taleb’s joke (“the best way to learn Russian is to go into a Russian jail”) both point at intensity and stakes.
    • People differ radically in how they think. Aphantasia is the inability to visualize (some people only think in words), while others cannot think in words at all and only in images. The “imagine an apple” test reveals where you sit on that spectrum.
    • An overdeveloped memory can be counter-evolutionary past a point. Hyperthymesia makes it hard to let go of grievances and slights, and there are real, underrated advantages to forgetting.
    • Forgetting is the hard, missing piece in AI memory. Systems store facts but have no pruning of salience, so loading lots of “memories” into context produces noise and spurious connections rather than wisdom.
    • AI hallucination is best understood as machine confabulation, and humans confabulate constantly. The Grenfell Tower “baby dropped and caught” story spread through multiple eyewitnesses and turned out to be a collective false memory once physicists questioned it.
    • Memory is bound to place. One participant had to move neighborhoods after a breakup because every coffee shop and corner replayed the relationship, echoing an Alain de Botton observation that a beautiful memory becomes the sharpest source of pain if the relationship ends.
    • Phantom phone vibrations are real and documented. Years of notifications Pavlovian-condition your body to feel buzzes that are not there, evidence of how deeply the device has wired itself into your nervous system.
    • You can train visual memory. Tools include “Drawing on the Right Side of the Brain,” gesture drawing with short timed poses, and learning to see specifics (the six local tree species) instead of the generic label “tree.” Attention and labels, not just raw acuity, drive perception.
    • The smartphone is described as a “black mirror.” There is data suggesting people with fewer mirrors at home self-report as happier, and “Zoom face” drove a surge in cosmetic surgery during the pandemic as people watched themselves on camera all day.
    • Packy McCormick’s essay “Riding the Leopard” anchors the meaning discussion. A reader who analyzed more than 200 sci-fi novels found that the most common unsolved problem in post-scarcity worlds is meaning (59% of books), with identity next at 17%.
    • Viktor Frankl’s framing recurs: “as the struggle for survival has subsided, the question has emerged, survival for what?” Ever more people have the means to live but no meaning to live for.
    • Nick Bostrom’s point (from his “solved world” work) is that almost everything we value in other people, discipline, prudence, good judgment, honesty, exists because we must negotiate a scarce world. Remove the scarcity and those values risk a strange “weightlessness.”
    • The precautionary principle cuts both ways: humans are very good at forecasting problems and very bad at forecasting the solutions that billions of people will eventually invent for those problems.
    • Chess is the optimistic counterexample to “AI removes all purpose.” Engines beat every human, yet people, including Magnus Carlsen, still love playing, because meaning needs resistance, not victory.
    • There is a real resurgence in religion, including the ascendant Latin Mass, conducted in a language the congregation does not speak. The group debates whether “comforting delusions” are actually rational if religious people are measurably happier, healthier, and longer-lived.
    • The Dawkins versus Ayaan Hirsi Ali exchange is held up as someone “optimizing for rationality while ignoring effectiveness,” and you cannot disprove a whole framework with a single counterexample the way you can in math.
    • Tim Ferriss is now far more focused on neuromodulation than psychedelics. Accelerated TMS, paired with a plasticity agent and refined into a “one-day protocol,” took him from an eight or nine on anxiety and rumination to a one, and resolved decades of insomnia.
    • The chemical-imbalance theory of depression and anxiety is, by his account, thoroughly debunked. You are not depressed simply because of low serotonin, which is part of why SSRIs come with off-target side effects and poor off-ramping plans.
    • The stellate ganglion block (SGB) acts like a hard reset of the nervous system. Tim measured a roughly 30% jump in HRV on his Whoop that held for months. It is used aggressively for PTSD in soldiers.
    • Psychedelics reopen critical-period plasticity windows (research associated with Gul Dolen) for two to three weeks afterward, which is powerful for relearning but also means whatever habits you instill in that window can stick hard. The brain is “Play-Doh warmed in the microwave.”
    • Most consumer vagus-nerve stimulators are “bunk” because they do not hit the nerve correctly (the target near the ear is the cymba concha). Kevin Tracey’s book “The Great Nerve” is cited as the credible source, and devices like gammaCore are FDA-cleared for migraine.
    • Hard safety warning: do not DIY brain stimulation. Hit the wrong target and you can make symptoms much worse. Use a reputable clinic.
    • Sequencing is everything, in TMS, in language learning, and in habit change. Most mistakes are sequencing mistakes. Pick the right domino to tip first and everything downstream gets easier.
    • The next interface is unsettled. Candidates include camera-equipped AirPods, a “Her”-style earpiece, a glanceable agentic home screen (the Sky app), and OpenAI’s Jony Ive collaboration. Elon Musk’s bet is that apps disappear and the phone generates whatever you need on demand.
    • Apple’s strategy is to never be first but to be best, letting other companies fund the R&D and split-test the market (MP3 players before iPod, smartphones before iPhone, wireless earbuds before AirPods), backed by a war chest and roughly 20 billion dollars a year from Google.
    • Both smartphone hardware and AI models feel like they are hitting diminishing returns in noticeable user experience, after a long stretch (iPhone 5 to 12) of obvious leaps.
    • If the UK were a US state it would rank first in many quality-of-life metrics (life expectancy, low homicide, healthcare coverage, paid leave) and 51st in GDP per capita. Scott Galloway’s line: America is the best place to earn money, Europe the best place to spend it.
    • A fast, real-world AI win: uploading photos of a years-long skin condition to Gemini, which correctly identified it as fungal and recommended ketoconazole shampoo after doctors had failed. Photo-based self-diagnosis is becoming a major consumer use case, as is AI-assisted “looks-maxing” and Facetune-style editing.
    • Tim’s recent long-form essay, “The Self-Help Trap: What I Learned After 20 Years of Improving Myself,” is on tim.blog, and George Mack’s book recommendations live at highagency.com/books.

    Detailed Summary

    Does Tim Ferriss dream in Japanese? Immersion and learning as an adult

    The episode’s title question gets a real answer. Tim Ferriss says he runs on an English interface but became genuinely fluent in Japanese as a fifteen-year-old exchange student, after misunderstanding that “Japanese lessons” meant all his lessons (physics, world history) would be taught in Japanese. Total immersion plus a pre-smartphone world with no way to retreat into English did the work, and when he came home it took about a month to switch back, waking up and speaking Japanese to his mother. The group challenges the myth that children learn languages faster than adults: kids appear faster only because they are forced into immersion and have no mortgage and no job to distract them. Adults arrive with conceptual scaffolding, grammar, abstraction, the ability to grasp a counterfactual subjunctive, that a three-year-old simply does not have. The real variable is density of practice, which is why a six-week immersion can beat a year of weekly classes, and why the Michel Thomas method and Nassim Taleb’s “learn Russian in a Russian jail” both lean on intensity.

    Language shapes thought: etymology and Sapir-Whorf

    The opening stretch is a love letter to etymology. “Soon” was once the Anglo-Saxon word for “now,” and degraded over generations as people said it without acting, forcing the invention of “now,” which is itself now drifting. Malay and Indonesian double nouns rather than pluralize them (table-table, and orang-orang, men, giving us orangutan, “man of the forest”). These are small doors into the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis and Wittgenstein’s claim that the limits of your language are the limits of your world. The group treats the idea that language shapes us, not only the reverse, as easy to dismiss and probably true, citing friends who feel they have a different personality or can access different thoughts in Italian or Swedish.

    Two ways of thinking, and the praise of forgetting

    From language they move to cognition. People differ dramatically: some have aphantasia and cannot picture an apple at all, thinking only in words, while others cannot think in words and only in images, one friend reportedly visualizing a staircase to count. Tim places himself far toward hyper-visual memory, able to recall the floor plan of nearly every restaurant he has been in. But the group keeps returning to the underrated value of forgetting. An overdeveloped memory, hyperthymesia, makes it hard to release grievances and slights, which may be counter-evolutionary past a point. The athletic version is the “yips,” where you have to learn to process a mistake on film and then discard it rather than ruminate.

    When memory becomes a feature: AI, hallucination, and false memory

    The forgetting thread maps directly onto AI. The founder building the Sky app notes that it is now trivial to have AI extract and store a fact, but there is no pruning of salience, no built-in sense that something is no longer relevant, so passing many stored memories into context produces noise and forced connections. AI hallucination, the group argues, is just machine confabulation, and humans confabulate all the time. The vivid example is the Grenfell Tower fire, where multiple eyewitnesses “remembered” a baby being dropped from the tower and caught, a story that fell apart once physicists ran the numbers, an illustration that eyewitness testimony and human memory are themselves hallucinated reconstructions.

    Attention, phones, and the black mirror

    Phones get treated as both nervous-system extension and liability. Phantom vibrations are real and documented, a Pavlovian artifact of years of haptic notifications. The smartphone is a “black mirror,” and the group cites data suggesting fewer mirrors at home correlate with higher self-reported happiness, plus the pandemic “Zoom face” surge in cosmetic surgery. Tim describes running no social media, no vibrate, and no ringer on his phone with no felt loss of being informed, and a wider complaint that screens are now so ambient (five screens on a treadmill, a video wall, subtitles everywhere) that going screen-free requires active effort.

    Riding the leopard: meaning in a post-scarcity world

    Tim reads from Packy McCormick’s essay “Riding the Leopard,” which opens with a parade of AI funding announcements and the deflating question, “who gives a damn, why do we care?” before pivoting to a reader, in remission from stage-four cancer, who analyzed more than 200 sci-fi novels and found that the dominant unsolved problem in post-scarcity worlds is meaning. The piece quotes Viktor Frankl on survival giving way to “survival for what,” and takes its title from Joseph Campbell’s image of Dionysus riding the leopard without being torn apart, living with composure atop overwhelming energy. The group widens it with Nick Bostrom’s argument that the human traits we prize exist only because we negotiate a scarce world, so removing scarcity creates a values “weightlessness,” and David Deutsch’s counter that problems are infinite and soluble.

    Friction, resistance, and the cocktail-party question

    The most coherent conclusion is that meaning requires friction. Chess stays meaningful despite unbeatable engines because there is still resistance. Capitalism’s genius and its cost is removing friction, dating apps turning people into a swipeable catalog, DoorDash delivering a bathing suit in thirty minutes, and that frictionlessness tends to cheapen the thing delivered. The “what do you do?” cocktail-party question gets dissected as a very Western tic that ties identity to craft and productivity. Winston Churchill becomes the case study: a man who nearly died countless times, believed he was preserved for a purpose, fought his “black dog” depression, and laid 200 bricks a day just to stay occupied.

    Religion, rationality, and comforting delusions

    The meaning question leads into the religion revival, including the surging Latin Mass conducted in a language nobody in the pews speaks. They revisit the Jordan Peterson and Sam Harris debates about whether a secular population can build a durable moral code from first principles, and the Dawkins versus Ayaan Hirsi Ali exchange, where Dawkins challenged the literal resurrection while Hirsi Ali described religion saving her from a suicidal low. The verdict offered is that Dawkins was “optimizing for rationality while ignoring effectiveness,” and that if comforting beliefs reliably produce better health, community, and meaning, calling them irrational starts to look like the irrational move. George Mack adds the logical point that you cannot void an entire framework with a single counterexample the way you can in mathematics.

    Rewiring the brain: TMS, the one-day protocol, and neuromodulation

    Tim delivers the episode’s most concrete material. He describes years of generalized anxiety, OCD, and rumination he now traces partly to Lyme disease and chronic neuroinflammation, and his use of accelerated TMS (intermittent theta-burst stimulation) targeting specific circuits identified via fMRI. Paired with a neuroplasticity agent, the antibiotic d-cycloserine, dissolved in the mouth beforehand, the treatment evolved into a “one-day protocol” that took him from an eight or nine to a one and ended decades of insomnia. He is careful to caveat: he is not a doctor, it has not worked every time (five or six attempts), and side effects include rebound symptoms, occasional insomnia, and temporary anhedonia. The broader claim is that the chemical-imbalance theory of depression is largely debunked, and that real innovation here, as with electric cars and early iPhones, starts with wealthy early adopters overpaying (around 30 thousand dollars out of pocket) until cost and throughput improve. He names Jonathan Downar as a leading researcher and is involved with a device company, Ampa, built around the one-day protocol.

    Psychedelics, plasticity windows, and the stellate ganglion block

    Adjacent to TMS, Tim explains that psychedelics (and MDMA) appear to reopen critical-period plasticity for two to three weeks afterward, work associated with researcher Gul Dolen, which is promising for stroke recovery or relearning but dangerous if you instill bad habits while the brain is malleable. He recounts a two-sided stellate ganglion block (SGB) with Matt Cook, essentially a hard reset of the nervous system that produced a roughly 30% increase in HRV on his Whoop that held for months, and is used aggressively for PTSD in soldiers. After years funding psychedelic science, he says he has done almost none in the last three years because neuromodulation has been that compelling, while warning that psychedelics are “nuclear power for the psyche,” not suitable for everyone.

    The vagus nerve, real and fake

    On vagus-nerve stimulation, Tim’s verdict is that most consumer devices are bunk because they do not hit the nerve in the right place (the ear target is the cymba concha, and many heavily funded products miss it). He points to Kevin Tracey, author of “The Great Nerve,” as the credible scientist, explains the “inflammatory reflex” and its relevance to rheumatoid arthritis and autoimmune conditions, and notes that gammaCore (the prescription version of Truvaga) is FDA-cleared for migraine, with SetPoint Medical’s implant another route. A migraine-with-aura sufferer in the group provides the real-world test case.

    The next interface and Apple’s wait-and-win game

    The future-of-computing thread argues the real AI device has not been invented yet. Candidates include camera-equipped AirPods, a glanceable agentic home screen (the Sky app’s pitch is surfacing what you need so you doom-scroll less), a “Her”-style always-on earpiece, subvocalization sensors that read intended speech, and OpenAI’s secretive hardware with Jony Ive. Elon Musk’s bet is that apps vanish and the phone simply generates what you need on demand, which is plausible now that people use ChatGPT or Claude for tasks that used to need dedicated apps. Apple’s counter-move is its classic one: never first, always best, letting rivals fund the R&D (MP3 players, smartphones, wireless earbuds all predate Apple’s versions), backed by a war chest and roughly 20 billion dollars a year from Google. Both phone hardware and AI models, the group feels, are now delivering diminishing perceptible gains.

    Britain, America, and the image economy

    The closing tangents include George Mack’s viral chart showing that if the UK were a US state it would rank first in many quality-of-life measures and 51st in GDP per capita, with Scott Galloway’s summary that America is the best place to earn money and Europe the best place to spend it. They land on AI as an everyday tool: uploading photos of a stubborn skin condition to Gemini, which diagnosed it as fungal and recommended ketoconazole shampoo where doctors had failed, and the booming use of AI for “looks-maxing,” facial analysis, and Facetune-style editing, with writer Freya India’s reporting that young women now compete to be the one holding the phone so they control the edit. Tim signs off pointing to his “Self-Help Trap” essay on tim.blog, George to highagency.com/books, and the Sky founder to the app’s growing wait list.

    Notable Quotes

    “The reason that people mistakenly believe that kids learn faster is because the kids have no choice. The kids have no mortgage. The kids have no job.”

    On why adults can actually learn languages faster than children

    “It’s the Wittgenstein quote of, the limits of my world are the limits of my language. And we think that we shape language, but language shapes us.”

    George Mack, introducing the Sapir-Whorf thread

    “There are some tremendous advantages to forgetting.”

    Tim Ferriss, on why an overdeveloped memory can be counter-evolutionary

    “As the struggle for survival has subsided, the question has emerged, survival for what? Ever more people today have the means to live but no meaning to live for.”

    Viktor Frankl, quoted by Tim Ferriss reading from Packy McCormick’s essay “Riding the Leopard”

    “Everything that we value in other humans can be refined down to the fact that you need to negotiate with a world that is scarce.”

    Summarizing Nick Bostrom’s argument about values in a solved world

    “What you see is a guy who is playing a game of optimizing for rationality whilst ignoring effectiveness.”

    On Richard Dawkins challenging Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s faith despite the outcomes it produced

    “There’s very few things that I can think of that are meaningful that are also totally frictionless or just there is no challenge in it.”

    On why meaning depends on resistance, from the chess and dating-app discussion

    “The general chemical imbalance theory of depression or anxiety is pretty much thoroughly debunked at this point. You’re not depressed because you have low serotonin levels by and large.”

    Tim Ferriss, on the shift from serotonin models to circuit-level neuromodulation

    “A lot of innovation starts with people with money spending way too much money. That’s true with electric cars, it’s true with Uber, it’s true with the early generation iPhones.”

    Tim Ferriss, on how expensive early treatments like accelerated TMS eventually scale

    These are short, curated pulls from a long conversation, not a transcript. For the full context, including the brain-stimulation walkthrough and the meaning debate, watch the full episode on YouTube here.

    Related Reading

  • Benedict Evans on Why AI Is Stuck in 1997: The Task vs the Job, Commodity Models, and Why the Jobs Apocalypse Is Overhyped

    Benedict Evans, the former Andreessen Horowitz partner and independent analyst behind the annual “AI Eating the World” presentation, sat down with Lenny’s Podcast for what the host calls the most rational take on AI you will hear this year. Instead of either doom or hype, Evans argues that AI is as big a deal as the internet or mobile, and only as big a deal as the internet or mobile, which means we are living through something closer to 1997 than to the singularity. The conversation moves through the jobs question, the difference between a task and a job, whether the model labs have any pricing power, the anti-AI backlash, and what people should actually do. You can watch the full conversation on YouTube here.

    TLDW

    Evans frames AI as a platform shift on the scale of the internet or mobile, with the crucial twist that almost nothing has been built yet, so we are in the 1997 moment where confident predictions about winners are usually wrong. He introduces his central tool, the distinction between the task and the job, to explain why “X percent of this profession is exposed to AI” studies are misleading, why the AI labs are paradoxically hiring forward deployed engineers and buying consultancies, and why accountants kept multiplying through every wave of automation (the lump of labour fallacy and Jevons paradox at work). On value capture he makes a deterministic bet that foundation models have no network effects, behave like a commodity, and will look more like cloud than like Windows, with the value moving up the stack to applications, much as it did in telecom, where a trillion-dollar industry grew data traffic thousands of times over while its stocks went nowhere. He covers distribution as the real moat, Apple Intelligence as the most compelling unshipped vision, the fuzzy anti-AI backlash (including the largely fake water panic and the very real harms of deepfakes), raising kids under radical uncertainty, and closes with the disarming admission that his own synthesis-heavy job is exactly the kind AI is currently worst at. His advice: presume radical uncertainty, dive in rather than sneer, and assume it will probably be okay.

    Thoughts

    The most useful thing in this conversation is a single question Evans keeps returning to: what is the task, and what is the job? A spreadsheet automated the arithmetic an accountant does, and the number of accountants went up for the next forty years. Claude Code can write the code, but deciding what to build, for whom, and why is the part nobody has automated. The reason the “this profession is X percent exposed to AI” studies feel hollow is that they assume a job is a neat stack of separable tasks. Evans argues, by analogy to the old expert-systems failure, that you simply cannot decompose a senior lawyer’s work that way. The 75-slide deck is the task. Walking your company, reading its politics, talking to your customers, and telling you the uncomfortable truth is the job, and that is what you actually paid McKinsey for.

    The boldest and most falsifiable claim is that the foundation-model companies look more like cloud than like Windows. No network effects means no winner-take-all, which means durable competition, which means commodity pricing and compressed margins, with the real value accruing up the stack in applications that nobody at the labs is going to build. His telecom analogy is the one to sit with. A trillion-dollar industry grew mobile data traffic by 1,500 to 2,000 times in fifteen years, and the stocks went nowhere for a quarter century, because it was a low-margin utility while all the interesting value moved to Apple and the people building apps on top. If he is right, the current token-burn economics, the person reportedly spending 1.5 million dollars a month on tokens, are the 2010 equivalent of a 50,000 dollar roaming bill, not the steady state. Evans flags openly that he could be completely wrong, which is the intellectually honest part and the part most forecasters skip.

    “It depends” and “it will probably be okay” sound like evasions, and Evans leans into that. But the 1997 framing is doing real work. The point is not that AI is small, it is that the things that will end up mattering have not been built, and that anyone confidently naming the winners today is repeating the 1997 mistake of betting on Excite over a search company with a weird logo. The discipline he is selling is to presume radical uncertainty and act anyway, because the alternative, declaring the whole thing slop and shouting about it online, buys a great feeling of moral superiority and nothing else. His repeated insistence that you can see the job that goes away but never the new job, because it does not exist yet, is the load-bearing idea under his optimism.

    The most disarming moment is the closing AI-corner answer, where the person whose entire brand is explaining AI admits he struggles to use it. His work is synthesis and precise information retrieval, and precise retrieval happens to be exactly what today’s models are worst at. He is, in his own words, the lawyer looking at VisiCalc: it is obviously transformative, and he just does not happen to make spreadsheets all day. That admission is worth more than any benchmark, because it locates the real variable. How much AI changes your life depends less on how good the model gets and more on whether your daily work sits on the part of the jagged frontier where it already works. That is a far more practical lens than arguing about whether AGI arrives in three years or thirty.

    Key Takeaways

    • Evans’s headline opinion is that AI is as big a deal as the internet or mobile, and only as big a deal as the internet or mobile. Both halves of that sentence matter.
    • If you make the internet comparison honestly, we are roughly in 1997: very exciting, most of it does not work yet, most of what people will build has not been built, and it is unclear how any of it will end up working.
    • Adoption is spread across a very wide distribution. Even among teenagers, only something like 15 to 20 percent are daily active users and another 20 percent weekly, with the majority saying they do not use it at all.
    • That spread maps onto the “jagged frontier” question of where AI works, where it does not, whether you can predict where it will work in advance, and whether you can even tell after the fact.
    • Software developers are the accountants seeing VisiCalc: for them everything has already changed. Most other professions are watching, intrigued but unsure what to do with it.
    • The AI labs are investing heavily in forward deployed engineers, consultancies, and professional services. Evans jokes that a forward deployed engineer is an Accenture outsourced developer who lives in San Francisco.
    • Companies do not have spare people sitting around to reimagine every internal workflow, so reinventing a business around AI is itself a project that needs consultants, which is why the most cutting-edge labs are funding exactly the firms everyone assumed AI would kill.
    • The central framework: separate the task from the job. Sometimes the task is the job (the elevator operator pressing a lever), and automating the task ends the job. Far more often, the task is only part of the job.
    • Amazon gets you the SKU once you know which SKU you want. Knowing which one to buy is a different job. Claude Code writes the code, but knowing what code and what features to build is the job.
    • A McKinsey or Bain engagement is not really about the deck. The deck is the task. The job is walking your enterprise, understanding the politics, talking to your customers, and telling you the truth.
    • The Jevons paradox is just price elasticity applied to labour. Make something cheaper to produce and you usually do far more of it, not the same amount with fewer people.
    • Excel did not give investment bankers shorter hours. iPhone SDKs did not shrink the number of engineers even though Apple writes 90 percent of the code for you. The number of accountants rose through every wave of automation.
    • The lump of labour fallacy: since 1800, each technology automates jobs and unlocks new ones. You can always see the job that disappears and never the new job, because it does not exist yet.
    • Evans is wary of argument from authority on jobs. He wants Dario Amodei’s view on where models go in the next 6 to 12 months, not necessarily his theory of labour markets and comparative advantage.
    • The doomer scenario of every company buying ChatGPT and firing everyone in two weeks misunderstands how enterprises work. Enterprise sales cycles run 18 months or more. Nobody is ripping out SAP overnight. The full transformation takes 3 to 10 years, sector by sector.
    • AGI and superintelligence are being quietly redefined to mean whatever works now. Larry Tesler’s theorem: AI is whatever machines cannot do yet, because once they can, people call it just software.
    • We have no theory of human intelligence, no theory of why these models work, and no theory of how much better they will get, so everyone is vibes-forecasting. Even if progress stopped tomorrow, what exists is already transformative and will roll out for a decade.
    • On value capture, Evans argues models show no network effects, so no single one runs away with the market. Persistent competition plus little real product differentiation means little pricing power.
    • Sam Altman’s pitch of selling intelligence on a meter like electricity ignores the brutal margin structure of utilities. Your TV maker does not pay the power company a cut of your bill.
    • The telecom analogy: a roughly trillion-dollar mobile industry spends 15 to 20 percent of revenue on capex, grew data consumption 1,500 to 2,000 times since 2010, and its stocks went nowhere for 25 years because it is a low-margin commodity utility.
    • The elemental question: does the model do the whole thing, or does it need thousands of different apps built by different people? If it needs apps, the labs cannot build them all, just as Microsoft did not, so it looks more like AWS than like Windows.
    • If the product is a commodity, distribution becomes the moat. Google pushes Gemini through its surfaces, Meta sprayed AI across its apps and quietly ranked between ChatGPT and Gemini in usage, and incumbents with distribution have a structural edge.
    • Browsers are the warning: Microsoft used distribution to win the browser war, then it turned out winning browsers did not matter because the value was further up the stack.
    • Apple Intelligence, as shown at WWDC 2024, was the most compelling vision of a personal AI assistant Evans has seen. Apple could not ship it, but neither could anyone else, because tool-using on-device agents with no hallucinations across thousands of apps is genuinely hard.
    • The model is “the dumb thing underneath” that powers a feature. The same commodity model can sit beneath both Gemini on Android and Apple Intelligence on iOS while the products and distribution differ entirely.
    • The anti-AI backlash is a big fuzzy mess. Some is real (local electricity bills, deepfakes, real job anxiety), some is sort of true, and some is simply false.
    • The data-center water panic is largely fake. A Livermore lab study put US data-center water consumption at about 0.017 percent of US water use. Local well conflicts are planning problems, not data-center problems.
    • We have shockingly little hard data. The model labs do not publish meaningful usage numbers. There is no public daily active user figure for ChatGPT, so economists are reverse-engineering effects from government surveys.
    • Real new harms do appear with each wave. A teenager could not use Photoshop to make explicit fakes of every classmate and send them to the whole school in an afternoon. Now they can, and turn them into video.
    • The UK Post Office Horizon scandal (buggy Fujitsu software wrongly showing cash shortfalls, leading to prosecutions, bankruptcies, and suicides) is a reminder that every technology brings new ways to ruin lives, by malice or by accident.
    • You cannot reliably predict what gets exposed. In 1997 people thought taxis were safe from the internet and newspapers would be fine. The opposite happened. Today, “AI-proof” jobs like personal trainer may not be as safe as they look.
    • Uber and Airbnb show that similar-sounding companies can have very different market impact. Uber demolished and then grew the taxi market, while Airbnb’s effect on hotels was fairly marginal because business travel still wants a hotel.
    • Every new technology first lets you do the old thing but more, then unlocks things that were not possible before. Recorded music revenue is U-shaped: first “what if I do not pay 15 dollars for a CD,” then “what if 15 dollars a month gives me all the music there is.” Spotify is not an online music store, it is something else.
    • Coding was supposed to be one of the last things automated, and instead it is the most transformed role of all, which is itself a lesson in how badly we predict exposure.
    • Practical advice: do not stick your head in the sand. Dive in, submerge yourself, and come out understanding what you can do with it. Going into a shrinking job market announcing you will never use AI is not the right posture.
    • Evans’s honest coda: he struggles to find AI use cases because his job is synthesis and precise retrieval, the things models are worst at. He uses it for proofreading, images, redecorating his apartment, and dictation. He is the lawyer looking at VisiCalc.

    Detailed Summary

    AI is as big as the internet, and we are living in 1997

    Evans opens with the opinion he calls his most controversial: AI is as big a deal as the internet or mobile, and only as big a deal as the internet or mobile. To some in tech that sounds dismissive, as if he is underrating a once-in-history event. His reply is that smartphones and the internet were themselves enormous, and we are talking over the internet right now. The deeper point is the comparison’s timing. If this is like the internet, then it is like the internet in 1997: thrilling, but most of it does not work yet, most of what will be built has not been built, and nobody knows how the pieces will fit. His latest 80-slide presentation, he jokes, is essentially 80 ways of saying “we do not know,” which is partly facetious and partly the entire point.

    The jagged frontier and the wide spread of adoption

    Adoption is not uniform, it is a wide distribution. Some people in tech have bought clusters of Mac minis and stopped using Google, while most people outside tech who use AI at all touch it once every week or two. Even among 13 to 18 year olds, daily active use sits around 15 to 20 percent, weekly use adds another 20 percent, and roughly 60 percent say they do not use it. That spread maps onto what Evans calls the jagged frontier: whether a given task works, whether you can predict in advance that it will work, whether it is intuitive, and whether you can even tell after the fact. Software developers are the accountants who just saw VisiCalc, living in a clear before-and-after. Everyone else is somewhere on the curve, picking it up to varying degrees and a little puzzled about what it is for.

    Why the AI labs are buying consultancies

    One of the most counterintuitive trends is that the leading labs are pouring money into forward deployed engineers and professional services, the very category many assumed AI would erase. Evans’s explanation is grounded in how companies actually operate. Firms do not keep spare people sitting around to redesign stores, hunt down churn, or rebuild a tech stack, which is exactly why they hire Bain, BCG, McKinsey, Accenture, or Infosys when a big project appears. Reimagining every internal workflow around AI, then actually plugging vertical and horizontal systems together and retraining people, is itself a multi-month project requiring people you do not have. So the work gets outsourced, and the most advanced labs are funding the firms that do it. His joke lands the point: a forward deployed engineer is a statistician, or an Accenture developer, who happens to work in San Francisco.

    The task versus the job

    This is the spine of the conversation. Ask what the hard part of a job really is. Sometimes the task is the job: the elevator attendant’s whole job was driving the car, the task got automated, the job ended. Much more often the visible task is only a slice. Amazon gets you the SKU once you know which SKU you want, but knowing what to buy is a separate job. Claude Code writes the code, but deciding what to build, for whom, and how to take it to market is the job. A consulting deck is the task, while the reason you pay Bain is for them to walk your company, understand its politics, talk to your customers, and tell you the truth. Evans notes you can already generate a bad McKinsey deck with AI, and the LinkedIn grifters who do are missing that the deck was never the thing you were buying.

    Jevons paradox and the lump of labour fallacy

    The Jevons paradox is just price elasticity applied to labour: make something cheaper to do and you usually do much more of it. Excel did not hand junior bankers their Friday afternoons off, it expanded the work. iPhone developers write a fraction of the raw code because Apple wrote the drivers and file system, and there are not a tenth as many engineers, there are far more. The count of accountants climbed through adding machines, punch cards, mainframes, databases, ERP, spreadsheets, and cloud. The lump of labour fallacy is the broader version: since 1800 every technology has removed jobs and unlocked new ones, the removed jobs usually look bad in hindsight, the new ones tend to be better, and GDP keeps rising. You can always see the job that disappears and never the one that does not exist yet.

    The jobs question, Dario, and the enterprise sales cycle

    On the coming jobs apocalypse, Evans is cautious about argument from authority. Running an AI lab makes Dario Amodei worth listening to on where models go in the next 6 to 12 months, not necessarily on labour economics and comparative advantage. The doomer image of companies buying ChatGPT and firing everyone within weeks misreads reality: enterprise sales cycles run 18 months or longer, nobody is tearing out SAP overnight, and the full transformation will take 3 to 10 years, sector by sector, as people slowly work out what to do. He points to the lag in software itself. Many SaaS companies founded the day before ChatGPT launched could have been built a decade earlier, and were not, because the delay was someone realizing a problem existed and that this was the way to solve it.

    Redefining AGI and superintelligence

    Evans is skeptical of the moving terminology. He cites Larry Tesler’s line that AI is whatever machines cannot do yet, because the moment they can, people call it just software. Machine learning, image recognition, and sentiment analysis all got reclassified as not really AI once they worked, the same way jet airliners were once high technology and are now just planes. AGI is now often quietly redefined as doing some percentage of economically valuable work, which a 1975 mainframe also did, rather than anything about consciousness or a soul. Whether we reach human-level intelligence is, in his view, genuinely unknowable right now. The reassuring point is that you do not need to resolve it. Even if models hit a brick wall tomorrow, what already exists is transformative and will take a decade to deploy.

    Where the value accrues: commodity models and the telecom analogy

    Here Evans makes his most deterministic argument. Foundation models appear to lack network effects, so no single model runs away from the pack, competition persists, and product differentiation as users experience it is thin. Without differentiation or lock-in, where does pricing power come from? He skewers Sam Altman’s image of selling intelligence on a meter like electricity by pointing out that utilities have terrible margins and nobody pays the power company a cut of their TV. His telecom career supplies the analogy: mobile is a roughly trillion-dollar industry that spends 15 to 20 percent of revenue on capex, grew data traffic 1,500 to 2,000 times since 2010, and whose stocks went nowhere for 25 years because it is a low-margin commodity utility while the value sits up the stack with Apple and the app makers. If models are commodities and the real product is thousands of apps the labs will not build, the outcome looks like cloud, not like Windows.

    Distribution as the moat

    If the product is a commodity, distribution decides the winners. The web browser is the cautionary tale: the browser product is a thin wrapper around a rendering engine, tab browsing was the last real innovation 20-plus years ago, Microsoft used distribution to win, and then winning browsers turned out not to matter because the value was elsewhere. Now Google drives Gemini through its surfaces and Meta sprayed AI across its apps and, in survey data, sat between ChatGPT and Gemini in usage despite tech writing it off. An adequate product with great distribution and brand becomes a big deal, which is why OpenAI spent last year trying everything to build a flywheel before the giants defaulted everyone onto their own offering. The power of the default and sheer inertia do a lot of work.

    Apple Intelligence and the model as the dumb thing underneath

    Evans calls the Apple Intelligence segment of WWDC 2024 the most compelling vision of a personal AI assistant he has seen: tool-using, on-device, agentic, with no prompt injection or hallucinations across a standardized API spanning thousands of apps. Apple could not ship it, but neither could anyone else, because that is genuinely hard. The episode illustrates his framing that the model is “the dumb thing underneath” that powers a feature. The same commodity model can sit beneath Gemini intelligence on Android and Apple Intelligence on iOS, with different products, different distribution, and different decisions about what the feature should be. Apple has a billion edge-capable devices, while Google’s “coming soon to our most powerful devices” really means it will not work on most Android phones.

    The anti-AI backlash, water, and real harms

    The backlash, Evans says, is a big fuzzy mess of very different things. Some is tangible, like a higher local electricity bill in a small number of places. Some is essentially fake, like the water panic. He dug into a Livermore lab study putting US data-center water use at about 0.017 percent of national consumption. Local well conflicts are planning failures, not data-center failures. The jobs piece is genuinely unresolved, with charts pointing both ways and a youth employment slowdown that shows up regardless of degree or AI exposure. He stresses how little hard data exists, since the labs publish no meaningful usage numbers and there is no public daily active user figure for ChatGPT. He compares the moment to the social media backlash, compressed, where some fears were true, some half true, and some simply false. The real new harms are real, though: deepfakes let a teenager generate explicit fakes of an entire school in an afternoon, and the UK Post Office Horizon scandal shows how buggy software plus institutional denial can destroy lives.

    You cannot predict what gets exposed, and what to actually do

    Evans dismisses the O*NET-style exercise of scoring what percentage of each profession AI can do as deluded, the modern version of the expert-systems problem, where you try to describe a job as 700 logical steps and it never works. You cannot say a senior partner’s work is 17 percent automatable. The history of prediction is humbling: in 1997 people thought taxis were safe from the internet and newspapers would simply save on printing, and both were wrong. Coding, supposedly one of the last things to automate, became the most transformed role of all. Personal trainers might be next once your phone can watch your form. His closing advice is to presume radical uncertainty and act anyway: do not retreat into sneering moral superiority, dive in, internalize what the tools can do, and make yourself a great hire. He ends with a candid admission that his own synthesis-and-retrieval job is exactly what AI is currently worst at, so he is the lawyer looking at VisiCalc, sure it changes everything while not personally making spreadsheets all day.

    Notable Quotes

    “My most controversial opinion is that I think that AI is as big a deal as the internet or mobile, and only as big a deal as the internet or mobile.”

    Benedict Evans, stating the thesis that frames the whole conversation

    “If you’re going to make the internet comparison, it’s like we’re in 1997. It’s very exciting. Most stuff kind of doesn’t work yet. Most of the stuff that people are going to do hasn’t been built yet.”

    Benedict Evans, on why confident predictions about AI winners are usually wrong

    “You can’t look at a senior partner at a law firm and say, well, 17 percent of their work could be automated. This is horseshit.”

    Benedict Evans, on why O*NET-style job-exposure scoring fails

    “Claude Code can write you the code, but what code do you want? It can make you the features, sure, but what features do you want? Who’s your customer? What’s the right product for that customer?”

    Benedict Evans, drawing the line between the task and the job

    “There’s this quote from Sam Altman where he said we’re going to be selling AI intelligence on a meter like water or electricity, and you look at this and think, my dear sweet child, you need me to explain the margin structure of the utility industry to you.”

    Benedict Evans, on why model labs may lack pricing power

    “The model is just the dumb thing underneath that powers the feature. The model is the commodity that powers different decisions about what the feature should be.”

    Benedict Evans, on why value moves up the stack to applications

    “Every time we have a new technology it automates away a bunch of jobs, and then that automation unlocks a bunch of new jobs, and you don’t know the new job because it doesn’t exist yet.”

    Benedict Evans, on the lump of labour fallacy and 200 years of automation

    “Don’t stick your head in the sand and say I hate all of this stuff. That gives you a great feeling of moral superiority, but that’s not going to help. What helps is you diving into this and coming out understanding what you can do with it.”

    Benedict Evans, on what to actually do about AI right now

    “AI is good at stuff that computers are bad at, and bad at stuff that computers are good at.”

    Benedict Evans, quoting an observation that explains why he struggles to use AI in his own work

    This is a curated set of pulls, not a transcript. To hear the full argument in context, including the telecom and recorded-music charts and the lightning round, watch the full conversation on YouTube here.

    Related Reading

  • Vibe Coding Hardware: Naval, Guillermo Rauch, Blake Scholl, and Max Hodak on AI-Designed Jet Engines, Vertical Integration, China’s Open-Source Bet, and Why Humans Become Verifiers

    This is part two of Naval Ravikant’s conversation with frontier founders Guillermo Rauch of Vercel, Blake Scholl of Boom Supersonic, and Max Hodak of Science. Where the first part argued that you should waste tokens to save time and that the job of an engineer is now to build the factory rather than the output, this segment drags that thesis out of pure software and into atoms. The question on the table is what happens to hardware when models can vibe code the spreadsheets, the simulations, and eventually the step files and PCB layouts that aerospace, semiconductors, and biotech are built on. This segment is one half of the discussion, and you can watch and read the full episode here. The full conversation is on the Naval Podcast YouTube channel.

    TLDW

    Blake Scholl describes how Boom Supersonic took hardware engineering workflows that used to live in siloed Excel spreadsheets and VBScript on individual laptops, with handoffs done by email like it was the 1990s, and turned them into versioned, testable software. The new model is that software engineers build the architectures and the tools while hardware engineers vibe code their own domain-specific pieces, which collapsed a turbine-blade analysis that once took one engineer one day per blade into something where two engineers can design an entire jet engine in real time. Naval generalizes this into the cataclysm of enterprise software: there is no longer a startup that can sell you hardware collaboration tools because companies just code the exact thing they need on demand, and even spreadsheets are cooked because they only existed as a proxy for custom software nobody could previously afford to build. Blake predicts that within 2026 AI will move from generating software to generating step files and PCB layouts, which reshapes mechanical and electrical engineering. The group debates China’s open-source push as a way to neutralize Silicon Valley’s software advantage and protect its hardware and supply-chain superiority, lands on the point that if you fall behind on generating software you fall behind on generating everything, and Guillermo notes that frontier coding intelligence still dominates real usage while cheaper models like Gemini win at scale for support and browser automation. Max Hodak explains Science’s vertical integration, including a captive MEMS foundry on the East Coast, because the most innovative hardware cannot be bought off the shelf, and argues that software still needs hands since a model that cannot make physical things hits real boundaries. The conversation closes on the shift from writing to verifying: junior engineering got absorbed by agents while juniors got promoted, the same way paralegals could be seen as fired or promoted, and humans across law, engineering, and operations are becoming the verifiers who sign off on systems they did not write line by line.

    Thoughts

    The most important shift in this segment is that vibe coding stops being a software-industry story and becomes a deep-tech story. In part one the examples were Postgres, ClickHouse, and deploy targets. Here Blake Scholl is talking about turbine blades that change shape when they heat up, and the brutal fact that converting between cold and hot geometry, and between aerodynamics and structures, used to eat one engineer for one full day per blade in an engine that has a thousand blades. That is the kind of math that quietly kills ambition. When he says two engineers can now design an entire jet engine because the structural and aerodynamic results update in real time as you change the geometry, that is not a productivity improvement, it is a change in what a small team is allowed to attempt. The interesting move is the division of labor: software engineers build the architecture and the framework because they understand systems and separation of concerns, and the hardware engineers vibe code the pieces only they understand. Nobody has to become both.

    Naval’s “cataclysm of enterprise software” is the most investable idea in the episode, and it is darker than it sounds for anyone selling B2B tools. His claim is that the entire category of internal collaboration software is being eaten from the inside, because a company that can generate exactly the tool it needs on any given day will not pay a vendor for an approximation of that tool. His follow-on that even spreadsheets are cooked is the sharpest version of the point. The spreadsheet won for forty years precisely because it was the closest thing to custom software that a non-programmer could produce. Remove the constraint that custom software is expensive and the spreadsheet loses its reason to exist. The counterweight, which the group raised in part one with the block-economy thesis, is that the infrastructure primitives agents reach for get more valuable, not less. So the safe place to build is not the collaboration layer on top, it is the primitive underneath.

    The China discussion is the geopolitical center of the conversation and it lands on a genuinely uncomfortable insight. The argument is that China leans into open-source models not only because it is a model or two behind, but because open weights neutralize Silicon Valley’s software advantage and let China lean on what it already dominates: hardware, supply chains, and component ecosystems. If software can be generated on demand from open models, then the country with the factories wins the stack. The sharpest line is that if you fall behind on the ability to generate software, you fall behind on the ability to generate everything, because software is now upstream of every hardware pipeline. That reframes the open-versus-closed debate as a question about who controls the means of producing the means of production. It also quietly flatters the American frontier labs, since the same logic says self-improvement requires frontier coding models, and on that narrow axis the consensus at the table is that the Chinese models are not yet in the race.

    Max Hodak provides the necessary cold water, and it is the most grounding contribution in the episode. Everyone else is describing software eating the design layer, and Max points out that you still have to make the thing. Science owns a captive MEMS foundry on the East Coast not as a flex but because there was no other way to do the packaging and assembly for products that approach a single block of covalently bonded matter. His framing that the software still needs hands is the real boundary condition on all the AI-eats-everything talk: a model can be smarter than every engineer in the building and still be unable to deposit a layer, bond a wafer, or pass a regulatory inspection. The optimistic version, which he also makes, is that he has instrumented the foundry so that as models improve, the gains show up immediately in cell engineering and material science. The pessimistic reading is that the physical world remains a hard rate limiter, and the companies that own the atoms will capture more of the surplus than the companies that only own the bits.

    The closing thread on verification is where the whole conversation resolves into a job description for humans. Guillermo’s point that the biggest problem in software is mountains of slop arriving as a pull request, and that the answer is not pretending to read every line but being able to say “I am signing off on the consequences of this PR, and I wrote the harness, the simulations, the proofs, and the type checkers that let me,” is the most practically useful idea in the episode. It generalizes cleanly. The lawyer you trust is not the one who wrote every clause by hand, it is the one putting their reputation on the line that the document is sound. The production engineer who gets paged at 3am is the one signing off that the system is safe to ship. As models absorb the junior tier of every knowledge profession, the surviving human role is the verifier who carries the accountability. That is a promotion for the people who can hold it and an extinction event for the people whose value was doing the work nobody now needs done by hand.

    Key Takeaways

    • The factory framing from part one carries straight into hardware: you are judged on whether you build the system that produces multiplicative outputs, not on the single artifact, and the real multiplier was always 100x or 1000x, not 10x.
    • AI completely changes the role of software and hardware developers rather than just speeding either one up.
    • A huge amount of hardware engineering lives in complex Excel spreadsheets and VBScript on individual engineers’ laptops, with no source control, no automated testing, and handoffs done manually over email. It is software that is not treated as software.
    • Boom Supersonic’s move from day one was to turn traditional hardware engineering workflows into real software frameworks that are automatable and repeatable, to drive down the cost of iteration.
    • The old bottleneck was never being able to afford enough software engineers to build those frameworks. AI removes that constraint.
    • The new model: software engineers create the architectures because they understand systems, algorithms, and separation of concerns, and hardware engineers vibe code the domain pieces only they understand.
    • A turbine blade is cold when it starts and hot when it runs, so it changes shape, and you must design both the cold and hot geometry across aerodynamics and structures. Classically that was one engineer, one day, for one blade, in an engine with a thousand blades.
    • With software and hardware people combined, you can now change blade geometry and see the structural and aerodynamic results in real time, which lets two engineers design an entire jet engine.
    • Naval’s cataclysm of enterprise software: no startup can sell hardware collaboration tools anymore because companies just code the exact thing they need at any given time.
    • Even spreadsheets are cooked. Spreadsheets won only because nobody could build custom software, so a spreadsheet full of VBScript was the closest available approximation. Remove the cost barrier and the approximation loses.
    • Engineers are moving from Excel to Python models that produce believable simulations of physical systems.
    • AI can generate software today, but within 2026 it is expected to generate step files and PCB layouts, which opens up mechanical and electrical engineering as the next frontier.
    • The hardware software boon is biggest for small gadget and parts companies that historically shipped bad software because they could not afford good software. Now they can ship good-enough software, or skip the human front end entirely and expose hardware agentically for voice and agent control.
    • China goes all in on open-source models partly to neutralize Silicon Valley’s software edge: if software can be generated on demand from open weights, China’s hardware and supply-chain superiority stops being offset by a software disadvantage.
    • Other reasons cited for China’s open-source push: it is a model or two behind, it is distilling models, and the government has a history of funding efforts that lift the whole ecosystem, especially in network-effect businesses.
    • Open-source heft is coming almost entirely from China. OpenAI is not open, Grok publishes models but is seen as a model or two behind, Google’s local models are not very competitive, and Anthropic is not known for open-source releases.
    • Without frontier coding models you do not get self-improvement, and if you fall behind on generating software you fall behind on generating everything, because software now sits upstream of every hardware pipeline.
    • Real AI gateway usage shows open models do get used, but the top is heavily dominated by frontier intelligence.
    • Frontier intelligence at the right cost and performance slaps at scale. Gemini models are underrated and excel as industrial production models for support tasks and browser automation, even if they are not the top pick for coding.
    • For pushing the frontier you need the best possible coding model, which is now only two or three models, and the Chinese models are not among them.
    • One contrarian view at the table: use DeepSeek for 97% of tasks because it is cheap, run it repeatedly for harder problems, and reserve frontier models for the most advanced work. The counterargument: intelligence is an unalloyed good, mistakes are invisible and costly, and a smarter model is always cheaper than a person, so you default to the most intelligent option.
    • Always wanting the most intelligent model risks creating a monopoly or oligopoly in AI, because when two models disagree you cannot tell which is right, so you trust the smarter one and stop asking the weaker one.
    • Vertical integration is forced, not chosen: if you cannot buy it, you have to make it. The preference is always to buy when a vendor offers a service at a great price, like PCBs from Asia.
    • The closer a product gets to a single block of covalently bonded matter, the better it performs: lower power, smaller, higher performance, longer lasting. The components for that level of integration simply are not available to buy.
    • Science owns a captive MEMS foundry on the East Coast, bought because there was no other way to do the packaging and assembly the company needed.
    • One of the biggest near-term AI impacts inside hardware companies is regulatory and documentation work: tracing which of thousands of ISO standards apply used to occupy a regulatory and quality team for months, and now AI just knows.
    • Software still needs hands. A model can be smarter than us and still hit real boundaries if it cannot physically make things, which is why Science has instrumented its foundry so model improvements show up immediately in cell engineering and material science.
    • Basic legal work is already going away. People have stopped asking lawyers for NDAs and routine agreements, because law is spaghetti code in English with no real APIs, and the basic tasks are handled by AI.
    • Junior engineers got promoted to senior engineers while junior engineering itself got taken over by agents. The same framing applies to paralegals: fired, or promoted to senior lawyers who now spend their time thinking about the law.
    • What you value in a lawyer is a trusted authority who puts their reputation on the line, not someone who read every clause. The same trust model is coming to engineering.
    • The biggest problem in software engineering today is mountains of slop arriving as a pull request. The old norm of reading every line of a PR is gone.
    • The new standard is being able to say “I understand and I am signing off on the consequences of this PR,” backed by the test harness, simulations, proofs, and type checkers you built, even without reading every line.
    • Embrace a world where code is spaghetti you do not fully understand, but build the evaluators that give confidence, and rely on production engineers to sign off because someone gets paged if the system goes down.
    • Creating software is easy from zero to one. The hard part is a thousand days from now: is it secure, tested, production grade, and performant, and are you still motivated to invest the tokens to maintain it in prod?
    • Humans are becoming verifiers. The same way models are trained on good verification data, the old functions of lawyers, engineers, and operations people are moving to verifying the stack and standing behind it.

    Detailed Summary

    Turning Hardware Engineering Into Software

    Blake Scholl opens by describing how AI completely changes the role of software and hardware developers at Boom Supersonic. From day one the company tried to take traditional hardware engineering workflows and turn them into software. For anyone who has not been around hardware engineering, he explains that an enormous amount of it happens in complex Excel spreadsheets on individual engineers’ laptops, sometimes with VBScript code, all of which is actually software but is not treated as software. There is no source control, no automated testing, and when an aerodynamicist hands work to a structures engineer it is done manually with a spreadsheet over email, like it is the 1990s. Boom started building software frameworks to automate and make those flows repeatable so the cost of iteration would drop, but progress was slow because the company could never afford enough software engineers.

    Two Engineers, One Jet Engine

    The mind-blowing change, in Blake’s words, is a new division of labor. Software engineers create the architectures because they understand systems, algorithms, and separation of concerns, and then hardware engineers vibe code the pieces that draw on what they uniquely know about hardware. The result is wildly different productivity for small teams. His example is the turbine blade: it starts cold and gets bigger as it heats up in operation, so you have to design both the cold shape and the hot shape, converting between them and between structures and aerodynamics. Classically that was one engineer, one day, for one blade of analysis, in a jet engine with a thousand blades, which means you simply could not do much. Now, with software and hardware people working together, you can change blade geometry and see the structural and aerodynamic results in real time, which allows two engineers to design an entire jet engine.

    The Cataclysm of Enterprise Software

    Picking up on the point that software engineers now build the tools and architectures for everyone else, Naval names what he calls the cataclysm of enterprise software. There is no longer a startup that can build and sell hardware collaboration tools, because internally companies just code the right things they need at any given moment. Even spreadsheets are cooked, he argues, because the reason spreadsheets succeeded is that no one could build custom software, so a spreadsheet stuffed with VBScript functions was the closest available approximation. With that constraint gone, the proxy collapses. He notes he has personally moved almost entirely from Excel to Python models where he can get believable simulations of things.

    Generating Step Files and PCB Layouts

    The next frontier, Blake suggests, is the thing AI has not reached yet but probably will within 2026: today it can generate software, but soon it will generate step files and PCB layouts, and when it comes for mechanical and electrical engineering that will be a whole other thing nobody has seen yet. On the hardware side this is described as a particular boon for the many small gadget and parts companies that historically wrote bad software because they could not make great software. Now they can make good-enough software, or skip a human front end entirely and expose the hardware agentically, so that an agent accesses it and a person controls the hardware by voice.

    China’s Open-Source Bet and Hardware Superiority

    This leads into one of the reasons China is described as going all in on open-source models. With hardware superiority, complex supply chains, and deep component chains, China’s logic is that if it can generate software on demand it no longer suffers a software disadvantage against Silicon Valley. That is framed as not the only reason: China is also a model or two behind, it is distilling models, and the government has a history of funding efforts that lift the entire ecosystem, especially in network-effect businesses. Ironically, the open-source heft comes from China precisely because OpenAI is not open, Grok publishes models but is a model or two behind, Google’s local models are not very competitive, and Anthropic is not known for open releases. The deeper point is that without great frontier coding models you do not get self-improvement, and if you fall behind on the ability to generate software you fall behind on the ability to generate everything, because generating software is embedded in every piece of the hardware pipeline.

    Frontier Intelligence vs. Cheap Models

    Naval raises a dinner-table argument from the night before, where someone claimed you will use DeepSeek for 97% of things because it is cheap, run it repeatedly when you need more intelligence, and reserve OpenAI or Anthropic for the most advanced tasks. Naval pushes back: intelligence is an unalloyed good, you always want more of it, model mistakes are invisible, and a smarter model is always cheaper than a real person in real time, so you default to the most intelligent model available. He notes the downside is that this tends toward a monopoly or oligopoly, because when two models give different answers you often cannot tell which is correct, so you trust the smarter one and gradually stop asking the weaker one. Guillermo confirms with AI gateway data that open models do get used, but the top is heavily dominated by frontier intelligence. His caveat is that frontier intelligence at the right cost and performance slaps at scale: Gemini models are underrated but are excellent industrial production models for support tasks and browser automation, while for pushing the frontier you need the best possible coding model, now only two or three models, and the Chinese models are not in that set.

    Vertical Integration and the Captive MEMS Foundry

    Asked about his push into vertical integration and extreme urgency, Max Hodak explains that for many things you cannot buy what you need, so you have to make it. The preference is always to buy when a vendor offers a service at a great price, and he points to PCBs, which are basically free and available in unlimited quantity from Asia. But the closer a product gets to being a single block of covalently bonded matter, the better it is: lower power, smaller, higher performance, longer lasting. The components for that level of integration are not available, so to innovate beyond piecing together off-the-shelf parts you have to learn to do it yourself, which shows up as vertical integration. Science owns a captive MEMS foundry on the East Coast, bought because there was no other way to do the packaging and assembly work the company wanted.

    Software Still Needs Hands

    Max expects AI to heavily affect all of this over the next few years, though it is not quite there yet. Ironically, one of the biggest impacts already seen is in regulatory interactions and documentation: figuring out which of thousands of ISO standards apply to a product change, and tracing it through, used to occupy a regulatory and quality team for months, and now the AI just knows. But for things like the surgical program or the MEMS fab, he argues the software still needs hands. It will be smarter than us, but if it cannot make things, those are real boundaries. Science has instrumented its foundry and many other parts of the company so that as models get better, the improvement shows up immediately in cell engineering and material science.

    Lawyers, Paralegals, and the Promotion of Junior Work

    The discussion turns to law as a parallel to engineering. It has been a while since anyone at the table generated a basic legal document using a lawyer. Routine work like NDAs and standard agreements is gone, because law is essentially spaghetti code that contradicts itself and has no real APIs, expressed in complicated English. Junior engineers got a promotion to senior engineers while junior engineering itself was taken over by agents, and the same framing applies to paralegals: you can say they were fired, or you can say they were promoted to senior lawyers who now spend their time thinking about the law. What you actually value in a lawyer is a trusted authority who went to law school and puts their reputation on the line when they tell you a document is legit.

    Slop PRs, the Thousand-Day Problem, and Humans as Verifiers

    Guillermo argues the biggest problem in software engineering today is mountains of slop ending up as a pull request. The old meme of reading every line of a PR is gone. In infrastructure he wants engineers to be able to say they understand and are signing off on the consequences of a PR, backed by the test harness, simulations, proofs, and type checkers they wrote, so they have confidence it will be safe in production even without reading every line. There is a world where everyone embraces that the code is spaghetti nobody fully understands, but builds the evaluators that give confidence and relies on production engineers to say it is fine to ship, because someone gets paged if the system goes down. The further warning is that creating software is easy from zero to one, but a thousand days from now you have to ask whether it is secure, tested, production grade, and performant, and whether you are still motivated to invest the tokens to maintain it in prod. The resolution is that humans are becoming verifiers, the same way models are trained on good verification data, and the old functions of lawyers, engineers, and operations people are moving to verifying the stack and standing behind it.

    Notable Quotes

    “What I found is it completely changes the role of software and hardware developers.”

    Blake Scholl, on how AI reshaped engineering at Boom Supersonic.

    “If you want to hand something off from like an aerodynamicist to a structures engineer that’s done manually with like a spreadsheet over email. It’s the 1990s. It’s terrible.”

    Blake Scholl, describing the state of traditional hardware engineering workflows.

    “It allows two engineers to design an entire jet engine, which is just wildly different.”

    Blake Scholl, on collapsing turbine-blade analysis with real-time structural and aerodynamic feedback.

    “Even spreadsheets are kind of cooked, right? Because the reason spreadsheets were successful is that no one could build custom software.”

    Naval Ravikant, on the cataclysm of enterprise software.

    “Right now it can generate software, but soon it’ll be able to generate step files and PCB layouts. And when it comes for mechanical and electrical engineering, that will be a whole other thing that we haven’t seen yet.”

    Blake Scholl, on the next frontier for AI in hardware.

    “If you fall behind on your ability to generate software, you fall behind on the ability to generate everything.”

    Naval Ravikant, on why software now sits upstream of every hardware pipeline.

    “Anytime I’m working to push the frontier you need the best possible coding model, and that’s basically now like two or three models, and the Chinese are certainly not in it.”

    Guillermo Rauch, on where frontier coding intelligence actually lives.

    “You can’t buy it, so you got to make it somehow. The closer that our products get to being like a single block of covalently bonded matter, the better they’ll be.”

    Max Hodak, on why Science is forced into vertical integration.

    “The software still needs hands. It’s going to be smarter than us, but if it can’t make things, then those are real real boundaries.”

    Max Hodak, on the physical limits of AI in hardware.

    “You need to be able to say I am signing off on understanding the consequences of this PR, or I wrote the test harness, the simulations, the proofs, the type checkers, to be able to say even without reading this, I have confidence it’s going to be safe in production.”

    Guillermo Rauch, on what code review becomes in the age of slop PRs.

    “Creating software is really easy 0 to one. But think about a thousand days from now. Is it secure? Is it tested? Is it production grade? And are you still motivated to invest all of those tokens in maintaining it in prod?”

    On the long-term cost of software that is cheap to create and expensive to keep alive.

    Watch the full conversation on the Naval Podcast here.

    Related Reading

    • Full episode: The AI Industrial Revolution, the complete hour-long conversation this clip is drawn from, covering software factories, hardware, regulation, healthcare economics, autonomous companies, and creativity.
    • Part one: Waste Tokens to Save Time, the first half of this same conversation, where Naval, Guillermo Rauch, Blake Scholl, and Max Hodak argue that the job of an engineer is to build the factory and that pure software is not dead.
    • Boom Supersonic, Blake Scholl’s company building supersonic civilian aircraft and its own jet engines, the source of the turbine-blade and two-engineers example.
    • Science Corporation, Max Hodak’s company, whose captive MEMS foundry and surgical program anchor the vertical-integration argument.
    • Vercel, Guillermo Rauch’s company, whose AI gateway data informs the point about frontier intelligence dominating real usage.
    • Microelectromechanical systems (Wikipedia), background on the MEMS technology behind the captive foundry Max Hodak describes.

  • Dan Loeb on Building Third Point’s $25 Billion Investment Empire: AI, Activism, Credit, and the FTX Mistake

    Dan Loeb has spent three decades turning a $3 million fund into Third Point, a roughly $25 billion collection of hedge fund, credit, insurance, and venture businesses. In this Invest Like the Best conversation with Patrick O’Shaughnessy, Loeb walks through how he reinvented his strategy from deep value and event-driven trades into quality and thematic investing, why he now believes every serious investor has to be a technology investor, how he reads the AI cycle and the semiconductor melt-up, where activism and corporate governance still pay, and the single mistake that taught him the most. It is a rare, unhurried look at how a famously sharp-elbowed activist actually thinks about markets, businesses, and people.

    TLDW

    Loeb covers an enormous amount of ground: his daily process for staying ahead of the information firehose, Jensen Huang’s AI stack as a mental model, and why Nvidia, Anthropic, and Elon Musk’s companies are the three most consequential firms he tracks. He traces Third Point’s roots in credit and event-driven investing at Jefferies, the influence of Joel Greenblatt’s “You Can Be a Stock Market Genius,” and his later pivot to quality investing shaped by “The Outsiders” and Lawrence Cunningham’s “Quality Investing.” He argues the AI rally is not a dot-com-style valuation bubble because the leaders generate enormous cash, explains why human judgment and structural market quirks still create alpha, and makes the case that AI will never fully run a capital system. He digs into corporate governance and his father’s influence, the Sotheby’s and Sony activism campaigns, the hard reality of activism in Japan, and what investing in Danaher’s operating system taught him. He names FTX as his hardest lesson, breaks down Third Point’s evolution into a 60-percent-credit platform spanning CLOs, structured credit, reinsurance and annuities, describes how he is pushing his analysts to use AI and Claude daily, and closes on kindness and the friend who let him sleep on a couch before he made it.

    Thoughts

    The most striking thing about Loeb is that he treats his own strategy as a thing to be disrupted rather than defended. He built his reputation on Greenblatt-style special situations, spin-offs, demutualizations, and post-reorg equities bought cheap because of forced selling and sandbagged guidance. Most investors who win that way spend the rest of their careers protecting the formula. Loeb instead watched the people who stayed rigid about deep value and low multiples underperform or disappear, and deliberately retrained himself and his team around business quality and thematic conviction. The willingness to abandon a winning identity is the actual edge here, more than any single trade. It is the rare investor who can say his current strategy would not fit cleanly on a PowerPoint deck and treat that as a feature.

    His AI framing deserves attention because it is unfashionably calm. The bear case on AI is usually about valuation, and Loeb dismantles it on the leaders’ own numbers: these are companies investing off their balance sheets, generating enormous cash, trading at multiples that do not resemble 1999. He was short the dot-com bubble, so he is not a permabull cheering from the sidelines. His real point is subtler, that the danger is expectations, not valuations. The semiconductor index ran up 40 percent on genuinely strong fundamentals, but Micron and Nvidia both put up monster quarters and saw their stocks fall because expectations had simply outrun even great results. That gap between fundamentals and price is where he thinks the human investor still earns a living, precisely because quant strategies, CTAs, and risk-managed pods are forced to sell into weakness rather than buy it.

    The governance material is the most quietly radical part of the conversation. Loeb defends shareholder primacy against the Business Roundtable’s softer stakeholder language, but his argument is not the cartoon version where shareholder value means strip-mining a company. It is that boards have one job, accountability for capital allocation and management, and that vague multi-stakeholder mandates become an excuse for directors to avoid the hard work. His read on bad governance is almost always relational: directors who let loyalty to an underperforming CEO override their duty, or who sit on boards for status and income. The Sotheby’s story is the clean illustration, a centuries-old, high-status business run unprofitably because nobody treated it like a business. Loeb’s pattern is to find the gap between claimed status and actual performance and to raise the social cost of coasting.

    What is genuinely new in Loeb’s posture is how he talks about AI inside his own firm. He is not pitching it as a moat or a headcount-reduction story. He frames Claude and AI tools as a way to make each person a more autonomous self-improver, something that gives back whatever you put into it, with some analysts running agents overnight and burning tokens while he personally uses it more for queries. Coming from a 30-year fundamental investor, the absence of defensiveness is the signal. He pairs it with Brad Gerstner’s nod to “Essentialism”: the firehose is now infinite, so the scarce skill is deciding what is actually relevant. That is a more honest answer to the AI question than either doom or hype.

    Finally, the FTX confession is worth sitting with because of how he frames it. He does not retreat into cynicism about venture or crypto. He notes that Sam Bankman-Fried, fraud aside, had a real nose for value, with stakes in Anthropic, Cursor, and Solana that would have made him a top venture investor of the era. The lesson Loeb extracts is procedural, not philosophical: their due diligence now includes checking bank balances, the most basic verification that would have surfaced the problem. It is a useful reminder that even sophisticated capital can skip boring fundamentals when a company is growing fast and the cap table looks good. The discipline is not in having a grand theory of fraud, it is in never skipping the unglamorous checks.

    Key Takeaways

    • Loeb’s macro focus right now collapses to two variables: where oil goes, dictated by war and geopolitics, and what AI does on the spending and infrastructure front and its impact on society and the economy.
    • He argues you can no longer punt on technology and focus on industrials or consumer; tech is a big, growing, compounding part of the economy that affects everything else, so every investor has to become a tech investor.
    • He uses Jensen Huang’s AI stack as a mental model: power and energy at the bottom, then chips and infrastructure, up through large language models, software, and applications.
    • The three most consequential companies he tracks are Nvidia, Anthropic, and Elon Musk’s companies collectively.
    • Third Point’s roots are in credit and event-driven investing, shaped by his time at Jefferies watching investors like David Tepper before he founded Appaloosa, Eric Mindich at Goldman, and firms like Angelo Gordon and Farallon.
    • Joel Greenblatt’s “You Can Be a Stock Market Genius” was his foundational framework: spin-offs, demutualizations, privatizations, and post-reorg equities where a new, illiquid security gets dumped by holders who will not do the work.
    • Spin-off managers often sandbag guidance because their incentive packages get set at the time of the spin-off, creating a predictable gap between conservative numbers and real value.
    • From 1995 to roughly 2013-2015, event-driven special situations were Third Point’s bread and butter; those opportunities still exist, but the real edge now is overlaying them with a business-quality lens.
    • The pivot to quality and thematic investing was influenced most by “The Outsiders” (capital allocation plus great operations) and Lawrence Cunningham’s “Quality Investing” (high-moat, high-return-on-capital businesses to own for years).
    • AI disruption made last year one of the worst for many apparently high-quality companies, as businesses that looked durable rapidly became less so.
    • Loeb sees the AI rally as fundamentally different from the dot-com bubble: the leaders invest off their balance sheets, generate enormous cash, and do not carry the valuation excess of 1999.
    • The danger in semis is expectations, not valuation: Nvidia and Micron posted spectacular quarters yet saw stocks fall because expectations had outrun even great numbers.
    • Structural forces still create alpha for fundamental investors: quants, CTAs, and multi-strategy pods have risk metrics that force selling on the way down, the opposite of what is rational for long-term holders.
    • He believes AI will not fully run a capital system; private equity, restructurings, creditor committees, and high-touch negotiation will always need humans.
    • His interest in governance came from his father, a securities lawyer and corporate governance expert who sat on the boards of Mattel and Williams-Sonoma and pushed ethical sourcing ahead of his time.
    • Loeb defends shareholder primacy, citing Milton Friedman and Warren Buffett, and criticizes the Business Roundtable’s move away from shareholder value as a distraction from the board’s real duty.
    • Bad governance usually comes from directors letting loyalty to a weak CEO override fiduciary duty, lacking the knowledge to do the job, or serving for status and income.
    • Writing is a core activism lever: great writing is clear thinking, and social pressure through writing and PR is one of the most effective ways to move a board, alongside financial and legal levers.
    • The Sotheby’s campaign targeted a high-status, centuries-old business run unprofitably; Third Point bought 9.9 percent, eventually brought in Tad Smith from MSG, who cleaned up operations and technology before the company sold.
    • Third Point increasingly prefers to back great companies with excellent management and cheer them on rather than hunt for mismanaged businesses, because bad management tends to cluster into a morass.
    • Third Point is a collection of businesses; the flagship hedge fund grew from $3 million to about $9 billion and is roughly 30 percent credit, with the broader firm closer to 60 percent credit.
    • The firm spans a roughly $7 billion CLO business, structured and corporate credit, an insurance company, asbestos liabilities, a small private credit unit, and a venture capital arm.
    • The unifying thread is valuing enterprises across early, mid, and mature stages and investing in whichever fulcrum security offers the best risk-reward, from equity to senior debt.
    • Loeb cites buying Twitter’s financing debt near 96-97 cents at a 12 percent yield when most credit investors were scared, and a difficult xAI debt financing, as examples of cross-discipline conviction.
    • He is the portfolio manager only of the hedge fund; the credit, CLO, structured credit, and high-yield businesses have their own PMs and investment committees he does not sit on.
    • The Sony campaign saw Third Point own up to 7 percent and push to separate the conglomerate; management resisted for years before spinning out the semiconductor and financial services businesses.
    • He learned that activism in Japan is hard, but the government often wants reform; he co-wrote a paper with Larry Lindsey and Niall Ferguson urging corporate governance and return on invested capital as a fourth arrow of Abenomics, picked up as a Wall Street Journal editorial.
    • Investing in Danaher was his most instructive experience, teaching him how the Danaher Business System drives continuous improvement (Kaizen) and how the company celebrates rather than shames underperformance because problems are fixable.
    • FTX was his hardest lesson; it looked great and was verifiable on the blockchain, but was not what it appeared, and now Third Point’s diligence includes checking bank balances.
    • He notes that, fraud aside, Sam Bankman-Fried had a strong nose for value with stakes in Anthropic, Cursor, and Solana.
    • Recent mistakes also include shorts where Third Point thought certain info-services businesses would resist AI disruption; he still expects a shakeout with some phoenixes rising from the ashes.
    • He is pushing his whole team to use AI daily, hiring native computer scientists and system integrators, and describes Claude as a tool that makes you autonomous and gives back whatever you put into it.
    • Third Point’s distinctive edge is optimism about AI creating net jobs and the ability to default into credit investing during stressed times, as it did with investment-grade credit in 2020.
    • Credit is hard to copy because it runs on relationships, not electronic trading; that is why Third Point built into CLOs and eyes the roughly $6 trillion structured credit market rather than treating it as tourism.
    • The great analyst has changed: 20 years ago it was someone who could model fast and crack a complex restructuring (Loeb made a career-defining bet on Drexel Burnham claims); today it is a Gavin Baker type who deeply understands an industry, like the analyst who flew to Texas and realized Casey’s General Stores was really a pizza chain.
    • Outside the US, Loeb is more bullish on Korea, Taiwan, and Japan as hunting grounds, finds Europe tough on regulation (though he owns Rolls-Royce and ASML), and finds the Middle East the most vibrant region.
    • What worries him most is not the business but running out of time for family, surfing, and reading; what excites him is incorporating everything relevant about the world and forming relationships with people building interesting things.
    • His closing reflection is on kindness as a top-tier value, and the friend, Carter, who let him sleep on a couch and seeded his early fund, echoing a Palmer Luckey line that money cannot buy friends who believed in you when you had nothing.

    Detailed Summary

    Staying ahead of the firehose and reading the macro

    Loeb opens by admitting he does not have a perfectly organized system for processing the modern flood of information. He checks the news for what is relevant to the economy and to Third Point’s positions, tries not to obsess over minute-to-minute moves, and leans more tactical than strategic. When people ask him about macro, he says the usual government-reported metrics (growth, unemployment, inflation, rates, currencies, gold, crypto) are trumped right now by two things: where oil goes, which depends on war and geopolitics, and what AI does on the spending and infrastructure side and its impact on society and the economy. To understand technology, he leans on Jensen Huang’s framing of the AI stack and talks to smart people regularly, and he watches three companies above all: Nvidia, Anthropic, and Elon Musk’s companies as a group.

    From event-driven roots to quality investing

    Third Point’s DNA comes from Loeb’s time as a credit investor at Jefferies, where he watched some of the best distressed, event-driven, and risk-arbitrage investors operate, from David Tepper to Eric Mindich to firms like Angelo Gordon and Farallon. His first lens was event-driven: spin-offs, demutualizations, privatizations, and post-reorg equities, where a newly created and illiquid security gets dumped by holders who will not do the work, and management sandbags guidance because incentive packages are set at the spin date. He barely thought about moats or returns on capital; he just wanted to buy something genuinely cheap with those characteristics. That was the firm’s bread and butter from 1995 until roughly 2013-2015. Those opportunities still exist, but Loeb describes deliberately evolving toward business quality and thematic investing, influenced by “The Outsiders” on capital allocation and Lawrence Cunningham’s “Quality Investing” on durable, high-return businesses. He organized the team around industry experts rather than generalists. The twist: AI disruption recently turned many apparently high-quality companies into much lower-quality ones, fast.

    The AI cycle, bubbles, and the human edge

    Loeb resists the bubble narrative. He was short the dot-com bubble and remembers the valuation excess; today’s AI leaders, by contrast, invest off their balance sheets and generate enormous cash, so unless you believe the capex yields no return, the earnings and multiples do not look like 1999. The real driver of volatility, he argues, is expectations: the semiconductor index ran up 40 percent on strong fundamentals, but Nvidia and Micron both delivered blowout quarters and still saw their stocks fall because expectations had run too high. That dynamic is exactly where a fundamental investor earns a living, because quants, CTAs, and risk-managed pods are structurally forced to sell into weakness. He also doubts AI will ever fully run a capital system, since private equity, restructurings, creditor committees, and high-touch credit always need humans. He cites “Reminiscences of a Stock Operator” and Ecclesiastes: there is nothing new under the sun, and human nature, with its bubbles, panics, and extremes, does not change.

    Governance, his father, and the duty of boards

    Loeb traces his governance interest to his father, a securities lawyer and corporate-governance expert who served on the boards of Mattel and Williams-Sonoma and championed ethical sourcing before it was common. He calls the American board system beautiful: directors are answerable to shareholders and accountable for strategy and key financial decisions. Governance breaks down when directors lose sight of their fiduciary duty, lack the knowledge or talent diversity to do the job, or prioritize things other than shareholders. He invokes Milton Friedman and Warren Buffett to argue that caring about communities, employees, and conduct is not inconsistent with shareholder value but part of it, and criticizes the Business Roundtable for muddying the board’s core duty. The most common failure he sees is directors letting loyalty to an underperforming CEO override their duty. Most of the time Third Point redirects existing boards without even taking a seat; the extreme proxy fights are the exception.

    Activism, writing, Sotheby’s, and Sony

    Great writing, Loeb says, is clear thinking and organizing your thoughts to get a desired outcome, and it is one of activism’s most effective levers alongside financial and legal pressure. Social pressure through writing and PR can move a board on its own. He sees a pattern in his campaigns: targets that hold themselves out as high status but are not living up to it. Sotheby’s is the clean example, a centuries-old, high-status business run unprofitably, where Third Point bought 9.9 percent, gave the existing CEO a year, then helped install Tad Smith from MSG, who modernized operations and technology before the company was sold. Sony was a two-act campaign in which Third Point owned up to 7 percent and pushed to break up the conglomerate; he recounts sharing the thesis with Andrew Ross Sorkin at the New York Times under embargo, the panic it caused, and how management resisted for years before spinning out the semiconductor and financial services units. The lesson: activism in Japan is genuinely hard, even though the government wanted reform. He co-authored a paper with Larry Lindsey and Niall Ferguson arguing corporate governance and return on invested capital should be a fourth arrow of Abenomics, which ran as a Wall Street Journal editorial.

    The Danaher operating system

    Loeb calls Danaher his most instructive investment. He and his partner persuaded the company to compress its five-day Danaher Business System training into a single day, and he came away with a deep appreciation for how a real operating system drives continuous improvement. The standout lesson was cultural: Danaher holds people individually accountable, but when it finds someone underperforming it celebrates rather than shames, because the problems are addressable and fixable, and it does this relentlessly across operations and working capital. He also points to the diaspora of Danaher executives, including Larry Culp and the leadership at Ingersoll Rand, as evidence of the system’s depth. The investment worked for about four years before COVID-era order surges and inventory swings turned tailwinds into headwinds; Third Point sold and has recently bought back in modestly.

    The structure of Third Point and the fulcrum security

    Third Point is not one fund but a collection of businesses. The flagship hedge fund grew from $3 million to about $9 billion and is roughly 30 percent credit, generically around 110 percent long and 30-40 percent short on the equity side. Across the firm the credit weight is closer to 60 percent, spanning a roughly $7 billion CLO business, several billion in structured and corporate credit, an insurance company, a couple billion in asbestos liabilities, a small new private credit unit, and a venture arm. The unifying thread is valuing enterprises at any stage and investing in whichever fulcrum security (the one with the best risk-reward) makes sense. Loeb illustrates with Credit Suisse’s takeover by UBS, where the holdco paper proved the fulcrum, and with buying Twitter’s resold financing debt near 96-97 cents at a 12 percent yield when other credit investors were scared, plus a difficult xAI debt financing that few credit people wanted. He pushes back on the idea that he sits atop everything: he is the PM only of the hedge fund, while the other businesses have their own PMs and committees he is not on.

    Insurance, the FTX lesson, and recent mistakes

    Loeb started a Bermuda reinsurance company in 2010, backed by himself, Kelso, and Pinebrook, on a barbell thesis of investing the float in Third Point and treasuries to defer taxes and lever capital. The reinsurance side soured, and about three years ago he concluded they had the right idea but the wrong vehicle, that plain-vanilla annuities (which can only invest in credit) would have fit better. Third Point merged the reinsurer into its UK closed-end fund, Third Point Offshore Investors, reincorporated from Guernsey to Cayman, and repurposed it into an insurance company managing private credit, structured credit, whole-loan mortgages, real estate lending, and investment-grade debt. His hardest lesson was FTX: it looked great, was verifiable on the blockchain, and had a strong cap table, but was not what it seemed; diligence now includes checking bank balances. He notes Sam Bankman-Fried, fraud aside, had a great nose for value (Anthropic, Cursor, Solana). Other recent mistakes were shorts where Third Point bet certain info-services businesses would resist AI disruption; he still expects a shakeout with some survivors rising from the ashes.

    AI inside the firm, the analyst of the future, and kindness

    Loeb is pushing his entire team to use AI daily, hiring native computer scientists and system integrators, and describes Claude as a tool that makes you an autonomous self-improver and gives back whatever you put into it, with some analysts running agents overnight while he uses it more for queries. He pairs this with Brad Gerstner’s recommendation of “Essentialism”: you cannot do it all, so you must decide what is most relevant. The great analyst has changed: 20 years ago it was someone who could model fast and crack a complex restructuring, as Loeb did with the Drexel Burnham bankruptcy claims early in his career; today it is a Gavin Baker type who deeply understands an industry and its technology, like the analyst who flew to Texas and realized Casey’s General Stores was really a pizza chain in disguise. On the rest of the world, he is more bullish on Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, finds Europe tough on regulation (while owning Rolls-Royce and ASML), and finds the Middle East the most vibrant region. He closes on what worries and excites him (time with family, surfing, and reading versus the joy of incorporating everything relevant about the world), and on kindness, crediting his friend Carter, who let him sleep on a couch and seeded his early fund, and echoing Palmer Luckey’s line that money cannot buy friends who believed in you when you had nothing.

    Notable Quotes

    “I think you have to be a tech person today. It’s a big and growing and compounding part of the economy. It affects everything else.”

    Dan Loeb, on why no serious investor can punt on technology anymore

    “Hold on to your seats because things are only going to accelerate from here.”

    Dan Loeb, recounting a 2013 Davos warning about technological change he now applies to AI

    “Maybe that’s where the human element comes in, to understand and to be able to make those tough trading decisions when fundamentals are going one way and stock prices are going the other way, and to be able to take the pain of losses in the short run.”

    Dan Loeb, on where a human investor still has an edge over machines

    “It’s very different from the dot-com bubble, which we were short going into. You don’t have the valuation bubble now on those companies that you had back in those days.”

    Dan Loeb, on why he does not see the AI rally as a 1999-style bubble

    “When they found someone that was underperforming, it was celebrated instead of shamed, because look at all these things you’re doing wrong, we can fix those. And they did.”

    Dan Loeb, on the accountability culture he learned from the Danaher Business System

    “I would have to say our investment in FTX. It looked great. The company was growing fast. We could verify it all on the blockchain.”

    Dan Loeb, naming his hardest investment lesson

    “Be kind to people you have no idea how it will ever benefit you. And sometimes it will and sometimes it won’t.”

    Dan Loeb, on elevating kindness in your hierarchy of values

    “The one thing money doesn’t buy you is friends that believed in you when you had nothing.”

    Dan Loeb, quoting Gavin Baker quoting Palmer Luckey, on the friend who seeded his early fund

    Watch the full conversation between Dan Loeb and Patrick O’Shaughnessy here.

    Related Reading

  • Raoul Pal: Why the Crypto Bull Run Is Just Starting, the AI Economic Singularity, and Why You Should Never Sell Bitcoin

    Macro investor and Real Vision co-founder Raoul Pal returned to the When Shift Happens podcast for episode 173 to argue that the recent crypto drawdown is a nasty correction inside a much larger bull market, not the end of the cycle. Across an hour and a half he ties together the AI capital race, the coming economic singularity, why layer one blockchains are a kind of universal basic equity, and the deceptively simple discipline that actually compounds wealth: buy, hold, and almost never sell.

    TLDW

    Pal frames everything through what he calls the universal code, the conversion of units of energy into units of intelligence, and says the global race to fund AI is so large that no government or company can stop feeding it capital. That liquidity, plus relentless currency debasement, is the engine under both the AI stocks going vertical and the crypto market that has lagged them. He calls the Bitcoin slide from 126K toward 60K a normal correction in a bull market, says liquidity is now reaccelerating, and argues smart contract layer ones (Ethereum, Solana, Sui) are the best risk-adjusted bet because the entire financial system and a coming swarm of AI agents will run on those rails, giving crypto an effectively infinite total addressable market. He explains why he added Zcash as a Bitcoin-with-privacy and quantum-proof trade, lays out his plan to launch an NFT fund built around grail digital art and NFT-backed lending, and makes a data-backed case that buying oversold dips and never selling beats trying to trade cycles. The conversation closes on a 70/30 bullish framework for 2026 and 2027 and a reflection on kindness.

    Thoughts

    The strongest idea in this conversation is not a price target, it is a reframe. Pal keeps pulling the camera back from “what will Bitcoin do this quarter” to “what is the organizing principle of the entire economy right now,” and his answer is the funneling of all available capital into anything that produces intelligence. Once you accept that frame, the buy-the-dip behavior in both AI equities and crypto stops looking like mania and starts looking like a rational response to a one-way game. The part worth sitting with is his game-theory claim that neither the US nor China can stop, and that even a spectacular failure like an OpenAI blowup would simply trigger an instant asset auction rather than a collapse, because no single player can be allowed to win outright. Whether or not that is fully true, it is a genuinely different mental model than the recession-and-bust cycle most investors carry around.

    His layer-one thesis is the most actionable takeaway and also the most quietly radical. The pitch is that for the first time ordinary people can own a piece of the core infrastructure that the machine economy will be built on, the way you never got to own a slice of TCP/IP or the open web. He calls this universal basic equity and treats it as humanity’s pension plan. The honest tension he admits is that the racy returns may not be in the boring base layer at all, and that the truly investable winners of this era, the private stablecoin companies, are largely closed off to retail. So the layer-one trade is partly a consolation prize for the fact that the best businesses are unreachable. That is a more candid admission than most crypto bulls will make.

    The behavioral core of the episode is the most useful for a normal reader, and it is almost embarrassingly simple. Pal has been in markets for 35 years and says he does not know a single person who reliably buys bottoms and sells tops, including the legends, who he points out made most of their money on management fees rather than heroic trades. His prescription is to add only when the asset is one to two standard deviations oversold on its long-term log trend, otherwise do nothing, and to treat patience as an action rather than inaction. The line that does the most work is “the market owes you nothing.” It quietly dismantles the entitlement that drives people to overtrade, chase, and burn emotional energy on a strategy that the data says underperforms simply holding.

    Where a reader should keep some skepticism is the certainty. Pal assigns the bull case a 70 percent probability and the bear case 30, but the bear case he sketches (Middle East war reignites, inflation forces tightening, liquidity gets starved, the intelligence buildout slows) is not a minor footnote, it is the whole structure failing at once. The thesis also leans hard on the assumption that AI agents will become massive on-chain economic actors, which is plausible but still mostly forward-looking rather than observed. The value here is the framework, not the forecast. If you take one thing, take the energy-into-intelligence lens and the standard-deviation discipline, and hold the specific tickers and timelines loosely.

    Key Takeaways

    • Pal’s central frame is the universal code: the universe, and now the economy, continuously converts units of energy into units of intelligence, and capital flows to whatever produces the most intelligence.
    • The AI buildout is a race of nations and corporations that nobody can exit. Game theory means neither the US nor China can stop, because the other side would gain a decisive advantage.
    • Even a catastrophic AI failure would not break the trend. If OpenAI ran out of money, its assets would be auctioned instantly to multiple buyers so no single company could double its compute and win the whole game.
    • The economic singularity is the point where institutions and the way we measure the economy can no longer keep up with the speed of technology, made worse when AI and robots are added to the population as economic actors.
    • AI is the first real-world example of Reed’s law, the exponential of the exponential, where most past technology followed the slower Metcalfe’s law log channel.
    • By around 2028, roughly five to six years after AI went mainstream, AI will have produced more words than all of humanity has produced in sum total since the Gutenberg press.
    • The current run is funded by cash flow, not debt. Unlike the late-1990s tech boom, the buildout is paid for out of the earnings of the most cash-generative firms in history.
    • Chips and energy are the binding constraints. Companies report being booked out three years and beyond, and xAI is reportedly handing older data centers to Anthropic because no one can get enough compute.
    • Pal expects the Fed to run a Greenspan-style playbook, cut rates and then get out of the way, letting a productivity miracle grow the economy faster than the debt pile so debt to GDP falls.
    • Bitcoin falling from 126K toward 60K is a nasty correction in a bull market, not a bear market. Pal has seen many 50 percent Bitcoin drawdowns since 2013, and altcoins always fall further on the risk curve.
    • The 2025 to 2026 correction has been choppy and slow rather than the fast V-shape of 2021, which is part of why sentiment feels so bad.
    • Crypto lagged because liquidity is finite. The government shutdown withdrew liquidity, which hits crypto with about a three-month lag, while AI capex and Chinese gold buying sucked capital away.
    • Liquidity is now reaccelerating in the US, China, and globally, which Pal sees as the reason the worst is likely over for crypto.
    • The birth of economic agents in late 2024 gives crypto an effectively infinite total addressable market, since agents will be economic actors that hold treasuries, make payments, and transact on-chain.
    • Smart contract layer ones are Pal’s preferred bet. He compares the structure to operating systems and cloud, where value concentrates into three to five major players plus a few specialists.
    • He calls owning layer ones universal basic equity and humanity’s pension plan, the chance to own the rails the agentic economy will run on, something the internet never offered retail.
    • Discounted cash flow analysis is the wrong tool for valuing a blockchain. The whole purpose of the network is to be the cheapest, fastest, and most programmable, so high fees are a bug, not a strength.
    • Pal measures layer ones by intelligence density: number of developers, programmability, speed to finality, applications per user, and the ratio of stablecoins to total value locked as stored energy.
    • Only three tokens maintained economic density when the market fell 80 percent: Ethereum, Solana, and Sui. ETH is the safe Microsoft-like choice, Solana is faster and cheaper, Sui is earlier but extremely fast and programmable.
    • Pal added Zcash in the correction as a Bitcoin-with-privacy trade. The left-curve case is simple privacy value, the right-curve case is that it is also quantum-proof and a hedge against AI-enabled state surveillance.
    • He admits he did not execute the Zcash buy well, kept meaning to add more while traveling, and watched it run up 50 percent. He treats it as a small position, not a portfolio overhaul.
    • On Hyperliquid he is complimentary but uninvested, because he does not trade, use perps, or use leverage, and he expects Robinhood and Coinbase to compete hard for that niche.
    • DeFi is better suited to machines than humans. Agents may not even need front ends or websites, just low-friction access to swap across multiple stablecoins and currencies instantly.
    • DeFi is not dead despite mega-hacks. Pal argues hacks force better products, and notes that banks quietly absorb theft losses too, so the answer is to build more secure systems.
    • The entire financial system is moving to blockchain rails because they are the most efficient way to operate, a prediction Pal first made in 2014 before smart contracts existed.
    • Pal is launching an NFT fund focused on grail assets (one-of-one alien CryptoPunks, top artists) trading from roughly 600K to tens of millions, plus a convex middle tier of artists with social consensus.
    • He names artists like Dies with the most likes (whom he compares to a Hunter S. Thompson of art) and Kim Asendorf, whose work uses tokens at the pixel level.
    • The fund will also lend against NFTs for yields around 15 percent or more, acquiring assets cheaply if borrowers default and recycling yield into emerging artists.
    • His real estate analogy: a smaller NFT in a great collection is like a modest apartment in a billionaire neighborhood, while grails are the 20 million dollar penthouses that actually compound.
    • Bitcoin is partly an AI proxy because global savings should rise as AI lifts economic growth, and Bitcoin targets a share of those savings as a digital store of value.
    • The core mindset shift: if you know where the world is going and roughly where market cap is heading on the log trend, you would never sell, you would only ever accumulate.
    • Selling well is nearly impossible. Even if you take profit at two standard deviations overbought, adding it back at the bottom is something almost no one actually manages.
    • The people who made the most money in crypto are the ones who did not trade it. Pal cites holders who profited by doing essentially nothing while active traders lost their edge.
    • Pal’s discipline requires roughly two to three actions every five years: add when one to two standard deviations oversold, optionally trim when two standard deviations overbought, otherwise nothing.
    • By his standard deviation measure, Bitcoin and crypto are as cheap as they have been in their long-term uptrend versus the NASDAQ, which he reads as a signal to allocate more to crypto.
    • Fear and greed sat below 10 for the longest stretch in the index’s history during this correction, hitting its lowest reading ever, a classic oversold extreme.
    • His 2026 to 2027 bull case stacks stablecoin explosion, the Clarity Act getting signed, rising global liquidity, debt rollovers forcing money printing, a strong business cycle, AI agents, and a cheap entry point. He puts it at roughly 70/30 to the upside.

    Detailed Summary

    Two economies and the money illusion

    The conversation opens loosely with travel, stablecoin spending, and a riff on why people agonize over a 75 dollar airport breakfast but happily lose money on an NFT that drops 80 percent. Pal’s explanation is that we live in two economies at once. The crypto and tech economy can grow 50 to 150 percent in a good year, while the real economy grows around 2 percent. Money earned in the fast economy does not feel real, which is why people spend and speculate so freely with it. This sets up the rest of the episode, where Pal treats the fast economy as the place serious capital is being forced to go.

    The AI capital race nobody can stop

    Asked why the stock market only seems to go up, Pal gives two reasons: liquidity expansion and the most extraordinary capital event in human history, the funneling of all capital into intelligence. He frames it as a race of nations, corporations, and individuals that cannot be slowed because of game theory. No superpower can let another reach AGI alone, only the US and China can afford the race, and neither can stop without ceding the advantage. He even games out an OpenAI bankruptcy and concludes the US would instantly auction the assets across many buyers rather than let one firm double its compute and win, which is why he calls the whole thing too big to fail. The practical conclusion is blunt: buy the dip, because the structure forces capital to keep flowing.

    The economic singularity, Reed’s law, and electricity through sand

    Pal defines the economic singularity as the moment when institutions and our economic measurements can no longer cope with the speed of technology, especially once AI and robots count as population. He explains that almost all past technology adoption followed Metcalfe’s law, a log channel visible in the charts of Google, Facebook, and the NASDAQ, but AI is the first observed example of Reed’s law, the exponential of the exponential. To make it concrete he cites ARK research showing AI will, by roughly 2028, have produced more words per year than all of humanity, and notes Anthropic expected 10x growth and got 80x in a quarter. He marvels that we are putting electricity through silicon, the second most common element on Earth, and producing intelligence six orders of magnitude faster than a human neuron.

    Why crypto lagged and why the worst is over

    Pal explains the crypto underperformance mechanically. There is only so much liquidity, the government shutdown withdrew it, and that hits crypto with roughly a three-month lag, landing right in the middle of the October drawdown. At the same time, the AI buildout and Chinese gold buying pulled capital toward the longest-duration assets, leaving SaaS and crypto with nearly identical charts as they got left behind. His read for 2026 is that liquidity is now reaccelerating across the US, China, and the world, so there is nothing to worry about yet. The Bitcoin move from 126K toward 60K is, in his framing, a normal correction, comparable in length to the roughly six-month 2021 pullback that resolved into new highs.

    Layer ones as universal basic equity

    The heart of the investment thesis is that smart contract layer ones will accrue a growing share of crypto value as the investable infrastructure layer. Pal argues the entire financial system plus a coming swarm of AI agents will use these rails, giving crypto an infinite total addressable market. Like operating systems and cloud, value will concentrate into three to five chains plus specialists. He measures them by intelligence density rather than discounted cash flow, since the point of the network is to be cheapest and fastest. By his analysis only Ethereum, Solana, and Sui held economic density through an 80 percent drawdown. ETH wins on developers, security, and Lindy effects (the Microsoft you do not get fired for owning), Solana is faster and cheaper, and Sui is earlier but offers a different order of magnitude on speed, finality, and programmability. He frames owning a basket of four or five as humanity’s pension plan.

    Zcash, privacy, and the quantum hedge

    Pal reveals he added Zcash during the correction, alongside buying more Sui. He had said in December he would wait for it to pull back, and he did, though he admits he did not buy enough as it ran up 50 percent. His left-curve case is that privacy has real value and people will understand it more, making it essentially Bitcoin with privacy that could plausibly reach 5 to 10 percent of Bitcoin’s value. His right-curve case is that it is also quantum-proof and a hedge against governments wielding AI-enabled control over people. He dismisses the mid-curve worry that it will be banned, noting that the ban fear has shadowed crypto his entire career and never materialized.

    Agents, DeFi, and financial rails

    Pal argues the biggest future users of DeFi and crypto payments will be AI agents, whose scale is effectively infinite. Setting up agents himself, he keeps hitting walls that require small payments, and sees agents making endless micro-payments plus larger transactions, holding treasuries across multiple stablecoins and currencies, and rebalancing through DeFi instantly without any human involved. DeFi, he says, is actually better suited to machines than people, and may not even need front ends. On the wave of mega-hacks he is unbothered, arguing they force better products, that banks quietly absorb theft too, and that the financial system always migrates to the most efficient rails because that is how you make more money. He first predicted blockchain would become the financial industry’s infrastructure rail back in 2014.

    The NFT fund and grail digital art

    Pal is launching an NFT fund because so many people told him they want exposure but do not know how. The fund targets grail assets, the scarce one-of-one pieces with proven social consensus that trade from around 600K into the tens of millions, plus a convex middle tier of artists who have long-term proven value and could be wildly re-rated. He names Dies with the most likes, an Indiana artist cataloging the decline of middle America whom he likens to Hunter S. Thompson, and German artist Kim Asendorf, whose 3D works are built from individually tokenized pixels. The math of convexity is the draw: an artist re-rating from 20 to 200 ETH while ETH itself multiplies could compound into a 100x. The fund will also lend against NFTs for yields above 15 percent, acquiring assets cheaply on default and recycling yield into emerging artists, and will build a club connecting investors to artists. His real estate framing reassures smaller holders: owning a lesser piece in a top collection is like a modest flat in a billionaire neighborhood.

    Never sell, and the math of patience

    The behavioral spine of the episode is Pal’s argument that buying, holding, and accumulating beats trading cycles. He has built a Real Vision indicator that signals a buy when an asset is one to two standard deviations oversold on its log regression channel, and says it compounds at a stupid rate. The problem with selling is deciding how much and then having the discipline to buy it back at the bottom, which almost no one does. In 35 years he says he has never met anyone who reliably buys bottoms and sells tops, and notes the trading legends made most of their money on management fees. The people who made the most in crypto are the ones who did nothing. He reframes holding as patience, an active stance, and ties it back to the universal code: buying Bitcoin and doing nothing is the most energy-efficient trade you can make, while overtrading burns mental and emotional energy for a worse outcome. His advice to those tempted by AI’s vertical charts is to go play with AI and just hold your Bitcoin.

    The 2026 to 2027 outlook

    Pal closes the macro case by stacking the bull factors: a massive stablecoin expansion over the next 24 months, the Clarity Act getting signed and freeing builders, rising global liquidity, trillions in interest payments that force more money printing, a strong business cycle recycling earnings into speculative assets, the arrival of AI agents, and a cheap entry point with fear and greed at historic lows. He even floats a permanent resolution of Middle East conflict as part of the upside. The bear case is the mirror image: war reignites, inflation runs hotter, tightening starves capital, and the intelligence buildout slows. He puts the odds at roughly 70 percent bullish, 30 percent bearish, and says he does not see the bear case yet. The episode ends on a personal note about kindness, with Pal unable to name a single kindest act because, he says, everything is made of kindness.

    Notable Quotes

    “We’re going through the most extraordinary time in human history. Nothing else matters. This whole funneling of all capital into intelligence is the biggest race that’s ever happened.”

    Raoul Pal, on why capital keeps flooding into AI

    “The game is so big that nobody will stop.”

    Raoul Pal, on the game theory of the US and China AI race

    “This is how amazing it is. We’re putting electricity through sand and creating intelligence.”

    Raoul Pal, on silicon and the universal code

    “It’s a nasty correction in a bull market. I’ve been in crypto since 2013. I’ve seen many corrections, non-bear markets of 50% in Bitcoin.”

    Raoul Pal, on Bitcoin falling from 126K toward 60K

    “The market owes you nothing. You would just have to be better at doing a job.”

    Raoul Pal, on the entitlement that ruins crypto investors

    “This is humanity’s pension plan. We get to invest in the infrastructure rails of which all the agentic economy will run.”

    Raoul Pal, on owning layer one blockchains

    “The people who’ve made the most money out of crypto are the people who don’t trade it.”

    Raoul Pal, on why holding beats trading

    “Your job is to be a mercenary for your own capital. You want to make the most money over time.”

    Raoul Pal, on why no one has to stay loyal to crypto

    “Bitcoin and crypto is as cheap as it has been in its long-term uptrend versus NASDAQ.”

    Raoul Pal, on the relative value signal he watches

    This is a compressed look at a wide-ranging conversation. Watch the full episode on When Shift Happens here for Pal’s complete reasoning, the charts he references, and the back-and-forth that the summary above leaves out.

    Related Reading

    • Real Vision the financial media platform Raoul Pal co-founded, where his Global Macro Investor research and exponential age thesis live.
    • Metcalfe’s law (Wikipedia) the network-value relationship Pal uses to model the log regression channel for crypto.
    • Reed’s law (Wikipedia) background on the exponential-of-the-exponential growth Pal says AI is the first real-world example of.
    • Technological singularity (Wikipedia) context for the economic singularity Pal argues is now only about four years away.
    • Zcash the privacy coin Pal added in the correction as a Bitcoin-with-privacy and quantum-proof trade.

  • Waste Tokens to Save Time: Naval, Guillermo Rauch, Blake Scholl, and Max Hodak on AI Software Factories, 1000x Engineers, and Whether Pure Software Is Dead

    Naval Ravikant gathers three frontier founders, Guillermo Rauch of Vercel, Blake Scholl of Boom Supersonic, and Max Hodak of Science, for a freewheeling conversation about how AI coding tools are reshaping what an engineer is, what software is worth, and where the moat goes when models speak English. The headline idea comes from Naval himself: waste tokens, save time. Stop measuring AI by tokens consumed or lines of code generated and start measuring it by the final output and the time you got back. The full conversation is on the Naval Podcast YouTube channel. This is part one of the discussion. Part two, on vibe coding hardware, follows the same group into jet engines, semiconductors, and biotech. You can also watch and read the full episode here.

    TLDW

    The job of an engineer is shifting from shipping output to building the factory that ships the output, which means 10x engineers were never really 10x, they were always 100x or 1000x in idea domains, and AI leverage is making that obvious. Models now reflect back the judgment of the user, so a senior architect extracts dramatically more value than a junior, although the junior also writes code they could never have written alone. The frontier models have quietly graduated from junior coders to principal engineers, returning with intuitive plans and real tradeoffs (sometimes with hilariously bad time estimates) rather than just running away with the prompt. Naval has stopped learning prompt tricks, scaffolding tools, and Claude plan-mode rituals entirely. Instead he throws Codex, Claude, and Gemini at the same problem in parallel and brute forces his way through, because tokens are still cheaper than a human and the models keep getting better faster than tricks can. That leads to the bigger question on the table: is pure software still investable, or is it now just a free byproduct of hardware, models, and taste? The group lands on the block economy thesis (a tip of the hat to Mitchell Hashimoto): agents do not want to reinvent Postgres or BMQ on the fly, they want to grab the right reusable building block, so infrastructure software actually gets more valuable, not less. Max Hodak closes the loop with a personal data point: he has not written a line of code in years and has built more software since December than ever before, all through agents, because just understanding APIs, data flow, and performance is what actually moves the work forward.

    Thoughts

    The “waste tokens, save time” line is the most important rhetorical move in this conversation, and it deserves to be unpacked beyond the soundbite. Naval is implicitly arguing that the entire token-economics debate (input cost, output cost, leaderboards, model arbitrage) is a category error in the same way that lines-of-code was a category error in the nineties. The thing being purchased is not tokens. It is a finished result delivered with less of your finite attention spent. If three parallel runs of Codex, Claude, and Gemini cost you a few dollars and one of them lands the answer in twenty minutes instead of you sweating the problem for two hours, the unit economics are not even close. The only people who care about the token bill are people who have not internalized that human time is the actually scarce resource. Once you do internalize it, the question is no longer “how do I prompt this more efficiently,” it is “how do I get out of my own way.”

    The 100x and 1000x engineer point is the one most likely to enrage commenters, and it is also the one most worth taking seriously. Naval is right that the egalitarian flinch in software circles always sat awkwardly next to the empirical fact that one Carmack, one Brendan Eich, or one Satoshi creates more durable value than every mid-tier engineer on earth combined. What AI does is collapse the bottom of that distribution. The marginal junior engineer at a typical company is now competing with a model that costs a few dollars an hour and never sleeps. The remaining premium for human engineers is taste, judgment, and the rare ability to pick the right thing to build at all, which Naval correctly flags as the multiplier that dwarfs raw coding speed. “Just one who had a better judgment on what to work on in the first place” is the most underrated line in the whole episode.

    Guillermo Rauch’s observation that the models have graduated from running away with your prompt to returning with three routes and a tradeoff matrix is the technical update most people have not actually felt yet. There was a real, qualitative shift when the model started saying “we don’t put high-cardinality telemetry into Postgres, you probably want ClickHouse or Athena.” That is not autocomplete. That is a peer. And the funny corollary, that the same model will then confidently tell you the work will take three weeks when it will take three hours, is not a knock on the model. It is a reminder that calibration is a separate skill from competence, and humans get this wrong constantly too. The right posture is to treat the model the way a good engineering manager treats a strong but cocky senior: take the architecture suggestions seriously, throw out the estimates.

    The block-economy thread, riffing on Mitchell Hashimoto, is where this conversation quietly answers Naval’s “is pure software dead” question. Agents are insatiable consumers of reusable building blocks because reinventing infrastructure on every run is wasteful, brittle, and incompatible with the rest of the world. If your service is the canonical primitive an agent reaches for (the queue, the database, the auth layer, the deploy target), you are not commoditized by AI, you are amplified by it. Pure software is not dead. Pure software with no distribution, no defensibility, and no integration into the agent toolchain is dead. That is a much less catchy headline, but it is the real one. The takeaway for founders is not to abandon software, it is to ask whether your software is something an agent will reach for ten thousand times a day or something a human had to be talked into using once.

    Max Hodak’s confession (no code written in years, more shipped software in the last six months than ever before) is the empirical proof that this is not just theory. The skill that ports forward is not syntax. It is the engineering leader’s instinct for what an API is, how data flows, where performance matters, and what level of expectation to set. Guillermo’s framing of “vibe coding through people on Slack” as the original form of vibe coding is genuinely insightful. A good engineering manager has always been transmitting intent to other minds and letting them run. Doing it with agents is the same skill, just with a faster, cheaper, more literal counterparty. The engineers who will struggle in this transition are the ones whose identity was tied to writing the code themselves. The ones who will thrive are the ones who already thought of themselves as taste, judgment, and intent, with code as an implementation detail.

    Key Takeaways

    • The engineer’s job has shifted from shipping output B to building the factory that produces outputs B through Z. You are now judged on the multiplicative system you create, not the single artifact you deliver.
    • 10x engineers were always a misnomer. In idea-domains and digital domains, the real distribution has always been 100x or 1000x. AI just made that obvious enough that arguing about it is no longer fashionable.
    • Token consumption leaderboards are the new lines-of-code metric: a vanity number that measures activity, not value. Tokens are an input, your time is the constraint.
    • Naval’s core rule: waste tokens, save time. Tokens are still vastly cheaper than human hours, no matter how the pricing scares you.
    • Models tend to be about as good as you are in a given domain. The feedback you give them, the corrections, the redirections, sporadically but powerfully shapes the quality of the output.
    • The quality of your reprompting matters enormously today, but will probably matter less over time as models get smarter and need less hand-holding.
    • Naval has refused to learn prompt scaffolding, plan-mode tricks, or named prompt frameworks. His bet is that the models will figure out how to use him faster than he can figure out how to use them.
    • His preferred technique: throw Codex, Claude, and Gemini at the same problem in parallel and brute force the answer. Time is the cost center, not API spend.
    • Lower quality first-draft code is not a blocker. When it is time to ship, throw more tokens at it for a hardening pass. Quality compounds across model generations.
    • Verifiable domains (problems with a clear right answer) are the ones the models will fully solve. Cutting-edge creativity work, the Terence Tao tier, still needs careful human collaboration.
    • Models have qualitatively shifted from “next-token autocomplete that runs away with your prompt” to “intuitive planning mode” where they return with multiple routes and explicit tradeoffs.
    • This is why people on social media say models are now PhD-level. It is not the raw output, it is the back-and-forth posture.
    • Models will confidently make terrible time estimates (“this is a three week project”). Treat them like a strong but miscalibrated senior engineer: trust the architecture, ignore the schedule.
    • Architect-level engineers are extracting much more value per session than junior engineers, but juniors are still leveling up because they can now write code far above their unaided ability.
    • The next career step for a junior engineer is moving from implementing features to picking technologies. Postgres vs ClickHouse, ZMQ vs other queues. The model can suggest, but a human still has to decide.
    • Taste and judgment remain the residual human advantage. Models will give you good tradeoffs if you ask, but knowing which tradeoff to take is still on you.
    • Concrete example: a recent model pushed back when asked to store high-cardinality telemetry in Postgres and recommended ClickHouse or Athena instead. Unprompted architectural judgment.
    • Humans are still completing the model for tasks like fetching API keys, moving capital, or performing real-world actions. That gap is temporary.
    • Every SaaS and hosting company will soon expose a CLI or API surface that agents can drive directly. Anything Unix-shaped and text-based, agents can already hack into a usable API themselves.
    • The missing piece for full autonomy is payments. Crypto, Bitcoin, or any programmable money lets the agent buy what it needs without a human in the loop.
    • The open question Naval poses: is pure software dead? We used to learn code to talk to machines. Now machines speak fuzzy, sloppy English back to us.
    • For hardware founders, AI is a massive boon. Software, which was always hard to hire artists for (per Patrick Collison’s “software is art” framing), is suddenly fast and cheap to produce alongside the hardware.
    • Model training, post-training, and fine-tuning may be the new “real software engineering” for those who want to work at the model layer.
    • Mitchell Hashimoto’s “block economy” thesis: agents need powerful, reusable, well-known building blocks. They should not reinvent message queues or databases every run.
    • Reinventing primitives is bad civic engineering. The value of “we both depend on Postgres 13.2” is interoperability with the rest of society and toolchain.
    • Infrastructure software and reusable libraries are getting more valuable, not less, in the agentic era. Vercel’s bet is on being the layer agents reach for.
    • Useful metaphor: building blocks are like a token cache. Why churn through a trillion tokens to reproduce code that already exists when you can fork from a known starting point?
    • Max Hodak has not written a line of code in years but has shipped a huge volume of personal software since December, all through agents. Projects he had fantasized about for years are now actually running.
    • What still matters from a real software background: understanding what an API is, how data flows, performance expectations, and how to set the right level of demand on an operation.
    • A proficient engineering leader has always been “vibe coding through people” on Slack and in one-on-ones, transmitting intent and letting others execute. Doing it with agents is the same skill, faster and cheaper.
    • Naval personally went from twenty years of not coding to coding constantly through agents, leaning on first-principles software engineering and algorithms knowledge.
    • The friction that historically killed personal coding projects (latest framework, infra plumbing, deploy setup) is now mostly handled by the agent. Vercel makes it easier, agents make it trivial.
    • The single biggest change Max highlights: you do not get stuck anymore. The indefinite debugging spiral on some narrow obscure bug is largely gone.
    • The old mantra that learning to program means accepting intrinsic frustration (“nope, that’s part of the deal”) is no longer true. The frustration was incidental, not essential.
    • The frontier founder pattern on display in this episode: all three guests build their own factories (Vercel’s AI cloud, Boom’s supersonic jets and engines, Science’s biohybrid brain interface) rather than composing from off-the-shelf parts.

    Detailed Summary

    The Software Factory and the Hundredfold Engineer

    Guillermo Rauch opens the substantive portion of the conversation with the framing he has been pushing publicly: the role of the engineer is moving from “ship output B” to “build the factory that ships outputs B through Z.” That reframes engineering judgment. You are no longer evaluated on the single deliverable, you are evaluated on the multiplicative system you put in place. Naval picks up the thread and points out that this also retires an old debate. Engineers used to argue about whether 10x engineers existed, with the egalitarian camp insisting that talent differences were marginal. The truth, Naval says, was always more extreme. In idea-domains, virtual domains, and intellectual domains, the distribution has always been 100x or 1000x, not 10x. Brendan Eich, Carmack, Satoshi, the canonical names, were thousandx programmers. AI has made the underlying distribution legible. And the multiplier on top of all of that is judgment: picking the right thing to work on in the first place is an infinity multiplier compared to picking the wrong thing, regardless of raw skill.

    Token Leaderboards Are the New Lines of Code

    Guillermo flags the current cultural confusion: people see their AI bills, see the token counts, and assume they should be optimizing for tokens-per-engineer or similar metrics. Max Hodak’s response cuts through it. Token consumption, like lines of code before it, is not a meaningful productivity metric. It is an activity metric, and activity metrics always mislead. Max adds his own field observation: the models tend to be roughly as good as you are in a given domain. A senior developer extracts genuinely powerful output, a junior gets junior-quality output back, because the feedback loop (the corrections, the redirections, the architectural pushback) is what shapes quality. The sporadic but high-leverage moments where the user redirects the model are doing more work than the prompt itself.

    Naval’s Brute Force Doctrine: Waste Tokens, Save Time

    Naval lays out his personal posture, which has become the title of the conversation. He has deliberately ignored all the prompting tricks, scaffolding tools, named prompt frameworks (“use Ralph Wigum, use OpenClaude, use Hermes, use plan mode”), on the bet that the models will figure out how to use him faster than he can figure out how to use them. He is ham-fisted with the models, gets frustrated, types less and less, and just brute forces his way through by running Codex, Claude, and Gemini at the same problem simultaneously. The justification is economic. No matter how expensive the models seem, they are still vastly cheaper than a human hour. Do not measure tokens as inputs or outputs. Measure your time and the final output. Even when the first-draft code is low quality, that is not a blocker. When the moment comes to ship, throw more tokens at it. The models will rewrite it, harden it, and they get better every generation. Naval explicitly excepts cutting-edge creative work (the Terence Tao tier of unsolved problems) where you still need to collaborate carefully and closely. Everywhere else, brute force is the dominant strategy.

    From Junior Coder to Principal Engineer

    Guillermo identifies a qualitative shift that has happened recently. Models used to do the classic next-token thing: take your prompt and run away with it in a direction you may not have wanted. Now they enter an intuitive planning posture without being told to plan. They come back and say “what you are asking has these three routes, here are the tradeoffs.” That, Guillermo argues, is the moment the model stopped being a junior engineer and became a principal engineer. The funny side effect is that they will then return preposterous time estimates (“this will take three weeks”) with full confidence. The conclusion is to treat the model as a peer for architecture and a baby for scheduling. Returning to the Max-vs-junior question, Guillermo argues juniors clearly do level up because they write code well above their solo ability, but architects extract maybe 10x while juniors extract more like 2x. The juice scales with the user’s existing taste.

    Taste, Judgment, and Architectural Decisions

    Max names the residual human contribution: taste and judgment. Picking between Postgres and ClickHouse for high-cardinality telemetry data, picking between ZMQ and another queueing system. The models can recommend, but a human still has to call it. Guillermo offers a recent concrete example where a model pushed back unprompted: when asked to put high-cardinality telemetry into Postgres, the model responded “we don’t put that kind of data into Postgres, you should consider ClickHouse or Athena.” That is the new normal. The peer-level architectural pushback is happening unsolicited, which is genuinely impressive and a real shift from the deferential autocomplete of two years ago.

    When the Human Becomes the Tool

    Guillermo raises the inversion question: at what point does the model stop being the assistant and the human start being the assistant who fetches API keys, moves capital, and performs real-world actions on the model’s behalf? Naval treats it as a temporary aberration. Every serious SaaS and hosting provider will soon expose a CLI or API surface that agents can drive directly. Even when they do not, anything Unix-shaped and text-based can be hacked into an agent-usable interface by the agent itself. The missing piece is payments. Once you insert programmable money (Naval mentions Bitcoin and crypto tokens), the agent can buy what it needs and the human is no longer the bottleneck.

    Is Pure Software Dead?

    Naval poses the biggest strategic question of the episode. If models now speak fuzzy, sloppy English the same way humans do, and the historical reason we learned to code was to talk to machines that did not understand English, is pure software still a viable thing to build a company around? His own framing of the answer: hardware founders win, because the historically hard problem of hiring software artists (per Patrick Collison’s “software is art” line) is now mostly solved by AI. Model builders win, because training, post-training, and fine-tuning may be the new “real software engineering.” But what about classic pure software companies? Naval lets the question hang, and Guillermo picks up the answer through a different door.

    The Block Economy and the Future of Infrastructure Software

    Guillermo cites Mitchell Hashimoto’s recent piece on the block economy (or “building block economy”). The argument: the most valuable thing for agents to have access to is powerful, reusable building blocks. You do not want your agent reinventing a queue system every time it needs to send an email. You want it to grab the right-sized block (BMQ, ClickHouse, whatever) and move on. Reinventing primitives is also a civic problem. The world only works because we all depend on the same Postgres 13.2, the same protocols, the same standard infrastructure. If every agent went off and invented its own bespoke universe, you would lose interoperability. So infrastructure software (which is, by self-admitted bias, what Vercel builds) becomes more valuable in the agentic era, not less. Guillermo extends the metaphor: reusable building blocks are like a token cache. Why burn a trillion tokens reproducing what already exists when the agent can fork from a known starting point? The block economy is the answer to “is pure software dead.” Pure software that becomes the canonical primitive an agent reaches for is more valuable than ever.

    Max Hodak’s Personal Proof: Years Without Code, Tons of Software Shipped

    Max grounds the discussion in his own experience. He learned to program young, got sucked into it in his teens and 20s, knew programming languages deeply. He has not written a line of code in quite a while. And yet since December he has built a huge amount of personal software, including projects he had fantasized about for years and now actually uses every day. He did not write any of it. He cannot imagine going back to writing code by hand. The skill that ports forward is not syntax, it is the understanding of how APIs work, how data flows, what level of performance to expect, and how to orient the model around the right expectations for an operation. Guillermo extends this with the most quotable framing of the episode: a proficient engineering leader has always been “vibe coding through people on Slack and in one-on-ones,” transmitting intent and letting others execute. Agents are the same modality with a faster, cheaper, more literal counterparty.

    Naval’s Return to Coding After Twenty Years

    Naval offers his own parallel. He went from not having written code in twenty years to coding constantly through agents. What carried him back in was first-principles knowledge of software engineering and algorithms, which gets you further than you would think. The reason he had stopped coding in the first place was not lack of ability, it was the friction of keeping up with the latest language, the latest architecture, and the constant infrastructure plumbing required to ship anything. Vercel made it easier. Agents made it trivial. Max closes with the most concrete benefit of all: you do not get stuck anymore. The indefinite debugging spiral on some obscure narrow problem, the thing that historically ate weekends and broke spirits, is largely gone. The old mantra that programming is intrinsically frustrating and that frustration is “part of the deal” turned out to be wrong. The frustration was incidental, not essential.

    Notable Quotes

    “The way that I’m judging you as an engineer is, are you producing the factory that will produce multiplicative outputs B through Z?”

    Guillermo Rauch, reframing what an engineer is actually being measured on in the AI era.

    “When you’re operating in idea domains, intellectual domains, virtual digital domains, it’s not even 10x, it’s 100x or 1000x. It always has been.”

    Naval Ravikant, on why the old 10x engineer debate was always under-stating the real distribution.

    “If you choose the right thing to work on versus the wrong thing to work on, that’s an infinity difference. It could just be one who had a better judgment on what to work on in the first place.”

    Naval Ravikant, on judgment as the multiplier that dwarfs raw skill.

    “I’ll throw Codex, Claude, and Gemini at the same problem over and over and just waste tokens to save time. No matter how expensive these models might seem, they’re still way cheaper than a human.”

    Naval Ravikant, on his brute-force multi-model coding workflow.

    “Just waste tokens, save time. Don’t look at the tokens either as inputs or outputs. Just look at your time and look at the final output.”

    Naval Ravikant, delivering the title thesis of the episode.

    “Clearly the models at some point graduated. They used to be junior engineers, now they’re principal engineers, because they come back to you with a set of tradeoffs.”

    Guillermo Rauch, on the qualitative shift in how current frontier models respond to prompts.

    “Bro, we don’t put that kind of data into Postgres, you should consider ClickHouse or Athena or whatever. That’s happened to me a lot, which is really impressive.”

    Guillermo Rauch, recounting unprompted architectural pushback from a recent model.

    “It’s like saying speaking English. We had to learn code to communicate with the models, now the models speak English. So where’s the moat?”

    Naval Ravikant, raising the central strategic question about the future of pure software.

    “I haven’t written a single line of code in quite a while. Since December, I’ve built a huge amount of software that I now use every day, projects I’ve fantasized about for years.”

    Max Hodak, on what becomes possible when you stop writing code and start directing agents.

    “A proficient engineering leader has been quote unquote vibe coding through people on Slack or one-on-ones, because you’re transmitting your will, your intent, your experience, and you’re letting others run with it. Now we do the same with agents.”

    Guillermo Rauch, reframing leadership itself as the original form of vibe coding.

    Watch the full conversation on the Naval Podcast here.

    Related Reading

    • Full episode: The AI Industrial Revolution, the complete hour-long conversation this clip is drawn from, covering software factories, hardware, regulation, healthcare economics, autonomous companies, and creativity.
    • Part two: Vibe Coding Hardware, the continuation of this conversation, where the same founders move from pure software into AI-designed jet engines, vertical integration, China’s open-source bet, and why humans become verifiers.
    • Naval Ravikant’s official site, the canonical home for Naval’s essays, podcast, and longer-form thinking on technology, judgment, and leverage.
    • Vercel, Guillermo Rauch’s company, building the AI-native cloud and frontend infrastructure that this conversation references as a canonical agent building block.
    • Boom Supersonic, Blake Scholl’s company building supersonic civilian aircraft and their own jet engines, the hardware example of a founder building the whole factory.
    • Science Corporation, Max Hodak’s brain-computer interface company developing the biohybrid neural implant referenced in the intro.
    • Mitchell Hashimoto’s writing, source of the “block economy” framing for why reusable infrastructure building blocks become more valuable, not less, in the agentic era.